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FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

ARABIA

(Persian Gulf, Saudi Arabia and the Yemen)

PART 9

January to December 1955

SECRET

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Chapter I.—PERSIAN GULF

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
General Correspondence			
1 Mr. Hooper No. 15	1955 Jan. 15	Incident on the Iraqi-Kuwait frontier near Um Qasr on the night of May 20, 1955 ... Exchange of notes, concerning an enquiry, between the United Kingdom and Iraq.	1
2 Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews No. 25	Feb. 22	Proposed Lebanese Consulate in Bahrain ... Refusal by the United Kingdom to accede to the Lebanese request that permission be given for the opening of a consulate in Bahrain.	2
3 Foreign Office	Feb. 28	Record of a conversation between the Secretary of State and the Ruler of Bahrain, February 21, 1955 ...	3
4 Mr. Burrows No. 26	Feb. 28	Trucial States and Muscat and Oman annual reports ...	4
5 Mr. Burrows No. 50	April 15	Persian Gulf: Annual review for 1954 ...	24
6 Mr. Burrows No. 69	May 31	Exile of trouble-makers from Dubai ... Banishment of Shaikh Juma bin Maktum and his three sons.	32
7 Mr. Bell No. 41	Oct. 11	Kuwait Oil Agreement ... Agreement in connection with the D'Arcy Kuwait Company and the Gulf Kuwait Company.	35
8 Mr. Bell No. 47	Nov. 28	The economic future of Kuwait ...	36
9 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 129	Nov. 28	Internal situation in Bahrain ... Report by Her Majesty's Political Agent at Bahrain.	41
10 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 143	Dec. 24	Egyptian influence in the Persian Gulf ... Egyptian influence growing through the export of teachers and technicians; politics and propaganda two other main spheres of influence.	45

Appendix—Biographical Notes

11 Sir Bernard Burrows No. 84	1955 June 24	Annual report on the leading personalities ...	[1
----------------------------------	-----------------	--	-----

Chapter II.—SAUDI ARABIA

General Correspondence

12 Mr. Pelham No. 5	1955 Jan. 6	Review of events for 1954 ...	51
13 Mr. Pelham No. 12 E.	Jan. 18	Saudi Arabia's budget ...	57
14 Mr. Pelham No. 14	Feb. 5	Report on the pilgrimage to the holy places in the Hejaz in 1954	60

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
15 Mr. Pelham No. 18	1955 Feb. 21	Report by Mr. Pelham on the conclusion of his tour of duty at Jeddah ...	62
16 Mr. Pelham No. 19	Feb. 22	Saudi policy towards the United Kingdom ...	67
17 Mr. Burrows No. 44	April 16	Her Majesty's Political Resident's discussions with the Saudi Arabian Government, April 9-12 ...	69
18 Mr. Phillips No. 44	May 11	Criticism of Saudi policy and administration ... Much of the real power wielded by the coterie of advisers surrounding King Saud; much of the advice reactionary and anti-Western.	78
19 Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs	May 30 Oct. 18 Oct. 27 Nov. 9 Aug. 4 Oct. 26 No. 21	Saudi frontiers ... Exchanges of Notes between Her Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah and the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs.	80
20 Mr. Wright No. 91	Aug. 23	King Saud's visit to Persia ... No great public enthusiasm shown for the visit; keen interest in the visit shown by the Russians; King Saud informed of the foolishness of his policy in sabotaging the Turco-Iraqi Pact.	87
21 Sir Robert Scott No. 480 Savingram	Aug. 24	Saudi-Russian relations ... Soviet suggestion that diplomatic relations should be established through the Saudi Embassy at Tehran.	89
22 Mr. Wardrop No. 517 Tel.	Sept. 16	Sir Reader Bullard's statement of resignation before the Tribunal at Geneva ...	90
23 Foreign Office	Oct. 4	Statement by Her Majesty's Government on the Buraimi dispute ...	91
24 To Sir Michael Wright (Baghdad) No. 144 Tel.	Oct. 26	Re-establishment of the position in the Buraimi Oasis ... Prime Minister's statement in Parliament of the United Kingdom position.	93
25 Sir Bernard Burrows	Oct. 31	Occupation of Buraimi ... Further report on recent events and on the present situation.	95
26 Mr. Phillips No. 85	Oct. 30	Situation in Saudi Arabia ... Anglo-Saudi relations in the melting pot following the resumption of control of the Buraimi areas by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat.	98
27 Paris	Dec. 15	Record of a conversation in Paris on December 15, 1955: Middle East; General ... United States views on Anglo-United States policy in the Middle East; United States anxiety about Saudi Arabia.	100
28 Sir Roger Makins No. 540	Dec. 22	Discussions with Mr. Hoover Jr. on Middle East policy ... Discussion concerning proposed United Kingdom measures to strengthen the Western position in the Middle East with particular reference to the vital need to ensure the flow of oil to Europe and to the related question of Saudi Arabian bribery; United States hope that a joint Anglo-American policy would be framed to avert the danger of the Saudis going over to the Russians.	101

TABLE OF CONTENTS

No. and Name	Date	SUBJECT	Page
Appendix—Biographical Notes			
29 Mr. Beeley ... No. 55	1955 July 1	Annual report on the heads of foreign missions ...	103
30 Mr. Phillips ... No. 71	Sept. 14	Annual report on the leading personalities ...	[1

Chapter III.—THE YEMEN

General Correspondence

31 Mr. McGregor ... No. 8	1955 Feb. 8	Annual review for 1954 ...	107
32 Sir Thomas Hickinbotham (Aden) (1) No. 158 Tel. Mr. McGregor ... (Taiz) (2) No. 43 (3) No. 44 Tel. Mr. Phillips ... (Jedda) (4) No. 4 Tel. Mr. McGregor ... (Taiz) (5) No. 47 Tel. (6) No. 49 Tel.	April 5 April 3 April 6 April 6 April 7 April 9	Situation in the Yemen ...	112
33 Mr. McGregor ... No. 22	April 25	Abortive <i>coup d'état</i> in the Yemen ... Failure of the <i>coup d'état</i> due in the main to the army's failure to remove the Imam.	116
34 Mr. McGregor ... No. 34	Aug. 6	Final despatch of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Taiz on leaving the Yemen ...	120
35 Mr. McGregor ... No. 35	July 31	Farewell interview of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Taiz with His Majesty the Imam of the Yemen ... The Imam wishes us to know that the cause of the present trouble in the Aden Protectorate was due to the announcement of the new federation scheme.	124
36 To Mr. Monteith ... (Taiz) No. 92 Tel.	Sept. 20	Anglo-Yemeni relations ...	127
37 Mr. Monteith ... No. 47	Nov. 16	Anglo-Yemeni relations ... Relations at present not too happy and the Imam not prepared to receive a United Kingdom Minister.	128

Appendix—Biographical Notes

38 Taiz Chancery ...	July 14	Annual report on the leading personalities ...	130
----------------------	---------	--	-----

SUBJECT INDEX

[The figures denote the serial numbers of the documents]

Chapter I.—Persian Gulf	ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEADING PERSONALITIES—30.
ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEADING PERSONALITIES—11.	ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1954—12.
ANNUAL REVIEWS FOR 1954—	BULLARD, SIR READER—
Trucial States, Muscat and Oman—4.	Resignation from Arbitration Tribunal—22.
Persian Gulf (General)—5.	BURAIMI OASIS DISPUTE—16, 17, 19, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26
BAHRAIN—	ECONOMIC AFFAIRS—
Internal situation—9.	Budget, 1954-55—13.
Lebanese request to open a Consulate—2.	INTERNAL AFFAIRS—
BURAIMI OASIS—	Criticism of policy and administration—18.
(See under Chapter II—SAUDI ARABIA).	MIDDLE EAST POLICY—
CONVERSATION BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE AND RULER OF BAHRAIN—3.	Discussions with Mr. Dulles in Paris on December 15, 1955—27.
KUWAIT—	Discussions with Mr. Hoover Jr. in Washington on December 20, 1955—28.
Economic future—8.	PELHAM, MR. G. C., VALEDICTORY DESPATCH—15.
Exchange of notes with Iraq about Um Qasr incident—1.	PILGRIMAGE TO MOSLEM HOLY PLACES—14.
Oil agreement—7.	SAUDI-PERSIAN RELATIONS—20.
PERSIAN GULF, EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE IN—10.	SAUDI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS—20, 21.
TRUCIAL STATES—	VISIT OF KING SAUD TO PERSIA—20.
Exile of trouble-makers from Dubai—6.	
UM QASR INCIDENT, EXCHANGE OF NOTES—1.	
	Chapter III.—The Yemen
	ANGLO-YEMENI RELATIONS—35, 36 and 37.
	ANNUAL REPORT ON THE LEADING PERSONALITIES—38.
	ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1954—31.
	POLITICAL SITUATION—32 (1)-(6) and 33.
	VALEDICTORY DESPATCH OF MR. R. MCGREGOR—34.

SECRET

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE RESPECTING
ARABIA (PERSIAN GULF, SAUDI ARABIA AND THE YEMEN)—PART 9

CHAPTER I.—PERSIAN GULF

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

EA 10393/1

No. 1

INCIDENT ON THE IRAQI-KUWAIT FRONTIER NEAR UM QASR
ON THE NIGHT OF MAY 20, 1954

Mr. Hooper to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 17)

(No. 15)

*Baghdad,
January 15, 1955.*

No. 1608/1608/7/36527

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Arab Affairs Department,
Baghdad,
January 2, 1955.*

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy, Baghdad, and, in continuation of the Ministry's Note No. 1608/1608/7/32020 of the 21st of November, 1954, has the honour to suggest that Saiyid Abdul Qadir al Barudi, the Qaimmaqam of Basra Qadha Headquarters, be the Chairman of the Joint Committee intended to be set up to investigate the aggression which took place near Um Qasr Customs Post.

In requesting the esteemed Embassy to furnish the Ministry with the names of the Koweiti members on the committee and the time and place of the meeting, the Ministry avails itself of the opportunity to express its highest consideration and esteem.

Note Verbale

*Baghdad,
January 11, 1955.*

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and, with reference to the Ministry's Note No. 1608/1608/7/36527 of the 2nd of January, has the honour to state that in conjunction with the competent authorities, the Embassy has considered the suggestion made in the Ministry's Note No. 1608/1608/7/26341 of the 7th of November, 1954, that a joint committee be set up to investigate the incident which took place on the Iraqi-Kuwait frontier near Um Qasr on the night of the 20th-21st of May, 1954.

Her Britannic Majesty's Government have from the outset given serious and sympathetic consideration to this matter but have come to the conclusion that the appointment of a joint commission merely to investigate the incident which took place as long ago as last May would serve no useful purpose at this late stage. The British Embassy have therefore been instructed to suggest that a joint commission might more profitably be appointed to undertake preliminary studies for the demarcation of the frontier between Iraq and Kuwait with a view to avoiding the occurrence of similar incidents. In this connection the Embassy would draw the Ministry's attention to the Embassy's Note Verbale No. 387 of the 18th of August, 1954, and the proposals contained in its Note Verbale No. 626 of the 28th of December, 1951.

SECRET

EA 1906/2

No. 2

PROPOSED LEBANESE CONSULATE IN BAHRAIN

Sir Edwin Chapman-Andrews to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received February 24)(No. 25. Confidential)
Sir,*Beirut,
February 22, 1955.*

With reference to your despatch No. 27 of the 9th of February (EA 1906/1) instructing me to inform the Lebanese Government that it had proved impossible to accede to their request to open a Consulate in Bahrain, I have the honour to enclose herewith a copy of a note on this subject which was delivered to the Lebanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

2. The note was delivered to the Political Director of the Ministry by a member of my staff. The Political Director commented that he had rather been expecting this reply and that he did not think his Government would be particularly upset by the refusal as long as we followed the same policy towards other Arab States who wanted to establish Consular representatives in the Gulf. He was referring in particular to a report he had seen that the Syrian Government had established such a Consulate. The Lebanese Government, he said, would take it very much amiss if there should be discrimination against them in this matter.

3. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Political Resident at Bahrain and to the Head of the British Middle East Office in Nicosia.

I have, &c.

E. A. CHAPMAN-ANDREWS.

Enclosure

Note No. 27.
19023/3/55*Beirut,
February 16, 1955.*

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy presents its compliments to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and with reference to the Ministry's Note No. 25080/5/1668 of the 23rd of November requesting permission to establish a Lebanese Consular Post in Bahrain, has the honour to inform the Ministry that this question has been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom and that appropriate consultation has been undertaken. Her Majesty's Government regret, however, that in all the circumstances, it has been impossible to accede to the request of the Lebanese Government.

Her Majesty's Embassy avails itself of this opportunity of renewing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the assurance of its highest consideration.

*Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Beirut.*

SECRET

EA 1016/4

No. 3

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE SECRETARY OF STATE
AND THE RULER OF BAHRAIN, FEBRUARY 21, 1955

(Confidential)

*Foreign Office,
February 28, 1955.*

The Secretary of State was received by the Ruler at the Palace of Shaikh Abdullah outside the airfield. After the usual exchange of compliments and politenesses had been completed the Secretary of State said that he and Her Majesty's Government had followed with sympathy the difficulties which had arisen in Bahrain in recent months. He felt it was desirable that the Bahrain Government should explain their policy to the people, both what they were doing and what they intended to do in the future. All Governments found it necessary to guide public opinion in this manner. Her Majesty's Government were doing it continuously. The Ruler replied that he was keeping the people informed by means of Government announcements, newspapers and magazines and that he would welcome any further suggestions for action which the Government should take. He asked whether the Secretary of State considered the actions of the Bahrain Government to be good or bad and he said that the Bahrain Government wished to receive the help of Her Majesty's Government both in external and internal matters. The Secretary of State replied that we appreciated the progress which had been made in Bahrain but that just because people now were better educated and had time to look round it was impossible to stand still. The difficulty was that the more progressive a country was the faster people wanted to change it still further. As regards the Ruler's request for help it would be necessary to consider problems as they arose and to discuss them between us. There might be differences of opinion about the timing of further measures but if we could agree we could naturally let it be known that we supported the view of the Bahrain Government.

SECRET

EA 1011/2

No. 4

TRUCIAL STATES AND MUSCAT AND OMAN ANNUAL REPORTS

Mr. Burrows to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received March 7)(No. 26. Confidential)
Sir,*Bahrain,
February 28, 1955.*

I have the honour to transmit to you herewith the Annual Reports for 1954 from the Political Agent, Trucial States and the Consul-General, Muscat. Mr. Pirie Gordon has amplified the Trucial States Report with a separate section on economic and commercial developments, but I am not sending this to you separately, as its salient points and main conclusions are being embodied in the next bi-monthly Economic Report by my First Secretary (Commercial).

2. There are two points in Major Chauncey's report on which I feel it necessary to comment. Firstly, Major Chauncey was on leave in the United Kingdom at the time of the Imam's capture of Ibri in October and his statement on page 4 of the report that this attack took place "at about the same time" as the oil company's geologists reached Jebal Fahud is perhaps misleading. The company's geologists and the Field Force only left Duqqam for the interior some days after the town had fallen to the Imam and some weeks after the latter had begun active operations against it. A detailed chronology of these events was set out in my despatch No. 107 to you of November 22. Secondly, I do not entirely share Major Chauncey's optimistic assessment at the bottom of page 5 of the present tribal situation in the inner Oman. The Saudi representatives in Buraimi are now in regular contact with representatives of these tribes and I think we must assume that, at the very least, they are prepared to spend large sums of money in support of tribal leaders who have not offered the Sultan their allegiance and in attempting to subvert those who have done so.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure No. 1

TRUCIAL STATES ANNUAL REPORT FOR 1954

General Introduction

The Buraimi dispute continued to be the major factor in the politics of the Trucial States as it had been in 1953. Turki bin Ataishan ensconced in Buraimi began to be regarded as a permanent figure in the local scene. He became a centre of attraction for those who were discontented with the actions of Her Majesty's Government, and of the local Rulers, a provider of income for the impecunious bedouin of the area, and a continuous source of profits to the merchants of Dubai. These were well paid if their goods successfully penetrated the blockade and were compensated if they did not.

2. The effectiveness and vigour of the blockade varied inversely with the fortunes of the negotiations being carried on in London and Jedda. During the eight months preceding the successful termination of these in August it was considered necessary to reduce possible incidents to the barest minimum so that a less active policy was pursued than had been the case at the end of 1953. While the British prepared for the conclusion of an agreement in this manner, not without cost to the local position, the Saudis appeared to hold the contrary view that it was necessary to snatch every advantage from the possibly short time left to them. Turki, the Saudi Emir, shrewdly and at a very early date, spread abroad rumours of his impending departure in order to minimise the loss of prestige to the Saudis, such an event would cause when it occurred, and to encourage the necessary evasive action among his supporters.

SECRET

3. As was to be expected Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi and his followers who held one-quarter of the Hamasa perimeter hastened to make money by smuggling and profiteering before the glorious opportunity created by shortages in the blockaded village disappeared. Saqr was warned to discontinue his activities, and exhorted to maintain the blockade, but with little effect, as he realised that although Her Majesty's Government knew that supplies were leaking through Buraimi suq, they were not prepared to take drastic action to prevent it.

4. The rot which had started continued apace. The Saudis in Hamasa used the Buraimi supply line and at the same time exploited gaps in the ring of Levies whose fortuitous positions at the end of 1953 had been frozen as a matter of policy so that no allegations of possible provocative action on the part of the supporters of the Al bu Falah should lead to the breaking off of negotiations. The result was unfortunate. The level of Turki's hospitality mounted to a standard that had not been reached since the beginning of the blockade, and his renewed freedom of contact with Obaid in the Beni Ka'ab country enabled the latter to restock his treasury and rearm his supporters. Thus strengthened, Obaid launched an attack on Abdullah Salim whom he deprived of all but a tenuous hold on a few villages in the neighbourhood of Mahadha and Shirm. Confidence in the British and their policy both among her allies and the Levies was reduced to a low level and references made by way of explanation to developments and gains in the field of negotiations failed to have any effect.

5. A further example of the forward policy of the Saudi Government in the whole field of the frontier dispute with Abu Dhabi, lay in the determination to assert themselves by sending a party of the Arabian American Oil Company to carry out operations on what we regarded as Abu Dhabi territory. Unfortunately it was not known at which particular point in the vast area at their disposal the company would select for this demonstration and a period of some three weeks at the end of May and beginning of June was one of crisis and agitation, for the political and military authorities both on the Trucial Coast and in Bahrain.

6. In the event an area immediately to the south of the Qatar peninsula was selected which had the advantage of virtual inaccessibility by road from the east. Messages were dropped from the air informing the company's working party that they were illegally on the territory of the Trucial States and an amphibious expedition of Levies and naval landing craft was mounted to send a detachment to visit the area. Although by the time the Levies arrived the company's working party had departed, it was nevertheless considered that the company's right to operate in the area had been sufficiently challenged to render the gesture useless to them for purposes of propaganda and evidence before the Arbitration Tribunal.

7. In the meantime on May 3rd the Political Agent visited Shaikh Saqr of Buraimi and succeeded in arousing his fears to such an extent that he agreed to reorganise his rationing scheme for the control of supplies from his suq in Buraimi into Hamasa on the lines laid down by the Agency, a representative of which would supervise the operation. For two weeks Buraimi suq was closed to Hamasaites, and on the third Wednesday two members of the Agency staff went specially to Buraimi to assist with the new arrangements. Their visit was fruitless, for while the supply line through Buraimi suq had been effectively closed, those through the gaps in the blockade which it was not permitted to remedy, were working to their full extent, and a delegation from Hamasa was able to refuse rations, and to declare that they had enough food for "forty years."

8. It was now Shaikh Saqr's turn to complain of the laxity of the blockade, and he did so with bitterness as Hamasa suq had reopened and was actually undercutting the merchants established in Buraimi. However by the end of May permission to block the worst gaps in the Levy blockade was granted, and an advanced post was placed only a few hundred yards from Turki's house. The results of this move became apparent, and on June 15 Shaikh Saqr was informed that the Hamasaites were willing to take the rations which they had hitherto refused. When the day for rationing came their delegation demanded rations for 3,000 people, while the Political Agent informed Shaikh Saqr that as he had no means of estimating what the correct population of Hamasa might be he was not prepared to grant the inhabitants food for more than 300 unless they gave proof of numbers to support their demands. On hearing this the delegation, who had brought with them a list of medicines required by Turki's doctor, retired, promising

SECRET

to return, but failed to do so. The first consignment of medicines was delivered four days later.

9. The reform of Shaikh Saqr's rationing system and the redistribution of Levy posts to block gaps in the perimeter caused much anxiety in Hamasa and Turki had immediately launched a campaign of propaganda declaring that the British were depriving the villagers of food and medical supplies while in actual fact they had been doing their best to overcome the resistance of Turki's supporters against the entrance of rations into Hamasa. Part of the Emir's campaign consisted of an appeal to the World Health Organisation and the International Red Cross at Geneva to send down a representative to investigate conditions in Hamasa. In answer to this the Red Cross representative, Mr. de Cocatrix, already briefed by the Saudi Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Residency in Bahrain arrived in Sharjah on July 2. Four days later he entered Hamasa accompanied by the Assistant Political Agent and the Arab Assistant, and was taken on an exhaustive tour round the village which failed to reveal any signs of food shortage but showed that Turki's doctor was well supplied with medicines provided by Her Majesty's Government. The Emir Turki having placed himself in the embarrassing quandary as to whether to do justice to Arab hospitality or to turn his guests away hungry on the grounds that there was no food in Hamasa, decided to serve a large meal lacking only in tinned fruits.

10. The visit was a success, and the Saudis were persuaded to allow Shaikh Saqr's men to take a proper check of the inhabitants of Hamasa so that a fair quantity of rations could be given them. This check was carried out with the help of the Arab assistant who formed part of a census committee which spent three hectic days in Hamasa. Unfortunately their work was for the main part wasted, as by the middle of the month it became apparent that the bargaining in Jeddah was reaching fruition. On July 30th the Arbitration Agreement and the Exchange of Letters were signed, putting an end to the first period of the Abu Dhabi-Saudi Arabian frontier dispute, and laying down the method by which it was to be settled.

11. The Agreement, which envisaged the evacuation of Turki, the delimitation of a disputed area into which the forces and officials of neither party could enter, and the setting up of an Arbitration Tribunal which would give a decision on the claims submitted to it by the disputants, was on the whole well received locally and was regarded as a victory for Her Majesty's Government. This impression was strengthened by the events of and the visible evidence of Turki's departure. Two days after the last stragglers of the police detachment which was to replace him arrived in the zone, on August 11 Turki, having given his farewell presents and banquets, left the oasis. Simultaneously the Levies raised their blockade, and leaving behind their police detachment, withdrew from the zone. Although the incoming party of Saudis, including the police detachment under Abdullah bin Nami (a captain of the King's guard who had commanded a brigade during the fighting in Palestine), had accepted a Levy escort on arrival at Nakhlat and after trouble with their own guides, allowed the Levies to show them the way Turki knew better. He refused the advice, company and guidance of the small escort which was placed at his disposal declaring that he knew his own country. No great surprise was felt when after a day he had not reached Magheira. Nevertheless a Levy search party was sent out and discovered Turki himself lying in a state of collapse from heat exhaustion at the side of the road, while his convoy had disintegrated and was scattered over an 80-mile stretch of desert. The Levies collected the vehicles and on the night of August 15 a partially revived but crestfallen convoy passed into undisputed Saudi territory on their way to Hasa.

12. However the Buraimi oasis, abandoned by Turki, was not to have a peaceful period of inauguration under the control of the combined police detachments. For Salamah, Shaikh Shakhbut's mother fell dangerously ill with pneumonia, and on September 1st the Ruler of Abu Dhabi entered the zone and went to her bedside. This was his first visit since August 1952 as he had resolved not to go to the oasis while Turki was in occupation, and his coming caused much satisfaction to the adherents of the Al bu Falah, who were banqueted and received minute sums of largesse while the pro-Saudi faction were correspondingly discomforted. This was a situation which had not been foreseen by the drafters of the agreements and Shakhbut was only persuaded to depart after a visit of two

weeks. This period might have been shorter had not the Shaikh considered it necessary to defy an improper order given to him by the commander of the Saudi police detachment telling him to leave.

13. From the time of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi's departure until the end of the year the Buraimi zone enjoyed a peace which appeared greater than it really was. While the "international" police force prevented any outbreaks of disorder the zone became an area where troublemakers who did not wish to fall into the hands of Her Majesty's Government or that of the Sultan could take sanctuary. Headed by Rashid bin Hamed and Obaid bin Juma who inveigled the weathercock Saqr of Buraimi on to their side, these discontents carried on intrigues to which Abdullah bin Nami gave secret encouragement, while publicly professing ignorance of their activities.

14. The final incident of 1954 was the dispute with the Saudis over the correct method of changing round the members of their police party in the event of leave or sickness. It was the contention of the local representatives of Her Majesty's Government supported, without however great enthusiasm, by the Foreign Office, that it would be a breach of the agreement for any Saudi vehicle to cross the disputed area, as some vehicles had in fact done, and equally for any Saudi aeroplane to land inside the zone itself. It was agreed that every facility would be offered for the change-over to be made through the proper channels.

After much arguing the Saudis undertook to send an aeroplane to Kahil just outside the zone and arrangements were made accordingly. In the event, however the aeroplane flew straight to Buraimi where the Saudi commander had prepared a landing ground. It seems probable that the Saudi Government wished to reassert their position in the zone after the various setbacks to their prestige brought about by other events and it would seem were guilty of deliberate duplicity.

15. The ebb and flow of fortune in Buraimi was reflected in other areas and especially in the neighbouring Beni Ka'ab territory. At the beginning of the year the fortunes of the Sultan's candidate, Abdullah Salim, were low, and they sank in proportion to the weakness of the blockade through which his enemy, Obaid bin Juma, was receiving supplies. In early January the latter's attempt to capture Abdullah's home town of Shirm by suborning the inhabitants with Rs.40,000 from Saudi sources were only foiled by a last-minute imprisonment of the newly bought pro-Saudi leaders. The failure of a conspiracy to assassinate Abdullah in February emphasised the fact that while the Shaikh of the Beni Ka'ab was resolute and courageous, his position was precarious.

16. In the months that followed Abdullah showed remarkable resilience and military skill, gaining victory in several small skirmishes. At the same time the increased rigour of the blockade hampered Obaid who was already restricted by the placing of several posts in Beni Ka'ab territory to stop the passage of bandits to the Jebel Faiyah area. The signing of the Arbitration Agreement found him in Hamasa. Here he decided to stay in order to organise armed forces which would march out to attack Abdullah and the loyal shaikhs of the Wadi Jizzi who were less capable and experienced in self-defence. In October bands of the followers of Ahmed as Self of Hafit, Rashid bin Hamed and Obaid attacked and occupied the villages of Hail Kitna and Wasat in the Wadi. The Wali of Sohar who had already been considering strengthening the Sultan's position in the area was stung into action, and by the end of the month Obaid's forces were discomforted and order restored in the valley. This defeat, the news of the fall of Ibri to the Huqf force, and the failure of his attacks on the Levy post at Svat to which he received mortar fire in reply so depressed Abdullah Salim's rival that in a moment of panic he ordered the evacuation of his stronghold, Khatwa. Abdullah, who had gained both experience and strength of character from the year's adversities, was left in possession of Obaid's archives and the field. Fortified by a welcome monthly allowance from the Sultan, Abdullah Salim embarked upon schemes for the improvement of trade, agriculture and education in the Beni Ka'ab territory which were continuing at the end of the year.

17. Except for one major setback public security had another good year under the auspices of the Levies. These were kept to a strength of 500 men and ten British officers during the period. The Adenese contingent, part of whom had been responsible for the Buraimi murders last year, and who besides being

unreliable failed to establish good relations with the local populace, were gradually repatriated, and Trucial Omanis recruited to take their places. The one major disturbance of the year took the form of a recurrence of banditry on the main roads to Buraimi and the Batinah coast. Gangs of Naim, Shawamis and Amiri robbers in a series of attacks on convoys at the junction of the roads at Jebel Fayiah, killed a total of eight of the public at the cost of two of their own number dead. To meet the menace the Levies placed posts at Dhaid, Tawi Hassan and in the Beni Ka'ab country. The Shaikh of Sharjah took the field in person and the Ruler of Ajman threatened to attack the home villages of the marauders. These measures proved effective and the bandits retired from the scene having brought universal reprobation on Turki who was believed to have sent them as his parting gift to the Trucial Coast.

18. The economic life of the Coast showed some improvement despite one or two recessions which proved temporary. The rate of emigration to the oilfields throughout the year stood at approximately 2,000 people per month, and the return stream bringing with it remittances for Trucial States families, and money to be expended in Dubai suq on articles that could be safely carried by lorries to the Batinah Coast and the Oman, was of roughly the same size. Pearlery diminished owing to the competition of cultivated pearls and the taxes imposed on Gulf pearls by the Government of India but in comparison the mother of pearl trade remained steady while the export of Kasha fish expanded rapidly. The date harvest while it benefited from the heavy rains of the winter, suffered from pest and was only moderate. The improvement of falajs and installation of pumps which is taking place all over the coast, showed no immediate effect.

19. For the Dubai merchants this has been an erratic year. Their trade is to a large extent concerned with the import and re-export of Japanese piece goods and textiles. In the beginning of August they were therefore badly affected by the measures taken by the Persian authorities to control legal and illegal imports into Iran, Dubai's chief market, at a time when Japan, which had lost the Indonesian market, suddenly cut her textile prices by as much as 25 per cent. Many of the Hindu merchants of Dubai who were already over-stocked were badly hit and one or two of them found difficulty in meeting their bills. One firm, sound in itself, had to close down as its head office in Bombay had failed, and the British Bank of the Middle East took the precaution of protesting bills for the first time in the history of the Trucial States.

20. The market made a rapid recovery. The Bank restricted its credit for the import of piece goods, and the glut in the suq was cleared by smuggling into Pakistan, which replaced Persia as the major market for the re-export of Dubai's goods. The Iranian authorities became, with time, slightly less conscientious and Japan who with the success of the Geneva conference gained markets in Indonesia, raised her prices once more. By November trade was better than it had been for several years, and the two main commodities, rice and piece-goods were both selling briskly.

21. Legislation and development had a busy year. Parallel drafts of road traffic regulations for people under the Rulers' jurisdiction and those under the Agency were produced and approved, and arrangements were made for the taking of driving tests. A model Trucial States passport which would replace the Rulers' certificates of identity was shown to the members of the Trucial Council, who placed orders for it to a total of over 20,000. The Political Agent's offer to arbitrate for the settlement of internal frontiers was agreed upon by six out of the seven States. A school was built at Sharjah and opened by the Political Agent in January 1955, Dubai and Sharjah creeks were surveyed, and advice of a dowsing together with equipment were provided for the falajs in Buraimi. On the other hand a well drilled in Dubai on a site selected by the dowsing proved to be a failure, and the hire of the drill was far more expensive than originally estimated. The scheme for drilling a well in each of the capital cities had to be drastically modified and by the end of the year it was planned only to attempt drilling only on three sites. The hospital received donations from most of the Rulers, some of which were generous, while Her Majesty's Government provided much needed equipment. Shaikh Rashid's generosity in forgoing his agreed rent on the doctor's house enabled the hospital to purchase the property.

Events in the Shaikhdoms.

Sharjah and Kalba

22. This year Shaikh Saqr appears to have adopted the policy of pushing his claims as Ruler of Kalba to the utmost. January opened with a crop of minor boundary incidents in the area round Daftah (Wadi Ham) where a Sharjah party was finally repulsed by Ras al Khaimah guards. The dispute between the two major Jawasim Shaikhs might have continued over Dibba in the following month when Sharjah's Wali in the town tried to transfer his allegiance to Ras al Khaimah. However, Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed's diplomatic lack of welcome proved the way for reconciliation.

23. The summer heat and the failure of an expansionist policy obviously had their effect and by June the Ruler of Sharjah was making real and not unsuccessful efforts to improve his relations with his neighbours. Members of the ruling family of Dubai, including Shaikh Rashid visited Khor al Fakhan and the Ruler of Ajman received the present of a rifle and also attended one of a series of "house parties" given by Shaikh Saqr in his Eastern dominions.

24. During Shaikh Saqr's absence on tour, Sharjah internal affairs deteriorated, as the Khawatir who had refused to pay anything for the repair of the falaj at Dhaid were first refused water for irrigation, and then expelled from the gardens. Ali bin Obaid joint Shaikh of the tribe came to the Agency and poured forth his complaints at great length, while his fellows took up firing positions at Tawi Suhaila. Saqr, who had just returned from tour was approached and agreed to return the Khawatir dates stored in the gardens at Dhaid and to discuss the matter with Ali bin Obaid in the hopes of reaching a reasonable settlement.

25. The Ruler of Sharjah was an innocent party in the last tribal clash of the year, over the control of territory. The headmen of two villages in the disputed Wadi Madha raised the Sharjah flag and refused to receive the Sultan's representative. This resulted in the Muscati Walis of Shinas and Sohar rushing forces to the area, and denouncing Sharjah's imperialism. However, Saqr had been away visiting Qatar at the time, and knew nothing of the incident. By the end of the year negotiations for the withdrawal of the Muscati forces which had seized the two villages and the settlement of the problem were taking place between Her Majesty's Government and that of the Sultan.

26. On the whole Shaikh Saqr's family gave him more trouble than his frontiers and his tribesmen. The year started auspiciously with the Ruler's uncle, Mohammed bin Saqr, accepting in writing an annual allowance of Rs.10,000 and thus settling a dispute which had lasted since Saqr's accession. However while Shaikh Mohammed was temporarily appeased, the sons of another uncle caused scandal by getting drunk and trying to shoot the Ruler's brothers when the latter came to arrest them. By this time Mohammed had expended his Rs.10,000 and he departed to Saudi Arabia to make a further collection.

27. In the absence of the wicked uncle the discontent of the brothers came into play. The eldest, Khalid, publicly announced his intentions of poisoning or otherwise doing away with his brother, the Ruler, and discussed at length the best ways of achieving his object. Saqr took a few wise precautions and on July 26th left on a tour of Bahrain, Kuwait, Baghdad, Amman, Damascus, Beirut and Cairo. As soon as he departed Shaikha Mirah, the mother of the three younger brothers added her support to her son Khalid, and persuaded the others, Mohammed and Salim to back his claim as successor to the throne. Mohammed and Khalid also took advantage of the Ruler's absence to pay a mendicant visit to Qatar.

28. Saqr's return made things no better, as he immediately dismissed the Regent who had governed wisely in the interim, Rahama, whose brother Saif bin Abdurrahman was made to replace him. The latter turned out to be a self-interested man who surrounded the Ruler with his own followers. This action was followed by a general exodus from Sharjah. The Prime Minister Ibrahim Midfa' obtained a naturalisation certificate, and protection from the Ruler of Dubai, Khalid departed hastily for Saudi Arabia, and Salim made urgent preparations for his stay at the American University in Beirut, which had been made possible by the generosity of the Ruler of Qatar. Only Mohammed remained in the Shaikh Saqr's favour, and he was sent to Saudi Arabia to bring back Khalid, who had become a hotelier living on a stipend from the King. Khalid refused to return unless he was granted

the succession, and by the end of the year Shaikh Mirah had left the country, and Shaikh Mohammed, the uncle, was also intending to emigrate to become a permanent commitment on King Saud's hospitality.

29. Despite all these distractions Shaikh Saqr continued his work of agricultural development at Khor Fakhan, Kalba and Dhaid, for which he imported 4,000 vines, orange, lemon and apple trees. His improvement of the falaj at Dhaid has already been mentioned. In another field the Sharjah school had a very successful year with its pupils and standard increasing under the guidance of Palestinian teachers lent by the Kuwait Department of Education. The school's sports day was well attended. For the development of the port of Sharjah, less could be done and Saqr's petition for a loan of 4 to 5 lakh for the work had to be met with explanations that until the survey was completed no work could start. On the other hand his efforts to encourage the registration of cars met with favourable results and brought about legislation in the Trucial Council.

Dubai

30. The beginning of the year found Shaikh Rashid on the Persian mainland and Qishm Island enjoying a successful month's hawking. In one district he hired the entire armoury of the area commandant of the gendarmerie for a week's hunting at the cost of Rs.45. Rashid's return was followed by lavish banquets given to every section of the community, and for the European edition of these many junior officers of the Levies attended. As relations between Dubai and the Levies had always been distant it was hoped that this was an improvement in the attitude of the Ruler and his son toward them. In June Rashid retired to India for treatment of his hernia and he underwent a successful operation in Miraj Hospital.

31. While the activities of the Ruler and Regent of Dubai had proved uneventful, the foreign affairs of the town were also placid. Visits were exchanged with the Ruler of Qatar and later in the spring it was rumoured that many of the exiled members of the Tudeh Party had fled to Dubai. However, if they arrived they caused no trouble, and it was only in September when Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi camped a few miles outside the town and distributed largesse to some of the local tribesmen, that Dubai's placid rate of living was disturbed. Shaikh Juma's sons trembled in the belief that the Ruler of Abu Dhabi had come to occupy the town with the help of the Agency. They increased the perimeter guards, and posting men in advantageous firing positions round Dubai started an inspection of all cars entering it. On hearing of this Shaikh Rashid disbanded the guards but he was unable to stop the vehicle check, which was only abandoned after Shakhbut had left for Buraimi.

32. The development of Dubai continued steadily and an English company Gresham Linley considered it worthwhile to attempt to negotiate a monopoly purchasing agreement for its Government. However, the Ruler not understanding what was wanted avoided the issue and the company's representative turned to the problem of municipal electrification, schemes for which were submitted by several merchants during the course of the year. As yet nothing definite has resulted, and the rising town land rents are certain to make the cost of a central site for a power house high. The town's first cinema was opened in March not far distant from the Medical Officer Trucial States' house the freehold of which Shaikh Rashid generously presented to the hospital, an institution for the expansion of which he made many proposals and even offered the necessary additional income.

Abu Dhabi

33. Shaikh Shakhbut's reluctance to part with his money, mentioned in last year's annual report, had, during the past few years, formed the basis of his unpopularity among the tribesmen. At the beginning of the year it became apparent that even the Ruling family of Abu Dhabi was not taking kindly to the privations they suffered due to this characteristic of their leader. Shaikh Zaid who had to bear both the financial and physical burden of Abu Dhabi's part in the blockade of Hamasa, had been granted an income which could not fail to fall short of his needs, even when it was supplemented by gifts from his mother and uncle. In comparison the sums which Shakhbut as a loving father poured out for Said and Sultan were ridiculously large, and were expended on nothing more useful than the search for personal pleasure.

34. It was not surprising, therefore, that the Ruler's brothers voiced their complaints with less and less restraint during the early months of the year. When Zaid was expressly forbidden to make any doles to the tribesmen, and told to send them all to Abu Dhabi to see Shakhbut, a procedure which visiting bedu from sad experience thought not to be worth while, a political grievance was added to the financial ones.

35. However the first sign of trouble came from Shakhbut's followers, not his family. The tribal guards whom Hazza had posted at Bada' Suwaihin deserted from their station because Shakhbut dismissed their leader for buying a camel to stave off starvation without Treasury sanction. Then on the night of March 6th Hamad bin Buti, Shaikh of the Qubaisat and Shakhbut's maternal uncle, who had vainly been trying to entertain the Ruler's neglected guests and support his 40 dependants on an allowance of Rs.40 a month, slipped away from Abu Dhabi by launch. He was accompanied by his sons, Ahmed bin Fadhil, former Wali of Liwa, and Fahad bin Rashid of Dalmah.

36. The news of this flight and the expressions of resentment that his brothers had been making over their allowances obviously upset Shakhbut and he declared his intention of abdicating. However, by the time the family had assembled to hear the official announcement he had changed his mind and with little resistance let himself be persuaded by the formal protestations of his brothers that he should remain. A family conference followed with what was understood to be satisfactory results for all. Shakhbut agreed to build houses alongside the palace for Hazza and Khalid who were to help the Ruler in his administration, thereby returning to the position of two years ago before the family rifts became acute. Nothing definite was done about allowances, the original source of grievance, but it was understood that Shakhbut would be "reasonable," and during the conference the brothers had asked him to give Zaid the bulk of anything that was going.

37. Surprisingly enough this arrangement appears to have worked well, and although there was some grumbling, both Hazza and Zaid were sufficiently reassured by it and the departure of Said for medical treatment in India, to leave soon afterwards on their previously planned tours of the desert. Zaid's trip in the Khatam, Luweidi, and Ramlat al Hamra areas came at a time when the poor winter rains had resulted in a scarcity of food and his hospitality was very welcome. Hazza saddled with his unsatisfactory nephew Sultan, who had been appointed Commander-in-Chief of the West met with fewer tribesmen and less success even after he had managed to get rid of his already unpopular companion half-way through the tour.

38. Shakhbut proved reluctant to attempt to engineer the return and reconciliation of Hamad bin Buti and declared that the Saudis would have little interest in his uncle. His forecast appears to have been more accurate than that of the Agency and after his reception in Riyadh Hamad moved to Qatar where he, according to rumour a disappointed man, lived on the hospitality of Shaikh Ali al Thani. His pride prevents him from demeaning himself by taking the first step in negotiations to return to Abu Dhabi.

39. The next event in the varied history of Abu Dhabi took place when, as already reported in the general introduction, the Ruler's mother, Shaikha Salama, who was living in Buraimi, fell dangerously ill with pneumonia and Shakhbut travelled to the sick bed. He held banquets and councils at which he distributed minute sums of largesse and from all appearances began to settle down for an indefinite stay to enjoy the discomfiture of the Saudi Government and police detachment. He was finally persuaded to leave after a fortnight's visit and complicated negotiations.

40. The final excitement of the year came soon after the Ruler's return to his capital. Sultan revealed a plot whereby Dhiyab bin Saqr, son of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi who had been murdered in 1928 to make way for Shakhbut, had received large sums of money from the Saudis to enlist an underground army with which he would seize the town. While the former part of his discovery was well founded, the latter, for which there was no proof or even probability, threw Shakhbut into a panic. Guards were placed on the crumbling causeway into Abu Dhabi, and patrolled the town by night from centrally-situated posts. A curfew was imposed on all land transport and launches during the hours of darkness. A hurried demand was sent to the Agency for permission to purchase 200 rifles and

fortifications were built at the entrance of the town. The tribesmen attracted by an unprecedented outpouring of wealth crowded in delightedly to enlist or join the labour corps, their ridicule of and their affection for the Ruler increasing at the same time. Even Shaikh Hazza acting as administrator, and Sultan, who had been placed in charge of defence appeared loath to let Shakhbut's panic, and therefore his expenditure fall. Only the townspeople had no enthusiasm for the "crisis" which disrupted their lives, and discouraged traders from entering the town, thus causing prices to rise.

41. By the end of the year Dhiyab, a worthless character, had done nothing to feed suspicion, and even Sultan who had shown himself to be a keen, if inexperienced, commander was beginning to flag. Shakhbut still shaken started to form a town police force, which was to receive training from Levy officers.

Ras al Khaimah

42. This year the foreign relations of Shaikh Saqr bin Mohammed's State consisted of a series of frontier disputes with every one of his neighbours. The first incident took place when his relation Saqr of Sharjah sent a small party from Kalba to occupy Daftah. The party was repulsed and the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah sent a mild protest to Shaikh Saqr. In view of this Saqr bin Mohammed's action of refusing to interfere when Sharjah's Wali in Dibba attempted to desert to him, was commendable.

43. However Ras al Khaimah had more to suffer from its neighbour Fujairah than from Sharjah. At the beginning of the year Saqr arrived at the Agency in a Land Rover punctured by several bullet holes, the works of the Ruler of Fujairah's guards, at Masafi, in the Wadi Ham. An impromptu arbitration brought satisfaction and Rs.300 compensation, but did not end the matter. Shortly after the arbitration Mohammed al Sharqi built road blocks and towers, and increased his guards round Masafi and when the Agency's Arab Assistant went to investigate he was warned off by a shot in the air, but later received with cordiality. Needless to say the Ruler of Fujairah was called to account for his power politics and the incident and in answer declared that he had never meant to shoot at the "Dowlat" and in future would limit his targets to the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah alone. This compromise was not accepted and Mohammed was fined and made to dismantle his defences. Shaikh Saqr took heart and by August was trying unsuccessfully with the help of 150 followers to persuade the inhabitants of Masafi to abandon their allegiance to Fujairah. At the same time he asked the Agency for permission to repair his towers in the Wadi but was advised not to do so.

44. Shaikh Saqr's dispute with Umm al Quwain (described in the section on that State) was as can be expected a comparatively peaceful affair and was only brought into prominence by the Agency's attempt to settle at least one frontier before the heat of the summer. In comparison the Muscati Shaikh of Bakha was a more unfriendly neighbour, for in June he instigated the Wali of Sha'am and his relations to rise against their Ruler. Before the rebellion got under way Saqr stifled it by arresting the ringleaders. Ras al Khaimah's other dispute with Muscat was in the far corner of his territory. When the Muscatis occupied the tower at Aswad, he came to the Agency (who had originally suggested that there should be a Muscati post there) to claim that the land on which the tower was built belonged to his followers the Dahannah. The matter was left undecided.

45. Not only did the Ruler have to cope with his neighbours, but also with his family and tribesmen. In June Saqr's uncle Mohammed bin Salim, some of his sons, and the Ruler's brothers began to express their discontent on the size of their allowances very forcefully. While Kayid, Saqr's elder brother remained neutral several of the others went so far as to intrigue with the Khawatir who were being unruly. Shaikh Saqr was very disturbed at the situation, and never left the fort at Ras al Khaimah without his son and several loyal guards in control and sought for the Agency's help in case internecine war broke out. The affair lapsed with the departure of some of the angry relations to Saudi Arabia, the distraction of their leader with a new wife, and the sickness of other disgruntled members of the family.

46. The Khawatir, who had remained peaceful ever since their return from Saudi Arabia the year before, were encouraged by Muhammed bin Salim and his sons to become rebellious as the autumn began and the summer heat diminished. The first indication of their renewed activity was when their Shaikh Ali bin Salim

shot a boy at Saadi on the excuse that he was Saqr's retainer and had come armed to ravage Khawatir trees. The tribe then raised a claim for a portion of the oil concession agreement money, which had not been paid for several years, and complained to the Agency about non-payment when Saqr asked for Levy patrols to curb their unruliness. The two parties were told that while Her Majesty's Government regarded the Khawatir as Ras al Khaimah subjects whose rebellion should stop, Shaikh Saqr had an obligation to pay maintenance to them under an agreement made by a former Ruler. They indicated that they would undertake negotiations to break the deadlock and some time later Saqr reported that an agreement had been reached. Nevertheless rumblings of discontent are still to be heard from the Khawatir.

47. The disturbed internal affairs of Ras al Khaimah left the Ruler little time for constructive work. However, he made plans for the repair of a falaj in the Wadi Quar, took quick and successful action when two of his subjects were murdered by inhabitants of Hamriya in Sa'adi village, and was instrumental in helping the Levies to catch red-handed their first slave trader.

Ajman

48. The Ruler apparently decided that a more orthodox and conservative policy was necessary with regard to travel documents this year, as his son Ali had reaped the benefit of last year's excursions. While he had received all the reproofs from the Agency Shaikh Rashid bin Humaid finally put an end to Shaikh Ali's income from the sale of passports by insisting on signing all documents himself. This was a hard blow for Ali to bear as he was already deeply in debt and had mortgaged his wife's jewellery to a Hindu merchant in Dubai.

49. Shaikh Rashid continued his co-operation with Her Majesty's Government by arresting an Ajman subject who had sold one of his younger fellow-citizens to the Saudis. He then confiscated the slaver's money and sent one of his men off to Saudi Arabia to buy the boy slave his freedom. The mission was successfully accomplished, and the boy repurchased from King Saud's own palace.

Umm al Quwain

50. The Ruler spent an idyllic and peaceful year between his capital and his country seat at Falaj al Ali, having salved his conscience over the fact that Abdullah bin Ghurrah had shipped slaves from his territory during the past year by paying Rs.1,500 to the Dubai hospital.

51. The only break in Shaikh Ahmed's life took place on the day that the Political Agent made a tour of his eastern frontier in an attempt to lay down a boundary. The Ruler of Umm al Quwain turned up obviously prepared with a lorry load of well-informed retainers while Saqr bin Mohammed who had made no preparations was abashed. Both Shaikhs agreed that there was no difference between the frontiers they claimed but the tour over a series of precipitous and unidentifiable sandhills revealed approximately 40 square miles of territory in dispute. For a short period afterwards both Shaikhs repeatedly visited the Agency to press their claims, but then tacitly allowed the matter to drop.

Fujairah

52. In the early months of the year the Ruler of Fujairah incurred the displeasure of the Political Agent for his conduct in the Masafi dispute mentioned in the section on Ras al Khaimah. This appears to have depressed him greatly as in September soon after his return from the Hajj he mentioned to the Political Agent that he was seriously considering abdication, and thought that Suhail bin Hamdan, a popular anti-Jawasim landowner who had acted as Regent during his absence would be able to bear the burden of government. Shaikh Mohammed left the coast soon afterwards and the consideration of his personal health appears to have obliterated the idea of abdication from his mind. Nothing more has been heard of it.

Oil

Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast) Ltd.

53. The drilling at the Murban site was stopped at a depth of 12,588 ft. when the rock strata the same age as those which produce oil in Qatar were penetrated and found to be neither porous nor oil bearing. The Murban bore has

therefore now taken the place of Jebel Ali as being the second deepest in the Middle East, the deepest being P.D.T.C.'s original attempt at Ras Sadr which reached 13,000 ft.

54. The testing of the well which began immediately after drilling had ceased, started in a singularly inauspicious manner when the engineer in charge of the tests lost his life by gas poisoning when a line burst. Not long afterwards during the flowing of the well which only produced large volumes of heavy-sulphurous gas, leaks developed outside the casing and further operations at the well head became dangerous. It was therefore decided to kill the well with heavy mud so that the little oil which had been found at great depth, and which was light, though sulphurous and viscous, should not seep away.

55. From Murban the rig was moved to a new site at Gezira which lies to the south-east of Jebel Dhanna some 22 miles from the coast. In December the oil gangs there were working feverishly in an attempt to get everything ready for the planned "spudding" in date of January 1. Rain defeated their efforts and delayed the event for about three weeks. At the end of the year the seismographic party was based at Zaygat half-way down the eastern side of the Sabkhat Matti whither they had moved from al Fadh in June.

D'Arcy Exploration Company

56. The Company pressed forward rapidly during the year with the seismic and geophysical survey of the Abu Dhabi sea-bed concession area using the most modern scientific aids, and accompanied by abundant publicity. M. Consteau, his ship the *Calypso* and his divers spent a busy few weeks exploring the sea bed, and after the passing of the summer heat work continued with the exploding of charges from a moving ship and the recording of the echoes.

57. During the autumn the company's titles changed, and in September Mr. Heseldin's Dubai concession was handed over to a new company known as Dubai Marine Areas Limited. In November the D'Arcy Exploration Company notified Shaikh Shakhbut of their intention to continue their operations under the name of Abu Dhabi Marine Area Limited.

Golden Valley Colours Limited

58. In January Mr. N. S. Kinnersley, one of the company's directors, came down to visit the red oxide workings on the Trucial States. His visit disclosed a chaotic state in the company's affairs. One of the more remarkable of his discoveries was that the oxide on the island of Dalmah, for which the company had recently concluded an expensive concession was worthless, while Abu Musa island which the company's representative Major R. A. J. Lippett, M.B.E., was in the process of abandoning still contained large deposits. On the departure of Mr. Kinnersley Major Lippett declared that he had decided to anticipate his dismissal by resigning as he felt that his director's findings impugned his professional competence. Before his departure Major Lippett visited Shaikh Shakhbut and according to his own reports was offered the post of personal adviser to the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. He intimated that he might return to the coast in such a capacity.

59. Major Lippett left many unsettled problems behind him, and in June signals emanating from Abu Musa indicated that there were labour troubles there. H.M.S. *Flamingo* visited the Island and discovered that the coolies who were engaged in loading the s.s. *Avristan* with oxide for England had behaved violently towards some of the staff of the company, had gone on strike for an increase of wages in an attempt to blackmail the company's representative to pay three pounds sterling per day to each man, and had stolen dynamite from a store on the Island. The arrival of H.M.S. *Flamingo* reduced the situation to normal. The *Avristan* was speedily loaded and the company's representative Mr. D. R. D. Barnett left the Island to discuss future policy with the Ruler of Sharjah.

60. Unfortunately Mr. Barnett returned to the Island before negotiations were completed, without informing anyone that he was doing so. The result was that he was marooned on the Island by the labourers who beached his launch, and confined him to his house. On receipt of the news the Agency launch was sent to the rescue carrying Shaikh Saqr's representative, the Agency Arab Assistant, Khan Sahib who had been the company's contractor in the past, and a score of

SECRET

Levies under a British officer. The situation was soon restored and the seven leading trouble makers were removed from the Island.

61. The final event of the year in the company's history occurred in December when Messrs. Kinnersley and Thomas another director visited the coast to mollify the local Shaikhs who had claims against them and to arrange a new agreement with Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah. They met with no success in this latter object while the speed of their visit and failure to create a good impression left the affairs of the company in a worse state than before. Its future remains unsettled and if no new agreement is signed before the old one expires in 1955 it will have to depart from the coast.

Chandler Bros. Colwill and How

62. The well-known figure of Major Lippett returned to the Coast in August, though he came not as Shaikh Shakhbut's adviser, but as a consulting engineer and local partner in the firm of Chandler Bros. Colwill and How of Liverpool. On landing Mr. Colwill and the Major proceeded with their local representative Rais Hassan to Abu Dhabi to sign an agreement with Shaikh Shakhbut. This agreement which created a company with the Shaikh as a partner to organise a customs service for Abu Dhabi, and which had a monopoly of trading and contracting in the Shaikhdome was quickly signed by the Shaikh who can neither read nor write.

63. On Mr. Colwill's return to England it was found necessary for the company to unburden itself of Major Lippett and it became apparent that certain modifications would have to be made in the Agreement. The company's representatives therefore revisited Abu Dhabi to discuss modifications and to clear up any difficulties that their short employment of Major Lippett had made locally. After further discussions with the Political Agent and at the Residency in Bahrain they departed for London. By the end of the year little more had been heard of them except that they planned to return but were reluctant to abandon their ideas on monopoly.

Public Health

64. There has been no infectious disease in epidemic form during 1954. Malaria has remained the predominant illness of Trucial Coast inhabitants.

Red Cross

65. As a result of a visit from the International Relations and Relief Adviser to the British Red Cross, a touring clinic van driven by Mr. A. R. Plummer arrived in the Trucial States in April and started a series of tours round the Shaikhdoms. His work has been appreciated having provided a much needed service for the inhabitants of the remoter areas who are too far away to come to Dubai hospital and cannot afford to do so.

Dubai Hospital

66. This year despite the generosity of all but two of the Rulers the hospital's funds suffered a decrease owing to the heavy expenditure involved in the replacement of Dr. Mohammed Yasin, who had finished his term, by Dr. Tayeb Hassan, and in Lieutenant-Colonel McCauly's leave. While the latter was away the hospital was deprived of the income it normally receives from the latter's private practice.

67. On the other hand it acquired much needed new equipment such as an X-ray unit which was provided under the Trucial Coast Development fund. Shaikh Rashid of Dubai renounced his right to rent for the remainder of the lease on the doctor's bungalow site, and presented the land to the hospital, which was thus enabled to buy the bungalow itself from Holloways, the builders. The Shaikh of Dubai's latest display of generosity, a promise to investigate the possibility of providing the money necessary to make the hospital more worthy of the name with an Indian surgeon and woman doctor is being gratefully and eagerly followed up.

SECRET

Slavery

68. 69 slaves were manumitted this year, which indicates that economic pressure continues to play its part in weakening the institution of domestic slavery. The masters who stay on the Trucial Coast are becoming less able to keep their slaves, while those who go abroad to the oilfields cannot expect to take them with them and not lose them. The main reasons given by slaves seeking manumission was that they feared that their master would sell them. Very few complained of bad treatment.

69. The year opened with the Agency's unsuccessful attempts to track down a well-known Saudi slave trader, Abdulla bin Ghurrab, who exported seven slaves from Hamasa, through the Trucial States. They were finally shipped to Saudi Arabia, and it is reported that they were delivered to King Saud who had originally ordered them.

70. The Rulers of the Trucial States, who had all, in accordance with a resolution passed in the Trucial Council, issued 'Alans prohibiting slave trading in their territories, proved willing to please. The Shaikh of Ajman imprisoned a trader, whose money was used to buy back from King Saud's own palace a young Ajmani whom he had abducted to Saudi Arabia, and the Shaikh of Sharjah was at the end of the year undertaking similar operations.

71. The co-operation of Shaikh Saqr of Ras al Khaimah led to the greatest success of the year, who in December informed the Agency that a certain Saud al Magharabi was hiding in the district of Idhin preliminary to shipping five captive slaves out to Saudi Arabia. A Levy party acting speedily and accompanied by the Ruler himself located and arrested the slaver. The latter was tried, convicted and sentenced to four years rigorous imprisonment, before the Court for the Trucial States. He is now appealing to the full Court.

Enclosure No. 2

REPORT OF THE BRITISH CONSULATE, MUSCAT, FOR THE YEAR 1954

The year opened with the Sultan still at Salalah, the blockade of Turki, the Sa'udi Emir in Hamasah, in full swing, and feverish activity in Muscat to get the necessary force together to enable Petroleum Development (Oman), as the I.P.C.'s subsidiary in the Sultanate now styled itself, to launch their operation on the south-east coast near Masirah Island before the monsoon. In Dhofar the Sultan was excited over news that the American company, Cities Service, had decided to return for further surveys as a result of the promising results of their visit last year.

In January Her Majesty's Government's negotiations with the Saudis seemed to indicate the possibility of an early agreement over the preconditions for arbitration, and Her Majesty's Consul-General, accompanied by the First Secretary from the Residency, visited the Sultan by air to secure his concurrence in the draft agreement.

As was to be expected the Sultan put up every kind of objection to any concession which mitigated his demand for the Saudis unconditional withdrawal from the oasis. He also wished to narrow the dispute as far as he was concerned to the single village of Hamasah, which Turki had occupied; and it was not until His Excellency the Political Resident himself had been compelled to visit him at the end of the month that he finally agreed to allow the portion he claimed of a zone of some 20 km. radius centred on Buraimi Oasis to be put to arbitration with the rest of the Abu Dhabi boundary, and to give Her Majesty's Government a free hand to get the best terms they could on the basis of the draft shown to him. Even then he stipulated that his final agreement would depend on his approval of the arbitrators and his being previously shown the case Her Majesty's Government proposed to put forward on his behalf.

When on July 30 the agreement was finally signed the Sultan's reactions were generally good, and since then his Minister of the Interior seems to have been able to co-operate much more actively with our own agreements in the neighbourhood of Buraimi. In particular there was no difficulty, as was at first expected, over the Sultan's askars being withdrawn from Buraimi, and a new post in Beni Ka'ab

SECRET

country was readily established, whilst quite surprisingly generous aid was, upon the Political Resident's suggestions, accorded to Shaikh Abdullah Salim. The latter with the counsel and aid of the Political Agent, Trucial Coast and the Trucial Oman Levies, had been able to take over the Mahadhah tract and establish himself as the paramount Shaikh of the Beni Ka'ab in allegiance to the Sultan in place of the renegade Obaid Bin Juma, his uncle and "regent" after the death of his father. The Sultan himself has also agreed, without having raised any objections, to the members of the Arbitration Tribunal proposed to him.

By the third week in January, Major Haugh, who had left Petroleum Concessions Ltd. in Qatar, and had accepted the appointment as second in command of the Muscat and Oman Field Force (as the Huqf Force had come to be called), was able to report that there were sufficient men trained to an adequate standard to enable the oil company's beach landing operation to take place. This was fixed accordingly for the second week in February. On January 25 the new Commandant, Colonel Coriat, arrived by air from England and assumed command in camp near Sohar where the force was training. Though somewhat taken aback at the obvious primitiveness and rawness of his men, he was eventually persuaded that they would suffice for the immediate task, and reported to the Sultan, albeit in guarded terms, to this effect when he visited Salalah at the end of the month.

Whilst all these preparations were going on, the Ghafari leader, Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar, with a party of petty Shaikhs, left for Mahot by lorry from his capital at Tanuf about January 9. Mahot is the port, actually suitable only for country craft, for the part of the coast near Masirah. It seems clear that, having learnt of the "Huqf" project, Shaikh Sulaiman, who had already pronounced himself Ruler of Jebal Akhdar and its dependencies, hoped to forestall the move by rallying local tribal support to oppose it and then do a deal on his own with the company. It is possible that this would have been unsuccessful in any case, but at precisely that time the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf, was visiting the neighbourhood in H.M.S. *Wildgoose*, and this coupled with the Sultan's previous preparations of the coastal Shaikhs must at least have helped to determine the latter to give no encouragement to Sulaiman, who thereafter ran out of petrol and had to make the best of his way home. His arrival by lorry was, however, interesting in confirming the belief of there being a motorable route to those parts from Central Oman.

Hearing from Sulaiman that his excursion had been on behalf of the Imam, supported by their own Hinawi Tamimah, Salih bin Isa, the Wahibah tribe, through whose territory Sulaiman had passed, immediately protested to the Imam against the visit and appointed a nephew of Salih as their tribal Tamimah in the latter's place. At the same time they also appear to have written to the Sultan objecting to the oil company entering their territory without their permission, a detail which the Sultan seems to have overlooked, presumably owing to some doubt as to the precise *habitat* of the Wahibah. For it later transpired that Duqqam was actually part of their ancestral tribal territory, but had come to be occupied by the Jenabah. Hence the Wahibah felt that they had a right to share in the askars to be supplied to protect the company, a claim which the Sultan refused to meet until much latter, when he directed his Minister of the Interior to satisfy it with money payments instead.

Thus when, in the middle of March, the Sultan visited the beachhead at Duqqam, he curtailed the company's area which they could then survey to include only coastal Jenabah territory and the Jiddat Harasis up to the border of the Dhofar province.

In the meantime the company's operation progressed. The Field Force, by then 411 strong, were moved by lorry from Sohar to Muscat and thence to Duqqam by the company's landing craft, *Jamila* and *Jasura*, working in three shifts. From Aden an L.T.C., supplied by the Admiralty, similarly brought all the transport and stores for the survey party to the beachhead. Duqqam had finally been selected as the most suitable, in fact the only possible, landing place on the coast, although it had been hoped to find one further north nearer the Wadi Huqf, from which the expedition had originally taken its name.

By March 10 the beachhead had been established and camps had been laid and considerable preliminary surveys within the area allocated had been undertaken. Unfortunately these preliminary surveys had revealed that practically all the coastal region was lacking in oil interest, so that when Her Majesty's Consul-General arrived from Muscat on March 12 in H.M.S. *Flamingo*, and the Sultan on March 16, it had to be explained to the latter that the company would wish to see much more of

SECRET

his territory before they could justify any drilling. The Sultan, who had arrived keyed up to see drilling almost in progress, was bitterly disappointed, and did not seek to disguise it. He was also depressed by what he saw of the Field Force, and, probably, by the news he had then received of the Wahibah's reactions. He returned in *Flamingo* to Salalah in poor spirits, though he agreed to visit again by land route in a month or so's time. On top of this the Commandant, who was dissatisfied with conditions generally, and his own terms in particular, had expressed his wish to leave at the end of six months. The Sultan accordingly asked Her Majesty's Government to find him a replacement.

Towards the middle of April the Sultan decided to make the attempt to visit Duqqam by land route. The company sent a party to the Dhofar border to await him and guide him on, whilst it was also hoped that he would be able to define on the ground the precise location of the provincial boundary which separated the company's concession area from that of Cities Service working in Dhofar. However, after about 70 miles, some of the Sultan's vehicles broke down, and it was found that the party had underestimated their requirements for water. The heat was intense and the Sultan decided to return to Salalah.

In view of the surveyor's reports and the limits set to the area in which they could venture pending invitations from the tribes, primarily the Duru whose habitat covered almost all the most likely territory, the company decided to reduce their personnel at Duqqam, and to await the cooler autumn weather. By that time it was hoped that the Duru would have come in. As the Field Force was far from ready to undertake any serious operations in the interior where opposition might be encountered, the opportunity was taken to reorganise, obtain more officers and generally improve and train up their men. A new Commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Cheeseman, ex-Indian Army, was found and sent to Beirut for a course of Arabic. Lieutenant-Colonel Coriat agreed to stay on till the former's arrival in November.

In the meantime in Muscat, the Minister of the Interior had been active in trying to induce the Duru Shaikhs to come in. In this he was assisted by certain intrigues on the part of Sulaiman bin Hamyar to get Ibri, the capital of Dhahirah Province, under his control. The Imam's Wali, who had originally been installed there with the agreement of the Sultan, had been driven out by the Ya'aqib Shaikhs of that place, who had sought Sulaiman's help for the purpose. With the latter's growing influence, however, the Shaikhs had come to regret their action, and, since the Imam had by now also become almost wholly under Sulaiman's influence, they appealed to the Sultan to take over their fort. This the Sultan declined as he did not feel able to sustain his position there at that time. The Minister of the Interior, however, seized the opportunity to invite the Shaikhs to Muscat. These included the Duru, who, though not owning Ibri themselves, had property and marketing interest there. When eventually they came to Muscat, the Minister put to them the proposal that the oil company should enter their country provided that they would write to the Sultan owning their allegiance to him and asking him to send the company. This they did in the beginning of August and then returned to their homes for the Id ul Ahda, and, as they said, to prepare their people. Obviously their ready co-operation was secured through their recognition of the fact that the operation would help their aspirations in Ibri, and they had included in their letter to the Sultan a promise of protection against the Imam. In doing this they proved more far-sighted than the Sultan's Minister, who discounted its significance.

Before this, however, the long expected death of the aged Imam, Mohammed bin Abdullah al Khalili occurred after a brief fever on or about May 2.

Contrary to expectation, but probably due to the action which the Imam had taken to nominate a deputy after his illness last year, the election of his successor took place quickly and quietly, and on May 7 the Muscat Government and this Consulate received letters from Shaikh Ghalib bin Ali, another Hinawi, to the effect that he had been elected Imam. The new Imam seems to have been supported at once by both Sulaimah bin Hamyar and Salih bin Isa, the Ghafiri and Hinawi Tamimahs, and to have had sufficient following to be able to carry out a tour of accession and obtain the recognition of most of the neighbouring tribes.

Aided and abetted by action from the Minister of the Interior a few tribes have however, refused recognition, notably the Wahibah and Beni bu Hassan of Jala'am, to whose leaders the Minister had sent sizeable presents.

Though the new Imam is reported to dislike the Sultan and to be energetic and ambitious, he is also believed to be personally opposed to Saudi infiltration.

In a letter to this Consulate announcing his election the new Imam included a reminder of his predecessor's letter of protest at the "British Government's" landing at Duqqam which the latter had written to Her Majesty's Consul-General shortly before he died, and to which a brief reply had been sent to the effect that the operation was by an oil company with the approval of the Sultan, and was likely to be of great benefit to the people. No answer was sent to the new Imam's letter except a brief acknowledgement of its having been received and forwarded to higher authority, and, of course, an expression of regret at the news of Mohammed al Khalili's death. It was known that simultaneously the Imam had sent his brother Talib to Saudi Arabia, and it was calculated that with no encouragement from Her Majesty's Government, and inability on the part of the Saudis to intervene effectively, even should they wish, the Imam and his supporters would eventually feel compelled to recognise the Sultan, or lose all chance of taking their places in the future prosperity of the country following a discovery of oil.

In late September, in defiance of threats from the Imam, the Duru Shaikhs returned to Muscat and declared their readiness to take the company to any part of their territory. The Sultan therefore lifted his ban on further penetration and authorised the company's geologists to visit any part of Duru territory with their Shaikhs and escorts of Field Force, provided, however, that they did not enter any villages.

About the same time as the geologists had thus reached Jebal Fahud in the middle of October, the Imam had decided to strike at the Duru by an attack on Ibri, the capture of which would, as already indicated, deny them their chief marketing centre. He had also, according to the Duru, threatened to destroy their habitations around Tana'am, whence their Tamimah, Ali bin Hilal himself hailed.

Subjected, therefore, to great pressure from the Duru, in fact a threat to go over to the Imam, Colonel Coriat took his force up to Tana'am, and thence to the outskirts of Ibri. He arrived there shortly after the place had already fallen to the Imam, who had attacked it and obtained its surrender following a brief fight and a few casualties. As the only water was about half a mile to the north of Ibri, the Field Force had to camp there. Convinced by the presence of Britishers with the Force, and, possibly the earlier evidence afforded by the visits of Her Majesty's ships, that Her Majesty's Government were behind the Sultan, the Imam's victorious garrison immediately capitulated and Colonel Coriat found himself inundated with offers of surrender and allegiance to the Sultan from all the Shaikhs and tribes in the vicinity. Upon hearing the news the Sultan was extremely upset, as he had not wished to bring himself into open opposition to the Imam at this stage. He felt that Colonel Coriat had inexcusably exceeded his instructions, and protested accordingly to the Political Resident. To remove these misunderstandings and in order to co-ordinate future plans and movements, his Excellency the Political Resident visited the Sultan in Salalah. As the situation cleared, however, it was seen that far from Ibri being the embarrassment to the Sultan that he had feared, the Sultan had reason to congratulate Colonel Coriat on his action, although, as he pointed out, it was probably more by good luck than by good management that his appearance at Ibri had not forestalled the Imam's attack, which no doubt the Duru had intended that it should, and that as a result, the Sultan's position was politically unassailable both locally and abroad. The incident had, in fact, run to rule. That is to say the Imam's attack on Ibri had been taken as an act of aggression, and all the sympathy of the tribes was with the Sultan for coming to the rescue. Had the Sultan's capture, or even acceptance of Ibri preceded the Imam's attack, exactly the reverse would almost certainly have been the case; and once again this very important lesson in Omani tribal reactions has been demonstrated.

With so much success, so easily achieved, a continuance of the march of the Field Force to Dhank and thence to link up with the Trucial Oman Levies and the Sultan's forces near Mahadhah and Sohar presented an attractive picture. But although Shaikh Saqr of the Naim in Buraimi had, on hearing the news from Ibri, lowered the Saudi flag which he had been flying since the withdrawal on conclusion of the arbitration agreement, he did not join the other Shaikhs in inviting the Sultan to Dhank, where he owned the key fort to the neighbourhood. Following, therefore, the rule mentioned above, and, possibly, a result of a note of caution sounded by Her Majesty's Government that he should not count upon the intervention of British Forces if he gets into difficulties, the Sultan decided, in spite of the insignificance of the probable resistance, to consolidate his position at Ibri.

From a point of view of the company's oil exploration this decision could scarcely be regarded as disappointing, though they had latterly intimated that they would now like to see the country to the north and west of Ibri. All and more than the territory which they had included in their agreement with the Sultan the previous year was now open to their exploration, whilst their main target of Jebal Fahud had come up to their expectations. By the close of the year the company had decided to drill at Fahud, and plans were being drawn up to proceed with this in 1955 and 1956.

For the Sultan, the picture, though not complete, was distinctly rosy. To the north he had the Beni Ka'ab under Abdullah Salim in touch with his Wali at Sohar through the Wadi Jizzi, which had been opened by the Muscat Government at the suggestion of his Excellency the Political Resident and with the help of the Trucial Oman Levies. In the Dhahirah all around Ibri and as far north as Aflaj Bani Qitab and lower Dhank all the tribes had acknowledged him since the fall of Ibri, leaving only the Naim and Al bu Shamis from there to Buraimi still estranged. From Ibri to Duqqam the Duru, coastal Jenabah and Wahibah enclosed Sulaiman bin Hamyar and the Imam and the tribes supporting them, who by now would not agree to find a force to oppose the company. Salih bin Isa had been to see the Sultan, and sought to regain his favour, whilst reports that the Imam and Sulaiman bin Hamyar were now considering how they too could restore their relationship with the Sultan were growing stronger. Even the Saudis appear to have been able to afford but cold comfort to the Imam's emissaries and could only advocate that they should seek recognition as an independent State with the Arab League in Cairo, where they seem to have inspired a campaign in the local Press.

At the same time the Saudi Government appears to have turned its eyes upon Dhofar, and in December the Sultan was informed that they had presented Her Majesty's Representative in Jeddah with a note stating that they had heard that an oil company with the Sultan's concession for Dhofar was intending to drill at a place which they deemed to be in Saudi Arabian territory. They asked that the Sultan should be requested to restrain the company, if the report was true. A report had also been received of the Saudi intention to move on Mughsin, which the Sultan regards as in Dhofar and in which he has had a post for some time. The Sultan seemed to doubt the ability of the Saudis to reach Dhofar across the desert and informed Her Majesty's Government that he had not thought of a reply to make to the Saudi pretensions, but assumed that Her Majesty's Government would not permit them to move unobserved through any territory under Her Majesty's protection, as he regretted had happened in the case of Buraimi in 1952.

Her Majesty's Consul-General carried out several tours of the country, but the Sultan was still averse to his visiting Central Oman, because, as he expressed it, such visits would be misunderstood, by which he presumably meant that as they could not be carried out under his auspices, the Shaikhs might somehow derive advantage from them.

On the tours that were carried out, although poverty was undoubtedly the order of the day, there was little sign of discontent, except in the bigger towns like Sur, where the leading personages were apt to criticise the Administration for the lack of any medical or educational provisions. In none of the several places where small communities of Indian Baniyas resided were any complaints revealed except in Masirah, where a theft had taken place, and it had not been possible to catch the culprits. As these were almost certainly men of the Aden Protectorate Levies serving with the Royal Air Force, the complaint was really against the officer in command, who both in this case and in an accident with a motor vehicle seems to have been lacking in a proper sense of responsibility, regarding which representation was made to Royal Air Force Headquarters in Aden. Otherwise the Indians appear to be well treated and to have become permanent settlers in these parts, like many of their fathers and grandfathers before them.

The most interesting tour was one of 17 days' duration to and from Salalah carried out in a sea-going motor-launch lent by the Sultan. In this Her Majesty's Consul-General was accompanied by his wife, which fact enabled him to meet the families of the people visited in some of the remotest parts of the Sultanate, and in the British possession of Hallaniya in the Kuria Muria Islands, by whose small colony no white woman had undoubtedly ever been seen before.

Apart from the activities of the oil companies, and tribal politics, there is little to remark on. In Muscat itself, with the Sultan's prolonged absence something

akin to stagnation has set in. None of the schemes for hospitals, water supply or agricultural development have gone forward. This may also be due to the Sultan's resources being considerably strained over political expenditure outside the scope of the oil company's payments to him. But also with some real hope of an oil revenue in some five years or so, the Sultan must feel that the schemes he had in mind may well be shelved for bigger ones when the time comes. Only in Gwadar has he sanctioned any project being commenced. There the building of the new school at a cost of Rs.60,000 has been started. Another project, the establishment of a fish factory by a Pakistani firm, was refused probably because the firm was connected with some Japanese trawlers which had been arrested for poaching in Pakistani waters. The trawlers have, however, since received permission to return to Gwadar for the next prawning season.

The Administrator in Gwadar is still Mr. M. G. Wynne, M.B.E., who after six years of being the only European in the place has still managed to retain his balance. Latterly the Sultan has been showing a considerable interest in the boundary of Gwadar and has called for a map. No further approach on the lease to Pakistan has been received from the latter Government.

Contrary to expectation, the customs receipts at Muscat showed no decline for the year 1953-54. The British Bank of the Middle East who had petitioned, on grounds of poor business to postpone the commencement of the new premises which they were expected to construct under their agreement with the Sultan, were asked to proceed with it as soon as the details over the site had been completed.

It is thought that revenue from all sources in the Sultanate, excluding certain payments from Her Majesty's Government and the oil companies made direct to the Sultan, were some 50 lakhs of rupees, 15 lakhs being from the Gwadar Customs alone, derived primarily from piece-goods from India which are later smuggled to Pakistan. No Administration report has yet been published, or even compiled. The Customs produce a purely statistical report, which does not, however, divulge the amount of duty collected, and this can then only be estimated from the value of goods and the tariff. Gwadar is not included, and no information is provided about that Administration. It is known, however, that little more than 1 lakh of its revenue is spent in the ordinary way.

With the exception of a few estate cases, there was no work for the Consulate Courts. Such cases as were brought to the Consulate in Muscat or Agency in Gwadar were all of a petty nature and capable of settlement by mediation. Similarly cases which might otherwise have been taken to the Shara Court were settled by mediation. Few complaints against the Shara Courts have been heard, though non-Muslim merchants have been saying that they appear to favour Muslims. No official complaint has, however, been brought to this Consulate, and, as stated, most cases are settled by mediation through the heads of communities who seem to have an excellent sense of responsibility in such matters.

The Indian Treaty was ratified on February 15, the Indian Ambassador again visiting Muscat for the purpose.

Lieutenant-Colonel P. R. M. Waterfield, M.B.E., arrived on January 27 to take command of the Muscat Infantry. The strength of this force is now being increased to 300 and recruiting is in progress. Their morale seems considerably higher, but their general appearance and drill still leaves something to be desired, whilst they were badly beaten by the navy and a civilian team at shooting. The artillery section has much improved, as a result of the commandant being an ex-artillery officer. Suitable recruits are difficult to find.

The strength of the Muscat Field Force (operating with the oil company) just exceeded the stipulated 400 by the end of the year after replacements and discharges to improve the force had been completed. Recruiting is still in progress, and the Sultan has agreed to take a few men from the Duru and other tribes in the locality of the operations. But recruits for this force are even more difficult to find, and it has not been possible to make good the many discharges and some desertions which took place earlier in the year.

In addition to the new commandant, Lieutenant-Colonel Cheeseman, and Major Haugh, Major O'Kelly and Captains Barron and Anderson had joined the force during the year, whilst Colonel Coriat, Captains Merrell and Burton left. Three more British officers are expected to replace the foreign Arab officers who are leaving.

In Sohar the Batinah force strength remains at 80, all ranks. The force is now in very good shape, but has not so far been used for any task, although several excellent opportunities have presented themselves on the frontiers. It seems that the Sultan has steadfastly refused to use either this force or the Muscat Infantry and preferred to employ tribal levies under the command of his Walis. It can only be assumed that he does this for political reasons, and intends at least for the present to confine his regular forces to garrison duties and for defence in case of attack on Muscat, Dhofar or Sohar only.

Major Maxwell remained in command, and Captain Armitage was transferred to Dhofar, being replaced by a new officer, Captain Pope, late of the Royal Marines. Captain Armitage is to raise yet another small garrison force of about 50 for use in Salalah.

Salaries of all the Sultan's forces were raised during the year and are now in line with one another. The Field Force, however, get an extra allowance while in the field. The Sultan also agreed to some centralisation of administrative control for his forces in Muscat but nothing very apparent had been introduced by the end of the year.

The Municipality continues under the control of Khan Bahadur Maqbul Hussain as High Authority and Saiyid Tarik as Administrator. There is however an air of lethargy about the place, and except for certain widening of the road to Matrah, the surface of which remains a disgrace, little appears to be done, and the energy displayed hitherto seems to be spent. The same officer is in charge of the State Finance Department.

The Muscat hospital continued as before under Dr. Sen until December 6, when, after over five years service, he left for the United Kingdom. He had been awarded a bursary by the British Council to assist him qualify for a diploma in anti-tuberculosis work at Cardiff University as a small recognition of his services. Dr. Lakhra of the American Mission was lent to fill the vacancy until a successor, Dr. Dandekar of Cutch Mandvi, arrived on December 20.

The Residency medical adviser, Dr. Doherty, arrived on February 1 for two months during which Dr. Sen was on leave. He took charge of the hospital and other duties of the Consulate surgeon. The Sultan continued his subscription of £1,000 for the year.

A total of 16,779 out-patients and 146 in-patients were treated. There were five deaths in hospital. 196 ships were granted pratique. 4,724 vaccinations and 1,814 inoculations were given. There were no epidemics. 29 seamen were treated from merchant vessels.

Both a doctor and a State engineer remained at Gwador throughout the year, creating, for Gwador, almost a record. Though a doctor was found for Sur, the Sultan would not approve the appointment until the Minister for Foreign Affairs could devise a satisfactory scheme to prevent him from embezzling the drugs. This the Foreign Minister declares he has so far been unable to do. The doctor is now being considered as a candidate for the post of second doctor for the Field Force. At Ibri the Force's existing doctor has done great work, the propaganda value of which is said to be immense.

Aden Airways had commenced a regular service to Salalah from Aden towards the end of the year though their terms for doing so were still somewhat obscure. The agreement for Gulf Aviation to run their service from Bahrain to Muscat has still not been finalised, though this is now expected early in the New Year.

Cable and Wireless had greatly improved their radio telephone reception and introduced a regular service to London at the close of the year. Test calls between His Excellency the Political Resident and the Foreign Office were demonstrated during the former's visit to Muscat in November.

The British Indian Steam Navigation maintained their regular weekly mail service calling at Muscat on journeys up and down the Gulf, except for some weeks in the summer as and when ships had to be taken off for dry docking. Altogether 196 steamers called at Muscat with varying cargoes of merchandise.

The Muscat Saidiya School seems to be flourishing under the new Palestinian teachers, and there are now 273 students. The English classes totalling some 80 boys were entertained on board H.M.S. *Newfoundland* during the Commander-in-Chief's visit in November.

Seven of Her Majesty's ships, including the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief of East Indies, and two United States ships visited Muscat during the year.

Except for the ratification of the Indian Treaty no other diplomatic or consular representative visited Muscat. In November the Indian Government informed the Sultan of their wish to appoint a Consul at Muscat.

The Sultan had made no selection of a tutor for his son, though names of candidates had been supplied to him. Apart from a slight attack of urticaria and toothache the Sultan has enjoyed good health throughout the year, but his thoughts are now turning to another visit to Europe, in particular to see a dentist, which he was advised to do every two years. His return to Muscat, which was expected in October, was postponed owing to the late arrival of the Cities Service drilling parties whose commencement of work the Sultan seems determined to await. He is now, less confidently, expected in January 1955. If he does not return by early February he will have been away from Muscat for exactly two years.

The following totals of routine duties were carried out by this Consulate during the year:—

New passports issued	43
Renewals of old passports	60
Emergency certificates	55
Certificates of identity	5
Visas (mostly for India and Gulf Shaikhdoms)	5,679
Registration of births	Nil
Registration of deaths	Nil
Registration of marriages	Nil
Registration of documents	20
Registration of British subjects	749
Letter of recommendation for exchange	60
Attestations of declarations and legalisation of signatures	55
Deposit of ships' documents	2
Attendances on board ship for inquests, inquiries, &c.	7
Masters' notes of protest	4
Civil suits filed during the year	6*
Criminal suits filed during the year	Nil
Estate cases	2*
Guardianship application	Nil
Manumission of slaves	30
Repatriation of distressed British subjects	11

* None outstanding at end of year.

The weather was normal throughout the year with temperatures slightly higher than last year. Rainfall, however, was very poor and a total of only 0.97" had been recorded by the end of December. Further up the coast, and in the interior, rain was plentiful. The disease known as Mataq had disappeared from the date trees, but the crop in general was less than usual.

EA 1011/3

No. 5

PERSIAN GULF: ANNUAL REVIEW FOR 1954

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Macmillan. (Received May 16)(No. 50. Confidential)
Sir,*Bahrain,
April 15, 1955.*

I have the honour to enclose a chronological summary of events in the Persian Gulf in 1954. The year has been remarkable, amongst other things, for the shift of activity from Kuwait and the Trucial States to Bahrain and Muscat. The chief problems with which we entered the year were those of the administrative deficiencies of Kuwait and the frontier dispute with Saudi Arabia over the question of Buraimi and the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi. The administration of Kuwait certainly became no worse during the year and in two respects perhaps somewhat better, due to the slackening of the tempo of development, which had previously been too rapid, and to the attempt by the Ruler to strengthen his executive power by entrusting greater authority to some of the younger shaikhs. The Buraimi question was transformed by the agreement with the Saudi Government in July to submit the frontier dispute to arbitration. Great changes also occurred in the situation throughout Muscat owing to a sudden improvement in the prospects of oil being found in that country and, partly as a consequence of this, to the greatly increased ability and determination of the Sultan to extend the authority of his Government into areas where it had been noticeably absent for half a century or more. Bahrain presented us with an entirely new set of problems for this area by the emergence of a political movement aimed at changing the constitution of the State and reducing the autocratic powers hitherto exercised by the Ruler and his British Adviser. This movement coupled with the inertia of the Bahrain Government obliged us to intervene in all manner of constitutional and administrative questions which we had previously been able to leave alone, and to engage in a somewhat novel course of reform in the political and, particularly, the labour sphere which may have widespread repercussions throughout the rest of the area.

2. The balance of events during the year may be considered not unsatisfactory from our point of view. The administrative objectives with which we began the year in

Kuwait, namely, the establishment of a system of administration meeting something more like our own standards of efficiency, had to be modified as they were found to be unattainable, but it also became apparent that Kuwaiti methods were not necessarily so dangerous in themselves and did not necessarily involve any loosening of the basic ties between ourselves and Kuwait, nor any serious damage to the basic economic interests which we have in relation to the disposal of Kuwait's revenue. The Buraimi settlement was a welcome temporary relief of tension, even though the execution of the agreement produced its own set of complications, and the outcome of the arbitration remains a gamble in which from our point of view the stakes are inconveniently high. In other respects developments in the Trucial States continued generally favourable. The greater activity shown in Muscat was wholly welcome from our point of view, apart from the fact that it could have been wished that both oil ventures were being conducted under British auspices instead of one being wholly American, particularly as it is this one which seems likely to produce the first definite results. The Bahrain situation produced its fill of critical moments and demonstrated with unfortunate clarity the weaknesses of the British-led administration, but it could never have been hoped that the Gulf States could remain for ever free of politics and the form which the new movement took in Bahrain had some favourable features, in that it was remarkably free from violence and from xenophobia. It had also been impossible during the course of the year to detect any link between it and subversive organisations elsewhere.

KUWAIT

3. The Government of Kuwait remained oligarchic. Four of the senior shaikhs continued to occupy the chief offices—Public Security; Public Works, Health and Municipality; Police; Justice and Education, but the extent of their powers and responsibilities remained indefinite. The Ruler as *primus inter pares* of the Sabah family continued to have the last word, but to postpone as long as possible the moment of

SECRET

pronouncing it. The Kuwaitis generally showed no desire to change their association with the United Kingdom and the Ruler himself confirmed his adherence to it by asking Her Majesty's Government to negotiate an agreement with the Iraq Government for the Shatt al Arab water scheme and by leaving Her Majesty's Government to give what reply they wished to requests from the Egyptian, Persian and Lebanese Governments to the opening of consulates. Earlier in the year he lavishly received King Saud of Saudi Arabia; on his way to Europe for a holiday in France he visited King Husain of Jordan and on his way back General Neguib in Cairo. Nothing of political importance appears to have resulted from these visits. The Ruler and his people are "good Arabs" and contacts of this kind are inevitable and apparently harmless. For similar reasons Kuwait continued to participate in certain cultural organisations of the Arab League, particularly in educational matters, and showed general sympathy for the Arab League's hostility to Israel, but no responsible Kuwaiti showed any desire for political connexion with the League. The Ruler and his family maintained their suspicious watch for any move by Her Majesty's Government to assert influence in internal affairs; some merchants, however, expressed privately the hope that some dramatic move of this kind would be made.

4. The slowing down of development as compared with the pace of 1953 caused disappointment and some discontent among merchants who had large stocks of construction materials on hand. As a result of criticism from these merchants of the inefficiency of the Government the Ruler appointed a High Executive Council and gave it full powers to issue decrees for the reform of the administration. He nominated to it three of the younger shaikhs, two officials close to him, and Izzat Ja'far, his personal secretary, who was, however, soon removed at the instance of Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak. The committee did useful work in the Health Department and on the Development Board while Shaikh Fahad was away on a visit to Europe at the latter part of the year but was not able to make any serious inroads upon Shaikh Fahad's domain, and found its instructions contemptuously ignored by Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak.

5. One of the worst defects in the Administration was its handling of security matters, particularly as evidence came to

light of the existence of Communists among the foreign workers in Kuwait. I offered advice to the Ruler on the means of improving his security arrangements, but he had not by the end of the year taken any definite step in this direction. The problem was also fully appreciated by the younger shaikhs.

6. The Police Department, and the Kuwait Courts under Shaikh Abdullah al Jabir, showed themselves more willing than they have been in the past to co-operate with us in the working of the two jurisdictions in Kuwait. On the other hand, the Ruler continued to show irritation with the present arrangements, and incidentally his imperfect understanding of them, and refused once again a suggestion that joint courts should be set up for the hearing of mixed cases; he asked for jurisdiction over all Muslims except Pakistanis. The Department of Education, which is under the control of Shaikh Abdullah al Jabir and is probably the most effective of Kuwait Government Departments, continued its rapid expansion of the State's education system and at the end of the year had forty kindergarten and primary schools and three secondary schools and was running classes for women and evening classes for men. Among the new teachers brought in Palestinians still predominated; members of the agency staff found that the Palestinian teachers and some of the Egyptian teachers welcomed social contact with them, and that there were several who during their training in Palestine had learned the value of British ideas in education.

7. Shaikh Fahad asserted his personal control over development affairs and so reduced the functions of General Hasted that he withdrew from Kuwait in April. Majd ud-Din Jabri, the Syrian Chief Engineer of the Public Works Department, who had taken over much of the work of direction which General Hasted had previously done, despaired of being allowed appropriate authority and after being refused the price which he considered would have made his difficult job worth while, himself left later in the month. At the same time the Ruler let it be known that he wanted to eliminate extravagance from the development programme and to see it progress modestly. As a result, the development which was achieved during the year consisted almost entirely of the final stages of the works which General Hasted had planned earlier. The first phase of the electric power plant was

SECRET

finished, schools were completed and handed over for use and the water distillation plant was able to operate at a capacity which made it unnecessary to call upon the Kuwait Oil Company for water supplies. The contract for the dredging of the port was cancelled, largely due to the self-interested intervention of Izzat Ja'far. But the Development Board rapidly accepted the recommendations of Sir Alexander Gibb and Partners, the consulting engineers employed on the Shatt al Arab water scheme, which has clearly captured the imagination of the Kuwaitis and will form the main feature of the next phase of development.

8. The five British contractors had a difficult time partly because of the Kuwaiti authorities' determination to wind up the contracts under which they had worked and partly because courses adopted while General Hasted was in charge of their affairs led them into trouble when he was no longer there to help. The allocation in November 1953 of new work in the school building programme on the basis of out-of-date estimates led to a shock for the Kuwaitis when actual costs became known and to charges of extravagance and deception against the contractors. The Ruler's desire to see development proceed on a more modest scale encouraged these charges, and the discovery of cracks in reinforced concrete in some of the schools added charges of inefficiency. There was, however, no serious attempt to meddle with the contracts for the building of the Distillation Plant and Electric Power Station. In spite of the contractors' difficulties preference for British trade continued, and the services of the Commercial Secretariat of the Agency in the centre of the town were used increasingly by Kuwaiti merchants and British exporters.

9. General Hasted was a controversial figure. His energy, drive, enthusiasm and industry were admirable and to these qualities the completion in a strikingly short time of the magnificent schools, camps and a hospital is due. But his steamroller tactics, and financial inexperience resulted, for example, in a £4 million technical school to which up to the present even with the inducements of scholarships it has not been possible to attract more than eight students.

10. Marked interest was shown in aviation matters. The Kuwait National Airways established themselves, but found the cost of operating an airline and the price of their servicing with B.O.A.C. higher

than they expected. Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak formed the Kuwait Flying Club in which young Kuwaitis are trained on Auster aircraft by a British chief instructor with Egyptian instructors.

11. The Kuwait Oil Company's production rose without apparent difficulty to a total of 42,500,000 tons during the year. The company's relations with the Ruler were generally cordial though he took more interest than previously in their affairs. He made it clear to them that he expected to receive "rupee for rupee the same treatment as the Saudis" and from the same date, and said that the basis for payments to him should be the posted price.

12. The American Independent Oil Company (AMINOIL) began production of oil from the Neutral Zone and exported 361,000 tons of crude oil during the year through their newly-constructed terminal at Mina al Abdullah in Kuwait. The Saudi concessionaire, Pacific Western, laid a pipe-line to take their share out through Mina al Saud, their terminal in the Neutral Zone where a few houses were erected for staff. The basis of payments embodied in Aminoil's 1948 concession, which follows the pattern then prevailing, was not revised, and Aminoil's payments for the year were about \$1 million. Payments by the Kuwait Oil Company totalling £65,400,000 still accounted for nearly all the State's revenue of £67 million, customs revenues contributing most of the difference. Revenue was divided roughly equally between capital expenditure, current expenditure and investment in the United Kingdom. Though no great progress was made towards better budgetary control, the Finance Department's expectations were proved largely correct.

13. Socially there have been the developments to be expected with a great increase of wealth. The checks and balances of mediæval society have been upset. The shaikhs with, comparatively speaking, unlimited wealth have become independent of the merchants. The merchants are in the van of the advance towards civilised living. Anyone at all well off manages to get away for some at least of the hot weather months to the cooler Arab countries or to Europe. More and more people only pretend to keep the fast of Ramadan and the elaborate ritual of exchanging calls on the Id holidays is being abandoned. For Kuwaiti women the veil and all that goes with it is still the rule, but it cannot be many years before they follow the example of Palestinian and

Lebanese immigrants and discard it. The first public cinemas operated by Egyptians are to be opened as soon as they can be built. The poorer people are eating less dates and more tinned food. Amongst all classes of Kuwaitis the idea is growing that while paying no taxes they are entitled to free or State-subsidised education, health, water, electricity, telephones and other services.

14. As a result of the strengthening of his staff, the Political Agent has been able to widen his contacts and sources of information and the improved relations with some departments of the Kuwait Government which it is possible to report are one result.

BAHRAIN

15. The year 1954 was notable in Bahrain for the marked increase in political activity that developed in the islands as compared with previous years. Shia-Sunni friction is a hardy annual in Bahrain but by now it has lost its purely communal character and become as much political agitation by the Shias—supported by many Sunnis—against the absolutism of the Ruler and the privileged position of the Al Khalifah in the islands, as anything else. A series of incidents in June brought to a head a demand for reform in the police and judiciary that had long been common talk. The Shias then with the support of a few "progressive" young Sunnis submitted to the Ruler and to the Political Resident and the Political Agent a list of demands, including the setting up of an Advisory Council, the preparation of a basic law, the appointment of properly qualified judges, wholly elected municipal councils and administrative reform in the police, public health and education departments. After some negotiations between the Government and the Opposition, the Government on July 15 issued a proclamation announcing the creation of a post of Judicial Adviser to the Government to be filled by a British judge, the preparation of a code of criminal law and of codes of criminal and legal procedure, the appointment of a properly qualified Arab lawyer as Registrar of the Bahrain Court and the creation of the post of Assistant Commandant of Police to which a trained senior British police officer would be appointed. In October it was made known that a "High Executive Committee" of four Shias and four Sunnis had been set up to prosecute what had become known as the "National Demands" of the people of Bahrain on the Government. These

demands were submitted in a petition to the Ruler and comprised an elected legislative council, codification of the criminal and civil law, reform of the courts and the appointment of qualified judges and the right to form trades unions. The Ruler in a brief reply to the petition rejected the demand for a legislative council but said that the Government intended to take all practicable and proper measures to ensure the progress and happiness of the people. The High Executive Committee expressed general displeasure at what it regarded as the unsatisfactory nature of the Ruler's answer. After some further inconclusive negotiations the committee declared a general strike throughout Bahrain for one week from December 4. This duly took place and was complete. No incidents occurred. The general organisation of the strike was in the circumstances remarkable and showed that the committee had considerable power and, more important, the ability to exercise it with restraint. After the strike had ended the Ruler issued proclamations announcing the appointment of a committee of six to investigate matters concerning education, public health, judicial affairs and public security. The appointment was announced in the proclamation of a British Judicial Adviser who was already at work, the appointment of a British Assistant Commandant of police and of other British officials in the police and public health departments. Reference was also made to the progress made in preparing a criminal code. The year ended with the Government and the Ruler uneasy and disinclined to give way on any matter of substance and the High Executive Committee determined to continue to press its demands, a number of which were in fact reasonable.

16. By the end of the year the two fortnightly newspapers published in Bahrain had both been suppressed by the Ruler, mainly because they supported the "National Demands." Thus Bahrain was without any regular published news sheet except the Government Gazette which only deals with Government affairs.

17. These developments were accompanied by an almost continuous series of discussions between myself, and/or the Political Agent, and the Ruler of Bahrain, sometimes of a rather acrimonious character, in which we attempted to induce him to accept the necessity of reforms in his administrations and of giving the public an opportunity to express their feelings in a

constitutional manner. We thus departed more flagrantly than usual from our theoretical rôle of non-intervention in internal affairs. One of the more difficult aspects of the situation was that while the Ruler often appeared anxious to follow an autocratic course of action he lacked the means to impose his will. The police force had fallen into a dangerously weak state with inadequate methods and equipment, very little discipline and no training in the control of crowds. Our efforts were therefore directed towards obtaining a breathing space by administrative reform and the establishment of procedures for hearing grievances and investigating criticisms, while at the same time improving the strength of the police in case these measures failed. Progress was slow in both directions. In the latter part of the year contact was also established between the Political Agency and the reformist movement, but we were careful not to give the "High Executive Committee" any form of recognition.

18. A new civil air agreement was signed with the Ruler in August for a period of twenty years. This is particularly important in view of the new runway that is being constructed at Bahrain at the expense of Her Majesty's Government and which will make Bahrain aerodrome even more important as a transit station on world air routes than it has been hitherto.

19. The Bahrain Government's programme of public works continues steadily. 1954 saw considerable progress in the production of electrical power and the extension of power lines to the villages, a contribution to general welfare unique in this area. The most important work in progress is the construction of a new jetty and the dredging of a bar to enable sea-going merchant ships to discharge cargo alongside instead of having to unload into lighters as at present. This represents a bold attempt by the Bahrain Government to maintain its position as an *entrepôt* for trade between the outside world and the neighbouring countries of Arabia, Qatar and Persia. This position is being threatened by the tendency of these countries to insist on importing direct, but it is hoped that if the facilities in Bahrain continue to improve it will be able to maintain its position at least for a considerable time.

20. Oil production and refining have continued at a steady rate. Egged on by the Ruler the Bahrain Petroleum Company

have made considerable efforts to find new sources of supply both by deep test wells on land and by exploring the neighbouring sea-bed areas. The most promising sea-bed area near Bahrain has, however, still been denied to them owing to the impossibility of securing an acceptable division of the sea-bed with Saudi Arabia. Negotiations on this boundary were resumed in the course of my visit to Jedda in the summer. They continued at intervals throughout the year and some slight progress was made. But the Saudis evidently realised as clearly as we did that a potentially valuable oil bearing structure was at stake and played their hand accordingly.

QATAR

21. This has been a quiet year. The oil revenues have continued their slow increase and the programme of economic development has also moved forward at a steady and satisfactory pace. There have been the usual squabbles between different branches of the ruling family and the Ruler had considerable difficulty in settling new rates of family allowances which had been demanded in the light of the increase of the oil revenue. The position of Abdullah Darwish continued to be the dominating factor in both the political and economic fields. There was what has now become an almost standard cycle of recrimination against him for his monopolistic practices, a quarrel between him and one of the shaikhs, his withdrawal to Saudi Arabia and subsequent return with everything apparently forgiven and forgotten. His position at the end of the year remained at least as strong as before. The Ruler accompanied by Abdullah Darwish visited the United Kingdom in September 1954 in order to secure treatment for various minor ailments. The personal behaviour of the party and particularly of Abdullah Darwish was such that I understand they may have difficulty in securing accommodation on any future occasion in any of the major London hotels, but in other respects the visit was a success. Just before the Ruler left for the United Kingdom I was able to inform him that The Queen had been pleased to accord him the decoration of Honorary K.B.E. and the title of Highness. I subsequently delivered the decoration to him at a ceremony at Umm Said on board the flagship of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

22. The chief matter at issue between ourselves and Qatar during the year arose from

the ancient dispute over the claims of the Ruler of Bahrain in respect of Zubarah on the north-west Qatar coast. The Ruler of Bahrain had revived his claims, or allowed them to be revived, in a series of injudicious, not to say provocative, steps and the Ruler of Qatar on this account said he felt obliged to reoccupy a fort which his father had built in the area and which had been left empty as a result of previous temporary settlements of the dispute. After a short period of rather acute tension in our relations I was able to secure a further temporary settlement in virtue of which the Ruler of Qatar is entitled to send his police to the fort, but not to station them there permanently. Fortunately the internal political preoccupations of the Ruler of Bahrain during the second part of the year have led to unusual quiescence in this problem for the remainder of the period under review.

TRUCIAL STATES

23. The first half of the year was taken up, on the international plane, by quarrels and negotiations with Saudi Arabia, arising from the presence of a Saudi force in Buraimi which was blockaded by the Trucial Oman Levies in order to prevent the further spread of Saudi influence into the surrounding area. The blockade was of only moderate effectiveness in regard to this object and produced a tiresome series of minor incidents. The Saudis from time to time tried to draw international attention to the situation by their publicity and on one occasion by inducing the International Red Cross to send a representative to the oasis to report on allegations that our blockade was causing the starvation of the inhabitants. Agreement was reached at the end of July that the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi, and the question of sovereignty over the Buraimi oasis, should be submitted to five arbitrators and that meanwhile both sides should withdraw from an area of 25 kilom. round Buraimi, leaving there only a small joint police detachment, and from a very much larger disputed area between the frontiers claimed by Abu Dhabi and by Saudi Arabia. This latter area was divided, for purposes of oil operations only, into three zones, a northern one in which the Iraq Petroleum Company subsidiary holding a concession from Abu Dhabi may operate, a southern one in which the Arabian American Oil Company may operate, and a narrow zone in the middle in which no oil operations may take place.

The withdrawals were executed during the second half of the year, but it soon became clear that local harmony would not thereby be restored. There began a series of complaints by the Saudi party in the Buraimi zone about the behaviour of the Abu Dhabi adherents and at the same time a stream of evidence reaching us of Saudi attempts to defeat the purposes of the agreement by the use of bribery and pressure on any tribal elements which might be of use to them. As an immediate consequence of the withdrawal of the Saudi party from Buraimi there occurred a series of cases of banditry extending some distance north of the oasis into areas which had previously not been affected. After several fatalities had occurred the situation was restored by redistribution of the Trucial Oman Levies on the affected lines of communication. A more important operation was the opening up of the Wadi Jizzi route eastwards from Buraimi to Sohar on the Muscat coast which at the beginning of the period was held by the notorious Obaid bin Juma, the pro-Saudi leader of a faction of the Beni Ka'ab. As a result of pressure from the north from the Trucial Oman Levies, and from the east by irregular Muscat forces, the evacuation of the Wadi by all hostile elements was brought about in October, and Abdullah Salim the pro-Muscat leader of the tribe was able to establish himself there and to keep the route open for regular communication between Sohar, Kahil and the Trucial States. This was a most satisfactory development as it restored Muscat authority in a highly strategic area and demonstrated the limitations of Saudi influence. Unfortunately it was for various reasons impossible to carry out a similar operation in the area south of the Buraimi zone where pockets of pro-Saudi sympathisers continued to exist.

24. The only other notable developments in the Trucial States were the continued modest successes of the Trucial Council in bringing together the Rulers of the seven States in discussion of problems of mutual concern, and the attempts, unsuccessful up to the end of the year, to find water at Dubai in spite of the efforts of a water-divining surveyor and a drilling rig, both of which had been imported by Her Majesty's Government as part of their development programme.

25. The family affairs of the Ruler of Sharjah caused some concern since he appeared unable to retain the support of any of the members of his family. The same applies to Abu Dhabi where there was

a serious crisis in the relations between the Ruler and his brothers, mainly owing to his parsimonious character and his failure to take proper steps to retain the loyalty of the Bedouin inhabitants of the State. Matters were, however, patched up and amicable relations apparently restored.

MUSCAT

26. Shortly after the beginning of the year the Muscat and Oman field force which the Sultan had been able to raise, thanks to a subvention from the Iraq Petroleum Company subsidiary which holds the oil concession for that area, was able at last to land at Duqqam in the south of Oman from whence it was hoped that it could move into the interior and so enable the Oil Company to explore the area which seemed of greatest promise. There ensued further vexatious delays while the company was confined to comparatively uninteresting areas near the coast. But in the middle of the year the situation at last began to change.

27. The old Imam died in May. His successor was elected without much difficulty, but did not secure immediate recognition from all the tribes of the interior, whose attitude may in some cases have reflected the efforts of the Muscat Government to draw their allegiance rather to the Sultan. In the course of the confused situation which thus resulted the Imam arrived at Ibri with a supporting force and after a short struggle turned out a number of the leading personalities who had refused to accept his authority. These men, partly from the Duru, partly from other tribes of the area, were taken to Duqqam and announced their readiness to move forward with the Oil Company and the Field Force provided that they were taken back into their home district including Ibri and the neighbouring centre of Tan'am. Colonel Coriat, who was then in command of the Field Force, accompanied by Mr. Henderson of the Oil Company thereupon set out upon their historic raid from Duqqam to Fahud, where the Oil Company wished to operate, and on, without stopping, to Tan'am and Ibri, a total distance of some 250 miles across almost entirely unknown and untracked country. The sight of this party arriving before Ibri was too much for the nerves of the Imam's supporters and they agreed to retire from the town which was then occupied by its previous owners, and the whole area confirmed its allegiance to the Sultan. The Sultan who was all this

time at Salalah was seriously upset at this news since he thought his force had gone too far and that he would be in for serious attempts at retaliation by the Imam. As, however, nothing of the kind materialised and as he appreciated the importance of the strategic position which had been acquired for him he calmed down and did all he could to stabilise the situation and to make preparations for further extension of his authority. This dramatic episode transformed the situation in Oman, and the relations of that area with Muscat, to a greater extent than anything which had happened in the previous 40 years, since the irruption of the tribes into the Muscat area during the first world war. The first surveys by the Oil Company confirmed their favourable view of the Fahud area and at the end of the year they were proceeding to establish themselves there with a view to drilling as soon as possible.

28. Meanwhile in Dhofar the combination of two American oil firms, known as Cities Service Dhofar, had obtained from Mr. Wendell Phillips the exploration licence which the Sultan had given him and began to move in their heavy equipment with a view to serious survey work. They had decided before the end of the year to drill in an area about 100 miles north of Salalah and for this purpose were beginning to repair the road over the mountains which the Sultan had previously built with his own resources. Their activities had provoked Saudi interest and a message was received by them from Aramco transmitting the view of the Saudi Government that the frontier ran on the watershed, *i.e.*, some 100 miles south of the great sands which we and the Sultan considered to be broadly speaking the correct boundary.

29. The Sultan remained for the whole year at Salalah but in spite of this and of the difficulty of communications with other parts of his domains managed to exercise a strong influence on events and to improve the position of his administration not only in the hitherto unadministered areas, as I have described above, but in the more settled districts around Muscat and along the Batinah coast. His agreement to the Buraimi arbitration settlement was obtained with considerable difficulty, but he continued to entrust the representation of his interests in almost all international affairs to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

SECRET

missed and that Shaikh Rashid should be supported, if necessary, by the Trucial Oman Levies. I arranged that the Levies should draw up plans with the Political Agent on the basis that they should avoid getting involved in actual street fighting but should concentrate in considerable force on the outskirts of the town where their presence would ensure the security of the Agency and the small British community. I suggested that they should be prepared to take over the watch towers round that part of the town where Juma's family lived, but that they should as far as possible rely upon the moral effect of their presence. It was at this stage that I sent you my telegram No. 325 informing you of my intentions. In this I reported that though I had told Mr. Pirie-Gordon to allow time if possible for you to comment, I had authorised him to act sooner if the local situation made this imperative.

6. On May 12, Mr. Pirie-Gordon telegraphed that the situation had become critical and that Shaikh Rashid had decided on early action as he feared a *coup d'état*. He at first intended to arrest the dissidents on the next day and to hand them over to the Levies for safe keeping until they could be embarked on their special aircraft, but after discussion of various plans at the Agency, he decided late on the night of May 12 to summon Juma and his three eldest sons to the Palace forthwith. His father had meanwhile been consulted and had agreed with Rashid's proposals. It was at first hoped that he could be persuaded to absent himself from the town at the time of the ultimatum, but at the last minute he insisted on remaining and supervising the whole operation in person, a decision which, in view of his great age, somewhat complicated the detailed arrangements and increased the risks of the plan miscarrying.

7. When Juma and his sons arrived at the Palace, they were told that they were required to leave Dubai as soon as possible. He protested and demanded to know the reason. Rashid in reply detailed their intrigues and treachery. A committee of notables and merchants who were assembled at the Palace pointed out to Juma the consequences of any refusal to go and eventually persuaded him that he had no alternative. I think there can be little doubt that in reaching this conclusion Juma was much impressed by the presence in the outskirts of the town of two and a half squadrons of Levies which had, with Rashid's agreement stationed themselves on both sides of the creek and had taken over certain of the watch towers. He stipulated, however, that he should be allowed to go to Saudi Arabia instead of Bahrain and that he should go by launch. The Political Agent was consulted on these changes and agreed.

8. In view of Mr. Pirie-Gordon's report of the situation on May 12, I had arranged with the Senior Naval Officer, Persian Gulf for H.M.S.S. *Loch Insh* and *Loch Killisport* to proceed from Bahrain to Dubai as soon as possible, but before they had time to arrive, Juma's acceptance of the ultimatum had opened the prospect of a peaceful settlement of the affair and in these circumstances Shaikh Rashid particularly asked that the ships should not spoil the effect by putting in an appearance, since this could only detract from the prestige which he hoped to acquire by managing the situation with resources locally available. I concurred with his view in this matter, and arranged that the two ships should be available, but out of sight.

9. After a day of packing, collecting debts, bewailing their fate and several postponements, the exiled party sailed by dhow from Dubai creek for Saudi Arabia at 2.30 p.m. on May 14. The Levies then withdrew, H.M.S.S. *Loch Killisport* and *Loch Insh* proceeded on other business and Mr. Pirie-Gordon handed over the Agency to Mr. Tripp, who had arrived at the height of the crisis. The only remaining problem was to ensure that a British journalist, who unfortunately happened to be embarked in H.M.S. *Loch Killisport*, did not report the whole affair to the papers he represented in such a manner as to cause offence to Shaikh Rashid and to provide material for hostile propaganda by Cairo radio. I hope that in this our worst fears have proved liars.

10. I think there can be no doubt that the effect of these events has been salutary not only as regards Dubai but also the whole of the Trucial States. Throughout the crisis Rashid consulted the Agency and knew he had their support. From being opposed to any action by the Levies in his territory, he came to rely on their presence to back up his ultimatum to Juma. The effect of their presence will not be lost on the rest of the area. Meanwhile if Rashid makes it clear that there is no possibility of Juma's return and if he at once institutes overdue reforms

SECRET

in the administration of Dubai, and particularly in the Courts, he will greatly strengthen his position. I have instructed Mr. Tripp accordingly. I have also congratulated Lieutenant-Colonel Johnson, Commanding the Trucial Oman Levies, on the orderly and efficient manner in which his troops carried out their share in the proceedings.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jeddah, the British Middle East Office and Persian Gulf posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

Chronological Summary of Events in the Persian Gulf 1954

KUWAIT

January 18.—Aminoil ship first tanker full of oil from Neutral Zone.
 March 16.—Inauguration of Kuwait National Airways.
 March 29—April 5.—Visit of King Saud.
 April 6.—Jabri leaves Kuwait.
 April 10.—Departure of General Hasted on resignation from Development Department.
 April 25.—Ruler leaves on visit to King Husain of Jordan and subsequently to Europe.
 May 21.—Frontier incident between Kuwait desert patrol and Iraqi camel patrol.
 June 23.—Return of the Ruler.
 July 19.—Ruler announced formation of High Executive Council consisting mainly of young shaikhs, to reform administration.
 September 7-8.—Visit of Mr. A. D. Dodds-Parker.
 September 26.—Opening of new commercial offices for the Agency by the Political Resident. High Executive Council suspends publication of all newspapers and magazines in Kuwait; permits opening of cinemas.
 October 20.—Shaikh Fahad arrives in England. Press ban lifted.
 October 25.—Celebration in honour of first Kuwaiti to qualify as a pilot.
 Final Report presented to Development Board on Shatt-al-Arab water scheme.
 November 13-15.—Visit of Mr. C. A. E. Shuckburgh.
 November 17-23.—Visit of Commander-in-Chief, East Indies to Kuwait and Mina al Ahmadi.
 December.—Unprecedented rains.
 December 12.—Visit of Indian Trade Mission.
 Appearance of *Kuwait al Youm*, official Government Gazette.

BAHRAIN

January 11-12.—Ruler's State Visit to King Saud at Dammam.
 March 24-27.—Visit of King Faisal of Iraq.
 April 11-14.—Visit of King Saud.
 April 21.—Celebration of The Queen's Birthday (throughout the Gulf).
 June 15.—Shia-Sunni riot at Sitra.
 July 1.—Shia demonstration at police fort: police open fire.
 July 15.—Government announce appointment of British Judicial Adviser and other reforms.
 August 3.—Signature of new civil air agreement.
 September 5-7.—Visit of Mr. A. D. Dodds-Parker on return from Far East.
 September 24.—Strike of taxi-drivers against high premiums resulting from Third Party Insurance Law.
 October 1.—Taxi-drivers return to work.
 October 28.—"High Executive Committee" announce presentation to Ruler of petition embodying "National Demands."
 November 3.—The Ruler replies to the petition rejecting its demand for legislative assembly.
 Suspension of remaining organ of Bahrain press.

November 3-9.—Visit of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 November 6-13.—Visit of Mr. C. A. E. Shuckburgh.
 December 4-10.—General strike of Bahraini workers.
 December 7.—Arrival of new British Assistant Commandant of Police.
 December 10-12.—Visit of Indian Trade Mission.

QATAR

February.—Labour troubles in Qatar Petroleum Company.
 April.—Signature of the Qatar tax decree.
 May.—Opening of the new Government power house.
 September.—Ruler leaves for visit to London.
 October.—Commencement of operation from Shell Company drilling platform off Dohah.
 November.—Return of the Ruler.
 November.—Visit of the Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 Presentation of insignia of K.B.E. to Ruler by Political Resident.

TRUCIAL STATES

February 24.—Move of Her Majesty's Political Agency from Sharjah to Dubai.
 Commandant Cousteau's ship, *Calypso*, begins operations off Abu Dhabi.
 April.—Opening of first commercial cinema in Dubai.
 May 29.—Judgment pronounced in "Buraimi Murders" trial.
 June.—Aramco "invasion" of Odaid peninsula.
 July.—Visit to Hamasa of M. de Cocatrix, of the International Red Cross.
 July 30.—Signature of Arbitration Agreement in Jeddah.
 August.—Signature of Abu Dhabi Development Company Agreement.
 Outbreak of banditry, the first since 1951.
 August 13.—Departure of Turki bin Atashan from Buraimi Oasis.
 September.—Drilling for water under Trucial States Development Programme begun at Dubai.
 December 2-6.—Visit of Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.
 Air/sea demonstration for Rulers.
 December 4.—Dubai bore abandoned at 645 feet.
 December.—Wadi Madha incident on Sharjah-Muscat frontier.
 Apprehension of Saudi slave-dealer in Ras al Khaimah.
 Arrival of Saudi aircraft at Buraimi.

MUSCAT

February.—Landing of oil company force at Duqqam.
 February 24.—Clash between Abdullah Salim and Obaid bin Juma at Mahadhah.
 March.—Ratifications of Indian-Muscati Treaty providing for exchange of consuls.
 May 2.—Death of Imam Muhammad al Khalili, succeeded after election by Ghalib bin Ali.
 July 31.—Visit of Duru shaikhs to Muscat.
 October 11.—Ibri falls to the Imam's forces.
 October 28.—Ibri recaptured by Huqf.
 December 7-9.—Visit of Commander-in-Chief, East Indies.

EA 1018/9

No. 6

EXILE OF TROUBLE-MAKERS FROM DUBAI

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Macmillan. (Received June 4)(No. 69. Confidential)
Sir,Bahrain,
May 31, 1955.

I have the honour in this despatch to review the events which led to the exile from Dubai of Shaikh Juma bin Maktum, brother of the Ruler, and of his three eldest sons, Obaid, Maktum and Hamed.

2. Shaikh Said, the Ruler of Dubai, has for some years owing to old age left the conduct of affairs to his son, Shaikh Rashid. Rashid's regency has not been an easy one. For several years now a faction led by his uncle Juma and his six sons has bedevilled and obstructed Rashid's administration and set his authority at naught, both internally and externally. They had threatened visitors to Rashid's Majlis, overruled the decisions of his courts, imposed their own system of taxation and issued title deeds for the purchase of land which were totally illegal, until people had begun to complain to Rashid of their exactions. They had openly vetoed a scheme for reform of the courts which we had persuaded Rashid to adopt. At the same time they had adopted an anti-British attitude and had rallied pro-Saudi elements, while continually subjecting Rashid to all kinds of pressure to modify his support of ourselves. In opposition to Rashid's express orders, they had gone out of their way to insult all the other Trucial Rulers when they visited Dubai and had deliberately arranged for the Ruler of Ras al Khaimah and the Ruler of Sharjah to be shot at from the watch towers at the entrance to the town. Followers of the Ruler of Umm al Qawain had been robbed and insulted and Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan of Abu Dhabi had been insulted during a recent visit to the Agency. These acts undermined Shaikh Rashid's longstanding efforts to heal old feuds, particularly with Sharjah and Abu Dhabi. This defiance, combined with their continuous intervention with internal affairs, meant that Rashid was no longer master in his own house.

3. Matters were brought to a head early in May when Juma threatened Rashid personally and presented him with a series of proposals which amounted to a demand that his faction should take control of the State. Rashid feared that failure to accede to Juma's demands would precipitate a *coup d'état* and on the night of May 10 he called on Mr. Pirie-Gordon, the Political Agent, to seek his advice and support in taking drastic action against his uncle and cousins. Mr. Pirie-Gordon, who was at that time expecting the arrival of his successor, Mr. Tripp, and preparing to leave Dubai, replied that, though he would have preferred matters to be settled at a more convenient moment, in his view Shaikh Rashid ought to take this opportunity of asserting himself, since if he failed to do so he would probably never again be in a position to repair the omission. Subject, therefore, to anything which I might have to say on the subject, Mr. Pirie-Gordon advised Shaikh Rashid to exile Shaikh Juma and his family in perpetuity. Shaikh Rashid seemed disposed to accept this advice and suggested Bahrain, where Juma had previously been in exile, as the best place to send the dissidents. He guaranteed to support them there and it was tentatively agreed that a special civil aircraft should be made available at Sharjah and that Juma's family should be told to leave in it at a specified time. For reasons of family honour, Rashid insisted that they would have to be given at least one day's notice, a precaution which Mr. Pirie-Gordon felt would give them an excellent opportunity to organise resistance and possibly to shoot Shaikh Rashid, if they were so minded.

4. Shaikh Rashid at this stage felt considerable doubt about the attitude which his father, the titular Ruler, would adopt. His first idea was to force him to abdicate, but he accepted the Political Agent's view that this might alienate public opinion, which he might reasonably hope to have behind him in dealing with Juma. Rashid finally thought he could get his father to agree to the steps proposed, particularly if Mr. Pirie-Gordon helped.

5. When Mr. Pirie-Gordon reported this situation to me I endorsed his view that the opportunity of ridding Dubai of a longstanding nuisance was not to be

SECRET

make more money as merchants in the town or as employees of the State and have no desire to uproot themselves from their families in Kuwait and work regular and exacting hours in Ahmadi. The company have canvassed all Kuwaitis who are studying overseas but none of them have shown any interest. Nor up to the present have the company had any success in interesting the students of the secondary school in the possibilities of employment, though they hope that as the output increases something may be achieved in this direction. A further trouble is that as soon as any Kuwaiti is sufficiently trained by the company to be promoted to the senior grade he is able to get a better job in Kuwait in the family business, with the State or in the employment of one of the merchants.

5. The explanation of the small number in the clerical, foremen and technical grade is similar. Any Kuwaiti who can be employed on accounting or clerical or technical work is at a premium in the town and can earn up to three times the pay. An air-conditioning mechanic recently trained by the oil company and paid Rs.900/- a month obtained work with the State at Rs.2,900/- a month. To compete with such inducements the oil company would have to risk upsetting their whole wage and salary structure by paying the Kuwaitis more than better men of other nationalities, including British, employed on similar work.

6. Of the Kuwaitis in the skilled labour grade, 120 act in supervisory jobs (e.g., gang leaders, charge hands, &c.); of these only 34 are literate. The company is now screening all skilled or semi-skilled Kuwaiti labourers to find any capable of promotion to supervisory jobs. Departments have provided the labour division with a list of 136 (only 36 of this number, however, are even partly literate in Arabic) whom they consider may be potential supervisors. They are being put through a Ministry of Labour "Training Within Industry" course both in "Job Relations" and "Job Instruction" with a view of finding those who are capable of promotion. The jobs for which they hope to place them are labour overseer, tindal, painter, charge hand, head rigmen, pipe fitter charge hand, boatswain's mate, first driver, carpenter charge hand, master tug boatswain, motor driver charge hand and tindal watchman.

7. As regards the unskilled labour category, no Kuwaiti willing and capable of working is turned away and facilities for training are given. The company maintain a school for the technical training of any Kuwaiti whether already employed by the company or not. No Kuwaiti need remain in the unskilled category if he is capable of undergoing training. Details of this school were given in my despatch No. 34 of August 22, 1955, dealing with vocational and technical education in Kuwait.

8. There are special difficulties connected with the employment of town Kuwaitis, and many Bedouin, in manual grades. They will not touch a broom or pick up as much as a piece of paper or an oily rag from the ground. Only exceptionally can they be persuaded to clean or tidy up their benches or lathes after their work; some other nationality must be found to clear up after them. They will not clean the bottom of a barge or pick through scrap if there is a possibility of a member of another tribe seeing them do so. What is more they are not really interested in working and the average Muscati or Omani will get through twice the work in the same time and shows an industry and an avidity to learn which is rare among the Kuwaitis. Nevertheless the oil company do, where possible, promote Kuwaitis over the heads of other nationalities if it is feasible in spite of the fact that if promotion were solely on merit they would often be passed over.

9. Finally, the number of persons with a real connection with Kuwait who are seeking employment is small. In 1948, it was thought that the population of the State was 110,000-120,000. Of these some 90,000 might have been Kuwaitis, which would include some 10,000 Bedouin. This might give a figure of 20,000 Kuwaitis seeking employment and it is clear that any Kuwaiti who has any industry, skill or capacity for work can get the job of his choice. Many of those who have none of these qualities will be given jobs as farrashes, &c., in Government departments which make little demand upon them but for which they are well paid. It is interesting to note, however, that the proportion of Kuwaitis employed by the oil company (about 25 per cent. of the total) is very much higher than that in any Kuwait Government department.

10. I am sure that these difficulties are considerable and substantial, and that it is not in present circumstances possible to increase significantly the number of Kuwaitis employed by the company. The situation may change when a greater

SECRET

number of Kuwaitis have received education in the schools and I think we ought to review this aspect of the question again in about two years' time.

11. There remains the question whether the company could do more to promote economic activity in Kuwait and develop manual and commercial skills. The oil company are conscious of the need to put as much business as they reasonably can in the way of the local merchants. They employ local contractors for construction work wherever possible and in the month of October placed contracts with 14 separate contractors worth £60,148. Because the work is not so complicated as the maintenance of the Bahrain Petroleum Company's refinery, the setting up of an organisation on the lines of Acme in Bahrain has not been called for and, in my view, the policy of spreading the work as widely as possible is more suitable to Kuwait conditions. The local purchases in the town now amount to £7,000-£8,000 a month. They do their best to spread these purchases among many merchants. They buy such things as paint, electrical equipment, pipe fittings and materials for the construction programme and are prepared to pay 10 per cent. more than if they bought in London. The company buy only those materials which the local merchant would normally deal in. The sum involved is small compared with their total procurement, which at present amounts to £100,000-£150,000 a month, but most of what they require are items like pipe and casing, of which they are the only users. The company have to carry large stocks of these items (in the region of £3½ million) and have to order nine months or a year in advance. The only way the company could bring the Kuwaiti into the supply of these items would be to require him to carry these stocks himself which he would be unlikely to do, or merely to indent through him, carrying stocks themselves. The Kuwaiti merchant would in that case do nothing at all for his commission and would be merely receiving a dole not only at the expense of the oil company but (since profits are shared 50 per cent. with the State) also at the expense of the State. The jealousies and troubles which arise from this system of distributing largesse to merchants who are doing nothing to earn it was exemplified in the case of the Kuwaiti partners of the "Big Five" contractors and I believe it would be a mistake to extend it to the oil company. There is also one small point. All materials which are bought through the local merchants carry 4 per cent. customs duty from which the oil company is exempt and it has not been practicable to devise a means of securing a refund of this duty.

12. Nevertheless the oil company are alive to the advantage of stimulating the local economy wherever possible. The management research section have just completed a survey of the company's printing and publishing operations and the possibility of making greater use of the town facilities was considered. They found that the cost of sending the work to local printers would be between £17,000 and £20,000 as against £14,000 for the same work done by the company. Apart, however, from the increased cost it would be extremely difficult to divert much of the printing and publishing now undertaken by their own organisation to the town, for the following reasons:—

- (a) company memoranda, accounts statements and company circulars are often somewhat confidential and could not be dispersed amongst local printers;
- (b) the daily *Bulletin* is published in the morning and collection of news goes on simultaneously with the production of the paper;
- (c) the management exercises a discretionary control over the contents of the weekly magazine "The Kuwaiti" up to the last minute of publication.

The manufacture of furniture, which the Iraq Petroleum Company have encouraged, is not a straightforward proposition in Kuwait. There are about six furniture makers of some consequence; two are Indian and the remainder Kuwaitis or Kuwaitis in partnership with immigrant Arabs. In no case, however, do the Kuwaitis seem to take an active part in the business. The managers and craftsmen are entirely foreign. It would appear, therefore, that if the oil company were to increase the demand for locally-made furniture, they would not be enlarging the field for the employment of Kuwaitis (who are reluctant to undertake woodwork) but would be encouraging the immigration of additional foreign labour. They would, of course, be increasing the profits of the Kuwaiti owner. The locally-made furniture is heavy and uncomfortable and before the oil company could purchase locally in any quantity, they would probably have to arrange for the local manufacturers to produce it to their own specifications and design.

EA 1532/98

No. 7

KUWAIT OIL AGREEMENT

Mr. Bell to Mr. Macmillan. (Received October 17)(No. 41. Unclassified)
Sir,Kuwait,
October 11, 1955.

I have the honour to report that His Highness the Ruler of Kuwait and Mr. C. A. P. Southwell, C.B.E., M.C., to-day signed a Consolidating Supplemental Agreement in connection with the concessions of the D'Arcy Kuwait Company and the Gulf Kuwait Company, together with an Agreement on dealing in crude oil and products in Kuwait, a letter *re* cash payments and an Agreement on the applicability of Kuwait Income Tax.

2. His Highness came to the Political Agency where Mr. Southwell, Mr. L. T. Jordan and Mr. E. A. V. de Candole of the Kuwait Oil Company; the Director of Finance, Sayyid Ahmed Abdul Latif; Mr. C. L. Wishaw; Mr. J. Polglase (representing Mr. Kemp), Sayyid Ashraf Lutfi, Acting State Secretary, and members of my staff were awaiting him. His Highness remarked that though many faces had changed since the last time he had signed an agreement with the Oil Company, the sentiments were the same. He did not attach importance to the words of agreements; it was the spirit that was important. Mr. Southwell replied that the Company's sentiments remained the same whatever changes had taken place and that like His Highness they attached importance to the spirit of their agreements with him.

3. The Agreements had already been signed in Paris by authorised representatives of the owning companies. Mr. Southwell had a Power of Attorney to sign in Kuwait on their behalf. His Highness signed first, then Mr. Southwell, and then I signed as a witness.

4. After signing, the Ruler recalled that during the negotiations leading up to the Agreement in Beirut he had paid tribute to my predecessor's services and he kindly added a warm reference to me.

5. On taking leave of Mr. Southwell, he said that his relations with him were based on sincerity, trust and affection and he was sure that would continue. Mr. Southwell replied that this had been the basis of the Company's relations with the Ruler ten years ago, was still, and would be in ten years' time!

6. After the ceremony, Mr. Wishaw left to arrange the exchange of letters between the Director of Income Tax and D'Arcy Kuwait Company on the keeping of records for the period from January 1, 1954, until December 31, 1955.

7. On the day before the ceremony, His Highness had signed the Kuwait Income Tax Decree (No. 3 of 1955) in Arabic and in English, the English text being identical with that enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 125 to the Acting Political Resident of August 19, 1955. Immediately after signature I telephoned to the Political Residency at Bahrain to arrange for the signing of Queen's Regulation No. 2 on that day giving the Decree the force of law to persons subject to Her Majesty's jurisdiction.

8. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Acting Political Resident at Bahrain, to the British Middle East Office at Nicosia and to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

G. W. BELL.

EA 1532/107

No. 8

THE ECONOMIC FUTURE OF KUWAIT

Mr. Bell to Mr. Macmillan. (Received December 3)

(No. 47. Confidential)
Sir,

*Kuwait,
November 28, 1955.*

I refer to your despatch No. 33 (EA 1007/13) of August 3, 1955, dealing with the economic future of Kuwait. I have the honour to comment on the two questions raised in paragraph 2.

2. The question whether Kuwait could derive increased economic and social benefit from its oil industry has been discussed in my predecessor's letter to Mr. Samuel (1535/4/55) of February 8, 1955, and his later letter (EA 1532/23) of February 22, 1955, to Mr. Fry, though those letters are concerned more with the possibilities of integrating the oil company's activities with the economy of the town than with the employment by the company of more Kuwaitis.

3. The number of Kuwaitis employed by the oil company is as follows:—

(a) *Senior Staff*

British, American and European	817
Indian and Pakistani	9
Kuwaiti	4

830

(b) *Eastern Staff (Clerical, Foremen and Technical)*

Indian and Pakistani	874
Other Arab and Iranian	102
Kuwaiti	29

1,005

(c) *Skilled Labour*

Indian and Pakistani	1,220
Other Arab and Iranian	660
Kuwaiti	550

2,420

(d) *Unskilled Labour*

Indian and Pakistani	36
Other Arab and Iranian	1,200
Kuwaiti	1,400

2,636

(e) *Domestic*

Indian, Pakistani and Iranian	764
Other Arab	11

775

Only one of the four Kuwaiti members of the senior staff is of true Kuwaiti origin. Of the remaining three, one is Shaikh Abdullah Khazal, son of the Shaikh of Muhammerah (Khorramshahr), who has now adopted Kuwaiti nationality. He acts as a general liaison officer concerned with Arab welfare, relations between the oil company and the Arab shops, &c., and also, through his own company, the Kuwait Khazal Development Company, undertakes contracting for them. Another is Khalid Jaffar, who is now accepted as a Kuwaiti national but is of Iraqi origin. He is assistant in the stores department and concerned with local purchases. The third is Sabri Sam'an, who is assistant instructor in the Arabic Centre; although he had adopted Kuwaiti nationality he has an Iraqi mother and Indian father. The true Kuwaiti is Issa Munim who works in the geological department.

4. The London office of the Kuwait Oil Company urge their local management to employ more Kuwaitis, but they encounter serious difficulties. Well-connected and educated Kuwaitis are not attracted to work in the oil company. They can

SECRET

13. I believe that the oil company are doing what they can to promote economic activity in Kuwait and to develop skills. They can probably do more during the next few years than they have done in the past, but I do not think we need to exert pressure on them at this stage. Mr. de Candole, who is shortly to arrive in Kuwait, is well aware of the importance of this matter, and I shall take an early opportunity of discussing possibilities with him. Meanwhile it would be useful to me to know what is being attempted elsewhere.

14. Although the question of social integration is not directly relevant to the subject of this despatch it is one which has a bearing on the general problem and is of considerable importance. Club life and its recreations is an essential part of the existence of the expatriate element among the company's employees and up to the present no way has been found to introduce Kuwaitis into any of the expatriate clubs. The danger of such social exclusion is evident and the company is well aware of it but no satisfactory solution has yet been found to overcome it, and the problem is complicated by the ban imposed by the State on Muslims taking alcoholic drinks. This question also is one which I shall take an early opportunity of discussing with Mr. de Candole.

15. The possibility of the company helping their native employees to build their own houses was mentioned in Mr. Pelly's letter of February 8 referred to above. This question has been engaging the attention of the oil company and the management is, in principle, firmly behind such a policy. They are, however, meeting with some practical difficulties in launching a scheme on the lines contemplated and nothing has hitherto been made public. It is hoped that further progress will not be long delayed.

16. You also raised in your despatch the question of whether the present oil revenue was being put to the best possible use for providing amenities for the people and a reserve against a possible drop in the price of oil. With regard to the second part of this question, I think the answer is clearly "Yes." At least one-third of the revenue is being placed at the disposal of the Investment Board in London. At present money is piling up because of delays in implementing the development programme and it is likely that this proportion may well be exceeded. I do not think that it is necessary or advisable for us to urge any further increase in the sums put aside for investment.

17. The answer to the first part of the question is more difficult. It is a matter of opinion what amenities would be of most value to the people of Kuwait. The money at present is being spent in the following way:—

- (a) to increase educational facilities; new schools have been built and the education department is anxious to build many more; teachers are recruited from all over the Middle East; the children are provided with free food, free uniforms and recreational facilities;
- (b) the house building programme is now gaining momentum and it seems to be the intention to provide all Kuwaitis with a dwelling house suitable to their income and station; a system is in operation whereby a tenant can buy his Government-built house by long-term easy instalments;
- (c) road building has been proceeding apace and will continue annually to provide Kuwait with an ever-improving system of both local and main roads;
- (d) labour codes have been enacted safeguarding the Kuwaiti employee and offering insurance and terms of employment which are probably unique in the Middle East; I will be reporting more fully on these shortly; wages and salaries are exceptionally high;
- (e) it is intended to provide Kuwait with a new deep-water port and a new airport;
- (f) allowance is being made in the programme for the provision of 45 gallons of water a head per day;
- (g) it is intended that the supply of electricity shall keep pace with the demand and its price is being lowered;
- (h) the health services are free to all and are continually expanding; a new 500-bed hospital is to be built;
- (i) the police services are being brought up to an improved standard of efficiency.

SECRET

18. The main difficulty lies not so much in lack of ideas for development and the provision of amenities but in the failure to provide a sufficiently efficient and disinterested organisation for carrying them out properly. It is doubtful, however, whether Her Majesty's Government can do anything more to influence the Kuwait authorities in the directions outlined in paragraph 6 of your despatch. The shortcomings in their own Government are well known to most Kuwaitis who are only too anxious to put them right. Their difficulty lies in the personalities of certain individuals in positions of power and authority and in particular Shaikh Fahad. I am convinced that at the present time we are more likely to see an improvement of the situation brought about by the Kuwaitis themselves than by the pressure which could be exerted by Her Majesty's Government. In many ways it is surprising how quickly and how much the Kuwaitis have learned in the last three years. They are feeling their way; they are making mistakes; but nevertheless they are managing their own affairs and are proud of doing so. There is nothing at the moment that they would resent more than interference from outside. This being so I think we must stand aside and see money wasted, see delays in fulfilling urgently required programmes and watch the employment of unsuitable experts. However, if Kuwait is ever to become an efficiently-run State it will probably have to reach that position by its own efforts. By this I do not mean that we should not be ready to tender advice or to obtain the best possible experts to help the Government whenever we are asked or the opportunity occurs, but I am convinced that patience will produce better results in the long run and a happier relationship between Her Majesty's Government and Kuwait than any attempt on our part to secure quick results. This means that if there is any opportunity to call in experts from the Development Division I shall certainly suggest this, but I am sure that at the present time and while the present atmosphere prevails there is not the slightest chance of persuading the Kuwait Government to accept a special mission to plan development or even to give advice on the development programme as a whole. There may often be occasions, however (and the airport was an example), when I can suggest a small mission to produce a report or make suggestions for solution of any specific problem.

19. I shall watch the situation both as regard the question of further integration of the oil company and Kuwait town and as regards development and be ready to seize any opportunities which may arise to further the object indicated in your despatch.

20. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Political Resident in the Persian Gulf and the Head of the Development Division, British Embassy, Beirut.

I have, &c.

G. W. BELL.

EA 1016/43

No. 9

INTERNAL SITUATION IN BAHRAIN

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Macmillan. (Received December 3)

(No. 129. Confidential)

Sir,

*Bahrain,
November 28, 1955.*

I have the honour to transmit herewith a copy of a despatch by Her Majesty's Political Agent at Bahrain in which Mr. Gault reviews recent developments in the internal situation.

2. The Ruler's policy towards the "reformists" has undergone a notable change in recent months; it is not only new that he should be able to reach some understanding with them, but new also that he should talk to them at all. It is less clear what has prompted this change. His Highness was for some time angling for a manifestation of support from us for a repressive policy in regard to this internal situation. He talked for instance of banishing the members of the High Executive Committee. Our obvious lack of enthusiasm for such courses, coupled with our repeated advice to him to continue with his administrative reforms and to improve his public relations, may at last have led him to realise that he could not rely on us to extricate him from all his troubles and that he must begin to fend for himself. There is reason to believe that at one stage he harboured the notion that he could play off the moderate members of the Committee against the extremists, but if so this hope has until now been disappointed. Perhaps, too, he realised that he was in no position yet for a trial of strength with his critics and decided to play for time until the police force is reorganised and strengthened: this thought has, of course, been very much in our own minds though it may be too far-sighted a consideration to attribute to Shaikh Sulman. Finally, I think that Shaikh Sulman has probably been impressed by advice which he has no doubt received from those educated Bahrainis who travel abroad, to the effect that Bahrain is no longer ahead of the times in respect of its Government and administration.

3. However this may be, the Ruler's present initiative, and the fact that he has at last proved willing to treat directly with "representatives of the people," are to be welcomed up to a point. They have, as Mr. Gault points out, much reduced the previous political tension in the island and have, for the present, removed the danger of strikes or political disturbances which would have severely tried the Bahrain police and probably found them wanting. But the measures to which he has agreed are not without their dangers, though they fall short of the elected legislative assembly which the reformists were demanding. In the first place they carry with them the danger of increased Egyptian influence. Since my return I have been struck by the rapid strides which Egyptian influence has made in recent months, not only in Bahrain, but elsewhere in the Gulf. As Mr. Gault recognises, and as I pointed out in my telegram No. 771 of the 28th of October, the supervisory committees described in the enclosed despatch are only too likely to serve as new channels for the introduction of Egyptian teachers, doctors and experts, while the intention which the Ruler has also proclaimed of bringing foreign Judges to help in the Courts will have the same result. Nor is the introduction of Egyptian specialists the only respect in which the new situation may favour the growth of Egyptian influence here. The close links between the reformists and the Egyptian revolutionary movement to which I have referred before, may oblige the Ruler in his attempt to establish friendly relations with the former to pose as a friend of Egypt as well. The immediate usefulness of the time-honoured remedy of invoking foreign affairs to cure, or obscure, internal dissensions, is not lost upon the Ruler, although its longer term implications probably are. The latest and most deplorable example of this is the success which has attended the collections in Bahrain for "Arms for Egypt"—a campaign in which the Ruler and his family played a leading part not, I believe, out of conviction but largely for considerations of domestic politics.

4. The second danger lies in the operation of the supervisory committees themselves. Mr. Gault points out that, although subject to general Government control of a budgetary nature, the committees will apparently be free to do as they

wish within the limits of the funds allotted to them. It is not a far step from this to a complaint by the committees that these limits are too narrow, and it will not be long before the Ruler's share of the oil royalties is called in question. A clash on such a fundamental point as this must lead on the one side to a "last-ditch" attitude on the part of the ruling family and on the other to a revival of the demand for a Legislative Council. The long term prospect is further darkened by evidence that in his latest moves the Ruler has outpaced the Adviser (a fact of which we should normally be slow to complain) and trodden on the toes of his British Judicial Adviser by announcing his intention of bringing to Bahrain a Muslim jurist not only to frame a criminal code, but also to draft a civil law and to undertake the reorganisation of the Courts. The existing Judicial Adviser had been under the impression that he had been brought here to fulfil precisely this role. It is clear, moreover, that the committees will not enjoy the support of the merchant class, whose general attitude is that the reformists have now been given enough rope and it is to be hoped that they will hang themselves. Experience of reformist movements elsewhere, once they have tasted power, hardly suggests that this is a likely outcome. At all events, the educated and ruling classes do not stand together at this critical juncture of Bahrain's constitutional development, and in view of the unity hitherto displayed by the reformists this is a pity.

5. It is perhaps relevant to consider whether this juncture represents the end of a journey or merely a halting-place on the road from feudalism to democracy. In favour of the former view there is the possibility that the middle-of-the-road reformers in Bahrain may be satisfied with "functional representation" of the kind now to be established (a functional representation which has, incidentally, its roots in the local tradition of using committees to settle such matters as pearl diving questions). As against this desirable conclusion there is the probability that the local reformers regard themselves, and are encouraged by Egyptian precept to regard themselves, as revolutionaries and many historical precedents underline the conclusion that revolutionary movements can never afford to stand still.

6. Much will depend upon what attitude we ourselves adopt in these circumstances. In my view, although we cannot and should not attempt permanently to stem the tide of constitutional advance, this process has gone as far as it should for the time being. In my despatch No. 101 of the 26th of October, 1954, I referred to the openings already available to the young aspiring politician in the form of the functional and representative bodies then existing. We should now be able to point even more strongly to the opportunities which the reformists have, if they have also the will and the ability, to gain practical experience of the responsibilities of government, before they press for wider popular representation. Moreover, bearing in mind the considerations set out in Sir Anthony Eden's despatch No. 203 (EA 10113/3) of the 14th of December, 1954, I think that the time has come when we must make it clear that we believe that the Ruler has gone a long way to meet the demands of the "reformists" and that it is now up to them to prove themselves. When I first saw him on my return, the Ruler made a point of complaining of our contacts with the opposition. While I do not consider this necessarily a bad thing because it is not in our longer term interests here that we should become completely identified with a ruling clique, I think that it is now in our own best interests, as well as those of the Ruler and his people, that we should emphasise the advantages of at least a long pause to see how this first limited experiment in representative institutions works before considering further steps towards popular government.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Cairo, Beirut and Jedda, and to the Political Office, Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

Mr. Gault to Sir Bernard Burrows (Bahrain)

(No. 12. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
November 20, 1955.*

As the political situation in Bahrain just now is quiet it is perhaps a convenient moment to review the latest developments.

2. As your Excellency knows the first reaction to the Ruler's agreement, given on October 6, to the setting up of councils or committees, half of whose members were to be nominated by the Bahrain Government and half to be freely elected by the people, to supervise the work of the departments of health and education and the work of the various municipalities in Bahrain was on the whole good. Unfortunately the Ruler, when the agreement was announced, failed to make any reference to two other points which the High Executive Committee, the leaders of the nationalist movement, had apparently been discussing with him at the same time as the question of the supervisory councils. These were the improvement of the police force and reform of the administration of justice. At first these points of criticism did not appear formidable and moreover I hoped that the Adviser, Sir Charles Belgrave, with whom I discussed them, would be able to bring the Ruler to make some suitable reference to them. Unfortunately again the Ruler proved obdurate and refused to say anything about the two points, though a statement was put in the *Government Gazette* by the Adviser saying, without mentioning the councils, that certain improvements had been introduced into the police and the law courts over the last year. I subsequently found out that the Ruler refused because he considered that a proclamation he had made in July 1954—No. 36-73—should be regarded as sufficient expression of good intention in these two matters and that since then a good deal had in fact been done, both in the police and in the law courts, which was well known to everybody. The High Executive Committee however sought to draw the maximum profit from the Ruler's refusal by accusing him of breaking his promises and by threatening retaliation by way of strikes and demonstrations, and, later, by accusing the Adviser of having persuaded the Ruler not to say anything about the two points at issue. Indeed, things reached a point where there was serious talk among the nationalists of pressing for Sir Charles Belgrave's removal and it was said that this subject would be raised at a meeting to be held on October 28 to commemorate the birthday of the prophet Mohammed. A few days before this however, the High Executive Committee let it be known to the Adviser that they would agree to enter into discussion with the Ruler on the matters at issue with him, the Adviser, present and one or two others. The Ruler accepted this proposal and a meeting took place on October 27. At this meeting the Ruler yielded more than he had hitherto undertaken to do, in that he agreed to the three supervisory councils or committees being more or less independent of Government control. While the committees should consult with the Government on the general question of the public good they were to be free to spend the annual amount granted to the department in question by the Government as they wished. This in effect means that they have complete freedom to run the departments in question. I understand that this fresh advance on the Ruler's part was unexpected, even by the Adviser, and took the wind out of the sails of the nationalist representatives who did not raise the matters of the police and the judiciary at all. As a result of their unexpected success the High Executive Committee at the meeting on October 28, far from attacking either the Ruler or the Adviser praised the Ruler for what he had done. Since then the political atmosphere has cooled considerably and both the Government and the members of the High Executive Committee are amicably considering ways and means of organising the elections to the three committees. As a first step an electoral roll is being prepared though I understand that the minimum age for voters has not yet been settled. The High Executive Committee want it set at 18 and that men only should be allowed to vote. The Government think this age limit too low and would like to see women voting as they have done in the past in the Manama municipal elections. It is not expected that it will be possible to hold elections and form the committees until about January 1956.

3. The arrangement now reached between the Ruler and the High Executive Committee besides being unexpected is something beyond what I would have thought either likely or necessary and also beyond the hopes of the reformists. It

is also considerably beyond anything done elsewhere in the Persian Gulf shikhdoms. In theory the idea is good because it does provide effective popular control over three important departments of government, public health, education, and the municipalities which touch the life of the Bahrainis more closely than any others. It will therefore undoubtedly go far to sidetrack the demand for a legislative council. It is interesting to note here that the secretary of the High Executive Committee, Abdul Rahman al Bakir, has declared privately that, in his view, Bahrain would not be ready for a legislative council for another five or seven years. In practice the idea has many difficulties. The committees are more likely than not to indulge in working off the private feuds and spites of their members and the latter's friends and in general pursue a destructive rather than a constructive path. There are very few individuals in Bahrain outside Government service who have any practical idea of administration and so the committees are likely to be made up mainly of inexperienced people. Indeed the first practical difference of opinion between the Government and the High Executive Committee since the arrangement was reached with the Ruler has been on whether Government servants should be allowed to become members of the committees or not. The Government says not because they are already finding that their very few good native officials are spending so much time on local political matters that their departmental work is suffering and there is also the ultimate question of their loyalty to the Government or to the popular party. The High Executive Committee says it has hardly any experienced people to put forward so the Government must allow suitable people from among its employees to serve on the committees. There is also the question of the British officials employed by the Government on contract. Here I think the most likely object of head chopping will be public health where the State Medical Officer, Dr. R. H. B. Snow, has been under repeated attack for not being a very good doctor for some years. There are a number of Indian doctors and medical staff who are likely to be attacked too, with unfortunate results on the efficiency, such as it is, of the public health machine. Fortunately there seems to be no hostility to British employees as such, only to individuals. But any attempt to support such individuals may well result in the growth of hostility to British employees in general, particularly if, as is only too likely, there is partisan pressure to employ Egyptians. The education department is particularly liable to an influx of Egyptians since there are a number of Egyptian teachers already employed by the Bahrain Government and Egypt is about the only source of trained teachers whose mother tongue is Arabic.

4. The Ruler has taken an unusually—and unexpectedly—bold step in agreeing to these three councils or committees being in effect independent of the Government. For this he deserves due credit, all the more so as he seems to have made up his mind for himself. The councils could work very successfully and it is to be hoped that they will be allowed to do so, though this unfortunately is far from certain. They should however serve to educate the reformists in both administration and responsibility, in neither of which are they yet very experienced.

I have, &c.

C. A. GAULT,

Her Majesty's Political Agent.

EGYPTIAN INFLUENCE IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received January 2)

*British Residency,
Bahrain,*

December 24, 1955

(No. 143. Confidential)
Sir,

I have the honour to report on the growth and significance of Egyptian influence in the Persian Gulf.

2. The Kuwait Government have for some years employed a large number of Egyptian school-teachers seconded from the Egyptian Government and have been in the habit of sending to Egypt a number of Kuwaiti students for further education (though in fact similar numbers are sent to the United Kingdom). The number of Egyptian teachers in Kuwait now runs into hundreds. Without them it is clear that the whole educational programme would collapse since there are not enough surplus teachers available in other parts of the Arab world. It is, however, noteworthy that the Director-General of the Education Department is a Kuwaiti and that his deputy is a Palestinian. In addition to these teachers there are a number of other Egyptian officials and technicians employed by the Kuwait Government, and the number is tending to increase. Here again, however, the chief positions in most of the departments are held by Kuwaitis, and Palestinians are also well represented. Some of the Egyptians are of a high calibre by any standards and, whatever may be their political views, undoubtedly do a good technical job. Others are light-weight and some no doubt have more interest in the political possibilities of their work than in its technical duties. The same thing has happened on a much smaller scale in Bahrain and Qatar. The Bahrain Government have tried not to tie themselves so closely to Egypt in the recruitment of teachers as Kuwait has done. Their needs are smaller and they already have a much larger proportion of Bahrainis trained as teachers. They make a point of obtaining their foreign teachers from Syria and the Lebanon, in addition to Egypt. In Doha the position is similar. The Inspector of the Education Department is Egyptian, but the Headmaster is Palestinian, and the other teachers are divided between those two nationalities. The whole department is under the control of one of the Darwish brothers, who is, of course, a Qatari. As has been reported in correspondence throughout this year the Egyptian authorities have lately tried to obtain a foothold in a similar manner in Sharjah, where there are now two Egyptian teachers provided by the Egyptian Government in addition to some Palestinians provided by the Kuwait Government, and where a doctor and a lady doctor from Egypt are also expected as soon as facilities can be provided for them.

3. In any assessment of this problem it must be clearly borne in mind that, whatever may be its real internal requirements, Egypt has teachers and technicians available for export to the under-developed Arab territories, that they often have at least adequate technical qualifications, and that there is at present no other source from which men of similar qualifications and knowledge of Arabic can be obtained at comparable cost. Whatever may be its motives Egypt is playing an important part in the development of this area, and even if we could close the door to Egyptian penetration of this kind we should only do so at the cost of slowing down the rate of progress. Even if we believe this rate may in some cases be too fast we shall never convince influential sections of the population that this is so, and in the attempt we should on our side appear to be influenced primarily by political considerations.

4. The other main sphere in which Egyptian influence is evident is that of politics and propaganda. Egypt has long been regarded as the centre of Arab learning. Its claim to political leadership as seen from here through the distortions and exaggerations of Egyptian propaganda is buttressed on the leading part played by Egypt in setting up the Arab League, the length and ferocity of Egypt's struggle against foreign domination, the success of its revolution, and now by its apparent

discovery of a new approach to the Palestine problem by building up Arab military strength with arms from Eastern Europe. Even though most of the Gulf Arabs are parochially-minded and some of them inclined to be sceptical of the lack of positive achievements of the Arab League, and though most of them do not actively chafe against the relationship of their States with Her Majesty's Government, nevertheless the themes of Arab unity and liberation from Western imperialism carry some mystical power among the younger and more idealistic members of society and command at least lip-service from the rest. But it is very largely on the last two considerations mentioned, namely, the Egyptian revolution and the Iron Curtain arms that Egypt's political attraction now relies in these parts. The constitutional systems of the Persian Gulf Shaikhdoms are an obvious target for the criticism of educated or semi-educated members of these societies. They are old-fashioned; they lead in some cases to administrative inefficiency and in many cases to a flagrant inequality in the distribution of wealth. It is obvious that the Egyptian revolution which overthrew a régime suffering in many respects from the same defects must be taken as a model by those who wish for change here. This has most obviously occurred up to now in Bahrain where there are undoubtedly links of a fairly direct kind between Egypt and the political reformist movement represented by the "High Executive Committee." It was noteworthy that after one of the leading members of this organisation passed through Cairo on his way back to Bahrain last summer the propagandist utterances of this group became for the first time specifically pro-Egyptian, anti-British and anti-Western in character. At the same time the "High Executive Committee" began to announce the offer by the Egyptian Government of scholarships for Bahraini students, and the Bahrain Government Director of Education, when making his annual visit to Egypt to recruit teachers, found for the first time an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion due, without doubt, to the committee's attacks on the Bahrain Government and on him personally which had found currency in Egyptian Government circles. There is some suspicion that the settlement recently achieved between the Ruler of Bahrain and representatives of this group for a limited constitutional advance contained a tacit or at any rate secret provision that there would be shaikhly tolerance of the movement's connection with Egypt, at least to the extent of allowing and indeed encouraging the collection of money in Bahrain for the benefit of the Egyptian arms drive. It is possibly more than a coincidence that another feature of this settlement was the abandonment by the "High Executive Committee" of their demand for a fully elected legislative assembly, which might not have fitted in too well with the pattern of constitutional development being followed by their Egyptian mentors.

5. There is no doubt that the Egyptian negotiations with Czechoslovakia for the purchase of arms to use against Israel have captured the imagination of Arabs in this part of the world to a remarkable degree. People here have never really been interested in the cold war, which they tended to regard as an unprofitable and dangerous private quarrel between America and Russia, with the former perhaps rather more to blame than the latter. (British diplomacy has on the other hand usually been admired for its efforts to reduce tension and to seek practical and just solutions to particular problems.) There was therefore no disposition to think automatically, as was the case in the west, that the introduction of Russian influence into the Middle East must be contrary to Arab interests, and the Egyptians succeeded in representing themselves as going to the only source available for a supply of weapons to resist further Israeli encroachment and eventually perhaps to drive the Israelis into the sea. Any efforts by us or America to supply arms or to give guarantees with regard to Israel have been prejudiced by the memory that if it had not been for us in the first place, the Jewish problem in the Middle East would not exist. Russia is (wrongly) believed to be free of this historical defect. The inhabitants of the Persian Gulf shaikhdoms probably have rather uneasy consciences about their lack of active support for Arab causes. They can usually shuffle out of responsibility by saying it is our fault that they cannot do this or that. But many of them jumped at the possibility of providing money, which everyone knows they have in some quantity, as a relatively painless demonstration of Arab solidarity in the one issue on which Arab thinking is really more or less united. The collection of funds for contributions to Egyptian rearmament began in Kuwait in a relatively small way and spread to Bahrain, where the sons of the Ruler of Bahrain, in the course of a demonstration at a football match, contributed relatively large sums for this purpose, and has now

spread to Qatar, where, through the influence of the Saudi Qadi, there is an announced intention to contribute at least three times as much as Bahrain.

6. Apart from the supply of technicians and direct contacts with the political movement in Bahrain the principal methods by which Egyptian influence is exerted are those of radio and press propaganda and the visit of Egyptian personalities. The Egyptian radio is not always believed, but it is listened to, partly for its technical qualities, partly because there is usually something exciting being said on it (and the Arab in these parts is apt to be extremely bored). The Egyptian press is read by those who read any newspapers at all in preference to that of other Arab countries. While inaccuracy over local events here in the Egyptian press and radio is often obvious, and is noted with disapproval, nevertheless one must recognise that these media give a continuous hearing to the Egyptian and often the Saudi point of view on topics both of local and of world-wide interest. The B.B.C. Arabic and Sharq al Adna are also listened to by large numbers and command respect both for their technical excellence and for the general reliability of their news. But a kind of Gresham's law of ideas seems to operate in the Arab mind by which bad news drives out good and falsehoods drive out truth. The visits of Egyptian personalities to the Gulf States are more frequent than those of other Arab countries. The most prominent lately has been Colonel Anwar Sadat, Minister of State in the Egyptian Government and Secretary of the "Islamic Congress." He has just visited Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait for the second time in a year. His behaviour appears to have been correct, and indeed in Bahrain he disappointed the "High Executive Committee" and the more enthusiastic pro-Egyptian elements. But such visits normally provide an occasion for popular demonstration of friendship for Egypt and for the exchange of speeches glorifying that brand of Arab unity currently being peddled in Cairo, Riyadh and Damascus.

7. I have no means of judging to what extent Egyptian propagandist and other activities in the Gulf are co-ordinated between the Egyptian and Saudi Governments. It is sometimes suggested that the Saudis cannot be too pleased to see Egyptian activity on their borders, particularly when associated with would-be revolutionary elements, since Saudi Arabia itself presents an even more obvious target for constitutional reform than the smaller States of the Persian Gulf. But in practice the influence of each of these States provides a useful foil for the other. The traditional and reactionary elements of the population in Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar and the Trucial States (except Abu Dhabi) tend to be on terms of historical friendship with the Saudi dynasty or the bin Jiluwis of Hasa. In the case of Qatar they have in common the Wahhabi creed. Kuwait was the base from which Abdul Aziz bin Saud reconquered Nejd, and although modernistic social tendencies are now appearing, the law administered in Kuwait is still that of the Shar'a and therefore basically the same as that of Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, the younger and more progressive element in these States is bound to be critical of Saudi Arabia and of its form of government, but they, as I have explained, find their progressive model in Egypt. Thus the Cairo-Riyadh axis has fashions to suit all tastes. Recent events in the neighbouring Shaikhdoms of Dubai and Sharjah provide a classic example of this dual approach. Shaikh Jum'a bin Maktum, brother of the titular but more or less non-functioning Ruler of Dubai, and Uncle of Shaikh Rashid, the Regent, had for long made trouble for his nephew's rule and in particular was the champion of the old order and of reaction against various administrative reforms which we had persuaded Rashid to adopt. He was also known to be closely linked with the Saudis and one of the main channels for their influence in the Trucial States. When he was finally expelled from Dubai he chose to go to Saudi Arabia rather than anywhere else, and is now living there on a Saudi pension. In Sharjah the Ruler is a young and ambitious man with a modicum of education and pretensions as a poet. He has been singled out among all the Trucial Coast Rulers as the Egyptian target and has been flooded with offers of hospitality and technical help by Egyptian personalities in or in close touch with the Government. On the other hand the remarkably lukewarm Egyptian support for the Saudi cause over Buraimi and Oman suggest that there may not be any definite or conscious accord between the two countries to stage a common offensive against our position in this area, and that the actions of each are to a large extent opportunistic, and may in fact adumbrate an underlying rivalry.

8. There is no serious sign yet that the predominance of Saudi and Egyptian influence has gone to the point where any of these States would wish to exchange their special relations with us for dependence on any Middle Eastern State or group of States. The advantages of the present situation are too clear. These Shaikhdoms can act in the knowledge of British protection and at the same time can think as Arab nationalists adhering to the Cairo-Riyadh political philosophy. There is no difficulty for an Arab in the divorce of thought and action. The danger for us is therefore not immediate but in the future, when generations will have grown up who are ignorant of the historical basis of our association with their States and who are more thoroughly imbued with Egyptian ways of thought, and who might therefore be more inclined to adopt the otherwise almost universal Arab trait of cutting off one's nose to spite one's face, and so give up the real advantages of our protection to satisfy an emotional urge towards Arab brotherhood. What can we do to avert this future danger? We must continue to show that the relationship with us is worth while. We must ensure that our part of it is unobtrusive and that it does not prevent the inhabitants of the Persian Gulf States from thinking and, within fairly elastic limits, acting as Arabs. To do all this we must show that we as well as Egypt are a reservoir of technical help and that ours is better than theirs and better or equal value for the money. This means that for key posts we must be prepared to provide really good technicians and if necessary subsidise their cost, and we must not provide too many British officials to give the impression that we are merely seeking a position for ourselves. There may also be increasing scope for organising technical self-help among the Persian Gulf States themselves. This is already being done in education by the Kuwait Government's help to Sharjah and Ras al Khaimah in the supply of teachers, and by the Bahrain Government's loan of both British and Arab technical officials to various Trucial Coast States. On the specifically educational side it is a tragedy that the opening of a British Council office has been so much delayed. Now that we at last have one in Kuwait we must give it all possible support and hope that by the quality of its work and by the quality of the education we can provide for carefully selected students in the United Kingdom we can to some extent counter-balance the quantity of educational advantage offered by Egypt. I have already included in my proposals for the economic development of the Trucial States a recommendation that we should not allow the same situation to develop there as in Kuwait and that we should from the beginning keep our foot firmly in the door by contributing financially to the development of education. In the interests of unobtrusiveness we must if possible avoid setting up British military installations which would become a focus for hostile propaganda and give the impression that we were only interested in what we could get out of the area. We should retain a fairly elastic conscience about those aspects of foreign affairs which touch an emotional chord here, particularly the prohibition of contacts of all kinds with Israel. After all, it is the foreign policy of the Persian Gulf States which we are supposed to conduct and this is not necessarily always exactly the same as our own. Our publicity services can do much to explode the wilder fallacies of Egyptian propaganda and they can do something to spread the idea that Britain provides a model of moderate social progress in many respects better than that of Egypt.

9. But with all this it must remain doubtful if we as a Western Power can create a positive philosophy to take the place of that now current here. It is perhaps only another Arab influence that could do this, and I suggest that it is for consideration whether such influence could be brought to bear from Iraq, and whether it is in our interest to see this happen. If we are relatively confident of the stability of Iraq in its present course I would feel there is much to be said for enlisting Iraq's help in the struggle for the minds of the Persian Gulf Arabs. At present Iraq's influence here is low, and it is only one or two unusually enlightened men who understand and appreciate both its growing importance and the wisdom of its present policy. So far as I can judge it would suit us well if Iraq were urged to remedy this state of affairs and to show more interest in this area by the offer of places in Iraqi schools and universities, by the despatch of technicians (this has very recently been promised for the Bahrain police, which is an excellent thing), by the visits by Iraqis prominent in both political and cultural spheres, and by an improvement and intensification of publicity for the Iraqi point of view by press and radio. Even if this process were begun it would take some considerable time to show its effect, but if there is much delay it will be all the harder to start because the Egyptian position will have become all the more consolidated.

SECRET

10. None of what I have said in this despatch applies to Muscat, which has for some time incurred the bitter hostility of both Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and which has by chance old family ties with Iraq, but even here it would be as well for the Iraqis not to rest on their laurels, but to consider ways in which they might be able to provide technical help for this State, which is rapidly emerging from obscurity and entering on a crucial and promising stage of development.

11. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Cairo, Bagdad, Beirut, Damascus, Amman, Jedda, to Persian Gulf posts and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

SECRET

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EA 1012/2

No. 11

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE PERSIAN GULF

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Macmillan. (Received July 17)

(No. 84. Secret)

Bahrain,

Kuwait (continued)

Sir,

June 24, 1955.

In accordance with the instructions contained in Foreign Office Circular W 1881/1881/50 of May 28, 1935, as modified by Circular No. 127 of December 14, 1944, I have the honour to submit (in proof form) my report for 1955 on leading personalities in the Persian Gulf.

2. I regret that it was not possible to render this report for 1954.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in the Persian Gulf, 1955

INDEX

Bahrain

1. Abdullah bin Hamad, Shaikh.
2. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.I.E.
3. Abdul Aziz Shemlan.
4. Abdul Rahman al Bakir.
5. Abdul Rahman al Ousaibi.
6. Ahmad Fakhroo, M.B.E.
7. Daij bin Hamad, Shaikh, O.B.E.
8. Hassan al Mudaifi.
9. Hussain bin Ali Yatim, M.B.E.
10. Isa bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh.
11. Kanoo family.
12. Khalifah bin Muhammad, Shaikh.
13. Khalifah bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh.
14. Mansur al Orayidh, M.B.E.
15. Muhammad bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.B.E.
16. Muhsin al Tajir.
17. Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al Khalifah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E., Ruler of Bahrain.
18. Salman bin Muhammad, Shaikh.

Kuwait

1. Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
2. Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh, C.I.E.
3. Abdullah bin Khaza'al.
4. Abdullah al Mubarak, Shaikh, C.I.E.
5. Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait.
6. 'Izzat Ja'far.
7. Fahad al Salim, Shaikh.
8. Jabir al Abdullah, Shaikh.
9. Jabir al Ali, Shaikh.
10. Jabir al Ahmad, Shaikh.
11. Khalid al Abdullah, Shaikh.
12. Muhammad al Ahmad, Shaikh.
13. Mubarak al 'Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh.

50004

14. Mubarak al Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
15. Nufi Yusuf al Nusf.
16. Sa'd al Abdullah, Shaikh.
17. Salim al Ali, Shaikh.
18. Sabah al Abdullah, Shaikh.
19. Sabah al Ahmad, Shaikh.
20. Sabah al Nasir, Shaikh.
21. Sabah al Salim, Shaikh.
22. Yusuf al Ahmad al Ghanim.
23. Yusuf bin Isa, Shaikh.
24. Jabri, Majd ud-Din.
25. Tala't Ghusain.
26. Sa'ud al-Fawzan.
27. Abdul Aziz Husain.
28. Ali Dawud.
29. Muhammad Qabazard.
30. Fu'ad Abdul Baqi.
31. Muhammad Yusuf al Nusf.
32. Ahmad Abdul Latif.
33. Abdul Latif Ibrahim al Nusf.
34. Jasim Qatami.

Obituary: Abdullah al Mulla Salih, M.B.E.

Muscat

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid.
2. Ghalib bin Ali bin Hilal.
3. Gokaldass, Rai Bahadur.
4. Ismail Khalil al Rassasi.
5. Muhammad bin Ahmad.
6. Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat.
7. Salih bin Isa al Harthi, Shaikh.
8. Shahab bin Faisal, Saiyid.
9. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh.
10. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid.
11. Tariq bin Taimur, Saiyid.

Obituary: Muhammad bin Abdullah al Khalili.

Qatar

1. Abdullah bin Darwish.
2. Abdullah bin Qasim Al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh.
3. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish.
4. Ali bin Abdullah al Thani, His Highness Shaikh, K.B.E., Ruler of Qatar.
5. Jasim bin Darwish.
6. Muhammad bin Uthman.
7. Salih al Mani'.
8. Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, Shaikh.

Trucial Coast

1. Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, M.B.E., Shaikh, Ruler of Umm al Qaiwain.
2. Hazza' bin Sultan, Shaikh.
3. Jum'a bin Maktum, Shaikh.
4. Khalid bin Sultan, Shaikh.
5. Muhammad bin Hamad Al Sharqi, Shaikh, Ruler of Fujairah.

Trucial Coast (continued)

6. Muhammad bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh.
7. Rashid bin Humaid Al Na'imi, Shaikh, Ruler of Ajman.
8. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh.
9. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh, Ruler of Dubai.
10. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh, Ruler of Ras al Khaimah.
11. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Shaikh, Ruler of Sharjah.
12. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zaid, Shaikh, Ruler of Abu Dhabi.
13. Sultan bin Salim Al Qasimi.
14. Zaid bin Sultan, Shaikh.

BAHRAIN**1. Abdullah bin Hamad, Shaikh**

Brother of the Ruler (No. 17). Born in 1911. Very short-sighted and wears thick glasses. Abdullah is very ambitious and undoubtedly had hopes of succeeding his father. He has always been keen on learning and is the only one of the brothers who speaks any English. He is sensible, though rather slow-witted, careful over money and fairly progressive. For several years he was a magistrate on the Bahrain Court, but he retired from it twice in a huff because his father refused him something he wanted. He walked out a third time and then to his disgust his father appointed Shaikh Daij (No. 7) in his place. When Abdullah wished to return he was not reappointed.

Abdullah and Daij accompanied Shaikh Hamad to England in 1936 and the next year Abdullah spent six months living with a tutor in Oxford learning English. When he came back he was full of Western ideas, but little of this has survived except the furniture and European sanitation in his house. Shaikh Salman appointed him president of the Muharraq municipality, a post which Shaikh Salman had himself held before he succeeded. He is also President of the Majlis al Tijara (the official commercial tribunal) and Honorary President of the Bahrain Club. Besides his one trip to Europe, Abdullah has travelled several times in India. He is more conversant with European ways than any of his brothers. Physically he is not very strong.

2. Abdullah bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Second brother of the late Shaikh Hamad and uncle of the present Shaikh of Bahrain (No. 17). Born about 1883. Shaikh Abdullah is the cleverest, wickedest, most entertaining and most powerful member of the Khalifah family. His education is very slight. He can read but can scarcely write, and often laments the meagre educational facilities available to him in his younger days. He is very intelligent, with a sharp sense of humour; he has tact, political ability and an even temper, though he can be fierce when really roused. He is a skilful negotiator and arbitrator.

Shaikh Abdullah has travelled in India and the Near East and has visited England twice, once in 1919 and again in 1923 with Shaikh Hamad, who took him because he was afraid to leave him on his own in Bahrain.

Shaikh Abdullah was his father's favourite and although his elder brother, Shaikh Hamad, had been appointed heir apparent, Shaikh Abdullah was for many years the most powerful man in Bahrain. Shaikh Abdullah is always in debt, but cheerfully so, and is not mean. Most of his money is spent on sexual pleasures, for which he is notorious throughout the Gulf. His tastes are catholic and he does not trouble to hide his affairs. He has had countless

wives and male and female attachments. He is feared and disliked by the Shia Baharinah on account of the wild doings of his earlier life. His servants used to carry off Baharinah women for their master. Respectable Arabs dislike and mistrust him. He is very popular with a section of the younger Shaikhs, who prefer him to Shaikh Salman. He strictly abstains from alcohol, but one of his sons is a notorious drunkard who visited England in 1953 for treatment for alcoholism.

Outwardly Shaikh Abdullah had always supported the Government of his brother, the late Shaikh Hamad, and has professed to be pro-British because Bahrain must be dependent, though he would himself prefer the country to be entirely independent. In the past, when there has been political trouble, there have been rumours that Shaikh Abdullah was behind it, but this has never been proved.

Shaikh Abdullah is more energetic than most of the younger members of the family. He used to be a good horseman and is fond of hawking and shooting. He is careful about his health, and in spite of his unrestrained lasciviousness he is rarely ill.

Shaikh Abdullah is Minister of Education (the only person in Bahrain to bear the title of "Minister"), the administration of this department being, however, in the hands of a Bahraini Director, Dr. Ahmad Al Umran. He is also the chairman of the Manama Municipal Council and is a judge of the Bahrain Appeal Court.

3. Abdul Aziz bin Saad Shemlan

Born about 1912. Sunni Arab. His father Saad Shemlan is a negro former slave, and his mother an Indian, probably from Malabar. His father is said to have been foster brother to the present Ruler. The father was deported about 1930 by Shaikh Hamad for seditious activities. Abdul Aziz went to the American University at Beirut in 1930 at the expense of the Bahrain Government. In 1939 he was employed as an informer by the present Senior Royal Air Force Officer, Persian Gulf, who was then Air Liaison Officer here. In 1945 joined the British Bank of the Middle East (then Imperial Bank of Persia) where he still works. Closely concerned with the now defunct paper *Saut al Bahrain* and a member of the High Executive Committee. Has quarrelled with his father. Speaks good English.

4. Abdul Rahman al Bakir

Born about 1912. Of a Qatari family. His uncle who was a small merchant was reported for bringing cultured pearls into Bahrain—he had been agitating against the then Ruler—Abdul Rahman came to school in Bahrain (Muharraq) where he organised a strike of the students. Obtained Bahrain nationality on the insistence of Shaikh Salman who was opposed by the Adviser. The Ruler withdrew his nationality in 1954. Since 1952 has been involved in local politics, attacking the Government in the newspapers. In 1954 helped to form the self-styled "High Executive Committee" to press reforms and improvements in the administration on the Government. With Abdul Aziz Shemlan (No. 3), he has since emerged as one of the leading figures of the reformist movement. He appears to have a considerable popular following, and has so far welded this weapon with reasonable discretion.

5. Abdur Rahman al Qusaibi

Born in 1892. Nejd, of plebeian origin. Formerly Victor Rosenthal's pearl-broker. An intelligent and sophisticated man. Has travelled much in the East and in Europe and was appointed an honorary Wazir of Saudi Arabia by Ibn Saud in 1951 and a Minister of State by King Saud in 1955. The Qusaibis have been for very many years unofficial

Saudi purchasing agents in Bahrain, being mainly concerned with buying supplies from Saudi Arabia. The family owns land in Hasa and Qatif. He dresses in European style and stays in the Savoy Hotel when in London. He often has big schemes which do not come off. In intelligence and outlook he is far in advance of the ordinary Bahrain merchant and is able to take an objective view of his own people and the "Arab cause," at least when talking to a non-Arab. He is a good and amusing talker.

6. Ahmad Fakhroo, M.B.E.

Born about 1905. Since the death of his father, Yusuf Fakhroo, in 1952, he has become the head of the family, which conducts one of the most important businesses in Bahrain. The firm deal in all kinds of trade and hold the Nuffield agency. They have connexions with Iraq and India and used to have a branch in Basra, but it has recently been closed. A proposal was once made informally that Ahmad should be made honorary Iraqi Consul in Bahrain, but it was not pursued. Though he confines himself largely to business, in 1954 with Mansur al Oraiyyidh played a useful part in restoring relations between the Shias in Bahrain and the Sunnis at a time of communal tension. For this was awarded the M.B.E. The family are Holis, i.e., Sunni Arabs who were previously domiciled in Persia and are considered to have lost the purity of their stock. Speaks good English. Has travelled much and is of progressive outlook.

7. Daij bin Hamad, Shaikh, O.B.E.

Brother of the Ruler. Born in 1915. An amiable and good-natured man, who was his father's favourite son. He is practically illiterate, but quite intelligent. He accompanied his father on both his visits to England in 1925 and 1936. He acquired a good deal of money and property from his father, for which reason most of his brothers dislike him. He is mentally energetic though physically slothful, and is much addicted to women. He is sometimes generous. He sits in the Joint Court with the Registrar of H.B.M. Court for Bahrain and in the Senior Bahrain Court jointly with the Adviser and Shaikh Ali bin Ahmed, a distant relation. At times when the local situation becomes difficult, such as when attacks on the Jews were threatened, he has shown a remarkable resolution in taking security precautions, and it was he who kept on urging his brother the Ruler to deal with matters firmly. Awarded the O.B.E., April 21, 1954. Speaks English.

8. Hassan al Mudaifi

Born about 1895. Shia. Close friend of Mansur al Oraiyyidh whose inseparable companion he is and whose views and opinions he reflects. Owns some land but is chiefly a pearl merchant of high reputation. Has two sons.

9. Hussain bin Ali Yatim, M.B.E.

Born in 1914. The son of a small trader in Bahrain of Sunni Persian origin (holi). Hussain Yatim, when quite young, was taken up by Major Holmes, a concession hunter through whom the Bahrain Oil Concession was arranged, and, after some years at the American Mission School, was sent to England to be educated. He was at Brighton Grammar School for about three years, usually spending his holidays at Major Holmes's house in Essex. He did well at school.

When he returned to Bahrain he was employed by Major Holmes as interpreter and secretary. He had inherited some money and property from his father and, in addition, had various commercial interests. After working for Major Holmes he was employed by the Bahrain Petroleum Company as

50004

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Hussain Yatim married the daughter of Yusuf Lutfali Khunji who was at one time a wealthy piece-goods merchant in Manchester. The girl was brought up in England, studying medical work. Her father eventually lost most of his money and returned to Persia. Hussain and his wife live in European style. They lost a gifted daughter in the "Comet" disaster of January 1954.

Hussain Yatim is the only man in Bahrain who was educated in England. It is difficult to say whether the experiment has been a success. Naturally from the point of view of commerce his education, his experience in England, and his methods, have been of great use; but these things have given him a feeling of superiority over his fellow-countrymen and of dissatisfaction with social conditions. He is clever and versatile, but not very stable. He is continually launching experiments of which he tires before there has been time to judge the results. Speaks good English. Awarded the M.B.E., April 21, 1954.

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11. Kanoo Family

Founded by Yusuf whose father was a charcoal burner from Persia. Yusuf became a leading Persian Gulf merchant and private banker about the time of the first world war. He was also munshi of the Bahrain Political Agency and for his services there was awarded a C.I.E. His skill lay in playing off the Political Agent against the Ruler and then stepping in to effect a settlement from which he reaped benefit. He was eventually dismissed by Major Daly about 1925. He had no sons but three nephews Jassim, Khalil and Ali. The cousins who run Kanoos now, Ahmed and Muhammad, are sons of Khalil and Jassim respectively.

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B 2

Trucial Coast (continued)

6. Muhammad bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh.
7. Rashid bin Humaid Al Na'imi, Shaikh, Ruler of Ajman.
8. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh.
9. Said bin Maktum, C.B.E., Shaikh, Ruler of Dubai.
10. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh, Ruler of Ras al Khaimah.
11. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr Al Qasimi, Shaikh, Ruler of Sharjah.
12. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zaid, Shaikh, Ruler of Abu Dhabi.
13. Sultan bin Salim Al Qasimi.
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50004

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B 2

12. Khalifah bin Muhammad, Shaikh

Son of Shaikh Muhammad bin Isa Al Khalifah (No. 15). Born about 1913. Director of Public Security in the Bahrain Police, educated at Beirut and spent a time at the Nasik Police School in India. He speaks English well and associates with Europeans more than any member of the family. He is fairly intelligent, enterprising and ambitious, and is on bad terms with a good many of the younger Al Khalifah, who are very jealous of him. He is not as soft as most of his young cousins, but he is putting on weight rapidly, which makes him less and less energetic. He is inclined to regard his services, for which he is well paid, as the conferring of a very great favour on the State. He has good manners, lives in semi-European style, is pleasant to deal with and has a sense of humour. He is interested in modern inventions such as cars, speed-boats, wireless and cameras. He is extravagant and in debt, but he does not use his official position to his own advantage. He is not popular with the general public, who regard him as ostentatious and arrogant. In 1948 he visited the United Kingdom as a guest of the British Council. He visited the United States in 1952.

Married a third wife, aged 16, in May 1951.

13. Khalifah bin Salman al Khalifah, Shaikh

Second son of the Ruler and full brother to Isa bin Salman (No. 10). Born 1936 and received the same education as his brother. Is rather taller and of more prepossessing appearance than Isa, but has so far given little sign of having any ideas or interests in life beyond the simpler sorts of amusement. Is said to be a stronger character than his brother Isa. He appears, however, to be at ease in the society of foreigners, likes being invited to their parties, and can manage social conversation in English quite well.

14. Mansur al Oraiyyidh, M.B.E.

Born about 1890. Shia. Owns a good deal of land in Bahrain and is also a pearl merchant. The Oraiyyidh family is a large one and the best-known Bahraini—as opposed to Arab—family in Bahrain. Many of its members work in Government employ. Mansur has a great deal of influence among the Baharina, which he usually wields with wisdom and sense. He was instrumental with Ahmad Fakhroo (No. 6), a Sunni, in settling, at least temporarily (and so reducing communal tension), the dispute in the summer of 1954 between the reformists, composed of Baharina (Shias) and Sunni Arabs, and the Government, during which the police opened fire on a crowd threatening the fort, killing and wounding several people. For this he was awarded the M.B.E. Suffers from cataract in both eyes and diabetes. Has two sons, both of whom have had some education in England.

15. Muhammad bin Isa al Khalifah, Shaikh, C.B.E.

Eldest surviving son of Shaikh Isa and uncle of the present Ruler. Born about 1881. In appearance Shaikh Muhammad is thin and upright. He has a grey beard, sometimes dyed black, and long hair in the Bedouin style, which is usually hidden under a head-dress. He is very short-sighted, and nearly blind without his glasses. His dazzling smile reveals a complete set, top and bottom, of gold teeth.

Shaikh Muhammad's manner is rather stiff. He is the most travelled of all the family, and has visited most parts of the world. He is fairly well educated, something of a poet, and excessively proud of what he considers his superior ability in drafting important letters, proclamations, &c. He is politically minded, autocratic, and intensely proud of his family's achievements. He is not anti-British, but is critical of many things the British do and

does not hesitate to voice his opinions. He is intolerant of Shias and actively dislikes the Baharina: He is extremely mean and always complaining of his debts. He is generous, however, to his own large family, which used to be better disciplined than others of the Al Khalifah. He is more moral than his relations and confines himself to women. He has had a good many wives.

Shaikh Muhammad is fussy, inclined to suspect that he is being slighted, and too fond of letting his personal interests influence his opinions on public matters. He is open to argument, but has a quick temper. He was very loyal to the late Shaikh Hamad, though the latter was usually bored by him and could not appreciate his liking for foreign travel. Shaikh Muhammad "enjoys" ill-health, which is partly genuine and partly assumed. He is more often abroad than in Bahrain, often visiting the Lebanon, Egypt and sometimes India and Pakistan, usually ostensibly for medical treatment. He visited the World's Fair, New York, in 1939.

Shaikh Muhammad fills no public office and is not relied upon by the Ruler in the same way as is his brother, Shaikh Abdullah bin Isa (No. 2).

16. Muhsin al Tajir

Shia. Has always dabbled in politics. Fairly intelligent. Has always been bitterly opposed to the Al-Khalifah. Since 1954 a member of the stff-styled "High Executive Committee." Has relations in Persia whom he visits frequently. Was head of the Shia Waqf Committee, but deposed by the Bahrain Government in 1955.

17. Salman bin Hamid bin Isa al Khalifah, His Highness, Shaikh, K.C.M.G., K.C.I.E.

The present Ruler of Bahrain. Born about 1894, eldest son of the late Ruler, Shaikh Hamad bin Isa. Has some education and a slight knowledge of the geography and history of the neighbouring countries. Has visited India and Egypt, and attended Her Majesty's Coronation in 1953 as the guest of Her Majesty's Government. On his journey he briefly visited France and Italy. Appointed successor by his father in a secret document in 1940 and elected Ruler by his immediate relations when his father died in February 1942.

In disposition cautious, careful over money, in some directions progressive but in other ways old-fashioned. His private life is outwardly respectable and he holds the view that people's behaviour in the privacy of their houses is no concern of anybody. He has never been in debt, even before he inherited his father's wealth. His generosity towards his relatives is considered with a view to keeping them in subservience. He is considerably older than his seven brothers, none of whom is particularly fond of him.

Shaikh Salman has at present two wives, the senior one from the Khalid branch of the family. Her father and other relations were involved in murderous attacks on Baharina villages about twenty years ago and were later suspected of complicity in the attempt to assassinate Shaikh Salman's father. Some of this family were exiled for several years. The senior wife, though childless, has a certain amount of influence over Shaikh Salman and she is not friendly towards the British. The second wife, mother of three sons and a daughter, is of the family of Khalifah bin Hamad of Jisra, politically a nonentity. She has in recent months been estranged from her husband and it is even rumoured that he has divorced her.

While genuinely attached to the British connexion and convinced of its necessity for Bahrain he is very jealous of the internal independence of his country and of his own position as its Ruler. He nurses two grievances; one, that Her Majesty's Government

is slow, as he thinks, to help him to assert his "rights" in Zubarah against the Ruler of Qatar; and second, that the Bahrain Petroleum Company cannot produce enough oil to provide a greater revenue. He values such visible marks of independence and prestige as the cession to him of jurisdiction over subjects of other Gulf States (1952) and the establishment of his own internal postal service with stamps bearing his effigy (1952). He would like more say in civil aviation matters, and in the control of the sale of alcohol; (a strict abstainer himself he is grieved by the drinking that goes on among his family and subjects).

He was awarded an honorary K.C.I.E. at the New Year, 1944, and an honorary K.C.M.G. at the New Year, 1952.

18. Salman bin Muhammad, Shaikh

Son of Shaikh Muhammad bin Isa Al Khalifah (No. 15). Born about 1927. He was educated at the American University, Beirut, and knows English well. He received a limited amount of judicial training in Palestine and sits on the Bahrain Junior Court. He has travelled much in the Middle East and Europe and has also visited the United States. He is usually on bad terms with the Ruler who regards him as extravagant and he is very critical of the Ruler's conservatism. He is generally regarded as the most likely source of trouble in the Ruling Family. He is always outwardly very friendly to the British political authorities. In 1954 became mentally deranged for a time, possibly due to excessive drinking.

KUWAIT**The Ruling Family of Kuwait (Al Sabah)**

The Ruling Family of Kuwait is divided into two factions. These are the descendants of Jabir, father of the last, and Salim, father of the present Ruler. Abdullah Mubarak, uncle of both the last and the present Ruler sides usually with the descendants of Jabir but is loyal to the present Ruler. The succession in Kuwait went from Jabir to Salim (both sons of the "great" Mubarak) then to Ahmad son of Jabir and now Abdullah son of Salim. Abdullah Mubarak, who is the only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak of whom the last two rulers have been grandsons, thinks that his turn should come next.

The family maintain outwardly cordial relations with the Saudi Royal Family, though many of the younger shaikhs were critical of the party which accompanied King Saud to Kuwait in 1954. The Salim faction have never been their genuine admirers. The present Ruler was disliked by the late King. Only members of the Ruling Family have the style of Shaikh.

1. Abdullah al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1905. Eldest son of the late Ruler Ahmad al Jahir. His mother was of the Al Ghanim family of leading local merchants. He is darkish, very fat and suffers from diabetes. He assists Abdullah Mubarak (No. 4) in the security office and is his substitute there. He is uneducated, summary in the execution of his duties (because he has not outgrown a tribal conception of public administration) and is not an easy conversationalist.

When he goes abroad he prefers to stay in the traditional Islamic atmosphere of Damascus rather than in cosmopolitan Beirut. He has never visited Europe. He is the only member of the Ruling family apart from the Ruler and possibly Abdullah Jabir who does not run up debts. He is also very

religious. As a result he has a very high reputation amongst the older generation of Kuwaitis but he is disliked and feared by the younger generation and the foreign Arab community for his cruel and arbitrary administration of justice. The Ruler has raised him to third place in the local order of precedence and he is on very friendly terms with Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak.

2. Abdullah al Jabir, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Born in 1902 and descended from a brother of the "great" Mubarak. Awarded C.I.E. in 1947. His father Jabir was not the ruler of that name. Is in charge of the administration of justice (in which he is assisted by his son Jabir, born 1930, educated for a few years at Victoria College, Alexandria, and by his younger son, Sabah), Department of Education and the Department of Auqaf. He is also in charge of a recently formed department for the registration of titles to land and is reported to have enriched himself on the proceeds. Rich but careful with his money and does not run up debts. In age and outlook he is closer to the Ruler than any other member of the Ruling Family, and possibly the only member of the family the Ruler turns to for advice. He acts as a peace-maker in the family quarrels of the Al Sabah.

He is somewhat obstinate and conservative in his general outlook but his administration of the Education Department is enlightened. Almost alone among the Shaikhs he takes an interest in gardening. Has two sons who have studied in England, Sabah born 1932 and Mubarak (No. 13) born in 1934.

3. Abdullah bin Khaza'al

Born about 1910. A son of the late Shaikh Khaza'al of Muharrarah (now Khurramshahr). Since the death of his eldest brother Chasib he claims to be the head of the family. In 1946 he led an abortive attack on Khurramshahr from Iraq territory and fled to Kuwait. His deportation was under consideration for some time but he was eventually allowed to settle in Kuwait where the Kuwait Oil Company gave him employment. He would renew his intrigues in Khuzistan if given the least opportunity.

4. Abdullah al Mubarak, Shaikh, C.I.E.

Born 1910. Awarded C.I.E. 1945. The only surviving son of the "great" Mubarak and therefore an uncle of the present Ruler. He is uneducated and is unable to understand the present-day problems of Kuwait. Mental processes of any complication are repellant to him and he refuses to have near him anyone who attempts serious discussion. If compelled to listen to it he takes refuge in platitudes. He meets any suggestion of criticism, however faint, with sulky and irrelevant counter-criticism. It is perhaps the need to compensate for this inadequacy which leads him to surround himself with sycophants who encourage his belief in his own power and importance and who never venture to contradict him.

He has remained loyal to the present Ruler who has placed him second in the order of precedence and who allows him to perform the formal functions of the Ruler in his absence. Abdullah Mubarak would certainly like to succeed the present Ruler and if it came to a fight he might be able to arrange that he did. His swashbuckling demeanour has a certain appeal to the youth of the town, and others fear his power. However, his arrogant and cruel behaviour and his contempt for Arab ideas of propriety in his private life have left him few real friends, although in a struggle for succession he could probably count on the support of Shaikh Sabah al Nasir (No. 20) and the Bedouin element.

He is in charge of the Public Security Department of the Kuwait Government which consists of the gendarmerie, and Kuwait army, the former is ill-organised and inefficient and appears to be losing ground to the town police under Shaikh Sabah Salim and Shaikh Sa'd (Nos. 21 and 16). He is, however, proud of the latter which, with the help of a British officer, has achieved some degree of efficiency. He has made himself Commander-in-Chief of the army and field marshal. He is also interested in the Kuwait Flying Club and has the honorary wings of the Association of British Aero Clubs and Centres.

Abdullah Mubarak used to make a display of pro-British sentiments and he probably hoped that Her Majesty's Government would support his claim to succeed the present Ruler but recently he has made less effort to appear friendly and partly for this reason and partly because of their disorganisation it has been less easy to co-operate with the Public Security Department than with most other departments of the Kuwait Government.

He visited the United Kingdom in 1951 and in 1952, but rather obviously avoided doing so during a trip to Europe in 1954. He spends much time in the Lebanon where his excesses cause some scandal.

He is married but has no children. (Written in 1954.)

5. Abdullah al Salim al Sabah, His Highness Shaikh, K.C.M.G., C.I.E., Ruler of Kuwait

Born about 1888, created C.I.E. in 1938 and honorary K.C.M.G. in 1952. Became Ruler in early 1950. Cousin of the last Ruler whom he actively disliked and nearly unseated in 1938. As a result of the "democratic revolution" of that year he became head of the Advisory Council, which his predecessor allowed to lapse and he himself has refused to revive, and was placed in charge of the State Treasury.

Unlike his predecessor the Ruler is not greedy, authoritative or fond of display. He claims to have the welfare of the State at heart and his general behaviour supports that claim. He has sold the luxurious yachts of his predecessor and abandoned the pretentious scheme to build a marble-lined palace. He has had a local dhow built for his own use and is happiest when away from Kuwait resting on the islands of Failaka. He is a bookish man with very simple tastes and has a reputation of never having incurred debts. He is invariably pleasant to deal with and to talk to although he has an impediment in his speech that makes him a little difficult to follow. He is acute in discussion and never misses a chance of scoring a point in a friendly way. Subjects he does not understand he petulantly dismisses.

His intentions are good but he is not a man of action. His health is not good, and in particular his legs give him considerable trouble. When in May 1952 his relatives gave trouble, he threatened to abdicate, and although he must have been sure that the threat would suffice to bring them to heel, he might not have been sorry if he had had to carry it out. Strong rumours of his abdication were renewed in October 1953, when he was said to be weary of family troubles and irritated by the pressure being exerted upon him by Her Majesty's Government. He shows an increasing unwillingness to make up his mind. He professes the greatest friendship for Her Majesty's Government in which he is doubtless sincere but tends to exaggerate the difficulties of his position. In 1953 he went to London for the Coronation as the guest of Her Majesty's Government, taking medical treatment at Vichy and Paris on the way. He came back with the knowledge that only one of his kidneys is

working but glad to have met the great in England and to have enjoyed Paris.

He is fatherly towards the younger sons of his predecessor. Abdullah Mubarak has been known to threaten to oust him.

He went to Evian for treatment in 1954, and adopted a diet which he still follows, which has reduced his weight and improved his health somewhat. He did not enjoy Europe's bad weather, however, and seems to have decided to take his holiday in Lebanon in future where he has bought some land and has built a house.

His only children (Nos. 11 and 16) are by slave women. His morals are those of his race and class.

6. 'Izzat Ja'far

Born 1912 in Egypt and educated in the Lebanon. Is believed at one time to have been a professional pimp. Has good manners and speaks English well. Attached himself to the late Ruler and ended up as his social secretary and controller of his household. Lived in the Ruler's palace where he made himself indispensable. The late Ruler's sons, Jabir and Sabah (Nos. 10 and 19), whom he saw grow up, are much attached to him as is the late Ruler's widow. His Majesty's Government insisted on his removal from Kuwait during the last war because of suspected intrigues with the axis Powers. He claims to have rendered assistance to the allied cause in the Lebanon during his absence. At the time of the late Ruler's death he was steadily acquiring more and more influence in Kuwait to the exclusion of the State Secretary, Abdullah Mulla, who referred to him as the snake. He brought members of his family into Kuwait, and has established them there with himself, as traders. He was the go-between in the negotiations for the American Independent Oil Company concession. That company took him to the States and feted him royally. He arranged the irregular Middle East Air Lines service from Beirut to Kuwait. He also tried to induce the Banque de l'Indo Chine to break the (legitimate) monopoly of the British Bank of the Middle East.

Since the late Ruler's death he still lives at the palace (not used by the present Ruler) with the widow and some of the sons of the late Ruler, and describes himself as an employee of the State. In 1950 under the pretext of taking Jabir and Sabah to the Lebanon he took them to London without the Ruler's consent. He explained that he did this because he knew that if he had asked for permission it would be refused.

The present Ruler on his accession was pressed to expel him, but as a promise was given that he would not be allowed to regain the influence he had enjoyed under the previous régime the matter was dropped.

While in Europe he underwent a successful kidney operation and returned to Kuwait in the retinue of Shaikh Fahad (No. 7) early in 1955. Since his return, although he has wisely not resumed his seat on the High Executive Committee, he has appeared to regain all his old influence with the Ruler. It was, for example, he who signed the decree reappointing Majd al Din Jabri (No. 24) to the post of Chief Engineer.

By 1953 he had again established himself as a leading adviser to the Ruler and used his influence to further his own interests which have generally conflicted with those of Her Majesty's Government. He is not a good businessman and has not even been successful in using his personal influence to get business for himself. It is therefore probable that, largely out of chagrin, he tried to turn the Ruler against the British contractors engaged on development and it is known that he used a dispute over a dredging contract to try to replace the Anglo-Dutch Overseas Dredging Company by an American

firm for whom he was agent. To buttress his position he introduced Ballantyne from Bahrain as legal adviser to the Ruler. He was appointed to the High Executive Committee when it was set up and in its early days was prominent in its discussions. However, he had, by the summer of 1954, overreached himself and earned the dislike of Shaikh Abdullah al Mubarak (No. 14), who is believed to have insisted that Izzat Ja'far should be removed from all his official positions. Since then Izzat has been in Europe for health reasons and the more sensational press has been full of reports that he has become engaged to ex-Queen Narriman. He is not popular with Kuwaitis and is a favourite target for the attacks of anonymous pamphleteers. (Written in 1955.)

7. Fahad al Salim, Shaikh

Born in 1906. He is a half-brother of the Ruler. His mother was a slave girl and he is therefore negroid in appearance. He was educated at the American University in Beirut and speaks a fair amount of English when pressed to do so. Although a forceful personality he has not in the past got all his own way with the Ruler. Formerly in charge of the State finances to his own profit and the State's loss. For some time after his brothers' accession he was without any official post; but in February 1952 he was made head of the Health Department. His behaviour there produced a crisis that led to his "resignation"; but under the pressure of Sabah al Salim (No. 21), the Ruler reinstated him. The Committee, and after being struck by Fahad, the Director of the Department resigned; but Fahad had his way and in the meantime was also made head of the Municipality, from which post he also claimed to control the Public Works Department. By 1953 he had achieved this and was also made head of the Development Board and from this position has had considerable influence on the progress of development. He does not fully understand the complexities of the Departments under his control and possibly for this reason finds it difficult to make decisions.

Until now, therefore, his influence has been mainly negative. He is largely responsible for slowing and stopping the original development programme which he regarded as unduly extravagant, but he has not yet been able to start any new work to take its place.

He has therefore been blamed by merchants for the decrease in profitable business openings and he became a target for the discontent which came to a head in the summer of 1954 and led the Ruler to appoint the High Executive Committee. However, when he returned from Europe at the beginning of 1955 he did not hesitate to alter any decisions of the High Executive Committee of which he disapproved, and it became clear that in the event of a direct clash between him and the Committee his views would prevail.

He used to have the reputation of being opposed to the British connexion in Kuwait, but this may have been because he felt that Her Majesty's Government were behind the claim of Abdullah al Mubarak (No. 4) to succeed the present Ruler. He probably has ambitions himself to follow his half-brother, but his slave birth may be too great an obstacle.

He has recently gone out of his way to be friendly and appears to pay some attention to reasoned argument if set out in simple terms. He seems genuinely ready to see contracts go to British firms wherever possible, but he is very suspicious by nature and does not wish to appear in any way influenced by direct British advice.

He is always an entertaining companion and ready talker and likes to display his extensive knowledge

of Arabic poetry and proverbs. He visited the United States of America extensively in 1950, and was in the United Kingdom for a short while on his way back. He went again to the United Kingdom in 1954 and appears to welcome the greater attention which has been paid to him by the Agency. (Written in 1955.)

8. Jabir al Abdullah, Shaikh

Yet another son of No. 2 Abdullah Jabir. A pleasant young man. Much too fat. Went to England to study law, but was driven away by the inclement weather of Spring 1952. He is now assisting his father in the Law Courts.

9. Jabir al Ali, Shaikh

A younger brother of No. 17 Salim al Ali. He is the most active and intelligent of the younger Shaikhs. He is head of the Electricity Department where he has been prepared to listen to the advice of Mr. Addison, the Chief British engineer in the department. He has been appointed by the Ruler to be a member of the High Executive Committee and since the departure of 'Izzat Ja'far (No. 6) has acted as its unofficial chairman, initiating and guiding all discussions. In the absence of Shaikh Fahad (No. 8) in the autumn of 1954 he presided as chairman of the High Executive Committee at meetings of the Development Board. He has visited England and speaks a little English but generally prefers Arabic. He is always ready to discuss a wide range of topics and is never afraid to express his views. (Written in 1954.)

10. Jabir al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1926. Third son of the late Ruler. His particular claim to eminence and the succession, is that both his father and mother were Sabahs. His mother is in fact the full sister of the present Ruler. He is very like his father both in appearance and disposition and would possibly make an arrogant and difficult Ruler. He is much under the influence of 'Izzat Ja'far (No. 6) by whom he is being groomed for stardom. The present Ruler used to take him about with him on his travels and may also be tutoring him for the succession. Speaks fair English and is in charge, under Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak (No. 4) of the security guards in the Kuwait Oil Company's area at Ahmadi.

Since his return from his world tour in 1953 he has appeared to be given an increasingly prominent place amongst the Shaikhs. He is friendly and appears to enjoy the company of Europeans, and if the next Ruler is to be chosen from the younger generation he is the most likely candidate.

11. Khalid al Abdullah, Shaikh

An illegitimate son of the Ruler and half-brother of Shaikh Sa'd (No. 16). He is black and negroid in appearance. He spent a period in England at Bristol University and therefore speaks some English, but he is less fluent than might be expected. He is in charge of the Port and Customs Departments and is a member of the High Executive Committee in whose discussions he plays a fairly active part. It was due to his initiative that the minutes of the High Executive Committee were made available to the Agency. He is a close friend and companion of Shaikh Jabir al Ali (No. 9). (Written in 1954.)

12. Muhammad al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born in 1907. Second son of Shaikh Ahmad, the late Ruler of Kuwait. Although he is a full brother of Shaikh Abdullah al Ahmad (No. 1), he is not so gross, and is of lighter complexion. He was educated in Beirut and speaks English. He has

managed His Highness's affairs in Basra, and in particular the litigation over his date gardens, for some time, and does his work with reasonable efficiency. In 1946 he was shot by an Iraqi patrol close to the Iraq-Kuwait frontier, in the belief that he was a smuggler, and wounded in the neck, but has since fully recovered from his injuries. It is doubtful whether he is a strict teetotaler, and he is reported to have a fondness for poker and a convivial evening. He is popular in Iraqi circles and knows how to get round minor officials.

13. Mubarak al Abdullah, Shaikh

A son of Shaikh Abdullah al Jabir (No. 2). He spent two years at Sandhurst where he found the restraints of military discipline irksome and his record was only fair. He has now returned to Kuwait and has been appointed as Colonel in Mubarak's Security Forces where he is allowed little authority and seems a little lost. This seems partly his own fault because, in order to avoid being beholden to Abdullah Mubarak he refused to accept pay from him. He speaks English well and enjoys the company of Europeans. (Written in 1954.)

14. Mubarak al Abdullah, Shaikh

The eldest son of Abdullah al Ahmad (No. 1). Owing to his father's conservatism he has less opportunity for travel than most of his contemporaries and he speaks little English. He has his full share of shaikhly arrogance and conceit but he can be pleasant and friendly to talk to. In the absence of Abdullah al Mubarak and Abdullah al Ahmad he takes charge of the Public Security Department. (Written in 1954.)

15. Nurf Yusuf al Nurf

Born about 1898. Member of a prominent Kuwaiti family and one of four brothers. From 1934 until the troubles in 1938 he was Director of the Municipality. He then went to Karachi to represent his brother's firm, later returning to Kuwait, where he continued such commercial activities until 1947. He then became director of finances in the Department of Education and in 1948 the Director of the Department of Health, while remaining on the Education Committee until the new elections in February 1952. In the spring of 1952, when Shaikh Fahad took control of the Health Department, he resigned, ostensibly on grounds of ill-health, and at present he has no position. He was a competent public servant in his time and as Director of Health gave full support to Dr. Parry, in charge of the State Hospital.

He is a brother of Muhammad (No. 31).

16. Sa'd al Abdullah, Shaikh

An illegitimate son of the Ruler and half-brother of Khalid (No. 11). He is also black and negroid in appearance. He spent two years training at the Hendon Police College, where he did well, and he is now assisting Shaikh Sabah (No. 21) in running the Town Police. He seems anxious to create an efficient Police Force on modern lines but is handicapped by the magnitude of the task and his unwillingness to take any action without the approval of Sabah. He speaks good English but is not very forthcoming in conversation. (Written in 1954.)

17. Salim al Ali, Shaikh

Born 1926. His father, who was killed in 1938, was a half-brother of the present Ruler. His mother was a sister of Sabah al Nasir (No. 20), so that both his father and mother were members of the Sabah family. It has been said that as he falls within the same age group as Jabir al Ahmad (No. 10) the Salim faction are advancing him as a rival, but he

is much less intelligent and energetic than his younger brother Jabir (No. 9) and his chief interest seems to be hunting. Although nominally Shaikh Fahad's assistant in the Public Works Department it was noteworthy that in the absence of the latter and of his brother Sabah in the autumn of 1954, Jabir al Ali took over as President of the Development Board. It is difficult to believe that Salim will be a strong candidate for the succession in spite of his advantages of birth. (Written in 1954.)

18. Sabah al Abdullah, Shaikh

Third son of Abdullah al Jabir (No. 2). He spent some time in England at Bristol and studying law in London, but he appears to lack the application and the education to make a success of even a simplified course. He is now assisting his father in the Law Courts. (Written in 1954.)

19. Sabah al Ahmad, Shaikh

Born 1928. Fourth son of the late Ruler. He was brought up with his half-brother Jabir (No. 10) by 'Izzat Ja'far and is much attached to both of them. He accompanied Jabir on his world tour and speaks quite good English. He has recently been appointed to the High Executive Committee, but appears to take a less prominent part in discussions than Jabir al Ali or Khalid al Abdullah.

He impressed all by his energy and ability to take the necessary decisions during the exceptional rains at the beginning of December 1954 when many Kuwaitis were temporarily homeless. He is pleasant to talk to and well liked by all. (Written in 1954.)

20. Sabah al Nasar, Shaikh

Born in 1903. Strong supporter of the late Shaikh Ahmad, who owed much to his assistance during the 1938 troubles. He is gross, gluttonous and possibly mentally unstable. Some years ago he murdered his younger brother while sitting beside him in a car in Kuwait town, threw the body out of the car and drove over it several times. He has been deeply involved in the smuggling between Kuwait and Iraq. In 1948 he was accused of murdering three Muntafiq tribesmen, including a member of the powerful Sadun family, who were participating in the smuggling racket on behalf of a rival Shaikh. Shaikh Ahmad threatened to expel him, and he fled to Ibn Saud, who refused to receive him. He subsequently returned to Kuwait, where Shaikh Ahmad was loath to take further action against him owing to the assistance he had received from him in the past.

He spends nearly all his time out in the desert where he has reserved large stretches of grazing for himself. Is very friendly with and supported by Shaikh Abdullah Mubarak, doubtless for reasons of common interest. His claim to the succession, which is strong if not serious, derives from his being a grandson of the "great" Mubarak and having had a Sabah mother and father. He is suspected of trafficking in slaves.

21. Sabah al Salim, Shaikh

Born 1913. He is a half-brother of the Ruler and Shaikh Fahad and in the absence of the latter has deputised for him, with the assistance of Shaikh Sa'd (No. 16), he also runs the Town Police, a body which has improved considerably in smartness and efficiency during the last year and is certainly now more effective than the Public Security Department. Shaikh Sabah appears alert and intelligent and is better educated than most members of the Sabah family. He has recently shown a desire to co-operate and to forget past misunderstandings. (Written in 1954.)

22. Yusuf al Ahmad al Ghanim

Born 1903. Has travelled to England and the United States. Speaks English, has a son, Abdullah, who studied engineering at Glasgow University. Is the Kuwaiti partner of I. and C. William Press in the Anaza Company, one of the "Big Five." Enriched himself through labour and other contracts with Kuwait Oil Company during the company's period of expansion. Has a joint local working arrangement with the Contracting and Trading Company of Beirut (Bustani). Very westernised and a steady drinker. Keen business man but pleasant socially. Politics liable to change with his personal interests. Is one of the many who are highly critical of the patriarchal administration in Kuwait and of the predominance of a largely uneducated and often worthless ruling family but is completely submissive to this order of things.

His old father who is still alive is much respected.

23. Yusuf bin Isa, Shaikh

Not of the Ruling Family, his title of Shaikh being given to him as head of the Qara'i sect. A very widely respected old man of considerable learning, who wrote one of the few books on Kuwait history. He is a close friend of the Ruler and is able to exercise considerable influence on him. He has somewhat reluctantly occupied the post of Chief Qadhi, temporarily and as a personal favour to the Ruler.

24. Jabri, Majd ud-Din

Ex-Minister of Public Works, Syria, and appointed Chief Engineer by Shaikh Fahad in February 1953. A cultivated clever man with an attractive personality, his motives for coming to Kuwait are obscure. He is reported to be wealthy and incorruptible. The fact that, after being Mayor of Aleppo, he spent years contracting in Jordan suggests that he likes moving around. He is very conscious of being an Arab and perhaps hopes to help in rehabilitating the people of his race.

In the spring of 1954, frustrated by the difficulty of getting positive decisions from Shaikh Fahad, he presented terms for continuing to work in Kuwait which the Ruler was not prepared to accept and he returned to Syria, but in March 1955 he resigned from the Syrian Chamber of Deputies to which he had been elected and agreed to come back to Kuwait. He has been reappointed by the Ruler as Government Chief Engineer, but is now again reported to be considering resignation.

25. Tala't Ghusain

Secretary of the Development Board. He is of Palestinian origin. After the end of the mandate he served with the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs both in the negotiations leading up to the signature of the Anglo-Yemeni Agreement and at the United Nations. He seems intelligent and level-headed and he is friendly and co-operative and willing to discuss in private the affairs of the Development Board and the problems of Kuwait development about which he generally takes a moderate and balanced view. (Written in 1954.)

26. Sa'ud al-Fawzan

Secretary to the Public Works Department. He is aged 32 and was educated in India where he learned to speak good English. He was then employed for a short time as a passport clerk, first at the Political Agency in Kuwait and later in Bahrain. When he resigned he returned to Kuwait where, after a period working for the Kuwait Oil Company, he started a business with his younger brother. Shaikh Fahad appointed him to be his Personal Secretary. (Written in 1954.)

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27. Abdul Aziz Husain

Director of the Education Department. He received his primary education in Kuwait, but in 1941 went to Egypt to study at Al-Azhar. While there he learned English through the British Council and in 1950 went to England to complete his studies under their auspices. In Egypt he took a leading part in the life of the Kuwait Students' Committee and he was editor of their magazine *Al Ba'tha* and was also in charge of the Kuwait Students' Hostel. When he returned to Kuwait he was appointed Director of Education succeeding the older and more experienced Palestinian Darwish Maqdadi who, however, agreed to stay on as his deputy. He appears to be intelligent and keen on his work and has been the central figure in the rapid expansion of the Kuwait Education Department in the last two years. Having been educated in Egypt he naturally leans towards Egyptian educational methods and the employment of Egyptian teachers in Kuwait schools. He is also a believer in inter-Arab co-operation and has more than once represented Kuwait at Middle East social and educational conferences. However, although he has at least once in public criticised certain aspects of policy of the Kuwait Oil Company towards its local employees, there is no reason to suppose that he is basically hostile to British political or commercial influence in Kuwait. He has always been friendly and co-operative. (Written in 1954.)

28. Ali Dawud

Director of the Health Department. Was brought up by relatives in Bombay where he attended a primary school and studied English. When he returned to Kuwait he worked for Haj Abdur Rahman Bahar, in his shipping firm. He stayed there for about seventeen years until Shaikh Fahad appointed him Director of the Health Department, in which position Dr. Parry has found him quite useless. (Written in 1954.)

29. Muhammed Qabazard

Director of Port. He comes from a prominent Kuwaiti merchant family (of Persian origin) but he has worked in the Port and Customs Department almost without a break since he was first appointed to the Customs. Many merchants oppose him and accuse him of being venal, and he resigned and worked as a merchant for a short time before he was appointed Director of Port (but not of Customs). (Written in 1954.)

30. Fu'ad Abdul Baqi

Aged 29 and of Lebanese Druze origin, educated at the American University of Beirut and did post-graduate work at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, University of Illinois and Columbia University. He worked for a time for Kellogg's, the United States engineering firm, and obtained from them a "first preference" United States immigrants visa as a person whose technical skill is needed in the United States. However, he decided to visit Shaikh Fahad, with whom he travelled in the United States in 1950, and he was offered the job of Inspector-General of the Public Works Department by him. He is handicapped by his youth and some British firms disliked having to work with a man who in the nature of the case can have little practical experience. He does in fact tend to stick closely to his books when in difficulty, but he has on occasion shown himself ready to listen to the advice of more experienced men and British engineers in the Public Works Department have not found it impossible to work with him. He drew up a plan for the reorganisation of the Public Works

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Department which was adopted by the High Executive Committee. However, when Majd ud-Din Jabri (No. 24) was reappointed Chief Engineer in March 1955, he insisted on the removal of Fu'ad Abdul Baqi, who was transferred to the Municipality.

31. Muhammad Yusuf al Nufi

A member of an old Kuwaiti merchant family and brother of Nufi Yusuf al Nufi (No. 15). He was formerly Director of the Public Works Department but he was unable to work with Shaikh Fahad (No. 7) and therefore resigned. He was, however, nominated in 1954 to join the High Executive Committee when it sat as a departmental committee. (Written in 1954.)

32. Ahmad Abdul Latif

Director of Finance. He was Secretary to Abdullah Salim, the present Ruler, when he was in charge of Finances at Kuwait under the late Ruler. On his accession the present Ruler did not nominate a Shaikh to be head of the Finance Department but instead appointed Ahmad Abdul Latif to be Director of the Finance Department under his own general supervision. Thus the Finance Department is the only department of the Kuwait Government that does not come under the direct supervision of a Shaikh other than the Ruler. He has leaned heavily on Colonel Crichton in coping with the problems of Kuwait expansion and he has been ready to listen to his advice. He is a member of the Development Board and of the High Executive Committee. (Written in 1954.)

33. Abdul Latif Ibrahim al Nufi

Member of the High Executive Committee. He is a personal friend of the Ruler, for whom he works as a confidential secretary. He was appointed to the High Executive Committee when it was formed, but up till now he has not taken a prominent part in its discussions. (Written in 1954.)

34. Jasim Qatami

Aged about 30, nephew of boat-builder, and once a sailor in a dhow. He was sent to Egypt and then to England and studied police methods in both places—in England for about four months. Speaks good English and is very friendly. Is Director of Police with rank of Colonel under Shaikh Sabah Salim (No. 21), who thinks highly of him. He understands the need for modern police methods and is curbed only by the need to carry his shaikh with him. Probably ambitious.

Obituary

Abdullah al Mulla Salih, M.B.E.

Born 1906. Awarded M.B.E. 1947. Succeeded his father as Secretary to the late Ruler in 1938 and managed to retain the office under the present Ruler. Is intelligent and speaks good English.

The strength of Abdullah Mulla's position is that everyone in the town hates him. For that reason he is invaluable to the Ruler who is thus assured that he is not in league with any possible usurper. The present Ruler hated Abdullah Mulla during his predecessor's reign and tried to oust him then but when he became Ruler himself was wise enough to see his value.

Abdullah Mulla is the Ruler's representative with the Kuwait Oil Company and with the American Independent Oil Company, so that he has an unrivalled knowledge of and experience in handling oil company matters. He has also much political experience. He protests that he is pro-British and probably is. From the point of view of Her Majesty's Government there might be a very much worse State Secretary in Kuwait than Abdullah Mulla.

His chief fault is that he uses his official position to further his private aims. He grew up in a Kuwait that was poor and he has not been able to resist the temptation to get rich quick. He has burnt his fingers and landed himself with a tobacco company that does not pay, an electric light company that is grossly inefficient and various other commercial activities that left him with a huge overdraft at the bank. After he got rid of these he recovered and joined up with Costains to do contracting. Initially at any rate he lost heavily at that but the bank, for political reasons, allowed him another huge overdraft. He has ten children of whom two are at school in Somerset.

Died of heart failure, June 1955.

MUSCAT

1. Ahmad bin Ibrahim, Saiyid

Born about 1898. Is a member of a junior branch of the Ruling Family of Muscat. His home is at Hazm where he owns date gardens and a large and an interesting old Arab fort which commands one of the important routes leading into the interior of Oman, and which is only some 5 miles from the old capital of Rostaq. It is said that at one time he used to hoist the White Flag of Oman and the Red Flag of Muscat as suited his convenience, but for some years now he has been in the employ of the Sultan as Minister of the Interior. He is a picturesque figure with a long grey beard, and has a forceful personality with a sense of humour and something of a reputation for cruelty and corruption.

In June and July 1948 he visited the Buraimi area as the Sultan's representative in an effort to get the tribes in that area to comply with the Sultan's wishes regarding the exploitation of oil there.

The negotiation ended in failure and while the oil company blamed Saiyid Ahmad, the Sultan blamed the oil company whose representatives also visited the area.

Although the Sultan directs all matters concerning tribal politics himself, and Saiyid Ahmad can do nothing without his orders, the latter is usually placed in command of any tribal force collected by the Sultan, as upon the occasion of the Sultan's intended march on Buraimi in 1952. Their policies do not always agree and Saiyid Ahmad is often free in his criticism of the Sultan. He is also apt to be indiscreet and impetuous, but nevertheless seems to be the ablest and, with his tribal connexions, the best informed member of the Government in which he is the senior Minister.

2. Ghalib bin Ali bin Hilal

Elected and styled "Imam of Oman" by certain tribes of the Interior at a gathering at Nizwa on the decease of Imam Muhammad bin Abdullah al Khalili on May 4, 1954 (29th Shaban 1373). His father is a Shaikh of the Beni Hina with headquarters at Nizwa. Though a small tribe it gave its name to the Hinawi political faction, and the appointment of another Hinawi must be a disappointment to the Ghafiri faction even if the majority acquiesced. He was previously the Imam's Qadhi at Rostaq. He has a brother Talib, who visited the Residency at Bahrain and Saudi Arabia as an emissary of the Imam in 1953. He is himself believed to be neither pro-Saudi nor pro-Sultan, whom neither he nor his father has ever visited. Aged about 45, intelligent, ambitious and vigorous, he is expected to try to maintain the independence of the Imamate. He has, however, a much less fanatical and a more progressive outlook than his

predecessor. As a matter of policy the Sultan's Government do not recognise the title of Imam, by which the Rulers were themselves formerly known, and address him as "Allamah," and the Residency and British Consulate follow suit.

3. Gokaldass, Rai Bahadur

Born about 1908. Head of the firm Khimji Ramdass in Muscat and leader of the Hindu community there. He is a typical Hindu "bania" with smooth manners and plenty of business ability, but has also travelled extensively and on occasion adopts European dress. He has from time to time undertaken Government contracts especially for the present supply of rations to labour employed by the R.A.F. on Masirah Island. Tactfully handled he and his four brothers who are partners in the firm, are always most co-operative and with their considerable business connexions and agencies can be exceedingly useful in emergency. He received the titles of Rai Sahib and later of Rai Bahadur in recognition of his services to the former British Government in India. He has always been anxious to keep in with the British authorities, and is nervous about the attitude the Sultan may adopt towards Hindus if they cease to be under British protection. His name was once suggested to the Government of India for appointment as their non-career Vice-Consul at Muscat but the proposal met with opposition from the Sultan.

With the establishment of a branch of the British Bank of the Middle East at Muscat his firm has lost some of its financial hold. He is, however, being employed by the British Oil Company as their agent in the Sultanate, and by the Sultan for the supply of provisions to some of his forces, and for making payments to shaikhs in the Interior. He has made generous donations to the Muscat Charitable Hospital.

4. Ismail Khalil al Rassassi

Born about 1908. A Palestinian who has been in the service of the Sultan of Muscat since 1929. He was originally a school-teacher but is now Wali or Governor of Matrah. He was at one time believed to be anti-British, but is outwardly very friendly. The Sultan makes use of him owing to his lack of educated and experienced persons to hold positions of trust, but he must be regarded as rather a doubtful character.

He was formerly permitted to exercise some measure of supervision over the other Walis, but this supervision is now exercised by the Minister of the Interior, Saiyid Ahmad (No. 1).

5. Muhammad bin Ahmad

Shaikh of Bakha, a small village on the Trucial Coast, north of Ras al Khaimah. Though only a petty shaikh of the Beni Hidayah section of the Shihuh tribe, he has come to notice through his participation in border disputes around Sha'am village (which is partly peopled by members of his tribal section) on the northern boundary of Ras al Khaimah where it meets the Sultanate province of Ru'us al Jibbal. Having claimed to be an independent shaikh and succeeded in getting himself included for purposes of supplies during the last war with other shaikhs of the Trucial Coast in political relations with the Political Officer at Sharjah, in a disturbance at Sha'am in which the Royal Navy had to be asked to intervene, he declared himself to be a Muscat subject and sought protection from the Sultan's Wali at Khasab. His status as a subject of the Sultan has now been recognised, and he and his family carry Sultanate passports. The opposing faction in the Sha'am dispute belong to the Beni Shatair section of the

50004

Shihuh who are traditionally at feud with the Beni Hidayah section. The former are supported by the Qawasim tribe to which the Shaikh of Ras al Khaimah belongs, and the latter by the Sultan of Muscat so that the dispute has now broadened into opposing claims for the ownership of the territory in which Sha'am is situated.

6. Said bin Taimur, Sultan of Muscat

Born in 1910. He succeeded as Sultan on the abdication of his father in 1932. He is normally accorded the title of "His Highness," but he does not allow this to be used in treaties and similar documents. As an independent ruler he is probably anxious to be given the title of "His Majesty." He is an honorary G.C.S.I. and K.C.I.E., but these titles are not used when addressing him and he made a mild protest in 1946 when the G.C.S.I. was conferred on him without his first being consulted. He was educated at the Mayo College, Ajmer, and speaks excellent English. He was at school in Baghdad from 1927-28. He visited the United Kingdom and United States in the winter of 1937-38. He is small in stature and rather shy and timid in his manner, but very astute and careful to preserve his dignity. He has a remarkable knowledge of correct procedure and can be relied on to "do the right thing" in public, although he is often embarrassingly reticent upon such occasions. He is always most polite and courteous, and reasonable regarding all matters which have no effect on his personal status. He is genuinely anxious to maintain his family's long-standing friendship with Her Majesty's Government. His rule is of an entirely personal nature and he has few competent persons to assist him, and few even whom he can trust. He has now a British Minister for Foreign Affairs, a British Administrator in Gwadar and British officers for his military forces, but so far has invested them with no more power than his other employees. They are, however, except for the Administrator, who is too far away, all recent arrivals. Once his confidence is won, the Sultan, perhaps because of his loneliness, is capable of very sincere friendship and absolute trust. His chief ambition is to extend his control over the whole of Oman, of most of which he is ruler in name only. He spends much of his time in his province of Dhofar many hundred miles from Muscat, and the administration of his State is liable to suffer in consequence. Whilst in Muscat he renders himself rather inaccessible also, a fact which does not help to make him popular. He has one son born in 1940, Saiyid Qabus. Though he has made enquiries about tutors and schools in the Lebanon or Egypt, no decision has so far been made as to his education, which at present consists of private tuition by the schoolmaster in the Government school in Salalah. The boy is bright and fond of riding.

7. Salih bin Isa al Harthi, Shaikh

The most influential Hinawi Shaikh and accepted as their Tamimah. It is said that his power extends to passing sentence of death upon any member of his faction. In 1948 he visited Muscat on his return from India (where he went for medical treatment), as a guest of the Sultan, and called at the Consulate. He received ammunition, rifles and a considerable cash sum as a gift from the Sultan. In 1954 he visited Egypt in order, so it is said, to groom himself for the Imamate, and his studies in this connexion are reported to have taken him even farther afield, to North Africa. His knowledge of Arabic poetry is said to be good. He was born about 1920 and resides at Ibra in the Sharqiyah district of the Sultanate, headquarters of the El Harth, of which he is the leading Shaikh. He has two wives but no sons. He succeeded his brother Muhammad,

who died in 1948. His heir is his nephew, Ahmad bin Muhammad bin Isa. The latter is gaining in influence and is favoured by the Sultan and seems to have become a rival for leadership in the tribe and among the Hinawis generally. Both carry Sultanate passports and visit Muscat and the consulate from time to time.

8. Shabah bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born in 1902. Uncle of the Sultan of Muscat and full brother of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur (No. 10). He ordinarily acts as personal representative at Muscat for ceremonial purposes while the Sultan is absent at Dhofar. He has charming manners and speaks the best Arabic, but in administrative matters is inefficient and is not trusted by the Sultan, who latterly has been unwilling to grant him any real authority during his absences.

9. Sulaiman bin Hamyar al Nabhani, Shaikh

Born in 1911. One of the few signatories of the Treaty of Sib 1920 still alive. He has for some time been seeking recognition by Her Majesty's Government as an independent Shaikh. He is also trying to do independent deals with oil companies, and is friendly with the American Mission Doctor, Dr. Thoms, in Matrah, by whom he has been visited frequently. He has visited Saudi Arabia, where he has also sought recognition of and support for his independence. He resides near the Jabal Akhdar at Tanuf and is Tamimah of the Ghafiris. He has three sons, the eldest, Sultan, being his heir. Apart from his political activities he leads a somewhat dissolute life and he is disliked and distrusted by many of the other tribal leaders. When he visited the Sultan in 1948 he was lavishly treated and given presents of a motor car, rifles, ammunition, rice and a large sum of cash. He has not visited Muscat since and avoids taking a Sultanate passport. He has, in fact, recently proclaimed himself as Ruler of Jabal Akhdar and its dependencies.

10. Taimur bin Faisal, Saiyid

Born about 1888. Sultan of Muscat, 1913-32, when he abdicated voluntarily. He was a weak ruler and was only too glad to be relieved of further responsibility for the management of affairs when his son Said (No. 6) was old enough to take his place. He receives an allowance of Rupees 2,000 a month from the Muscat Government. He had a catholic taste in wives and married amongst others a Turkish and a Japanese lady. He lived for some years before the war in Japan, and had one daughter by his Japanese wife. He is now living as a private gentleman in Bombay, and likes to be known by the name of "Mr. T. F. Al Said." He is on good terms with his son, the present Sultan, and paid a visit to him in Muscat in 1945. He was last visited in Bombay by the Sultan in 1949.

11. Tariq bin Taimur, Saiyid

Born in 1922. Half-brother of the Sultan of Muscat and third son of the ex-Sultan, Saiyid Taimur, by his Turkish wife. He was educated during his early years in the English school at Constantinople, and later in Germany, and speaks good English and German. He returned to Muscat shortly before the war, and his first task there was to learn Arabic. During the war he spent some years in India, where he received training in police work and civil administration. He also spent some months attached as an officer with the Zhob Militia in Baluchistan. He is at present employed as Administrator of the Municipality of Matrah and Muscat.

He was married, it is believed somewhat against his will, to an Arab lady in 1946, and a son was born to him in 1947. He is very friendly and enjoys British society and games of hockey, tennis and bridge.

Obituary

Mohammad bin Abdullah al Khalili

Born about 1878. A member of the Beni Ruwahi. In 1920 he was elected as the Imam of Oman. As such he possesses spiritual authority over most of the tribes of the interior and also considerable temporal power. He resides at Nizwa, and has his own Walis or Governors stationed at various places throughout Oman. His influence is naturally opposed to that of the Sultan, who is anxious to bring the whole of Oman under his control, but of late he has made several approaches to the Muscat Government for financial and other assistance. His death has been expected and hoped for by the Sultan for many years but he shows remarkable powers of survival. Owing, however, to his advanced age and poor health, a deputy has recently been selected by the tribes to assist him. Owing to the paucity of the people he seems to have withdrawn his opposition to penetration by oil companies if the people can expect to benefit thereby.

QATAR

1. Abdullah bin Darwish

Born about 1903. Lives at Dohah. A typically sharp, avaricious, vain and calculating merchant of Persian origin. Until the second world war, he was a man of meagre means, but like many others, he profited by war conditions. His particular line was smuggling, in which he was helped by the laxity and avarice of the then Ruler (No. 2) and the deceased Shaikh Hamad, who was the Ruler's second son and appointed successor. He paid them heavily for their compliance, but his immediate profits were large enough to stand the strain, and by making himself indispensable to them, he became executor of Shaikh Hamad's will and administrator of his estates, thus recouping his initial expenditure with interest. It appears probable that he will succeed in laying hands on Shaikh Abdullah's fortune in the same way. He is distributor for the Bahrain Petroleum Company products in Qatar, contractor to Qatar Petroleum Company, Limited, and the Gulf Aviation Company. He is the only Qatar merchant to hold any business agencies for European firms. He has improved his financial position by arranging a purchasing agreement between the Government of Qatar and C. Tennant, Sons and Company, Limited, of London, whereby supplies are ordered from the United Kingdom, but all orders must be passed through his office, for which service he draws a heavy commission.

He has consolidated his influence over the present Ruler (No. 4) by lending him money and by avoiding the error made by Salih al Mani' (No. 7) of quarrelling with Shaikh Abdullah, who still exercises great influence over his son. He is the virtual Ruler of Qatar, using both his wealth and influence over the Shaikh to secure a monopoly of all competitors, whom he has now all but eliminated. In spite of the fact that he spends an ever-increasing proportion of his time at Dammam in Saudi Arabia, where he has extensive and growing interests, mainly contracts with ARAMCO, his influence over the Ruler has not diminished. He has exercised it in fewer instances since the Adviser came to deprive him of his previous monopolistic position, but the Ruler still

consults him on all important decisions. He is a coward, however, and will abandon Shaikh Ali in any crisis (usually crises within the Ruling Family, which constitute the only real threat to public order in Qatar) which is likely to involve him in taking sides without profit to himself.

He is a man of immense ability and energy, whose unpleasant and domineering nature encourages Europeans to criticise his activities frankly and even rudely. He does not enjoy this, but he profits from it, and his technical efficiency has increased and is increasing at a remarkable rate. He is noisily pro-British, and has intelligence enough to try to appear to be going our way, and to advocate the sort of thing which he knows we want, but fundamentally his nature and aims are incompatible with ours, and his influence on the course of affairs in Qatar at present is bad.

His moral character is said to be worse than that of the generality of people amongst whom he lives. He is probably the best-hated man in Qatar.

2. Abdullah bin Qasim Al Thani, His Excellency Shaikh

Former Ruler of Qatar. Abdicated on 21st August, 1949, about six months after losing his son Hamad, on whom he greatly relied, and whom he had designated as his successor. Took with him the entire contents of the Treasury, plus a pension of 4 lakhs (£30,000) a year, leaving his eldest son, Ali, in the penniless state which contributed largely to the speed with which Darwish was able to establish control over him.

He now lives at Riyan, about ten miles from Dohah, where he dominates his son, and is dominated by the Darwish brothers, to whom he has practically abandoned the management of his property and affairs. He is a venerable, patriarchal, white-bearded figure, with a firm old face which does not belie his character, and even in his approaching dotage is quite clearly a stronger character than his son. He suffers from diabetes and some chronic complaint of the legs, and recently had a slight stroke which has left him unable to rise without assistance, and considerably more halting of speech than formerly.

His influence over Shaikh Ali, while still considerable, has gradually given place, in political affairs particularly, to that of Abdullah Darwish, and he now asserts himself only in family matters. The outstanding case was his intervention in the first allocation of the family allowances from the oil royalties, when he insisted on larger allowances for those of whom he approved personally, irrespective of the claims of justice and equity. He was unable, however, to achieve the same success when the allowances were revised by the Adviser in October 1951, although he secured an increase in his own pension to 5½ lakhs a year. In general his continued presence in Qatar has had a bad effect on the Ruler, who is resenting more and more the influence which his father still has on affairs in Qatar.

3. Abdul Rahman bin Darwish

The youngest of the Darwish brothers. Gives an impression of oily untrustworthiness which is only too accurately borne out by subsequent acquaintance. His morals are loose, but he is an astute rogue, and his smooth manners help him to take in those whom he deals with more successfully than can his brother Abdullah. But whereas further acquaintance with Abdullah may lead to a more favourable appraisal of his character, based on his undoubted ability, second thoughts on Abdul Rahman are unlikely ever to do so. He is the family liaison man and do-all. He is now to be seen continually in the

50004

presence of Shaikh Ahmad bin Ali bin Abdullah (second son of No. 4). This is the latest move to bring the Darwish influence to bear on the next generation of the Ruling Family.

4. Ali bin Abdullah Al Thani, His Highness Shaikh, K.B.E.

Born 1894 and succeeded his father as Ruler in August 1949. He is Abdullah's eldest son. A fine presence, and in repose a dignity too soon belied by the vacuity of his conversation and the hysterical fury of his ineffectual wrath. A weak, self-indulgent character, spendthrift where his father was miserly, and vacillating where his father was obstinate. Crises provoked by various outrages upon private individuals committed by members of his family, as well as their persistent demands for increased allowances, have been handled by him with a firmness hitherto unsuspected, although no doubt born of desperation.

He is bigoted in religious matters, having sought consolation in religious contemplation when, in his earlier days, his father's favour and trust was extended over his head to his brother Hamad.

His visits to the Ruler of Bahrain in 1950, to Beirut in 1952, and his attendance at the Dammam frontier conference in January 1952 have broadened his horizons to some extent and implanted in him, besides a new sense of his own importance, a genuine anxiety to see his country develop on the lines of what he has seen abroad. He remains, however, a man of limited intelligence and outlook. Although he can seldom be persuaded to wise courses by reason, a show of firmness will generally intimidate him and cause him to acquiesce though unconvinced.

He has seven sons, of whom the second, Ahmad (No. 8) is at once his favourite and the most intelligent and promising. The question of the succession is confused by the presence of the sons of Hamad, who in their father's lifetime were considered his most probable successors, and are the favourite grandsons of Shaikh Abdullah. But although they have reached a position where they virtually dictate their wishes to the Ruler and behave generally with insolence and in defiance of authority, they have simultaneously forfeited respect, and Shaikh Ahmad now seems to be generally accepted as heir.

The Ruler was awarded an honorary K.B.E. and the title of Highness in 1954, in which year he also visited London for medical treatment.

5. Jasim bin Darwish

The eldest of the Darwish brothers, and an essential element in their system. The other brothers defer ostentatiously to Jasim, who is very much the "chef de famille." He is also of a pious disposition, and helps lend an air of respectability to a family sadly in need of it. He scrupulously avoids any appearance of mixing in "politics," but is of great use in translating into suitably Koranic language, for the benefit of Shaikh Ali, the latest questionable scheme hatched by Abdullah (No. 1).

He is said to be very fond of his Syrian wife, whom he treats with customary cruelty (she suffered for a week with toothache before she could escape clandestinely to the mission hospital) and he is considered by the ladies of Dukhan to be "rather a dear."

6. Mohammad bin Uthman

Director of Customs, Dohah. He is related to the Darwish family and is married to their sister. A member of the Fakhroo family (see Bahrain No. 6). He has been Director of Customs for about five years, and although his salary has only recently

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risen from 800 rupees a month to 1,500 rupees a month he has made himself one of the wealthiest men in Qatar. His house, completed two years ago, is said to have cost 2 lakhs. He is used increasingly by the Ruler as a mediator in family feuds, an unenviable task which he appears most successfully to fulfil.

7. Salih al Mani'

Born about 1893, but does not look his age. He is a Nejdī by origin, and started his career as a small pearl merchant, at the same time doing some clerking for the ex-Ruler, whose secretary and "Representative" he became. He acquired great influence and wealth while he had the ex-Ruler's complete confidence, but realised in 1949 that he was being eclipsed by the Darwish, and after they had several times overridden him in the Shaikh's counsels, he quarrelled violently with Shaikh Abdullah at the time of his abdication, in the engineering of which he undoubtedly played a considerable part. If he thought that he had thus cut the ground from under the Darwish feet, and substituted a Ruler more amenable to his own will, he was rudely disappointed. The Darwish consolidated their position with a flexibility and sureness of touch in marked contrast to his own touchy cantankerousness, and Salih's position has continued to deteriorate.

8. Ahmad bin Ali Al Thani, Shaikh

Second and favourite son of the Ruler (No. 4), he is without doubt the most intelligent and promising of all his generation of the Ali Thani family. In general he is accepted as heir-presumptive, though the sons of the late Hamad, second son and one-time appointed successor to Shaikh Abdullah (No. 2) are still favoured by their grandfather.

As a result of this confusion over the question of the succession, and in order to reduce the likelihood of family feuds, he has steadfastly remained in the background where Government is concerned. He has, however, been appointed as the Ruler's representative on the Ruler's Court for Qatar; to this task he has brought dignity, common sense, and a degree of fairness in judgment hitherto unsuspected. He represents his father on official ceremonial occasions, which by reason of his infirmity his father is unable to attend.

He is not bigoted in religious matters like his father; his hopes, rather, are centred on seeing Qatar develop on broader lines. On his visit to England in 1953, when he represented the Ruler at the Coronation, he made a poor impression; this was due in part to the general impact of Europe upon him, from which he took refuge in sullen silence, and in part to his one weakness—an inability to concentrate on any subject for more than half an hour—which results in a variety of forms of apparent brusque rudeness.

He has an intense dislike of the Darwish family and though Abdul Rahman bin Darwish (No. 3) acts as aide to him, it is anathema to him to see the hold that the family maintains over the Ruler. He has never indicated any but pro-British feelings and, properly handled, might well prove an active opponent of Abdullah bin Darwish.

TRUCIAL COAST

1. Ahmad bin Rashid Al Mu'alla, Shaikh, M.B.E.

Ruler of Umm Al Qaiwain. Born in 1904 and succeeded in 1929. He is enormously fat and quiet and, to meet him in audience, one would imagine that he was anchored permanently to his chair; yet

in his small way, he is a wise, straightforward, peaceful and efficient administrator. He keeps his word and avoids interference in other people's affairs. Is, therefore, popular and much respected by the other Shaikhs who, with their tribes, regard him as an authority on their affairs and approach him often for mediation in their disputes. He has full authority in his territory and is loyal to Her Majesty's Government. Was awarded the M.B.E. in 1950 for his services as a pacifier and mediator in disputes between other Trucial Shaikhs. Is weakened in health by chronic diabetes which he can only check by a near-starvation diet.

He has a strong aversion to the Saudis, caused by the almost unbelievably rude treatment accorded to him on the 1953 pilgrimage.

2. Hazza' bin Sultan, Shaikh

Born about 1908. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 12). A skilful negotiator and great talker, he has a remarkable knowledge of tribal affairs, wider, in fact, than any of his brothers, and his views on tribal policy are generally sound. He is popular with the tribes, but less so than his brother Zaid (No. 14), who is more generous and more manly. During the past four or five years relations between him and Shaikh Shakhbut have become strained, despite various attempts at reconciliation. Hazza' has a pleasant rather diffident manner, is genuinely pro-British and will probably be the next Ruler.

3. Jum'a bin Maktum, Shaikh

Born about 1888. Eldest brother of the Ruler of Dubai (No. 9). Is entitled to a salute of one gun. This old man, with his direct noisy manner, used to be regarded as a source of comic relief to the ceremonial visits to the Shaikh. During the Dubai-Abu Dhabi dispute in 1946 he revealed himself, however, as an influential intriguer carrying weight in the Dubai councils which was thrown into the scale against the interests of His Majesty's Government. He is believed to have played a prominent part in the slave traffic before the advent of the Levies. He leads the pro-Saudi faction in Dubai, and there is good evidence that his support to Turki bin Ataishan, moral and material, was considerable.

He dislikes the British, and has not called at the Agency for many years. Recently exiled by the Acting Ruler (No. 8) with his three eldest sons, after challenging the latter's rule.

4. Khalid bin Sultan

Born about 1914. Brother of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi (No. 12). A stolid and unimpressive character, illiterate and known locally as "cold coffee," with the characteristic Al bu Fallah leaning towards perversion.

He often, however, comes out with surprisingly shrewd remarks which show that he has a very clear idea of what is going on.

5. Muhammad bin Hamad al Sharqi, Shaikh

Ruler of Fujairah. Born in 1906. Became Shaikh of Fujairah after the death of his elder brother in December 1940.

Recognised by Her Majesty's Government in April 1952, and thus joined the ranks of the Trucial Rulers. Though generally well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government—he actively pressed for recognition from the time of his accession until achieving his object—he is a masterly intriguer and would undoubtedly serve two masters if it suited him. He showed remarkable reticence about his visit to Riyadh early in 1953. Much of the territory controlled by him used to be under Qawasim rule, but his father broke away from Qawasim control and the latter exercise no influence in the Fujairah area

now. Most of Shaikh Muhammad's tribesmen, the Sharqiyeen, pay complete allegiance to him and he exercises full authority over them, though some pay zakat to Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad of Ras al Khaimah (No. 10). He is friendly with the other Trucial Rulers and tribes with the exception of, of course, the Qawasim and the Beni Qitab, to whom he is hostile. The Qawasim he considers as his hereditary enemies and does not trust them—nor do they trust him. From the time of his recognition as a Trucial Ruler he has shown the utmost suspicion of Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah (No. 11) as well as the other Shaikh Saqr of Ras al Khaimah (No. 10), with whom he is perpetually at enmity and he never misses an opportunity of plotting and intriguing against them. His relations with the Sultan of Muscat, from whom, apparently, he got a Sultanate passport in 1951, are particularly close. He had for long been anxious that P.C.L. should take up an oil concession in his area, and in August 1953 the Company concluded an agreement with him. He often makes real efforts to do what the Agency ask of him. He has an engaging and rather child-like manner which make it difficult to be angry with him in the face of his periodical "enormities" of one sort or another.

Shaikh Muhammad is married to the daughter of the Ruler of Ajman (No. 7), with whom he always stays when visiting the Trucial Coast, and has one son of about 7 who lives at present in Ajman.

6. Muhammad bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1913. Acted as Regent of Sharjah during the prolonged illness of his brother the late Shaikh Sultan, in 1949-51. Announced his succession as Ruler on the death of Shaikh Sultan in April 1951, but subsequently allowed himself to be displaced by the former Shaikh's eldest son, Saqr (No. 11). He receives a larger allowance than his brothers, though it does not meet his expenditure. He owns some landed property in Sharjah and a date garden in Ras al Khaimah.

He is a well-meaning, rather ineffectual character who co-operated loyally with His late Majesty's Government during his Regency provided he was not asked to do anything dangerous or unpleasant.

At times he tends to take an anti-Christian line and of late he has shown unmistakable sympathy—to put it no stronger—with the cause of the Saudis in Buraimi.

He makes unreasonable financial claims on the Ruler and becomes resentful when they are not met.

7. Rashid bin Humaid al-Na'imi, Shaikh

Ruler of Ajman. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is tall with a long black beard, and a typical Bedouin in appearance. He is even more parsimonious and avaricious than the average, but he is not unjust and is liked by his people. He spends a lot of time in the desert and is on good terms with the other Trucial Shaikhs and tribal chiefs, with the exception of Shaikh Saqr bin Sultan, chief of the Na'im in Buraimi, who bitterly dislikes him. He gets around a great deal and visited Shaikh Sulaiman bin Hamyar of the Jebel Akhdhar in 1948 and again in 1950, and has been in Bahrain, Muscat and Saudi Arabia more than once. His territory is secure and he chases robbers himself. He is a good shot and generally kills his man if he gets him in his sights, which has twice landed him in trouble in the past year, once when he killed a robber with whom he was at feud in Umm al Qaiwain territory, and once when he killed the cousin of the paramount Shaikh of the Beni Qitab by mistake. He can read and write Arabic fairly well and listens to the news on the radio (when it is in working order).

His eldest son, Ali, who handles much of the business of the States, is handsome, surprisingly well read and well travelled. But his prepossessing exterior conceals a wealth of cunning. Both father and son are genial characters who, on the whole, do as they are asked by the Agency.

8. Rashid bin Said bin Maktum, Shaikh

Eldest son of the Ruler of Dubai (No. 9). Born about 1914. Since 1938 he has been Regent for his father, who, however, "acts" for him during his absence. He is still a little wild, but by no means unattractive. He is married to a wife whose influence on him and Dubai affairs is both strong and good. She is a daughter of Hamdan bin Zaid, one of the Rulers of Abu Dhabi who was murdered in the 1920s. She is opposed to the Ruler's pro-Saudi brother Shaikh Jum'a (No. 1) and his family. During the war with Abu Dhabi in 1946-47 Rashid adopted a defiant attitude to His Majesty's Government which only changed after punitive measures had been taken against his father. Of recent years, however, he has "grown up" considerably. His mind has developed and he shows both intelligence and administrative ability which would be greater if affairs of State were not sometimes neglected in favour of hawking. He is kindly and generous and genuinely liked not only by his people but also by the British community in Dubai, who swear by him and his father. He makes real efforts to do as he is asked by the Agency and if unwilling to comply with any specific request explains his reasons with cogency and ability. Like Shaikh Saqr of Sharjah (No. 11) he has been trying hard to heal the various feuds he has inherited himself as well as to act as peacemaker in other peoples'. He conducted himself well in the difficult position he found himself in owing to the blockade of Buraimi and has on many occasions loyally supported the Agency against the immediate interests of himself and his subjects. With Saqr of Sharjah he is the Ruler of whom most can be expected for the future.

9. Said bin Maktum, Shaikh, C.B.E.

Ruler of Dubai. Born in 1882 and became the Ruler in 1912. He is a Bedouin in appearance and at heart, and is generous. He is conscious of the traditional duties and responsibilities of an Arab Shaikh, though he has now allowed these to devolve on his eldest son, Rashid (No. 8); he himself spending his time hawking, shooting and travelling in the desert and at sea. He has recently become interested in agriculture and spends much of his time in attending to his gardens in Ras al Khaimah, where he has installed water pumps and made other improvements. Shaikh Said's relations with the other Trucial Shaikhs and the tribes are good. His dispute with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, which absorbed most of his shaikhdom's resources for three years, has been finally settled. He is on particularly good terms with the Sultan of Muscat, whom he occasionally visits, and is also friendly with the Shaikhs of Qatar and Bahrain. He is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government and only persuaded to unwise courses occasionally by his brother, Juma (No. 3). Created C.B.E. in 1951.

Generally liked and venerated by both Arabs and British. Of recent years has shown signs of becoming amiably senile.

10. Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim, Shaikh

Ruler of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1920. Seized power from Sultan bin Salim (No. 13) in February 1948, and was recognised as Ruler in August 1948.

Though on first encounter he strikes one as an unprepossessing character, this one-eyed young man has so far showed himself a strong Shaikh and strict Ruler. Occasionally he takes cruel and violent action—he has been known to put out the eyes of criminals—but he is, on the whole, impartial in his conduct of affairs. He is intelligent and in business shows a welcome ability to understand points of view other than his own. He attends to his affairs, security and good order prevail in his territory and crimes are uncommon. He is supported in his rule by his father and his five brothers and is friendly with all the other local Shaikhs and tribes and loyal to Her Majesty's Government. Although Sultan bin Salim made away with a large part of the funds of the Shaikhdom, Saqr has waived a number of taxes and reduced the customs duty.

He has a dispute with Shaikh Muhammad of Bakhah (Muscat No. 5) over rights in the village of Sha'am which has led to several incidents. In 1950 he extended his rule near the island of Jazirat al Hamrah, and in 1951 he successfully occupied the rebellious village of Rams.

In 1953, as the result of arbitration by the Agency he made peace with Sultan bin Salim, with whom he is now on terms of amity. He is a good friend to the Agency and always helpful.

11. Saqr bin Sultan bin Saqr al Qasimi, Shaikh

Born about 1924. Officially recognised by His Majesty's Government as Ruler of Sharjah in succession to his father on 8th May, 1951, after having canvassed popular support for his claim to succeed instead of his uncle Muhammad (No. 6). Like all the Qawasim of Sharjah, he has an exaggerated notion of his own importance and a tendency to think of the glorious past of his family as though it had survived into the present day. He is, however, morally upright, young, comparatively energetic, sometimes remarkably businesslike, and modern in his outlook; he is foremost among the Trucial Rulers in having constructive ideas for the improvement and development of his Shaikhdom. He has a likeable personality and is the only one of the Trucial Rulers who has any real interest in, or knowledge of, the affairs of the Western world.

Shaikh Saqr undoubtedly enjoys more local popularity than did either his father or his uncle, and if he can come through the first few years of his reign without being dismayed by the realities of his situation—as he seems to be doing—he should make a very able Ruler. He has shown himself consistently loyal and co-operative towards Her Majesty's Government.

Three of his brothers, Khalid, Muhammad and Salim speak remarkably good English—unique among Trucial Coast Shaikhs—which they learned in India. The first two visited London in 1951 and seem to have profited considerably from their trip. All three are intelligent but lack of occupation is tending to make them thoroughly unsatisfactory, and they are all intriguing in one way or another against Saqr. Saqr visited Riyadh in 1955 to complain about Khalid's activities in Al Khobar, whence he is spreading seditious propaganda against Sharpe, another British connexion, but returned with a poor view of the Saudis.

12. Shakhbut bin Sultan bin Zaid, Shaikh

Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Born in 1904 and became Ruler in 1928. He is stubborn, a great procrastinator and parsimonious in the extreme, but is generally considered to be fair in judgment and does not extort nor sell justice. Over the past five years

he has become more and more unpopular with his brothers and the tribes, and is now widely disliked for his meanness and his cavalier treatment of tribal visitors.

During the later part of 1954 and early 1955, however, relations with the brothers improved while the antagonism previously expended on them became directed against Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Ltd. A number of fancied grievances against the company have recently coloured his whole judgment over a wide range of subjects and on many occasions it has been found for this reason virtually impossible to do business with him on rational lines. There is no doubt that he has grown even more unreasonable than previously over the period mentioned.

Shaikh Shakhbut looks delicate, has very small bones and suffers from syphilis, but he has an air of quiet dignity about him striking in an Arab Shaikh. Physically he bears a strong resemblance to the Van Dyck portraits of Charles I. After the death of his first wife he took a second one, a young girl, one Hamdah bint Ahmad bin Khalaf bin Utaibah, who left him after one night and never returned. In 1947 he married the daughter of Hamid bin Buti, his maternal uncle, and in August 1948 he also married a young Bedouin girl whom he casually met near his fort.

Shaikh Shakhbut is well disposed towards Her Majesty's Government. He is on ostensibly friendly terms with the other Rulers and tribes but intensely dislikes the Ruler of Dubai and his son, because of their aggression against him. He seldom leaves Abu Dhabi except to go to the Abu Dhabi Islands and Buraimi occasionally. Together with his brother Zaid (No. 14) and his son Said he visited Paris in August and September 1951 in connexion with the sea-bed concession arbitration between Superior Oil Company and Petroleum Development (Trucial Coast), Limited. This visit did little to broaden his outlook or extend his very scanty knowledge of world affairs. He visited England in 1953, partly to seek medical treatment and partly to see the Coronation, to which, in company with the other Trucial Rulers, he had not been invited. Having with great difficulty been given a seat in the Abbey, he left a few days before the ceremony for no apparent reason, and betook himself to Paris where he was turned out of his hotel for flooding his bedroom. He had great animosity against Ibn Saud, who claimed a large slice of his territory; and his presence at the boundary conference with the Saudis which took place at Dammam early in 1952 did nothing to contribute towards a settlement. Since then, he has been a firm supporter of the measures taken by Her Majesty's Government in connexion with the frontier dispute, although his gratitude was hardly evident from his behaviour at the time of the Coronation.

His mother, Salamah bint Buti, is said to have great influence over him. He has two sons, Said and Sultan. The former is a wretched creature whose irresponsible conduct has done much to lower the reputation of the Ruling Family. He is a drunkard, and syphilitic. The latter, though barely 15, is growing up thoroughly spoiled, and has already taken to wine and perversion.

13. Sultan bin Salim al Qasimi

Ex-Ruler of Ras al Khaimah. Born in 1891. An unpleasant character—thoroughly untrustworthy and intriguing. He neglected the interests of his Shaikhdom for years in order to squeeze money out of the people to aggrandise himself through trade. In February 1948 his nephew, Shaikh Saqr bin Muhammad bin Salim (No. 10), seized power with the people of Ras al Khaimah and the Khawatir tribe during Sultan bin Salim's absence in Dubai.

They have only recently composed their differences, as the result of arbitration by the Political Agent. Sultan is liable to take violent courses, one of which (shooting at the Political Agent) obliged Her Majesty's Government to impose upon him a fine and a year's exile in Muscat. He is now once more living on the Trucial Coast, dividing his time between Sharjah, Dubai, and his date gardens in the Wadi al Qaur.

His eldest son, Saqr, murdered Shaikh Hamad bin Said al Qasimi, Ruler of Kalba, whose guest he was, on 4th July, 1951, and usurped the Shaikhdom of Kalba. He withdrew under pressure in May 1952, the former Shaikhdom of Kalba reverting to Sharjah rule.

14. Zaid bin Sultan

Born in 1916. The youngest of the three brothers of Shaikh Shakhbut of Abu Dhabi and the strongest character of the four. In this family, notorious for its moral laxity and sexual perversion, he alone of the four has an unsullied reputation for clean living. He is now the most efficient, most powerful, most generous and most popular of all the desert Shaikhs of the Trucial States. No Shaikh on the Trucial

Coast is more courteous and forthcoming to the British or adjusts himself better to their ways. Though slightly less well versed in tribal politics than his brother Hazza' (No. 2), he has a remarkable memory for names and places and is a very good judge of character. Like most Bedu he prefers ease to action, but has great organising talent and is undoubtedly a fine leader. Against these good qualities must be set the fact that at Buraimi, where he lives when not hunting or travelling in the desert, he presides over a thieves' kitchen, and has shown an altogether irresponsible attitude over the misdeeds of the Awamir, whom he claims as a subject tribe.

Over the past five years his relations with his brother Shakhbut steadily worsened until 1954 (see No. 12). He has made repeated attempts to heal the breach and shown an admirable tolerance of Shakhbut's coldness.

He has been an unfailing source of strength to Her Majesty's Government in their struggle to stem Saudi encroachment, constantly buoying up waverers, often with considerable sums of money from his own pocket, and never hesitating to put all his resources at the disposal of the Agency or the Trucial Oman Levies in their prosecution of the blockade against Turki bin Ataishan, in 1953-54.

CHAPTER II.—SAUDI ARABIA
GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

ES 1011/1

No. 12

SAUDIA ARABIA: REVIEW OF EVENTS FOR 1954

Mr. Pelham to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 13)

(No. 5. Confidential)
Sir,

Jedda,
January 6, 1955.

I have the honour to submit in what follows a review of activities and trends in Saudi Arabia during the past year in both home and foreign affairs. Listed in an appendix to this despatch is a chronological summary of the more important events.

2. 1954 has been a year of change in Saudi Arabia's history. It has witnessed the first effects of a new king on the throne; a marked if gradual alteration in the method of government; the emergence of Saudi Arabia as a growing power in the Arab world; a decisive step towards settlement of a long-standing frontier dispute between her and the United Kingdom; and, continuing a process that began some years ago, a steady increase of political awareness in the country as a whole. Two people have dominated the year's course of events—King Saud and his brother Faisal, the Crown Prince. They have given every indication of working in harmony and there is no reason to suppose that the present régime will be jeopardised by a feud within the Royal Family. Yet the differences between their characters are considerable. The new King is more figurehead than ruler. He has many of the regal attributes—dignity, generosity, piety—but intelligence and a true understanding of affairs he almost certainly lacks. He has, during his first year on the throne, achieved a surprising popularity among his subjects: even the more educated among them, who are not to be humbugged by the feastings and largesse which the King so liberally dispenses, are ready to admit that as ambassador-at-large he has done much to increase the importance of Saudi Arabia in the eyes of her neighbours. In this rôle King Saud has been indefatigable. Cairo, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen—each in turn has been treated to a State visit and a demonstration of Saudi Arabia's new concern for the unity of Islam. Prince Faisal, on the other hand, is less visionary. He probably does not object to his brother's *idées de grandeur*, but he has realised that the need of the moment is for internal governmental organisation to cope with the rapid increase in the country's

oil revenues and the growing social problem which this creates.

3. The death of Ibn Saud towards the end of 1953 removed at one blow paternal restraint upon the behaviour of his family and the chief obstacle to Saudi Arabia feeling its way towards a more democratic form of government. While he was alive it seemed easier to accept the traditions of patriarchal autocracy and it did not appear that the vested interests of the ruling clique were at all seriously threatened by the increasing discontent of the professional and labouring classes. But now the dangers of class conflict have been increased. Ibn Saud's large family, free to behave as they wish, are becoming daily more enamoured of the power they wield in the country, while the lower and especially the new middle classes grow increasingly aware of the inequalities in the régime. Yet there has, during the past year, been no such evidence of class conflict as was the strike of the Arabian-American Oil Company's Arab employees in 1953. The past twelve months have been outwardly peaceful, and the reason, I believe, is threefold. First—an immediate consequence of the strike—arrangements were made in January for a wage increase and certain other benefits for the company's workmen. Second, the new reign, while allowing greater license to the more irresponsible of the Palace set, has also thrown into prominence men in whom there is still a considerable amount of popular confidence—notably Faisal. And third, the discontented sections of the people have not yet found a spokesman.

4. But if the stresses in the body social have in the past year been largely hidden under a benign exterior of moderately full employment, continuing prosperity, and popular acclaim of King Saud, they are present nevertheless—and are increasing. I have often in the past been able to report that I could detect no firm foothold for communism in Saudi Arabia, but towards the end of the year Communist-inspired pamphlets were appearing in the towns of al-Hasa province, the oil-bearing district.

5. The Government, however, composed for the most part of the more capable

among the King's brothers, have recognised the possible dangers inherent in the increasing political awareness of the people, and, moved by a blend of altruism and self-interest, are working to introduce a measure of reform. That their labours should often be self-conflicting, slow, and considerably hampered by official corruption and princely jealousies, is inevitable. Nevertheless there is a heartening amount of optimism in the present régime, and I doubt if at present the country's affairs could be better managed under any other form of rule.

6. The formative months of the new reign were filled with speculation as to which of the many power groups in the palace would preponderate in influence over the King. But the King, as we have seen, though decked out with all the trappings of an absolute monarch, is not the real ruler. In fact, it is the ascendancy of Prince Faisal, in a degree cultured, travelled, astute and encouragingly liberal, which marks 1954 as the end of an old and the beginning of a new régime in Saudi Arabia. The change would have come in any case, but it was made to seem more sudden (and to the general public was conveniently epitomised) by the personal conflict between Prince Faisal and Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman which filled with drama the sultry month of August. Abdullah Sulaiman was for many years Ibn Saud's Minister of Finance and chief adviser, and the power he wielded was second only to the King's. Somewhat irrationally, he came to symbolise in the eyes of the younger men who now fill the ministerial posts all that was unsatisfactory in the old régime. With much face-saving he was gently removed from power and his place filled by Sheikh Mohammed Surur, a competent man, but one who depends on Faisal for major decisions. Thus the reins of government passed to one who, though no more experienced than Abdullah Sulaiman, yet realises more clearly that Saudi Arabia can no longer be ruled in the arbitrary manner of the good old days.

7. The machinery of a Council of Ministers, originally set up to guide the affairs of State during Ibn Saud's dotage, has in the course of the past year begun to function properly. Its first session was convened in March and since then it has met regularly. Most of its time has been spent in debating the national budget, all of which, excepting the votes for the Ministries of Commerce and Finance, has now been passed, although the money has not yet been

allocated. In spite of great wastage, speculation and delays, and the fact that much of their energy has necessarily been taken up with departmental organisation, some Ministries have now something to show for their efforts. A few schools and hospitals have been built, and some attention is being given to the desirability of staffing them with Saudis. The Government airlines (American-run) have expanded, and much money has been spent on the armed forces—notably in establishing a large military college at Riyadh and an ammunition factory at al-Kharj. Preliminary steps have been taken to resuscitate the Hejaz Railway. With the setting up of a proper Ministry of Agriculture a modicum of encouragement has been given to agriculture and locust control, and, helped by a Pakistani technical mission at present in the country, there are hopes of making better use of the water resources, particularly of the Nejd and the southern Tihama. Needless to say, what few public works have been actually accomplished represent in cash expenditure only a minute fraction of the oil revenues; but it may still be enough to muffle for a time the rumbling dissatisfactions of the people. It is clear that too little attention is being given to development projects which will not need to depend on oil revenues. But to suggest this to a Saudi is hopeless. His idea of the future is, fundamentally, still that of his bedouin ancestors—"Allah will provide." And indeed He well might, for it is now established that the Ghawar field is far and away the single largest oil-field in the world. Already the total production of Saudi crude oil is running close on a million barrels a day; so much oil seems to make nonsense of mentioning the parable of the wise and foolish virgins.

8. The Arabian-American Oil Company, on the product of whose activities now rests the whole crazy structure of the Saudi Arabian Government, has not had an easy year in its dealings with the Government, and its various difficulties have not unnaturally set the pattern for Saudi-American relations generally. The company, like other foreign concerns here, has had to contend with the increasing truculence which is a consequence of the sudden wealth oil has brought to the country; and a consequence also, perhaps, of the company's easy-going acquiescence in past Saudi demands. An agreement between the notorious Mr. Onassis and the Government which is intended to allow the

former to float a Saudi National Maritime Company and create a virtual monopoly of the transport of Saudi Arabian oil was signed in January, though not published until five months later. The flagrant flag discrimination which it implied brought protests both from Her Majesty's Government and the United States Government: these were largely disregarded. But the Saudi Arabian Government could hardly ignore so easily ARAMCO's claim that the deal constituted a breach of their concession agreement, and the issue will now probably be taken to arbitration in January 1955. The whole affair will perhaps have done some good in that the Government may in future be more circumspect in their treatment of the company, and in that the latter have learnt a much-needed lesson—that firmness is, in Saudi Arabia, the best policy. In fact, relations between the company and the Government improved considerably towards the end of the year, so much so that it now seems that the protracted negotiations over an increase in oil payments will soon arrive at a satisfactory agreement. The fifty-fifty principle of dividing the oil revenues will not be affected, but certain adjustments in the method of payment will effectively increase the Government's royalties. The proportion of these royalties which are paid in sterling will also be increased, a fact which should boost United Kingdom trade with this country.

9. Trade generally was brisk during the past year and far more attention is being paid to Saudi Arabia by non-dollar countries. Greece, Italy and Japan all sent trade missions to this country during the year; but the chief increase came in German economic activity. At the start of the year a German combine, operating under the name of Govenco, was established as the Government's official public works contractors. Their presence naturally did much to stimulate the sale of German products. But partly due to the feud between Prince Faisal and Abdullah Sulaiman (who was responsible for introducing Govenco in the first place), partly to the increasing distrust of Western influence in Saudi Arabia, and partly to the Saudis' proud desire to manage things themselves, accusations of dishonesty were levelled at Govenco, the contract was declared invalid, and the company disbanded. The episode was a useful object lesson showing the dangers to which foreign enterprise in this country lies open. However, the consequent set-

back to German trade and influence has only been temporary. Govenco's passing not only left behind a number of German technicians but also, in the circumstances of its dissolution, led to the formal establishment of diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and the Federal German Republic. A legation, which is expected to concern itself chiefly with trade matters, is shortly to be set up in Jeddah.

10. When the trade figures for the final quarter of 1954 are available British exports to Saudi Arabia may be slightly up on the 1953 figure of nearly £6 million. The main increase has been in electrical commodities and supplies for Aramco, though this has been offset by the loss of the sugar trade to Belgium. Britain is still a good second of all Saudi Arabia's suppliers; yet there has been regrettably little evidence during the year of the trade drive on the part of United Kingdom manufacturers which one had hoped might result from recommendations made by the Benthall Trade Mission after their visit to Saudi Arabia in December 1953. British goods, it is true, are now outpriced in many lines by fierce continental competition. It may be that British exporters have misinterpreted the present surge of nationalism in the country, imagining that it implies a measure of discrimination against imports from the West. This is not so; and the market for consumer goods is bound, so far as I can see, to increase greatly here in the next decade.

11. It is true, on the other hand, that Western firms and organisations actually operating in Saudi Arabia have had a difficult year. I have already mentioned the Saudi treatment of Govenco. The same treatment, if less spectacular, has been meted out to the British construction firm of Braithwaites. But the most startling instance of Saudi arrogance was the dismissal in August of the top-heavy American Point-Four team and rejection of all further assistance from that source. Politically, this was a logical extension of the much-publicised Saudi refusal earlier in the year to accept anything in the way of American military aid. It was thought by some at the time that the general worsening of Saudi-American relations towards the middle of the year was brought about by Saudi Government pique at not receiving American support in their frontier dispute with Her Majesty's Government. A simpler explanation is that, with the newly formed Cairo-Riyadh axis to support her, Saudi Arabia merely wanted, in an inexpensive

way, to prove to other Arab States her assiduity in protecting Islam from non-Moslem influences. Economically, too, Point-Four was apparently considered an expensive luxury and far too little Government money could be found for its various schemes. Another example of this curiously self-denying piety has been the move to ensure that no Saudi children being educated abroad receive their primary education in non-Moslem schools.

12. It is arguable that these blatant demonstrations of Saudi Arabia's confidence in herself and her conduct of affairs is little more than proof of an underlying lack of confidence now that she has reached the full status of a modern Arab nation and, like her neighbours in the Middle East, is having more and more to measure herself by Western standards. Yet, with Saudi Arabia, I am inclined to believe that this is not the case. Saudi pride, if unreasonable, is genuine and not a form of inferiority complex. The Saudis feel that they are God's chosen people: their nationalism is, as it were, extroverted: its nature more Germanic than Middle Eastern.

13. A natural consequence of this growing national conceit was that Saudi Arabia should seek a more influential part in Middle Eastern affairs. She has been at great pains during the past year to emphasise her die-hard anti-Zionism—a somewhat artificial pose for Saudi Arabia to assume, because of all Middle Eastern countries she has suffered least by the creation of Israel. Her relations with Egypt have been conducted more realistically. Earlier in the year it seemed that Iraqi political manoeuvres, following on the Turco-Pakistan pact, might render Egypt's position in the Arab League isolated. Since Saudi Arabia could hardly follow a lead which came from Iraq it was only to be expected that she and Egypt should draw closer together, form an uncompromisingly anti-Western bloc, and present a challenge to the other Arab States whose loyalties were still wavering. But it was a marriage of convenience only, as subsequent events have shown. Egypt reached an agreement with Her Majesty's Government on the Canal dispute and at once abandoned her refractory attitude towards the West. Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, who had so publicly linked her objections to Western influence with her concern for a revival of Islam, could not perform such a *volte-face* without abandoning her ultra-Moslem rôle and losing any prestige she may now have in the

Middle East. The year's events have consequently left Saudi Arabia with her political ambitions abroad largely unfulfilled.

14. Her Majesty's Government's relations with Saudi Arabia during the past year were again largely marked by negotiations over the undefined boundaries between Saudi Arabia and the various limitrophe territories on the east and south under British protection. The highlight of these negotiations was the conclusion at the end of July of an agreement whereby the frontier dispute between Saudi Arabia and the Sheikdom of Abu Dhabi and the question of sovereignty over the oasis of Buraimi are to be submitted to arbitration. The achievement of this agreement was in no small way due to the change in the Saudi régime. The old King was fiercely attached to the principles which he conceived to be at issue: Saud was more easily persuaded by his advisers that the dispute had reached stalemate. Yet the signing of the agreement could do little fundamentally to improve Anglo-Saudi relations. The affection in which Ibn Saud had held Britain—despite the frontier dispute—regrettably died with him; and, because of the widespread American influence and of Saudi Arabia's close association with her sister Arab States, no agreement in 1954 could be hoped in itself to restore British prestige in this country to the level it had in Ibn Saud's day.

15. Yet, though the Buraimi Agreement may not have produced much improvement in Saudi relations with the United Kingdom, it is open to question whether the settlements which will sooner or later have to be concluded in respect of other frontier disputes between the two countries will be as bitterly contested by Saudi Arabia. The changing character of the country itself may make such disputes seem less important here. For the King and his advisers the disputes of course still remain engrossing for the obvious reason that through them can be expressed the vanities and ambitions of the Saudi personalities involved. But such politics, all very well for the simpler autocracy of the past, are becoming somewhat divorced from the present spirit of the country. A firmer grasp of realities on the part of thinking people here should make them more concerned to see some improvement in the running of the country than to hear of some fresh territorial gain. It is not too much to hope that Prince Faisal at least does not overlook this. And, while he cannot be expected to change overnight the opportunist character which has marked

Saudi behaviour in disputes with the United Kingdom up to now, he may well counsel the King towards a measure of reasonableness in the problems that remain to be solved with Her Majesty's Government.

16. Saudi Arabia is faced with a testing year ahead. In 1954 the régime has established itself. The new King is assured of the loyalty of his people, and in Faisal they have a competent Prime Minister. He, and the various princes and Ministers who make up the Government, are more or less aware of the country's needs and are optimistic that they can in time provide for them. So far they have done little. If that can still be said of them at the end of 1955 it would not be unreasonable then to suppose that the continued existence of the present régime might be less secure and it would be important to examine closely the elements of unrest.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Appendix

Chronological List of Important Events in Saudi Arabia during 1954

January

- 1 Govenco, a German combine, established as Public Works contractors to the Saudi Arabian Government.
- 2 Her Majesty's Ambassador visits Riyadh to present credentials to King Saud on his accession.
- 4-7 King Saud tours the eastern and northern provinces of the kingdom.
- 14 Announcement of pay increases to Aramco's Saudi employees.
- 12 Sheikh Salman, Ruler of Bahrain, visits King Saud at Dhahran.
- 20 An agreement is signed at Jeddah between Mr. A. S. Onassis and the Saudi Arabian Government relating to the transport of Saudi Arabian oil. The agreement was not published until June 7.
- 23 Meeting between King Saud and King Hussein of Jordan at Badinah on the frontier between the two countries.

February

- 3 Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Syria agree to repair the Hejaz Railway.
- 14 Opening of the final round of discussions on the frontier dispute over Buraimi and the contested territories to the west. Her Majesty's Ambassador meets Sheikh Hafiz Wahba and describes a possible basis for arbitration.

March

- 7 First session of the Council of Ministers convened in Riyadh.

March

- 16 Sheikh Mohammed Abdullah Alireza appointed Minister of Commerce.
- 17 Sheikh Yusuf Yasin gives Her Majesty's Ambassador the Saudi Arabian Government's reply to the British proposals of February 14 above. The chief point at issue is the definition of the disputed areas.
- 20 King Saud leaves Jeddah for an official visit to Cairo, and later to Kuwait.
- 31 While in Kuwait King Saud suggests that the frontier dispute be settled by direct negotiation.

April

- 11 King Saud arrives in Bahrain for a State Visit.
- 12 Meeting of Bahrain between King Saud and the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. The King proposes that there be informal meetings between representatives of both parties to the frontier dispute with a view to settling the dispute by negotiation, and that meanwhile preparations for arbitration should continue.
- 14 King Saud leaves Bahrain for a ten-day visit to Pakistan.
- 30 Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has meetings with Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and Sheikh Hafiz Wahab in Bahrain. The Saudi proposals for a basis for negotiation on the frontier dispute are found to be not acceptable.

May

- 13 Visit of Her Majesty's Ambassador to Riyadh and discussions with King Saud on the frontier dispute. No common ground is found on which to conduct negotiations and it is agreed that both sides should work to reach a settlement by arbitration. King Saud raises the charge that the British blockade of Hamasa is threatening the inhabitants with starvation.

June

- 5 Major Salah Salem, Egyptian Minister of National Guidance, arrives in Riyadh. Saudi Arabia and Egypt agree to a measure of co-ordination between their armed forces.
- 10 Saudi Arabia appeals to the International Red Cross to send help to the blockaded people of Hamasa.
- 14 King Saud leaves for a State Visit to Jordan.
- 18 Dr. Rashad Pharaon, recent Saudi Ambassador in Paris, replaces the Amir Abdullah Faisal as Minister of Health. The latter remains Minister of the Interior.
- 22 King Saud begins a three-week tour of the south-western provinces of the kingdom, and opens the country's first ammunition factory (at al-Kharj) *en route*.

July

- 9 The first of a series of meetings between Her Majesty's Ambassador and Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in Jeddah during the course of this month. They were concerned with agreeing to the conditions under which both sides were prepared to submit the frontier dispute to arbitration.
- 17 King Saud visits the Imam of Yemen at Sana.

July

- 30 The signature in Jeddah of an agreement between Her Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government to refer to arbitration the dispute concerning the frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia and sovereignty in the Buraimi oasis.

August

- 4 Govenco's civil engineering contract with the Saudi Government declared void by Royal Decree.
6 Colonel Abdul Nasser visits Saudi Arabia and performs the pilgrimage.
14 Saudi Arabia rejects Point Four aid, and Point Four officials are asked to leave the country.
16 The Amir Faisal is appointed Prime Minister.
31 Sheikh Abdullah Sulaiman resigns from the post of Minister of Finance and Sheikh Mohammed Surur as-Sabban is appointed in his stead.

September

- 9 Sharia Court in Jeddah formally annuls Govenco contract.
17 King Saud is entertained in Mecca and later in Medina.

October

- 4 King Saud is entertained by Jeddah merchants.
8 The King leaves Jeddah to visit the Asir.

October

- 26 Aramco are given thirty days by the Saudi Arabian Government to come to terms with Mr. Onassis, failing which the matter would come under arbitration.
28 Arrival of a Pakistani Development Mission. Their chief concern is to advise on the use of the country's water resources.

November

- 10 Visit of Mr. Shuckburgh to Riyadh. Establishment of diplomatic relations with the Federal German Republic.
12 Celebrations to mark the first anniversary of King Saud's accession to the throne.
13 Major Salah Salem visits the King in Riyadh. H.M.S. *Newfoundland*, flag-ship of Commander-in-Chief East Indies, visits Ras Tanura.
18 Arrival of an officially-sponsored Japanese Trade Mission of five for a ten-day visit.
30 Arrival of an Italian Trade Mission on a two-day visit.

December

- 1 King Saud leaves Riyadh for Dammam.
13 The Saudi Minister of Finance announces that the dispute between Aramco and the Saudi Arabian Government over the Onassis deal will go to arbitration on January 15, 1955, unless there is agreement before then.
14 King Saud returns to Riyadh.

SECRET

ES 1111/1

No. 13

SAUDI ARABIA'S BUDGET, 1954-55

Mr. Pelham to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received January 26)

(No. 12 E. Confidential)

Jedda,

Sir,

January 18, 1955.

The last Saudi budget, in fact merely a repetition of that of the year before, was issued in April 1953 and was reported on in my despatch No. 51 E. of April 18, 1953. No one could be expected to take that budget very seriously, and as time went on and Government indebtedness grew it was clear that Sheikh Abdulla Sulaiman, then Minister of Finance, had to a large extent lost control of expenditure altogether. With the death of Ibn Saud in November 1953 came a movement among the new King's advisers—a movement led by Sheikh Mohammed Suroor—to put the Minister's house in order. But though plans for a new budget to be issued in April began to be discussed at the beginning of 1954, an interminable wrangle developed between Abdulla Sulaiman and the members of the Royal Family in the Council of Ministers, over the question of allowances and spending priorities for the many princes. With the downfall of Abdulla Sulaiman in August 1954 and the appointment of Mohammed Suroor as Minister of Finance with the full backing of Crown Prince Faisal, a new broom was confidently expected and a rapid reorganisation of the Ministry forecast.

2. In the event the task had proved incredibly difficult and it is too early to say that the new Minister has succeeded. His first objective has been to reconcile all the many claims for funds and to prepare a proper budget. For some months there was doubt whether the budget once finally drawn up was to be published at all. However—no doubt appreciating the need to show results to local creditors, the mildly cynical Saudi public, and the world at large—the budget was approved by King Saud on November 30, 1954 and finally appeared in the Government newspaper *Umm al-Qura* on December 26. I enclose a translation⁽¹⁾ of the figures, together with translations of the King's decree and a letter to the King from the Minister of Finance.

3. The first point to be noted is that the budget year itself is now altered so as to begin at the start of the Moslem year. For the current year (1374) that was August 30, 1954. Past budgets operated from the seventh Moslem month (about March/April in the present decade). Thus the budget for 1371-72 was effective from April 1952 and that for 1372-73 from March 1953, each for one year, whereas the current budget for 1373-74 by operating from August 1954 leaves the period from March to August 1954 uncovered. The reason given for this change in effective date is that of religious observance and example: the start of the Moslem year is the proper time for such things as budgets to begin. However that may be, some reason had to be found to explain away the delay.

4. From the start it should be said that while there is no major revolution in the format of the 1373-74 budget figures by comparison with former lists (it still contains a large number of curiosities which could hardly pass muster for a moment in a country not an autarchy) the drafting is better and the arrangement a great deal more satisfactory and orderly than in the past. Since the last budget a number of new Ministries have been carved out of the Ministry of Finance, and each is now given a proper budgetary allocation. In effect the Ministry of Finance still controls all funds: the difference now is that each Ministry has a Ministry of Finance representative attached to it who decides when budgetary allocations may be drawn on from the account which each Ministry is now to be allowed to open with the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency. The new Ministries can now at least claim their allotted shares so long as they can produce proof that funds are actually needed.

5. For the first time a budgetary deficit is frankly admitted: the estimated excess of expenditure over revenue is near 212 million riyals (£21 million). The method proposed to meet the deficit out of the "General Reserve Fund" is absurd. This Fund was created in the 1371-72 (1952) budget as the result of a suggestion

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

made by the Point IV budgetary adviser. At that time the Minister of Finance made it clear that there was nothing to put in it unless departments could effect savings; and in view of the new Minister's admission that debts at the end of 1953 amounted to over 600 million riyals (£60 million) no one can really be expected to believe that there is anything in it now. Neither my American colleague nor the American head of the Monetary Agency had ever even heard of the Fund, and it must be assumed that the deficit will simply remain a deficit to be tided over in coming years. Nevertheless, it will be an achievement to the credit of the new Minister of Finance if he can reduce Government debts substantially. Most of these are with local merchants: the only foreign debts, so far as I know, are contract moneys due to the British firms Gellatly Hankey and John Howards, amounting to perhaps 3,000,000 riyals (£300,000) in all.

6. Taking Government revenue as a whole it is worth noting that at 1,143,010,500 riyals (£143 million) the estimate shows an increase of nearly 50 per cent. on the 1952 figure. This is accounted for mainly by an estimated increase of nearly 100 per cent. in tax payments. These are mostly from the Arabian-American Oil Company—presumably on the revised basis for estimating the Company's payments, which is still under discussion. The inflated 1952 estimate of revenue from Saudi Arabian Airlines and the Saudi Arabian Government Railway has been reduced to a more sensible level, but otherwise there are no significant changes. The new Minister seems to have used the last budget as a basis and simply scaled the figures up or down. It is not out of the question that the revenue estimated will actually be received. The head of the Monetary Agency estimates that in the four months since the end of August 1954 he has received 409 million riyals (£41 million)—some 317 million of which are from the Oil Company—which is a correct proportion of the estimate for the full year.

7. The estimate of expenditure at 1,355,000,000 riyals (£135 million) is more than 75 per cent. greater than the 1952 estimate and probably reflects a greater sense of realism in the new Minister than in his predecessor. At the same time, there does not seem to be any attempt made to regulate spending for unfruitful purposes. The Ministry of Defence (whose budget includes payment of tribal levies and irregulars) is scheduled to receive no less than 40 per cent. of the total: a fourfold increase over 1952. The Ministry of Communications has an allotment of nearly 100 million riyals (£10 million), most of which will be spent fairly usefully. Other noteworthy beneficiaries are the Ministry of Education (nearly four times as much in 1952), Agriculture (a tenfold increase but still only 1/32nd of the Defence allocation), and Public Security (allocation doubled). Though some new projects are budgeted for, many of the same developments planned for 1952 reappear, but it is doubtful if much will be achieved this year again. Though Sheikh Mohammed Suroor claims that 20 per cent. of the Government's budget is to be spent on development projects, it is hard to believe that this will really happen.

8. Perhaps the most remarkable and least convincing feature of the budget is the estimate for the King and royal family. This is stated at 44½ million riyals (£5 million)—an increase of only 8½ million riyals on the 1952 figure—while the 1952 allocation of 66 million riyals (£7 million) for "Official Departments in Riyadh" has disappeared altogether. However, a study of other items carefully dispersed about the new list of allocations shows that the King will receive officially a great deal more than £5 million. These items are, notably, Nos. 15, 23, 24, 26, 29, 31, 32, 33, 36, 38, 39 and parts of 40. One cannot help feeling that this is a rather childish way to deceive the public, who only give the budget a cursory glance. Naturally no one here believes for a moment that the Royal Family will live on a mere £5 million a year. For one thing, the head of the Monetary Agency has told me in confidence that the King is receiving considerable sums of money from the Oil Company by way of deduction before Company payments to the Government reach the Monetary Agency. One item of this kind amounts to 2,000,000 riyals (£200,000) a month. Naturally nothing of all this appears in the budget. The Monetary Agency assume, moreover, that the \$70 million which the Oil Company recently agreed to pay to the Saudi Government by way of back payments will turn out to be nothing more than a windfall into the King's own lap and will not appear in the budget either.

9. In brief, therefore, while the new budget represents an advance on its predecessors in being a neater, more workmanlike, and probably more honest,

production, it suffers like its predecessors from obscurities and confusion, especially over the question of debt payments and deficit. As dope for the masses it may be acceptable (and public reaction to it here seems quite favourable): as a technical document it remains quite unsatisfactory. But sections of it, at least, stand a chance of being adhered to approximately.

10. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office at Nicosia and the Head of his Development Division at Beirut, to the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of Commercial Relations and Exports Department of the Board of Trade, the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, the Treasury Representative at Her Majesty's Embassy in Cairo, and Export Credits Guarantee Department.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

ES 1781/2

No. 14

**REPORT ON THE PILGRIMAGE TO THE HOLY PLACES IN
THE HEJAZ IN 1954**

Mr. Pelham to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received February 14)

(No. 14. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *February 5, 1955.*

I have the honour to send you herewith a brief report on the Pilgrimage of 1954 (1373 A.H.). I shall be grateful if, as in previous years, you will arrange for such distribution of the report as may be considered necessary.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure

The Pilgrimage for the Moslem year 1373, which took place in August 1954, was not especially remarkable. It showed in the way it was conducted some improvement on previous years and it would be reasonable to expect this trend to continue.

2. The pilgrims were fortunate this year in that the month of August was not as aggressively hot as it can be. There were only sixty-nine deaths from sunstroke during the five days spent on Arafat and at Muna—an unusually low figure. The health of the pilgrims was generally good, and during the whole course of the pilgrimage there were no epidemics. This was just as well, for the new quarantine station which the Saudi Government had built to the south of Jedda was never opened. However, it is hoped to have it functioning for the coming pilgrimage.

3. The number of pilgrims from abroad this year was officially put at 164,072: Yemen was said to have led the field with over 27,000, followed by Egypt, Pakistan, Turkey and Indonesia (in that order). The official figures, however, are seldom reliable, a fact sufficiently proved by the absence from this year's returns of the Russians who performed the pilgrimage. There were possibly twenty-five of them, of whom twenty came in a Russian plane to Jedda via Damascus, and the rest, Turkestanis, travelled with a group of Afghans from Karachi.

4. Distinguished pilgrims this year included the Begum Aga Khan; Ghulam Mohammed and Mohammed Ali, the Governor-General and Prime Minister of Pakistan; Mohammed Khan, the uncle of the King of Afghanistan; Jamal Abdul Nasser, Colonel Anwar Sadaat and Colonel Hussein al Shafei from Egypt; Sayed Aloul, who led the Algerian Pilgrimage Mission; the Nawwab of Laharu; the Sultan of Lahej; and a number of tribal sheikhs from other parts of the Peninsula.

5. In spite of the Koranic injunction not to "debate" during the period of the pilgrimage, there was the customary political activity at Mecca, though none of it of a particularly inflammatory nature. The chief event was the decision to hold an annual conference of Moslem nations in Mecca at the time of the pilgrimage. The initiative for this is reported to have come from Jamal Abdul Nasser, and was no doubt intended to help restore Egypt's paramountcy in the Arab League. Recent developments, however, threaten to make such a conference redundant, though it will probably still serve its ancillary purpose of giving a boost to Saudi Arabia and of forwarding King Saud's ambitions for the Caliphate.

6. The King was much in evidence during the whole course of this, the first pilgrimage of his reign. He led the various religious ceremonies, took a personal interest in the policing and traffic arrangements of the pilgrimage, and held a number of dinners in Mecca in honour of the visiting notables. The chief of these ceremonies was a grand reception for the Moslem delegations. The theme of the King's address at the reception was the oneness of Islam, and the vulnerability of its present disunity. Israel came in for the usual castigation, though, to suit that particular audience, its creation was presented more as an insult to Islam than as an injury to the Arab body politic.

7. Although last year's pilgrimage was in no way as chaotic as that of 1952, there was a sufficient degree of disorganisation to cause even the Saudi authorities to see the

SECRET

need for improvements. By a recent order of the King, certain lands in and around Mecca are to be appropriated for widening the roads used during the ceremonies of the pilgrimage. There has also been some movement, backed by the local press, to reorganise the *mutawwif* or pilgrim agent-cum-guide system. The proposals are that the *mutawwifs* should form a closed union, membership of which would largely be hereditary, and that their affairs should be supervised by a board elected from their number. The aim is to restore self-respect to what used to be a profession of some dignity, and to curb as far as possible the activities of spurious *mutawwifs*.

8. Nothing, however, was done last year nor will be done this year about reducing the cost of the pilgrimage for the individual

pilgrim. It was at one time hoped that there would be a 25 per cent. reduction in the fares between Jedda, Mecca and Medina: this has not materialised and, in view of the powerful interests involved, is not likely to do so for some time yet. The various fees levied by the Saudi Arabian Government were not reduced for the 1954 pilgrimage, and it has been announced that they will remain the same for the coming one.

9. Nevertheless much has been done during the past few years to improve the lot of the pilgrims, and the pilgrimage is much less of an adventure now than it used to be. If the improvements have been slow in coming, that was to be expected: it is gratifying that they have come at all.

SECRET

ES 1015/1

No. 15

**REPORT BY MR. PELHAM ON THE CONCLUSION OF HIS TOUR
OF DUTY AT JEDDA**

Mr. Pelham to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received March 2)

(No. 18. Secret)
Sir,

Jedda,
February 21, 1955.

As the end of my mission in Saudi Arabia approaches it is my duty to review the major trends which have shown themselves in the affairs of this country during the past three years. Both materially and morally the period has been a time of considerable change. For the most part the changes have been similar to those which have taken place in other Middle Eastern States where oil is being produced, but in Saudi Arabia they have been more extreme, more sudden, and ultimately could perhaps be more disastrous.

2. It is one of the ironies of history that the richest oilfields should have been found in the one country which, with its traditions and bigotries little altered during the past 1,000 years, was the least suited to cope with sudden wealth and the impact of Western techniques. That the challenge has been met with some slight success is proved by the fact that the social fabric of the country is still intact. The *pax Saudiana* remains; the right of the Saud clan to continue ruling is seldom questioned; and discontents are few, or at least not often voiced. But it is an uneasy equilibrium which it would take little to upset. Until now, stability has been maintained by a rapidly increasing economy, frequent injections of money in the form of tribal subsidies, and because the unlettered proletariat of the country, seeing their lot better than it used to be, feel that there can be little to worry about. It only requires the stream of money from the oil company to diminish, or even merely to cease growing, and one or other of the merchant, tribal or labouring classes, or a combination of them, may well become rebellious. It is, I think, an appreciation of the possibility of internal upheaval, rather than any idea of rendering Saudi Arabia fit to repel aggression from without, which impels the Americans to maintain a small military and air base on Saudi terms and to take considerable interest in the development of Saudi armed forces which could police the country and protect the interests of the Arabian-American Oil Company. But the possible danger to Western interests inherent in the development of such forces beyond a necessary minimum—even if a stable Government can be assured—are obvious.

3. Since the stability of the Government depends so much on it, it is important to examine the chief source of the national income. First a few facts and figures. Saudi Arabia's income from oil in 1948 was approximately worth £11 million; in 1952 £61 million; in 1953 £70 million; in 1954 £110 million; and the income for 1955 may be around £135 million. Furthermore, the proved reserves in Saudi Arabia's oilfields were established last year as the greatest in the world—30,000 million barrels as compared with the United States' 28,950 million. These are telling figures: but the prosperity of the country must still depend on a continued demand for oil and, more particularly, on a market for Saudi Arabian oil. Events during the past few years have considerably helped the expansion of Saudi Arabia's oil industry. First the Korean war and then the closing of the Persian oilfields made it possible for the industry to develop at an optimum rate. Yet even now it does not seem that the flow of Saudi Arabian oil need be reduced by the lack of markets. It has been suggested that, wars apart, world consumption of petroleum may be expected to double itself every twelve years or so (and it is scarcely possible that developments in harnessing nuclear energy will embarrass the oil industry for some decades yet). Moreover the likeliest increases are expected to be in the non-American markets. With Venezuela more and more occupied in filling the gap between consumption and production in the United States, it seems safe to say that the Middle East will continue to be the chief supplier for Europe and the East, and will consequently be the first to profit by increases in world consumption. In another respect the Middle East is fortunate: the peculiar geographical conditions of the area have ensured that only the largest companies with capital equipment enough to provide suitable living conditions in the desert can possibly and profitably exploit its oil. And

SECRET

it is the large companies rather than the small ones who are best able to safeguard their interests by mutual agreements should it be necessary to lower prices in the face of rapidly increasing world production or the exploitation of new fields. I therefore feel that there is little to fear from outside Saudi Arabia which in the foreseeable future might seriously threaten the continuance of, and gradual increase in, its oil revenues. But there are certain perils which the industry must face from within the country.

4. Much must depend on the state of relations between the Arabian-American Oil Company (Aramco) and the Saudi Arabian Government. The former must satisfy its shareholders, must feel that the tax and royalties it pays are not unreasonable, and must have sufficient liberty to market its products and continue capital expansion as it thinks best: the latter must continue to accept that the Company's interests are also the Government's, and that nationalisation or offering the concession to some other company would not be worth it—even as a political gesture. Aramco's demands from this relationship are already adequately met; and, when one considers that the Company would probably be able to pay its way even if 85 per cent. of the profits went to the Saudi Arabian Government, it does not seem as if it need have any doubts for some time yet. The Government on the other hand are harder to please. So gargantuan is the extravagance of those in power that even the present revenue cannot meet every demand upon it; for some years now, the Government has been overdrawn, the payment of its officials is in arrears, and all the time the rate of frittering away the national income increases. Although even the Saudi Arabian Government cannot expect the oil revenue to continue doubling itself every two years as it has in the past, they may be trusted to make frequent attempts to have their share of the profits increased. Should they fail in this, and should they also fail during the next year or so to curb their extravagance and improve the administration of the country, it is not impossible that they may in desperation reconsider their relation with the oil company altogether. But this would be such an extreme measure that I do not think it will easily come about. First, as I have suggested above, the natural increase in the oil revenue due to the industry expanding should provide a sufficient margin of safety. Second, I do not believe that Saudi Arabia, even with their apparently self-denying nationalism which ousted Point Four last year, would ever go so far with the oil company. Aramco is not only the goose which lays the golden eggs: it is the only goose. And third, relations between the oil company and the Government, after an initial period of too ready acquiescence on the part of the one and arrogance on the part of the other, would seem now to evince a practical awareness of each other's best interests.

5. The above few paragraphs show that there is no reason, whether of an international or local nature, why Saudi Arabia should not continue to receive during the next few years a sufficient income to allow of the present régime continuing in power. But money is not the only consideration. It is notorious that oil wealth, unless sensibly managed, brings to a primitive society more problems than benefits. This country's gigantic oil revenues have in the past been for the most part used up in satisfying the appetites they created. And this is a process which time aggravates unless, and until there grows up a habit of wiser spending. Fortunately there have been during the past year some slight attempts to reorganise the administration of the Government and root out some of its endemic corruption. Even if the results have been few, it is something that the ruling classes have realised that prudence demands that not only they themselves should benefit from the country's sudden wealth.

6. The reason for this salutary reappraisal has been a blend of self-interest, fear and conceit, with a dash of altruism. Although the Royal Family's orgy of spending has to some extent enriched the merchants and ultimately benefited all levels of society, it was natural to fear that there would be some who sooner or later would feel that they were not benefiting enough, and would become envious of the prime spenders of the national wealth. The tribes and lower classes were either too fixed in their habits or too undiscerning to cause worry; but the grasping merchants or the new potentially volatile middle class of professional men and artisans could scarcely be expected to see the wealth of the country drained away without complaint. In point of fact there has been little open criticism of the way the affairs of the country are managed. The most startling instance was the strike of Aramco's Arab employees at the end of 1953. There can be little doubt that this, the first evidence that the masses had a voice, did much to shake the complacency of the ruling few.

SECRET

7. The recent measure of reform in the administration was also, I believe, a consequence of inherent Saudi pride and the necessity of saving face. Even before the old King, Ibn Saud, died, it was generally admitted that the chaos could not long be allowed to continue. But while he lived nothing could be done that was not his command, so complete was his authority; yet he himself, though painfully aware of the state of the country, was too stupefied by senility to exert himself. His death broke the fetters of the past. The new King and his advisers had to prove their worth, not only to the country they ruled but to themselves. If Kuwait and the despicable Iraqis could show something for their oil revenues, surely the Saudis could do no less. And so in the middle of last year began the task of ordering the finances of the country. Abdullah Sulaiman, the old King's chief adviser, was removed from power and the Emir Faisal, the new Crown Prince, was appointed Prime Minister. The new men who now run the country are for the most part active but inexperienced and often irresponsible. I sometimes feel that they regard the business of government as merely another and more expensive pastime. Even so, what little they have so far achieved has, in one way, had a value far greater than its immediate effects. Backed up by wordy promises of greater benefits to come, these few stirrings towards reform have caused the country's critics to reserve their judgment for a while; and this internal truce, as it were, has enabled the new régime to establish itself, not only at home but also in the eyes of other Arab States.

8. Nevertheless it would be unwise of the régime to be lulled by the present docility within Saudi Arabia. The Arab is notorious for the fickleness of his political loyalties. In Saudi Arabia, lack of education together with religious traditionalism have left the national character somewhat a-political; but that is changing. I have already referred to the new middle class as a possible cause of disruption, and this danger is yearly increased by the changing composition of that class. Only a short time ago it chiefly comprised Palestinians, Egyptians, Syrians and Lebanese whose attitude to the Government was largely cynical. But now the foreign element is being outnumbered by Saudi nationals—the technicians of the oil industry, the new half-educated who fill the growing civil service, and the artisans in the boom towns of Jedda, Riyadh and the East Coast. It is this new type of Saudi which, like the new type of Syrian thrown up by Western influences in the nineteenth century, may be expected sooner or later to have a catalytic effect on this country. It is this class, ultimately, which proclaims the arrival of Saudi Arabia in the mechanical age—more so than the superficial trappings of Cadillacs and air-conditioners.

9. By and large the stresses set up in the social and political fabric of Saudi Arabia by the exploitation of her oil resources have not yet caused any major rents. I have indicated two possible directions from which trouble might come: discontent among the merchants should the halcyon days of easy money ever end; and the growing political awareness of an indigenous middle class. I have also suggested that the country's rulers are aware of these dangers, and in a muddled and not very resolute way are attempting to allay them in the only manner possible—by improving the administration. But there is a third consequence of sudden wealth whose ill effects, more insidious and more far-reaching than the others, will be harder to overcome. I refer to the decay of the moral fibre of the country; the loosening hold of tradition; the growing inadequacies of Koranic doctrines to cope with the changing conditions of the country.

10. Its religion has been both the blessing and curse of Saudi Arabia. In the good old days of Ibn Saud's reign, when money was scarce and the problems of government almost non-existent, it was the Wahhabi discipline of living imposed by the King on the land he had conquered which provided the country with a backbone, and made it possible for this one man by his fiery personality to bind together the warring tribes and factions. But by the time the oil money began to flow in, the fires had burnt low: Ibn Saud was a spent man. There was little danger however that tribal war would break out again: after twenty years of peace, during which time an effective police organisation had been established throughout the country, the tribal leaders could be easily controlled by a few subsidies. It was those nearer the King—and the money—who became the first to indulge their extravagances uncurbed. If the new King had had one-tenth of his father's personality, it might have been possible to stop the rot. Even so, there have been a few attempts to limit the amount of money spent by the royal

household, though no one bothers much now how it is spent—whisky, women, private cinemas; anything goes. But paradoxically, it is more in the observance of the precepts of Wahhabi Islam rather than in their disregard that the real danger lies. In other Middle Eastern countries the conflict between Islamic fundamentalism and Western rationalism has been largely resolved because the modernising movement could be fostered by the more liberal Moslems, not to mention Christians and Jews. The beliefs of Islam were conveniently pliant: in Saudi Arabia they are pure concrete. Any trend towards the more rational ways of thinking which are necessary if Saudi Arabia is to become a modern State have to be carried on behind a façade of lip-service to the strict and literal interpretation of the Koran. The individual may be able to perform the mental contortions involved, but for the State as a whole they impose a strain. There seems little doubt that Wahhabism will disintegrate as time goes on, and it will I think be necessary to watch the effects this may have. They need not be harmful. Islam will of course remain a sufficient guide for individual conduct as it has in other, more modern States. Education, in a manner more up to date than that of the present Koranic schools, could prepare the ground for more liberal ways of thinking. And, given reasonably good and enlightened government, pride in the nation's progress could eventually replace religious faith as the binding force in the country. But this is asking a great deal of a régime which thinks that the spread of liberal ideas will necessarily weaken its hold on the country.

11. In Saudi Arabia's foreign relations also the course of events during the past three years has been chiefly influenced by the newly acquired wealth and the death of the old King. In general the outlook of the country's rulers has hardened. An opportunist spirit has replaced the old idealism. Ibn Saud was very much aware of his country's responsibilities as part of the free world. To-day Saudi Arabia looks little further than the Middle Eastern arena, and has consequently less truck with the West. It is ironic too that although Ibn Saud commanded far greater respect than his son in other Arab States, it is his son whose influence seems to be the greater. One reason, of course, is the wealth he has at his disposal: another is the abandonment of Saudi Arabia's former role of judicious isolationism. But the old fears and jealousies linger on, in other forms. Even if the Saudis no longer believe that Hashemite Iraq has ideas of regaining the Hejaz kingdom, they are no less jealous of Iraq's prosperity and no less fearful of her designs in the Fertile Crescent. In fact, dislike of Iraq is rooted so deep in the Saudi mind that I feel this will provide a stumbling-block to Arab harmony for some years yet. Meanwhile Saudi Arabia may be expected to align herself with Egypt whenever by so doing she can advertise to Islam and the world generally her specious concern to preserve the Arab countries from close association with the West.

12. I have left till last any consideration of the United Kingdom's position in Saudi Arabia. You know, Sir, that our influence in this country has steadily diminished, and had until recently been replaced by that of the United States. This perhaps was inevitable because of the presence of Aramco, but it was aggravated by the running dispute over Buraimi. Our firmness over this frontier question caused Ibn Saud as early as 1950 to feel that, although our friendship might still be valuable to him, a safer guide would be America who had the attraction of being both "non-colonising" and a long way away. As a world power he respected us, but as a power in the Middle East and especially as an open supporter of the Hashemites he distrusted us. But the present régime have come to distrust both the United Kingdom and the United States, partly as a result of Saudi Arabia's closer association with the Arab League, partly for fear of economic domination and partly because little support was forthcoming from America over the Buraimi dispute.

13. The arrangement for the arbitration of this particular dispute has, as I have already reported, made little difference to the coolness with which Britain is regarded by Saudi Arabia. With the expansionist policies the latter likes at present to adopt she cannot but regard our presence in the Persian Gulf and Southern Arabia as irksome, to say the least. But polite firmness on our side, and on hers a greater realisation of where her best interests lie, will do much to ease the situation. Pride and love of intrigue, rather than necessity, are the springs of Saudi Arabia's present conduct. Her concern for territorial expansion is not whole-hearted. It is more a case of the bleating of the lamb exciting the tiger, when beyond her borders the cupidity of the populace and local sheikhs is roused

by her wealth and prestige. There must therefore be a clear and conscious decision of the frontiers which we will hold, a careful examination of the means of doing so, and a quiet but prompt execution of the policy decided on. Paper protests may satisfy our need to establish legal right or legal doubt; but their principal effect will be to excite the Saudis to further efforts to maintain the prestige which in their eyes these protests injure—particularly in those cases where we do not have the force to maintain our claims on the ground itself.

14. My conclusion is that our most effective policy in the areas of United Kingdom responsibility on the periphery of the Arabian Peninsula would be the skilful and suave use of money and material development backed up by a show of force; and I feel that where possible the money should be found at least partly from the oil interests most likely to benefit from such a policy. If a plan on these lines is followed in these frontier questions it is not inconceivable that the Saudi rulers may in time recognise the futility of trying to buy influence in the areas for which we are responsible, and will, however grudgingly, acquire some respect for our firmness. Looking further ahead, it might then be possible to foresee the day when the Saudis would perhaps prove more ready to receive such technical advice in the development of their own country as we may be prepared to offer them. But such happy conclusion to these adolescent years of the new Saudi Arabia would require the highest qualities of statesmanship on both sides, and might be feasible only against the background of a general improvement in relations between the West and the Arab world as a whole.

15. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Washington.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

SAUDI POLICY TOWARDS THE UNITED KINGDOM

Mr. Pelham to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received March 2)

(No. 19. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *February 22, 1955.*

In my telegram No. 45 to you to-day I had the honour to report briefly on my visit to Riyadh to take leave of King Saud on the termination of my mission here. I shall not expand greatly on my mention of Buraimi in that telegram. The King and his counsellors expressed their satisfaction at the conclusion of the Arbitration Agreement, but seemed to take it for granted that this was not the time or place to go into details of current difficulties in that connexion. They were confident that these could be settled satisfactorily through the usual channel of negotiation; and, having assured myself that the counsellors knew that I was still expecting an answer to my proposal regarding access to Buraimi (my telegram No. 26 of February 1), I did not pursue the matter. It was only on my return to Jedda that I learned that the Saudis had expressed the intention of sending two trucks to Buraimi without your prior agreement. Had I known of this in Riyadh I would certainly have taken the matter up there.

2. The King for his part seemed anxious to lose no time in discussing relations between Saudi Arabia and the United Kingdom on a broader plane. His protestations of friendship sounded less sincere from his mouth than they would have from his late father's, and I had the impression that he was paying lip-service to a tradition. Certainly it was difficult for me to reconcile his words of friendship with what he went on to say—by implication—of Western, and in particular British, efforts to perpetuate an imperialistic policy in the Middle East. He appeared to be speaking a well-rehearsed piece, but if there was anything specific that I could infer from this speech it was that his Government's attitude towards the West had hardened since I last spoke to him, a few months ago.

3. It is only to be expected that the current negotiations between Turkey and Iraq have been the main cause of this hardening. With my Chancery letter No. 1065/175/55 of February 16 to Eastern Department on this subject was enclosed the text of an address by the King some days before, and I find much similarity between

that address and a *bout de papier* which was handed to me as a message from the King just as I was leaving Riyadh. I enclose a copy of a translation of this paper. It is obviously intended to be an answer to all that I said to the King in accordance with your instructions. There is nothing new in it, nothing constructive, nothing concrete. It seems to me to reflect perfectly the vague and woolly antagonism towards the West which is so typical of the Arab *émigré* coterie around Saud in the rôle of counsellors. Indeed, I have little doubt that, although it was approved by the King, its authors were Jamal Husseini and Khalid al Qarqani (Leading Personalities No. 133 and No. 149).

4. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain, the Head of the British Middle East Office, and Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington.

I have, &c.

G. C. PELHAM.

Enclosure

In the name of God.

Both our old policy and our new one have been inclined towards Britain. Ever since the beginning of the Buraimi affair and up till now our efforts have been directed towards solving the matter in a friendly manner. Any judgment of our behaviour, our patience, and our efforts to reach this conclusion is left to the conscience of the British side and to the Government of America, who have been the friend of all and who have known of this matter and followed its development since the beginning. Now that the case has been put to arbitration we await the result with great hopes that it will put an end to misunderstanding. It is with pleasure and with sincerity that we will submit to the verdict.

It is mistaken to assume that we are opposed to the just interests of Britain's friend, the Sultan of Muscat. We are far from being so. In fact, our policy impels

us to unite the hearts of the Arabs, and to respect the rights of others so that they may respect the rights of ourselves.

Since the signing of the Arbitration Agreement—and even before that—we have been sincere in our aim of a rapprochement with Britain and in coming to an understanding with her. We wish to meet her half way, and in this we are prepared to go to any trouble.

With regard to our Arab policy, which concerns the affairs of the Middle East, both myself and my Government have loyally been labouring since my accession for the unity of the Arab States, for supporting their League and for preventing its collapse. With regard to our co-operating with the West, this is already an established fact in one major respect. I refer to our opposition to communism and to the fact that we do not co-operate with it. But the full co-operation with the West which is demanded of us is more in the hands of the West than in ours. The reason for this is that times have changed. The national awakening among the Arab peoples has reached such a degree of awareness that they cannot now be misled, nor can their policies be shaped for them. The direction of their affairs is no longer in the hands of their rulers, for the people themselves have begun to conduct their affairs. Whoever thinks otherwise is either being obstinate or has erred in his judgment.

We have therefore resolved in our League to show our complete readiness to co-operate with the West provided that the latter reciprocate our feelings with sincerity, appreciate our national hopes, realise the present developments, and solve the problems which exist between us.

Since there are a million people homeless and in conditions of misery abhorrent to

humanity; since there is bloodshed in Algiers, since its people are being deported and its rulers deposed, the honour of its women taken away and its children slain; and since the problems of the Arab Peninsula persist and have not been tied up, it is necessary that the good sense of the West should triumph over its ambitions and inclinations and alter its opinions and change its mentality. For the Arab people do not wish to be used as fuel in their own countries; to suffer all the loss while the colonisers reap all the benefits; nor do they wish to keep themselves subjected to slavery by their own hands.

Such is the national awakening which has taken place among the Arab nations. So long as the West does not fundamentally alter its policy, I am convinced—and of this I wish to assure you—that, in spite of whatever strength, love and support my people and my country give me, it is not in my power to co-operate with the West as it desires; nor, indeed, is it in the power of any other of the Arab leaders. Whoever claims otherwise is mistaken.

In saying this, I am saying something which is in the interests of the West, the Arabs and the human race in general. And by saying it, I only wish to speak truly and thus to seek God's blessing and to satisfy my own conscience. I am sincere in what I say.

As I have already said, should the West change their views the Arabs will grasp the hand which is extended to them. They are aware of the importance of this friendship, and especially of the friendship of Britain whose past history binds her to the Arabs. She will be foremost amongst their friends, and the West will discover in the Arabs the staunch friends which they have proved themselves to be in the past.

ES 1051/4

No. 17

HER MAJESTY'S POLITICAL RESIDENT'S DISCUSSIONS IN RIYADH WITH THE SAUDI ARABIAN GOVERNMENT, APRIL 9-12

Mr. Burrows to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 28)

(No. 44. Confidential)
Sir,

*Bahrain,
April 16, 1955.*

I have the honour to submit a report on the discussions which I held at Riyadh with the Saudi Arabian Government from April 9 to 12 concerning the execution of the Buraimi arbitration agreement, the sea-bed frontier between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, the sovereignty over islands claimed by Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, the issue of a proclamation regarding the sea-bed of the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone and the determination of the frontiers of that zone. I have thought it best to report on these matters in a single despatch in order to show the manner in which the talks developed as a whole and because in the end an attempt was made on the Saudi side to bring all these matters together in a single balance sheet. I enclose extra copies of this despatch to facilitate recording on the appropriate files.

2. I travelled to Dhahran on the morning of April 9 with the promise that a Saudi aircraft would be sent to meet me there and take me to Riyadh. On arrival it was discovered that the aircraft (a Saudi Airlines aircraft on a regular service) was not expected from Beirut until some time in the afternoon. After news of further delays had been received from various sources, I was visited at the American Consulate-General by none other than Turki bin Utaishan, the leader of the Saudi incursion into Buraimi and now a senior official in the Hasa province, who informed me that the Saudi Airlines aircraft had been indefinitely held up, that an unsuccessful attempt had been made to obtain another one from Jedda and that he now hoped to arrange for me to travel on the aircraft which was due to return shortly from Buraimi! Finally, however, this was also delayed and on instructions from King Saud an aircraft was commandeered from Aramco which brought me through a thunderstorm to Riyadh at about midnight. I was met at the aerodrome by Yusuf Yasin, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, and was accommodated in the royal guest house. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jedda had very kindly sent two of his staff to assist me in my talks and they had arrived the same morning from Jedda. I had two audiences with King Saud, one on the morning of April 10 and one on April 11 just before my departure, and I lunched with him on April 10. He was affable, but refused to be drawn into any discussion of substance. The remainder of the talks took place with Yusuf Yasin who was supported by another of the royal counsellors, Khalid abu al Walid. My impression of Yusuf Yasin was that he did not have his heart in the argument quite so much as on previous occasions when I have dealt with him. His attitude on certain points, though not the important ones, might almost be called positive and on matters of disagreement his detailed obstinacy of argument did not seem quite so marked as before.

Buraimi

3. Yusuf Yasin raised with me the question of access to Buraimi even before I had had my first audience with the King and therefore before I had started talking about the subjects which we wished to raise. The gist of the discussions has been summarised in Jedda telegram No. 99 of April 13. Yusuf Yasin argued strongly that there should be occasional access by land to the Buraimi zone as well as by air, both in order to carry out the intentions of the arbitration tribunal and because this might on some occasions be a matter of practical necessity, e.g., in order to replace motor transport. I was unable to confirm the accuracy of his detailed account of the proceedings in the arbitration tribunal but stuck to the two points that the tribunal provided for access by agreement and that access by land by the Saudis would be directly contrary to the main purpose of the agreement, since it would allow them but not us into the disputed area. I finally made the personal suggestion that we might perhaps leave aside the question of principle for the time being and continue as at present to take in supplies by air on both sides since this seemed to be working quite satisfactorily. Shaikh Yusuf was

non-committal on this. My impression was that provided no practical requirement for supply by land arose on their side they might possibly be willing in practice to continue for some time as at present and to defer further reference to the tribunal. But this is by no means certain and the recent incident, which has been reported separately, in which a Muscat force has entered the Buraimi zone in error may well cause the Saudis to feel that they must send vehicles there too.

4. The practical defects of supply solely by air had, of course, long been apparent to us also, particularly with regard to the replacement of vehicles. But I still feel that it remains most desirable to keep closed this Saudi loophole into the disputed area if we can possibly do so.

5. Certain other Buraimi matters were raised by Yusuf Yasin immediately prior to my departure—indeed while talking in the car on the way to the airport—when he was attempting to draw up a balance sheet of the matters in which he alleged we were adopting an unhelpful attitude towards the Saudis. He complained in this connection about:—

- (a) the imposition of visa requirements on Saudis visiting the Trucial States;
- (b) the restrictions on movement of goods and travellers imposed at Kahil;
- (c) the failure of Captain Clayton, the commander of the police detachment at Buraimi, to co-operate with his Saudi opposite number or to answer the latter's complaints and protests.

As regards (a) I said that there was no discrimination as regards visas against the Saudis in the territories under our control, and that moreover it ill-became them to complain about visa arrangements when their own visa system was the most difficult and complicated this side of the Iron Curtain. Yusuf Yasin replied to the latter point that the Saudi authorities gave special facilities as regards visas to inhabitants of the Persian Gulf States. As regards (b) I said that it would be easier to deal with Saudi complaints about Buraimi if we did not have so much evidence of the attempts being made by the Saudis to upset the purposes of the arbitration agreement by distributing money and putting pressure on the inhabitants of the disputed area and the Buraimi zone. As regards (c) I said that I understood that Captain Clayton and the Saudi commander got on well together but that their function was to keep order and not to discuss political questions; an answer would be provided to the Saudi complaints, but I was also anxious to know what the Saudis were doing about their contraventions of the agreement, particularly as regards the excessive numbers of people that they had in Buraimi and the fact that one member of their police party—Qoreishi—lived at Hamasa and not with the joint police detachment. Yusuf Yasin said that he was unaware of these last two points; if the numbers were excessive he would arrange for them to be reduced and he would give orders that all members of the Saudi party should live at the joint camp. I trust that if they have not already done so Her Majesty's Embassy at Jedda will convey to the Saudi authorities details of our complaints about the strength of the Saudi detachment which are already available to them.

6. I had a short talk, of a purely social character, with Abdurrahman Azzam, the former Secretary-General of the Arab League, who has now been appointed Agent for the Saudi Government before the Buraimi arbitration tribunal and who was also staying in the guest-house at Riyadh. He said that since the conclusion of our agreement with Egypt he bore no more rancour against us and hoped that in view of our traditional position in the Persian Gulf the frontier dispute might be amicably settled.

Bahrain-Saudi Sea-bed

7. At my first audience with King Saud I handed to him a letter from the Ruler of Bahrain which was based on the enclosed note supplied by me to the Adviser to the Bahrain Government after discussion with him and the Bahrain Petroleum Company. Its main object was to revert to the agreement obtained from the Saudis in the course of my talks in Jedda last summer to the effect that the boundary should begin at the mid-point of the Fasht bu Saafa and run thence southwards to join the Saudi median line proposed at the London talks in 1951, and to suggest that the Fasht must be defined as the area of depth of one fathom or less. It also contained acceptance of the idea of dividing the Baina islands, provided that the boundary was in other respects satisfactory, but proposed to do this in a different manner to that previously proposed by the Saudis. After

this letter had been read to the King I urged him to consider two general arguments in favour of the Ruler's case. One was that Saudi Arabia was the largest Arab State and had enormous oil resources, perhaps larger than those of any other country, and that King Saud could therefore well afford to be generous to Bahrain which was perhaps the smallest Arab country and had extremely limited oil resources. The second argument, which I made clear I was putting forward on my own and not at the request of Shaikh Salman, was that, as King Saud knew, there had recently been political unrest in Bahrain and that people were trying to impose a new constitution on the Ruler and to reduce his power. I knew that King Saud did not approve of these proceedings, and had in fact refused to support the Reformist Party when they had sent an emissary to him. I suggested that the best way in which he could strengthen the Ruler's position would be to make a settlement of this boundary which met Bahrain's requirements. I suggested that it was in his own interest to do so since political trouble of this kind was apt to spread from one country to another. King Saud replied with the usual stream of generalities about his love for Bahrain and the al Khalifah, with an incidental reference to his efforts to persuade the Arab League to adopt a strong attitude in resisting the Persian claims with regard to Bahrain. I offered to show him in a general way on the chart what the proposals signified, but he asked me to deal with Yusuf Yasin at any rate in the first instance.

8. At a meeting immediately following this audience I presented to Yusuf Yasin a chart on which had been plotted the line which we wished to obtain as the sea-bed frontier between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain. This started from the mid-point of the one-fathom patch at Fasht bu Saafa, went southwards from there to join the Saudi median line (based on the sketch map enclosed in my letter to Mr. Samuel 1087/23/54 of August 12, 1954), following that line until it reached point 5; from there it went straight to the northern point of the northern Baina, through that island and then straight to the northern point of the southern Baina island, through the middle of that and then straight to point 10 on the Saudi median line. In reply to Shaikh Yasin's enquiries about what happened to the line north of Fasht bu Saafa I said that if the Saudis wanted the Rennie shoal and the settlement was otherwise satisfactory we would be ready to concede this. In that case the line would go east from Fasht bu Saafa leaving Rennie shoal to the north and from there would go straight to the nearest point of the median line which would divide the sea-bed on the Persian side from that on the Arabian side of the Gulf. In the course of lengthy and repetitive discussion of the part of the boundary in the neighbourhood of the Fasht bu Saafa Yusuf Yasin's arguments boiled down primarily to two. One was that we were now proposing quite a different line to what had been put forward on the British side in London. In reply to this I pointed out that that line had been without prejudice to the shoals and islands which naturally affected the position of the final boundary. (I would interject here that the production by our delegation at the London meetings of 1951 of this theoretical median line has had a disastrous effect on the whole subsequent course of these negotiations and emphasises the danger of making hypothetical statements to people with mentalities like that of the Saudis in order to illustrate legal concepts instead of relating our position to the facts and the matters of real interest involved.) The second point was that when the Saudis had agreed in Jedda that the line should run southwards from the mid-point of the Fasht bu Saafa they had thought that the Fasht was the area bounded by the 10-fathom line which would give a mid-point much further east, or alternatively that this statement had not meant that the line should run due south, *i.e.*, it might run to the nearest point on the Saudi median line. I replied to the latter point that there was only one way to draw a line southwards and that if in the paper handed to me at the Jedda talks King Saud had meant south-east rather than south he would no doubt have said so, but that in fact he said southwards. As you are aware the basic argument on this portion of the frontier turns on our wish to retain the potential oil-bearing structure for Bahrain and the Saudis' wish to obtain it for themselves. As regards the southern part of the line and the division of the Bainas, Yusuf Yasin said after some discussion that it was clear that the problem was a mainly technical one as to where the dividing line could most conveniently be drawn, and he said he would refer the various possibilities to technical experts. The two proposals in the field were the Saudi one that the northern island and its territorial waters should belong to Saudi Arabia and the southern island and its territorial waters to Bahrain, as shown on the Saudi line drawn on the sketch map referred to above, and secondly Shaikh

Salman's suggestion described in paragraph 7 above that each island and its territorial waters should be divided. As Shaikh Yusuf appeared to see some difficulty in dividing in half such small pieces of territory and as it seemed to me that in fact this is a slightly absurd idea in practice, I threw out the personal suggestion of a third alternative, that the line should be drawn along the eastern edge of the northern Baina and along the western edge of the southern island, *i.e.*, giving each country the whole of one island but only half its territorial waters. This would keep the line more or less straight as desired by Shaikh Salman and would avoid the complicated and rather silly procedure of marking a line down the middle of a sand-bank whose size and shape is liable to change.

9. After consulting King Saud, Shaikh Yusuf told me that the whole question would have to be referred to technical experts on the Saudi side and that they would then draw up a complete proposal for the boundary line and send it to the Ruler. At my farewell audience King Saud handed me a letter for Shaikh Salman to this effect. I urged on him that when he came to consider the reports of the technicians he should beware of their tendency to struggle for every small piece of advantage for their own side and look at the question in a broad way bearing in mind that whatever was in the interests of Bahrain was in the long run in the interests of Saudi Arabia also. I also reminded him of assurances given in his name at Jeddah that the sea-bed boundary should start from the mid-point of the Fasht bu Saafa and run southwards. I said that I hoped I could be sure that any future proposal put up from the Saudi side would start from this point and would not seek to go back behind it. The King said that he would never go back on what had once been agreed.

10. My general impression was that Yusuf Yasin found himself in some difficulty between his desire to keep the potential oil-bearing structure for Saudi Arabia and the agreement which he had given in King Saud's name at Jeddah about the location of the northern part of the boundary line. He will now no doubt consult Aramco and seek by every possible means to devise some new formula to achieve his object. From what I gathered during my subsequent stay at Dhahran it seems likely that there are two schools of thought in that company. One is that they have plenty to keep them busy on land and do not want to get involved in a sea-bed operation and that therefore it does not much matter to them where this line is drawn. The other is that in the interests of their long-term association with Saudi Arabia they are bound to give the King the best possible advice in his favour. I expect that the latter will prevail. But it is possible that there will emerge from Aramco a suggestion for some kind of sharing of any oil that may be found in this area. This might, as has been agreed in previous correspondence, be in the last resort acceptable to us if nothing better can be obtained. Shaikh Yusuf's mind seemed to be running more on the idea that Fasht bu Saafa itself might be divided as a separate entity but that the general boundary should remain more or less as drawn by both the British and Saudi delegations at the 1951 talks, *e.g.*, by splitting the comparatively small difference between the two lines produced on that occasion. I refer below to the general question of how far we could or ought to be prepared to bargain concessions over other matters in return for Saudi acceptance of our proposals in this question.

Kuwait Islands and Neutral Zone Islands

11. Yusuf Yasin recalled that at the meetings in London in 1951 there had been discussion of certain islands claimed by both Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. At the end of that meeting the British delegation had offered to recommend that if the Saudi Arabian Government recognised Kuwait's claim to the island of Farsi they would recommend that the Ruler of Kuwait should abandon his claims to the other islands under discussion. Yusuf Yasin said that if this offer was still open the Saudi Arabian Government were disposed to accept it. I said that I would obtain the views of the Ruler of Kuwait. Yusuf Yasin had previously indicated that he also wished to discuss the two islands of Qaru and Umm al Maradim which are claimed by Kuwait but which the Saudi Arabian Government considered belonged to the Neutral Zone in which Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have equal rights. When we got on to this topic (after having in the meantime discussed the Neutral Zone sea-bed proclamation) Yusuf Yasin said that the Saudi Government maintained their claim that these islands belonged to the Neutral Zone but that the particular reason for mentioning them now was that it had become desirable

to establish a lighthouse on one or both of them and that they wished that there should be agreement between them and the Kuwait Government that the necessary measures should be taken. We went over at some length the familiar arguments about these islands, *i.e.*, on our side that the islands are not mentioned in the Qair Convention which defines the Neutral Zone as being bounded on the east by the sea, that they are mentioned as belonging to Kuwait in the (unratified) Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1913 and that they have always been generally held to belong to Kuwait, and on the Saudi side that the Neutral Zone obviously carried with it the waters and islands naturally pertaining to it and that the argument of proximity is in this case overwhelmingly strong. Yusuf Yasin finally said that if no agreement was possible the question would no doubt ultimately have to go to arbitration, but that meanwhile it might be agreed that each side maintained their position with regard to these two islands but that without prejudice to their respective claims they should agree that the necessary lights should be built to provide for the safety of navigation. This would be a similar arrangement to that previously reached about the erection of a light on Farsi and I said that if this could be regarded as a separate issue I thought I would be able to put the proposal to the Ruler of Kuwait.

12. At the next meeting I told Yusuf Yasin that on reflection, and after consulting the record of the London talks, I was not at all sure that the two island questions could be treated separately as he had proposed. The London offer had been made in the course of discussions in which the Saudi claim to Qaru and Umm al Maradim had not been under consideration. Indeed, at one point in the discussions Yusuf Yasin had himself referred to Umm al Maradim as a Kuwait island (21 lines from the bottom of the third page of the record of the Third Session of the Sub-Committee on August 20, 1951, enclosed in Foreign Office despatch No. 132 (ES 1053/8) of August 28, 1951). The Saudi representatives were now suggesting that I should tell the Shaikh of Kuwait that he was being asked to abandon his claims to seven of the islands discussed in London in return for Saudi abandonment of their claims to the eighth of these islands, but that the Saudis were not abandoning their claims to other islands which Kuwait claimed and to which the Ruler attached particular importance. I was not sure whether we would be willing to put this proposal to him and I was even more doubtful whether he would accept it. I would have to refer the matter to you, Sir, for instructions. Shaikh Yusuf appeared somewhat put out at this and, after some further argument, said that he would be prepared to leave aside the question of Qaru and Umm al Maradim altogether for the time being and not even to proceed with the idea of building lighthouses there. I asked if this meant that the Saudi Government would abandon their claims that the islands belonged to the Neutral Zone. He made it clear that it did not mean this, but only that they agreed that the question should be put in cold storage. I said that this might not suit the Ruler of Kuwait who had given a concession for these islands and might want his concessionary company to start work on them.

13. I propose to discuss this question with the Ruler of Kuwait during my forthcoming visit. He had in the past accepted the idea of giving up his claims to all the islands discussed in London, except Farsi, in return for Saudi recognition of his claim to that island (Bahrain despatch No. 124 of October 20, 1951), but this was before the Saudi claim about Qaru and Umm al Maradim was brought to his notice as a result of the Saudi note of April 10, 1952 (Jeddah telegram No. 39 of April 12, 1952), and I am not sure how he will react. I will report further after my visit to Kuwait.

Neutral Zone Sea-bed

14. I spoke to Yusuf Yasin on the lines of your despatch No. 64 (EA 1083/23) of June 23, 1953, to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Jeddah, saying that we were prepared to take the Saudi draft of the joint proclamation as a basis for discussion but wished to obtain the two amendments specified in your despatch. After some rather pettifogging discussion Yusuf Yasin said he was ready to recommend that the Saudi Government should accept the substitution of "equitable principles" for "equal principles" in the first sentence of clause 1 of the proclamation. As regards the second proposed amendment however, namely the reinsertion of a reference at the end of clause 1 to the possibility of further agreement being reached

about the Neutral Zone in accordance with the terms of the Oqair Convention, he argued that

- (a) it was inappropriate to refer to this convention in this context since it would imply that Saudi Arabia as well as Kuwait was obliged to accept the good offices of Her Majesty's Government. This had been the case under the 1916 Agreement at the time when the Oqair Convention was made, but was no longer the case since the conclusion of the Treaty of Jeddah in 1927;
- (b) since the second clause of the preamble of the proclamation referred to the Oqair Convention as setting up the Neutral Zone, this made it sufficiently clear by implication that if any change in the status of the Neutral Zone took place a parallel change could or should also be applied to the sea-bed. I suggested a possible comprise by which there might be added at the end of clause 1 "unless and until further agreement is reached with regard to the Neutral Zone" or words to that effect. But Yusuf Yasin continued to hold that any addition was unnecessary and I said I would report his views to you.

Yusuf Yasin then raised the further point that he did not think it appropriate to refer in this proclamation to the "Persian Gulf" and wished to substitute "Arab Gulf" or "The Eastern Gulf of the Arabs." After some further argument in which Shaikh Yusuf seemed somewhat impressed by a point which I put forward rather light-heartedly to the effect that the use of the name "Persian Gulf" might help us in pressing our eventual claims against Persia in the longitudinal division of the sea-bed, he appeared to be disposed to drop this matter. Unfortunately at a very late stage during my visit Yusuf Yasin told me that in the course of discussing the result of our talks with the Emir Feisal, who had in the meantime returned to Riyadh from Egypt, the latter had said that he did not like the substitution of "equitable" for "equal" in this draft proclamation since he thought that it would only lead to more difficult argument when we came to discuss the division of the sea-bed with Persia and other neighbouring areas. I asked Shaikh Yasin to try to persuade Emir Feisal to change his mind and accept our amendment on this point.

15. I propose to discuss this draft proclamation with the Ruler of Kuwait. He is unfortunately also likely to fasten on the reference to the "Persian Gulf" since efforts have for some time been made in Kuwait to establish the term "Arab Gulf" instead of it. I shall be glad to know how strongly you wish to insist on the two amendments set out in your despatch under reference. My own feeling was that Yusuf Yasin made a good case for omitting further reference to the Oqair Convention and that we ought if possible to try to secure the "equitable" amendment, but that if this seemed likely to lead to much further delay we might perhaps give in on this point also.

16. In the course of discussion Yusuf Yasin further asked whether reference in the proclamation to territorial water might not cause difficulties since Saudi Arabia claimed a six-mile limit whereas Kuwait claimed only three. If two companies obtained a concession for the sea-bed they would have a different area according as they held their concession from Kuwait or Saudi Arabia. I said that I recognised that this point would arise but I did not see that it need affect the wording of the proclamation which was intended to establish joint rights of parties *vis-à-vis* the outside world. On the practical point I thought it likely that the Ruler of Kuwait would give a separate concession for the sea-bed area between the three and six-mile limits, probably to his existing concessionary companies. Thereafter the areas available would be the same. Shaikh Yusuf exclusively agreed that the point need not be further considered in relation to the issue of the joint proclamation. I shall be glad to receive your views on this question of Neutral Zone territorial waters in due course.

Neutral Zone Frontiers

17. I told Yusuf Yasin when we were going over our agenda that I wished to discuss the procedure by which this question could be dealt with. He agreed and at a subsequent meeting proposed that this should be done in three stages:—

- (a) a map of the area should be made by a joint party of surveyors to be appointed by the two parties respectively;

- (b) there should be a meeting of political representatives to set down on the map thus produced the boundaries described in the Oqair Convention;
- (c) a further joint party should be sent out to set up marks on the ground to show the frontiers thus delimited.

I said that I thought these proposals sounded sensible and that I would recommend them to you and the Ruler of Kuwait. I did not go into the topographical details mentioned in paragraph 3 of your despatch to Jeddah No. 75 (EA 1087/14) of July 4, 1952, because Shaikh Yusuf clearly had no conception whatever of the area and I believed that reference to these places at this time would merely provoke useless argument and make him suspicious of the whole idea of demarcation. Moreover it seems to me that with the well-known uncertainty of our own maps with regard to the places mentioned in the Oqair Convention it will be more profitable to begin with an agreed topographical survey. I will make further recommendations after discussion in Kuwait as to how a survey party might be composed on our side.

18. One of the satisfactory features of the talks was that no reference was made by the Saudi representatives at any time to the questions of the administration of the Neutral Zone or the exercise of jurisdiction in it. You will recall that we have hitherto felt inhibited from raising with the Saudis matters relating to this area in case they took this as an excuse for discussing administration and jurisdiction which we preferred at present to leave alone.

19. Towards the end of the talks Yusuf Yasin suggested that we should have an agreed résumé of our discussions. I agreed and he produced a rather tendentious draft which would have involved me in agreeing to various points on which I have in fact said I would have to refer to you or to the Ruler of Kuwait. I produced a counter-draft, of which I enclose a copy. When Shaikh Yusuf saw this he thought it would be merely a waste of time to argue about a text and abandoned the idea of a written record. We went over the points in the draft however and there was no doubt left on either side about the positions reached in the course of our discussions.

20. At a still later stage the whole conversations were characteristically given a new slant by a last-minute manoeuvre by Yusuf Yasin. As he was accompanying me to the airport after my final audience with King Saud he said that he was disappointed at the negative attitude which we were adopting in a number of matters, specifying, as I have said above, the visa requirements for the Trucial States, the control exercised at Kahil over access to the Buraimi zone, our refusal to agree to supplies being sent to the zone from Saudi Arabia over-land, and also my objection to treating the sovereignty over the islands claimed for Kuwait in the London talks of 1951 as a separate matter from the sovereignty over the islands of Qaru and Umm al Maradim. He said that when we were adopting this negative attitude towards matters in which the Saudis were interested it was wrong for us to expect that the Saudis would be forthcoming over matters in which we were asking them to meet our requirements, by which he presumably intended to refer to the Bahrain sea-bed boundary. I rebutted his remarks about Buraimi and the Trucial Coast as already described above. I also said that I thought it was wrong to try to bargain one of these questions against another. Would the Saudis really be prepared to tell the Ruler of Bahrain that he could not have the frontier he wanted because the Ruler of Kuwait would not give up his claim to Qaru and Umm al Maradim? In all these matters we were not dealing with our own territory but with that of individual rulers with whom we had to deal individually. Yusuf Yasin said that as the Saudis saw it they were dealing with Her Majesty's Government on all these questions and they wished to deal with us face to face as principals. They believed that only in this way could a satisfactory overall settlement be reached.

21. In spite of the disadvantages I think we shall have to consider carefully whether it is desirable to consider in any way the possibility of an overall settlement of the kind advocated by Yusuf Yasin. Part of the answer will depend on the attitude of the Ruler of Kuwait about the Neutral Zone islands. But I doubt if agreement to shelve this question for the time being, as desired by the Saudis, would be enough in itself to secure a sea-bed frontier satisfactory to Bahrain. The Saudis evidently feel strongly about the execution of the Buraimi arbitration agreement and it is probably in this sphere that we should have to find

a *quid pro quo* if we decided to pursue the idea of a general settlement. If one could ever feel sure of the *bona fides* of the Saudis it might conceivably be possible to strike a bargain simply about Buraimi arrangements, e.g., that they would stop subsidising people in the zone and in Oman if we allowed access by land or restored the visa waiver, but I fear that one of the few certainties of the situation is that they will in all circumstances and whatever they say continue to use bribery and pressure in an attempt to extend their influence in and around the disputed area and the Buraimi zone. I propose to send further comments on this question of the overall settlement after my visit to Kuwait when we shall have a more complete picture of the attitude which we wish to adopt on the individual items under discussion.

22. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Jeddah, the British Middle East Office and the Persian Gulf posts.

I have, &c.

B. A. B. BURROWS.

NOTES FOR LETTER FROM SHAIKH SALMAN TO KING SAUD

Mr. Burrows told me of the conversations which he had with Your Majesty at the beginning of August in Jeddah about the settlement of the boundary in the sea between Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, and he brought me the paper in which it was written that you agreed to the equal division of Fasht bu Saafa. I have also heard of the conversations which Mr. Wall had with Your Majesty at Dammam a few weeks ago.

2. I should now like to reach a final settlement of this matter which I believe would be in the interests of both countries and I have, therefore, given this further letter to Mr. Burrows to deliver to Your Majesty in the hope that he may be able to reach agreement with you on my behalf.

3. The only two points which remain to be settled are the method of dividing the shoal of Fasht bu Saafa in order to fix the northern point of the line and the position of the boundary in the Baina islands. As regards the first point I had previously proposed that for the sake of simplicity the line should start at the lighthouse, since this is a point to be seen by all without difficulty or risk of confusion. If, for some reason, this is not acceptable to you then we must select the middle point of the shoal, but for this purpose the shoal must, of course, be defined in a manner which accords with local knowledge and custom and with the nature of the sea-bed in that place. A shoal is well known to be a shallow part of the sea over which small boats cannot pass at low tide and behind which they can shelter in rough weather. If there is no land which is uncovered by the sea at low tide then the shoal must be defined by the least possible depth in order that these conditions may be fulfilled. This also accords with the definitions accepted internationally by experts. In all these circumstances it is clear that the most convenient depth to choose for the definition of this shoal would be that of one fathom, and I hope you will agree to this. The figure of 10 fathoms was mentioned on your side. This however would take in a large area of the sea which provides no hindrance to the passage of boats and no shelter in case of storm. It also includes the entirely separate shoal of Fasht al Jeijah several miles to the east of Fasht bu Saafa. To include all this area in Fasht bu Saafa would be contrary to all the correct principles. It is also clear from photographs that the Fasht bu Saafa is a small well-defined area of shallow depth in the neighbourhood of the lighthouse and that the other shoal is separated from it by a large area of deep water which cannot be called a shoal.

4. If we can agree on a general settlement of this boundary I would be prepared, in response to Your Majesty's wish, to divide the Baina islands between us, in spite of the long-standing claim which Bahrain has to both of these islands. I think it would be more convenient for both sides if each of these islands and the waters surrounding them were divided in half instead of giving one island to Bahrain and the other to Saudi Arabia. The reason for this is only so that the boundary line should not approach either country more closely than is necessary.

SECRET

5. The boundary line which I propose is shown on the maps which Mr. Burrows brings with him. It goes from the mid-point of the Fasht bu Saafa to the south until it meets the median line put forward by the Saudi delegation in London, and follows that to the end, except for the small change in the area of the Baina where the line has been straightened to leave half of each island to each country.

DRAFT RESUME OF THE DISCUSSIONS HELD IN RIYADH BETWEEN SHAIKH YUSUF YASIN AND KHALID ABU AL WALID ON THE SAUDI SIDE AND Mr. B. A. B. BURROWS, C.M.G., ON THE BRITISH SIDE, APRIL 10-11, 1955

Shaikh Salman's letter addressed to His Majesty on 10.8.1374 (3.4.1955) concerning the drawing of a boundary between Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, and sovereignty over some fashts and islands, was studied together with the map presented by Mr. Burrows. It was agreed that the Saudi side will present in the very near future a complete draft for an agreement defining the boundaries with Bahrain, including some islands and fashts, taking into consideration the results of the previous conversations at Jeddah on this subject, Shaikh Salman's request and the interests of both parties.

2. The question of the islands claimed by Kuwait was discussed. Reference was made to the British offer made in London in 1951 to recommend that, provided the Saudi Arabian Government recognised Farsi as belonging to Kuwait, the Kuwait Government should abandon its claims to the other islands claimed for Kuwait in the London meeting. The Saudi representatives said that they were now prepared to recommend acceptance of this suggestion. Mr. Burrows said that he was not sure whether in view of the Saudi claim to Qaru and Umm al Maradim which had been put forward subsequent to the London meetings, the British offer was still in force. He was even more doubtful whether in these circumstances the Ruler of Kuwait would accept such a proposal. It was agreed that he would transmit the Saudi views to the British and Kuwait Governments and that the Saudi Arabian Government would be informed of the result as soon as possible.

3. A draft joint proclamation concerning the sea-bed of the Neutral Zone was studied. An amendment to the Saudi draft of 1952 was agreed, namely to substitute "principles of equity" for "principles of equality."

Mr. Burrows proposed a further amendment relating to the possibility of subsequent agreements about the Neutral Zone in accordance with the terms of the Qair Convention of 1922. The Saudi representatives objected to this and Mr. Burrows said he would obtain the further views of the British Government. It was agreed that when the text had been accepted by the Ruler of Kuwait the Saudi Arabian Government would be informed and arrangements made for the signature of the proclamation by His Majesty King Saud and His Highness Abdullah as Salem.

4. The question of drawing the boundaries of the Neutral Zone was discussed. The Saudi side proposed that this be implemented in the following three stages:—

- (a) Sending a joint group for survey and drawing up of an accurate map.
- (b) Holding of a meeting of political representatives for drawing up the boundaries on the above-mentioned map, in accordance with the Qair Convention of 1922.
- (c) Sending an engineering party to install the boundary markers.

Mr. Burrows said he would recommend to the British Government and to the Ruler of Kuwait that these proposals should be accepted.

5. This resumé represents the discussions which took place and does not bind either side except after approval by the Governments concerned.

SECRET

ES 1015/6

No. 18

CRITICISM OF SAUDI POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Macmillan. (Received May 25)(No. 44. Confidential)
Sir,Jedda,
May 11, 1955.

From the reports which I have submitted from time to time on my negotiations with members of the Saudi Arabian Government it will be evident that much of the real power in this country is wielded by the coterie of advisers who surround King Saud. Few of these are Saudi-born; most are mercenaries or *émigrés* from other Arab States; and it would not be too much to say that they stand for reactionary principles of government inside Saudi Arabia and strongly anti-Western policies abroad.

2. Since the power of these advisers is maintained through their constant and direct access to the King it is hardly surprising that they should regard as dangerous to themselves the existence of Ministers whom they could not control and who could make recommendations to the King contrary to their wishes. Thus there has been a recent spate of royal decrees on various subjects, issued without reference to the Council of Ministers or even to the Ministers within whose sphere of responsibility they came. It seems likely that the royal advisers have been playing on the King's vanity and suggesting to him that his position would be strengthened by the issue of decrees serving to remind the people that whatever machinery of government might exist the King still held the reins firmly in his own hands and could make whatever enactments he chose without reference to anyone else. And with the King's position strengthened, so (the advisers no doubt hope) would their own place in the court be made more secure, and their pickings more lucrative.

3. Such a haphazard manner of making policy could hardly be expected to escape criticism even inside the country, despite the difficulties of free speech. For the most part this criticism is probably not openly expressed, though murmurs of it reach me from time to time. Recently, however, a member of my staff has been treated by Mohammed Alireza, Minister of Commerce here, to an outspoken recital of violent criticism of the whole clique of advisers in Riyadh. He claimed to have emphasised to Crown Prince Faisal (who is of course

also Foreign Minister), on the subject of the Turco-Iraqi pact, that in a time of crisis it was ludicrous for Saudi Arabia meekly to follow Egypt's lead in foreign policy when her interest lay in seeking real protection from the Soviet threat through closer relations with the United States and United Kingdom and in sinking dynastic feuds with the Hashemites by offering to subscribe to the Turco-Iraqi pact. The Egyptian leaders had no experience of international affairs and were inflated with their own conceit. And it was absurd to suppose that, with the Dhahran oilfields so close to Russian bomber bases, Saudi Arabia could remain neutral in another world war.

4. Mohammed Alireza thought that the foreign policy being pursued by Saudi Arabia at present was disastrous. He knew it was the work of the *émigré* advisers round the King—and the infamous Otto von Hentig was the newest addition to them. Even Faisal was not strong enough to go against them. The only way to remedy the situation (Mohammed Alireza went on) was to get them out; and he and others were working for the removal from effective control over foreign affairs of Yusuf Yasin (who resides at court) and the latter's nephew Taher Ridhwan (who as head of the Foreign Ministry resides in Jedda with no authority except to act as postman for Yusuf). As a substitute for Yusuf Yasin the Alireza group had in mind Mohammed's brother Ali. The latter had acted as adviser to Prince Faisal for some time (he went with him to the Bandung conference) and it was intended to make an effort to have him formally appointed as such. Then he might be made Faisal's deputy in place of Yusuf Yasin. And, indeed, I detect signs that part of this programme has been accomplished: the press here announced on the 29th of April that Ali Alireza had been given the title of Minister of State.

5. But Mohammed Alireza's criticisms are by no means confined to the conduct of foreign affairs. Himself a business man, he was scornful of the ignorance and incompetence of the Council of Ministers. What, he asked, did Jamal Hussein, Khalid al-Qarqani, or princes Mishaal, Sultan,

SECRET

Fahad, Abdulla Faisal, or even Faisal himself, know about business matters? He quoted a case which had occurred some months ago when Jamal Hussein had proposed that an announcement should be made that all Government debts were in future to be paid by instalments. Everyone agreed until Mohammed Alireza pointed out that this would mean declaring a moratorium and thus irrevocably damaging such little credit as the Government still had left. No one at the meeting, he said, had even heard of a moratorium! It was agreed, however, that the whole should be dropped. There was no unity and sense of direction in the Government in Riyadh: there was merely a pack of bigoted, misguided or merely ignorant people trying to press their ideas on the King by playing on his vanity, and not making any attempt to achieve a properly co-ordinated policy.

6. One is bound to take the words of Mohammed Alireza with a grain of salt. His growing unpopularity in the upper levels of the Government, his set-back over the Onassis oil tanker agreement (of which he was the main promoter), and his own desire to get back to business, make it likely that whatever happens he will resign before long. I doubt if his sentiments are as strong as he wishes us to believe, but I think he is genuinely dissatisfied with the state of the country's internal affairs and foreign policy, and feels the need for a more broadly based system of government which would take some account of the views and interests of the merchants of the Hejaz and the Nejd, who may fairly be said to constitute what public opinion there is in Saudi Arabia.

7. If the Alireza family secured any degree of control over foreign policy here,

the result could hardly fail to be an improvement over the present state of affairs. The Alirezas as a family are sophisticated and westernised, and Ali Alireza at least has some diplomatic experience with the Saudi delegation to the United Nations to his credit. Negotiations with him would probably be more fruitful and certainly less exasperating than with Yusuf Yasin.

8. While, therefore, there is some ground for hoping that the conduct of Saudi foreign affairs may possibly be transferred into other hands, there is little chance at present, as I see it, of any significant change for the better in the ramshackle structure of the Saudi Arabian Government as a whole. It may be that the seeds of such a change are in the murmurs of popular criticism which I have mentioned above; that the King will be prudent enough to take heed of the criticism and give the people their fair share of the country's oil wealth. Or he may stifle the critics and yield nothing of his autocracy. Provided he continues to have the strength of his religious following, his tribes, and his gold, to maintain that position, he may well choose the latter course. For the West this might have the present advantage of ensuring the best possible guard against communism in this country. But obviously it has its dangers, too; and whether the King is made aware of these in time or not will depend largely on the will of his advisers.

9. I am sending copies of this despatch to Head of the British Middle East Office, the Political Resident at Bahrain and the Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

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50863

G*

EA 10814/15

No. 19

SAUDI FRONTIERS

(1)

*Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Embassy at Jedda**(Received June 8)*

(Confidential)

Jedda,

May 30, 1955.

The Saudi Arabian Government have taken note that the British Government consider themselves responsible for all the military movements which they are carrying out in the disputed areas of Oman in the name of the Sultan of Muscat. In this respect the British Government are not observing the spirit of the arbitration agreement concluded between them and the Saudi Arabian Government, in that they are not refraining from actions which are to be construed as influencing Saudi subjects in those areas. Moreover, the British Government wish to interpret that agreement as giving them a free hand to do as they please in those areas, although they know that they are disputed areas.

The Saudi Arabian Government have made several approaches to the British Government and drawn their attention to the fact that the Saudi Arabian Government have not forgone their rights in the territories outside the area of arbitration, but have sovereignty over these territories and Saudi subjects therein.

The Saudi Government do not recognise the right of anyone but themselves there. They have requested the British Government to stop the acts of violence and force and the killing of innocents there and have requested that the matter should be solved by amicable means. But the British Government have done nothing but persist in their chosen plan, which is a plan of violence and force.

The Saudi Arabian Government, who have not slackened their strenuous and sincere efforts towards rapprochement and understanding and reversion to the basis of their traditional friendship, did not expect the British Government to meet their friendly approaches with threats and force and continue a policy which prevents the rapprochement and understanding so sincerely longed for and desired by the Saudi Arabian Government.

The Saudi Arabian Government wish to state that they are certainly determined to claim their legal rights and have no desire to meet threats with force, for in this matter they rely on the might of right and on their absolute conviction that right shall prevail, however long it may take.

In pursuance of the resolve of His Majesty's Government to follow such a plan they wish to make the following proposal with the object of reaching a satisfactory solution between them and the British Government:—

1. Cessation of the present movements.
2. Withdrawal of British forces from the areas they have recently occupied.
3. The Saudi Arabian Government are prepared to enter at once into negotiations for the final definition of all remaining borders under dispute outside the areas included in the arbitration agreement.
4. Alternatively, the British Government should agree to authorise the present arbitration tribunal to define the frontiers between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the territories of all other rulers who claim to have a dispute in these territories, up to the end of the Saudi frontier with the Yemen.

EA 10814/24

(2)

*Her Majesty's Embassy at Jedda to Saudi Arabian Ministry of Foreign Affairs**(Received August 17)*

(Confidential)

Jedda,

August 4, 1955.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Jedda present their compliments to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and, on the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have the honour to make the following reply to the Ministry's Memorandum of the 30th of May, 1955.

SECRET

2. His Highness the Sultan of Muscat and Oman has been consulted and has requested Her Majesty's Government to reply on his behalf to such parts of the Ministry's Memorandum as concern his territories and interests.

3. With regard to the first part of the Memorandum, Her Majesty's Government desire to make clear that no part of Oman (save that which lies in the Buraimi Zone itself) is subject to arbitration or to the conditions attached to the Buraimi Arbitration Agreement. Oman is part of the dominions of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and any movement of troops that may take place there is his responsibility. There are in fact no British troops either in Oman or in any of the areas that are subject to the Buraimi Arbitration.

4. Her Majesty's Government emphatically reject the suggestion in the third paragraph of the Memorandum that they have been responsible for acts of violence in Oman. From the notes handed to the Saudi Arabian Ambassador in London on the 24th of May and to the Ministry for Foreign Affairs in Jedda on the 26th of May the Saudi Government are already aware of the true facts. It must be emphasised that the Sultan of Muscat and Oman has every right to put down law-breakers in his own territory.

5. It follows from the above that the first two proposals in the last paragraph of the Memorandum are based on a misunderstanding of the facts.

6. As regards proposals three and four, Her Majesty's Government assume that these refer to the frontiers of Oman and of the Eastern Aden Protectorate. On this assumption the Embassy have the honour to make the following observations:—

(a) In the northern region, that between Buraimi and Umm al Zamul, it is the contention of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman that Saudi Arabia does not extend as far east as this area and that there is in consequence no common frontier there between Muscat and Oman on the one hand and Saudi Arabia on the other. Her Majesty's Government agree with this view. But whether or not it is correct cannot be known until the Buraimi Arbitral Tribunal has made its award.

(b) From Umm al Zamul southwards and south-westwards the boundary of Muscat and Oman is a line joining the following points: Umm al Zamul to 22° N., 55° 40' E., to 20° N., 55° E., to 19° N., 52° E. At this point the line meets the boundary of the Eastern Aden Protectorate which runs from there along the southern fringe of the sand dunes on the general lines of the following co-ordinates: 18° 48' N., 51° 03' E., 18° 10' N., 48° 20' E. Thence it runs due south-west to the boundary of the Yemen. All areas east and south of these lines are indisputably within the territories of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman or of the Aden Protectorate, as the case may be. There is therefore no case to be submitted to negotiation or arbitration in regard to these areas.

7. Her Majesty's Embassy are instructed to add that they hope the above statement will serve to clarify the position and to eliminate any justification for future dispute or friction between our two countries. Her Majesty's Government earnestly desire that the traditionally friendly relations between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia should be maintained and they trust that the Buraimi arbitration, the conditions of which they are themselves scrupulously observing, will also serve this end.

EA 10814/29

(3)

*Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Embassy at Jedda**(Received October 26)*

(Confidential)

October 18, 1955.

The Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the British Embassy in Jedda and have the honour to reply as follows to the Embassy's note No. 196 of August 4, 1955, which dealt fundamentally with matters concerning the frontiers in the south of the Arabian Peninsula.

SECRET

2. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government it is not at present appropriate to discuss the subject of the frontiers of that province which is broadly situated to the north of latitude 23° north, since it is undesirable to complicate in any way the difficult task of the Arbitration Tribunal in this province. Therefore His Majesty's Government at present maintain their general attitude towards this region, until such time as the Tribunal give their verdict upon the matters in their jurisdiction. When that verdict is known His Majesty's Government will submit a statement of their point of view accordingly. But meanwhile they reserve the right especially to claim against any loss or damage befalling subjects of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in that region which might result from unlawful actions perpetrated by persons acting in the name of the Sultan of Muscat or of any other Ruler for whose international commitments the British Government are responsible.

In their note of the 8/10/1374 (May 30, 1955) His Majesty's Government proposed that the Muscat or British forces should withdraw from the area which they had recently occupied and give up their activities there. In requesting this the Saudi Arabian Government were and still are actuated by a desire to maintain peace in the areas under arbitration in order that those refugees escaping from aggression [elsewhere] who flee to the areas under arbitration shall not have any effect there (sic). Another purpose in this request was to prevent friction and clashes and argument in those areas until the completion of arbitration. As is known, the Saudi Arabian Government lay claim to some of those territories which lie between the area under arbitration and the Imamate of Oman. Furthermore, they do not admit that the Sultan of Muscat has any authority in Oman and they recognise an independent Ruler in Oman who is the Imam Ghalib bin Ali. The Muscat Government had previously concluded the Treaty of Sib with the Imam's Government on September 25, 1920, with the knowledge and intermediation of the British Government. If the British Government and the Sultan of Muscat, in whose name the British Government are acting, do not make allowances for this, the Saudi Arabian Government must reserve their complete right to do what they think will safeguard their rights and commitments.

In their desire to reach a friendly solution of all problems between them and Britain, His Majesty's Government are prepared to come to a friendly temporary agreement—a gentlemen's agreement—on the basis of their earlier proposition for maintaining tranquillity in those areas, at least until the end of arbitration.

3. In regard to the region which lies broadly between latitude 23° north and 19° north His Majesty's Government's view is that there are no frontiers common to the territories of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and those belonging to the Sultan of Muscat. Therefore the question of the frontiers in this general region calls for no discussion with the Sultan.

4. With regard to the region which lies south of latitude 19° north, His Majesty's Government propose that the frontiers between Saudi Arabia and the territories of the Rulers for whom the British Government are entitled to act should start at the point 19° north 56° east; the frontier should then run to the point 17° north 52° east and thence westwards along latitude 17° north until it reaches longitude 48° east; thence it should run through the point at 16° north 46° east to the Yemen border. In the opinion of His Majesty's Government this line depicts a true and moderate estimate of Saudi Arabia's rights in the area in question.

5. In view of these existing rights His Majesty's Government wish strongly to put on record that they do not agree with the statement in the Embassy's note to which this reply refers: namely the statement that the frontiers of Muscat and Oman are the line defined in that note—which line lies for the most part north of the line described in the preceding paragraph. The establishment of international frontiers is not a matter to be decided by unilateral action. Since the line proposed in this connection by the British Government is not acceptable to His Majesty's Government, the question of the frontiers remains categorically unsolved. Because of this the dispute between the two Governments continues, however regrettable this may be. In the light of these facts the other expression in the Embassy's note to the effect that "there is consequently no case to be debated or submitted to arbitration" can hardly mean what it implies.

6. In these circumstances it seems to His Majesty's Government that there are two ways, either of which could lead to a friendly solution of the dispute. If the British Government should reconsider the subject and desire to enter into joint

discussions His Majesty's Government would be quite prepared to do this: they are also ready to treat the matter in a spirit of concord. On the other hand, should the British Government insist that the attitude taken in their note of August 4, 1955, does not admit of negotiation His Majesty's Government are prepared to co-operate with the British Government to seek other means of reaching an amicable solution. His Majesty's Government have already, for example, shown their readiness to submit the matter to the existing Arbitration Tribunal which is made up of persons of extreme integrity and efficiency. At the same time they are ready to consider any other method which the British Government may suggest.

7. In this connection His Majesty's Government wish to repeat the words which Mr. Churchill addressed to the late King Abdul Aziz on April 2, 1953: "We shall stand up for what we believe to be right. Your Majesty will undoubtedly do the same, neither of us shall think the worse of the other for it. If neither of us can convince the other, is it beyond the power of statesmanship to find the means of reconciling our views with justice and honour?"

The Ministry for Foreign Affairs take this opportunity to express to the British Embassy in Jeddah the assurances of their high consideration.

EA 1081/425

(4)

BURAIMI

Denunciation of Buraimi Arbitral Agreement

Her Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah to Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Received November 2)

(No. 243. Confidential)
Your Royal Highness,

Jeddah,
October 26, 1955.

On the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs I have the honour to make the following communication to Your Royal Highness.

2. In consultation with the Sultan of Muscat and Oman and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Her Majesty's Government have been reviewing the present state of the Buraimi arbitration.

3. Her Majesty's Government cannot escape the conclusion that the Saudi Arabian authorities have systematically disregarded the conditions of the arbitration which were agreed upon. The police group which they were permitted to keep in the Buraimi oasis was officered by political officers who could not be regarded as ordinary police officers whose sole mission was to maintain law and order. In consequence of this and other factors, bribery and intimidation on a widespread scale has taken place in the disputed areas. This has gone so far that a fair estimate of where the loyalties of the inhabitants lay before Turki bin Ataishan's armed incursion is now impossible. This in turn renders a fair and impartial arbitration impossible since one of the terms of reference of the tribunal is this very question of the traditional loyalties of the inhabitants.

4. In other important respects also, indicated in the United Kingdom statement of the 4th of October, the conduct of the Saudi Arabian Government has been fundamentally inconsistent with the Arbitration Agreement and with the whole spirit of fair international arbitration.

5. These facts have inevitably led Her Majesty's Government regretfully to conclude that the Saudi Arabian Government are no more willing to reach an equitable solution by arbitration than by negotiation. The actions and conduct of that Government amount to a repudiation on their part of the Arbitration Agreement and have made continuation of arbitration impossible.

6. Her Majesty's Government have therefore with regret felt obliged in exercise of their duties to protect the legitimate interests of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, to advise them that the attempt to reach a just solution by means of arbitration has failed. The forces of these Rulers,

supported by the Trucial Oman Levies, have consequently resumed their previous control of the Buraimi oasis in addition to the area to the west of it. No further Saudi flights to the oasis will be permitted and landing-strips there have been rendered unserviceable.

7. Her Majesty's Government and the Rulers concerned have decided to declare what they regard as the frontier between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. They have no doubt that as a matter of law they would be entitled to declare the line known as the 1952 Line claimed in their recent Memorial before the tribunal. However, while fully reserving all their legal rights in that respect, they have decided, in order to act in as reasonable and conciliatory a manner as possible, to declare without prejudice to the legal position a line more favourable to Saudi Arabia, namely the line known as the Riyadh Line as offered by Her Majesty's Government in the course of the interchanges that took place in 1935 and as modified in 1937 in favour of Saudi Arabia. No unauthorised crossing of this line either by land or by air will be permitted.

8. This declaration does not preclude minor rectifications in the line to be effected by agreement.

Pray accept, Your Royal Highness, the assurance of my highest consideration.

H. PHILLIPS.

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

EA 1081/424

(5)

Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah
(Received November 2)

(No. 381. Confidential)

Jeddah,

October 27, 1955.

The Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the British Embassy at Jeddah and have the honour to inform them of the following:—

1. With reference to the British Chargé d'Affaires' Note No. 234 of October 26 addressed to H.R.H. the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

2. The Saudi Arabian Government do not consider that there is any difference between them and the Sultan of Muscat and the Sheikh of Abu Dhabi; but the difference is between them and the British Government who have imposed their will upon these rulers in order to achieve their own private aims.

3. The Saudi Arabian Government reject the British Government's accusation that the Saudi authorities have not observed the terms of the Arbitration Agreement which were agreed upon. The task of those authorities were only to maintain law and order in accordance with the conditions agreed upon by the two parties to the dispute.

4. The Saudi Arabian Government strongly reject the accusation of intimidation and bribery of the inhabitants in the area, particularly since such an accusation should really be directed at the British Government themselves who have perpetrated these things in accordance with a designed plan from the start of the dispute until their withdrawal from arbitration.

5. The Saudi Arabian Government strongly protest against the British Government's action in occupying the Buraimi area which is under dispute. They consider this an act of aggression which threatens the peace and conflicts with the British Government's obligations under the charter of the United Nations. This charter ordains that problems between member states should be settled in an amicable fashion and therefore the Saudi Arabian Government will be compelled to take the necessary steps to protect their interests and preserve their rights by every means at their disposal.

6. The Saudi Arabian Government do not accept the equivocations which appear in the Embassy's Note and which imply that the Saudi Arabian Government do not wish to reach a fair solution by arbitration. The facts of the matter show that it is the British Government who have caused arbitration to be obstructed by

disgraceful manoeuvring. They did this when they felt the critical nature of their position when the final text of certain of the verdicts, not in the interests of the British Government, were being drafted. The Saudi Arabian Government aver, as they did when Sir Reader Bullard withdrew from the arbitration tribunal, that they were and still are fully prepared to solve this outstanding problem by peaceful methods and in a spirit of friendship.

7. The Saudi Arabian Government do not recognise the ruling given by the British Government concerning the frontiers between Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia. They consider that the unilateral declaration of this ruling is valueless and inconsistent with international law and the charter of the United Nations. It does not affect the legal rights of Saudi Arabia which the Saudi Arabian Government still stand by.

8. The Saudi Arabian Government request the withdrawal of the British forces from the disputed area and the reversion of the situation to its natural state, in earnest of the goodwill referred to in the Embassy's Note, and as a means of reaching the desired understanding in a way which is both reasonable and amicable.

The Ministry take this opportunity to express their high consideration.

EA 1081/511

(6)

Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs to Her Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah
(Received November 12)

(Confidential)

Jeddah,

November 9, 1955.

The Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs present their compliments to the British Embassy at Jeddah and, further to the Ministry's note No. 381 of 10.3.75 (27.10.55), state as follows:—

1. His Majesty's Government have, up to the date of this present note, not received the British Government's reply to the note referred to above. The Saudi Arabian Government have been informed of the United Kingdom letter of 29.10.55 to the Security Council and they,

2. While reaffirming their protest against the acts of open and unjustifiable aggression perpetrated by the British authorities in the Buraimi area, and in pursuance of their friendly endeavours,

Propose the following to the British Government:—

(a) Resumption of arbitration for a solution of this dispute through the tribunal in accordance with the terms of the arbitration.

(b) That the situation in Buraimi and the adjoining areas under dispute should revert to what it was before the recent British aggression on 26.10.55.

(c) That a neutral observation committee should be set up under the jurisdiction of the arbitration tribunal or the Security Council, to reside in Buraimi itself with the right of movement in the disputed areas for observation there until the dispute is settled.

3. His Majesty's Government are sending a copy of this note to the Security Council for its information.

The Ministry take this opportunity to express their high consideration.

EA 1081/551

(7)

Her Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah to the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs
(Received November 30)

(No. 260)

Jeddah,

November 21, 1955.

Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy at Jeddah present their compliments to the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs and acknowledge receipt of the Ministry's note No. 1/1/26/470 of 23.3.1375 (9.11.1955) regarding Buraimi; and, on the instructions of Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, have the honour to make the following reply.

2. In his note No. 243 of 26.10.1955 (9.3.1375) Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires stated that Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom could not escape the conclusion that the Saudi Arabian authorities had systematically disregarded the conditions of arbitration which were agreed upon, and that in this and other respects the conduct of the Saudi Arabian Government had been fundamentally inconsistent with the Arbitration Agreement. Her Majesty's Government have to state with regret that the voluminous documentary material which came into their possession at Buraimi on October 26 contains the fullest possible evidence that these conclusions were correct, and Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the Saudi Arabian Government have by their actions repudiated the Arbitration Agreement.

3. In the face of these facts and this supporting evidence Her Majesty's Government cannot but regard the Saudi Arabian Government's proposals for a resumption of arbitration and the appointment of a neutral commission as unrealistic. The money distributed by the Saudi Arabian Government during the last three years cannot be taken back; nor can the bribery and intimidation of sheikhs and tribesmen be undone.

4. Her Majesty's Embassy are also instructed to state that neither the Ruler of Abu Dhabi nor the Sultan of Muscat and Oman would permit Saudi officials to return to the formerly disputed areas. These officials used their positions under the Arbitration Agreement to suborn the Ruler's and the Sultan's subjects and supplied them illegally with arms and ammunition. No rulers could accept the possible renewal of such a situation.

5. Her Majesty's Government note that the Saudi note-verbale under reply accuses them of aggression. They wish to repeat that the only aggression that has been committed during this dispute was the armed incursion of Turki bin Ataishan into Abu Dhabi territory in 1952 and his illegal occupation of part of the Sultan of Muscat and Oman's territory. The action of the two rulers on October 26, 1955, has only restored the position to that existing before Turki bin Ataishan's attack.

6. Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom much regret that their persistent and sincere efforts to reach a settlement of the Buraimi problem by negotiation or arbitration have been frustrated. They remain more than anxious to restore friendly relations with the Saudi Arabian Government and are reluctant to publish the detailed evidence referred to above. They trust therefore that the Saudi Arabian Government will accept the solution now declared and refrain from any action which might exacerbate the situation. With this long-standing source of friction removed the two countries may hope to rebuild the firm friendship which existed in the time of His late Majesty King Ibn Saud. To this end they would not fail to examine and discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government any practical suggestions for improving Anglo-Saudi relations which the Saudi Arabian Government may wish to make, and they would draw attention in particular to the statement made by the Prime Minister in the House of Commons on October 26, expressing their readiness at all times to discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government any minor rectifications of the existing Line which may seem convenient in the light of local circumstances.

Her Majesty's Embassy take this opportunity to renew to the Saudi Arabian Ministry for Foreign Affairs the assurances of their high consideration.

ES 1941/7

No. 20

KING SAUD'S VISIT TO PERSIA

Mr. Wright to Mr. Macmillan. (Received August 27)

(No. 91. Confidential)

Tehran,

Sir,

August 23, 1955.

I have the honour to report that King Saud of Saudi Arabia, accompanied by a suite nearly a hundred strong, arrived here on Tuesday, the 8th of August, on a State visit. He left again on the 17th of August. The party, which included one of his sons, various members of the Royal Family, a German doctor, Sheikh Yusuf Yason (Deputy Foreign Minister), and a heavily-armed bodyguard, arrived in four aeroplanes. They were met at the airport by the Shah, the Royal Princes, the Cabinet, other high Persian dignitaries and the heads of all Moslem missions. In addition, the Russian Ambassador insisted, despite the fact that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had let it be known that only the heads of Moslem missions were expected, on being present at the airport.

2. With the exception of King Saud's young son, who preferred the comparative freedom of Western clothes and the Darband Hotel, the Saudi party was lodged at the Sahebqaranieh Palace, an old and pleasantly ramshackle Qajar summer palace about 10 miles north-east of Tehran which was used to house the Stokes-Harriman mission in 1951. This palace had, I understand, been somewhat grudgingly accepted by the advance Saudi party sent up here to prepare for the Royal visit, and only after they had insisted on the installation of bathrooms, air coolers and had themselves erected a radio transmitter.

3. On the day following his arrival, King Saud received the heads of all diplomatic missions at the Sahebqaranieh Palace. He moved freely among the assembled diplomats, using the Egyptian Ambassador as his interpreter, and paused longest to make polite conversation with the Russian Ambassador and myself; he asked about the health of Her Majesty the Queen and told me he had twice had the pleasure of meeting Her Majesty.

4. Large receptions were given on Wednesday, Thursday and Friday evenings, the 10th, 11th and 12th of August, by His Majesty the Shah and Queen Soraya, the Prime Minister and Mrs. Ala and King Saud respectively. At both the Shah's and the King's receptions the heads of missions, together with Cabinet Ministers and other dignitaries, sat down 130 strong to a banquet presided over by the two royalties, before the less exalted guests arrived. The spirited Mrs. Ala (daughter of the last Qajar Regent of Persia) was notably absent from these two parties since, as a matter of principle, she refuses, in spite of her husband's position, to attend any party at which the Shah is present. The food at both these banquets was identical and of the Western variety now favoured in polite Persian society. They were followed in each case by a firework display, made doubly impressive by the setting ablaze first of the Shah's kitchens on the Wednesday night (due, I believe, to a short circuit), and of a tall fir tree (by the fireworks) on the Friday night in the Sahebqaranieh gardens; luckily both fires were extinguished before they had spread. I understand that the Shah, in spite of Saudi prejudices, insisted on Queen Soraya and other wives taking part at those parties, though Saudi susceptibilities were considered in that no alcoholic drinks were served on any occasion. The Prime Minister has since told me that the Saudis were "very impressed with the *décolleté* of the Persian ladies."

5. In the course of his stay in Tehran, King Saud visited the familiar sights, including the tomb of the late Reza Shah, the crown jewels, the Majles, the Sepahsalar Mosque and the University. He also inspected the munitions factory at the Saltanatabad army base where he attended a big military display including the dropping of parachutists which, according to the Prime Minister, greatly impressed him. On Saturday, the 13th of August, the King and his suite motored to Ramsar on the Caspian, inspecting *en route* the Karaj dam site, and returned to Tehran by train from Babulsar on the 15th of August. That same evening there was a final reception for men only, attended by the Shah, at the Saudi legation. In the course of this reception the Saudi Arabian Minister was elevated to the rank of Ambassador and the Shah handed out decorations to King Saud and about

thirty of his suite. The following and last day seems to have been spent quietly and in shopping, but included a final talk between the two monarchs in which the Shah stressed the dangers of Communism and the need for the Moslem world to unite and turn to the West for help against this danger. On the 17th of August the Royal party flew off at 6 a.m. for Saudi Arabia, being seen off by the Shah and the Royal Princes, members of the Cabinet and the heads of all diplomatic missions who managed to get themselves up in the half light and down to the airport in full morning dress by 5.30 a.m.

6. The following communiqué was issued at the end of the visit:—

“ During the happy visit paid by His Majesty Malek Sa'ud-ebn-Abdul Aziz Al Sa'ud to His Imperial Majesty Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi, the Shahanshah of Iran, discussions were held between leading personalities of the two Governments.

During these discussions it became clear that both countries have great interest in the consolidation of fraternal Islamic relations between themselves and other Islamic nations. They also pay the greatest respect to the principles of the United Nations Charter and support the resolution passed by the Bandoeng Conference. The friendly sentiments expressed by the two sovereigns towards each other confirmed that present and future relations of the two countries are based on complete sincerity and will strengthen from day to day. For the accomplishment of this purpose the status of the diplomatic missions of the two countries in Tehran and Jedda is raised as from this date to that of Embassies.”

7. As you are aware, acting on instructions, I asked both the Shah and the Prime Minister to impress on King Saud the threat of Communism and the foolishness of his present policy of sabotaging the Turco-Iraqi Pact. I have reported elsewhere on the not unsatisfactory action taken upon this request. I have also reported separately on the Russian Ambassador's keen interest in this visit and his unsuccessful efforts to get a definite answer from King Saud to proposals made to the Saudi Minister here before the arrival of the King that diplomatic relations should be established between the USSR and Saudi Arabia, that the USSR should supply the Saudis with arms and that Saudi Arabian neutrality should be guaranteed by the USSR, the United Kingdom and the United States. Apart from this, little political discussion of importance appears to have taken place. The Prime Minister has told me that the Persians agreed to a Saudi proposal that the two countries should negotiate a Treaty of Establishment and Commerce and a Civil Aviation agreement. He has also told me that at his last interview with the Shah, King Saud complained of our unfriendly attitude towards Saudi Arabia, mentioning in particular the Buraimi Oasis troubles and our recent bombing of tribesmen in the Aden Protectorate.

8. The royal visit inevitably caused a certain amount of public interest, but neither the Press, the public, nor such Persians with whom I have spoken have shown any great enthusiasm for it. King Saud's personality inspired no one, the heavily-armed bodyguards with their sub-machine guns, rifles and gold-scabbared swords, prowling among the guests at the receptions, provoked mirth rather than respect. I have heard considerable criticism of the waste of money spent on this lavish State visit and of the indifference to human suffering caused by having soldiers and police line miles of roads for hours on end for several consecutive days under a broiling sun waiting for the royal party to flash past in their Cadillacs and Chryslers. King Saud was generous in his distribution of gifts, and in addition to expensive jewels for the Queen and the gold watches, Arab cloaks and daggers (gold-scabbarded) which were given to Cabinet Ministers, ex-Prime Ministers and others, he presented a cheque of £10,000 for charitable purposes and a further £5,000 to the Tehran municipality for assisting the poor. I also understand that the *mullas* were not forgotten in this distribution of largesse.

9. I am copying this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives at Washington and Jedda, and to the Head of the British Middle East Office (Nicosia).

I have, &c.

D. A. H. WRIGHT.

No. 21

SAUDI-RUSSIAN RELATIONS

Sir Robert Scott to Mr. Macmillan. (Received August 26)

(No. 480. Confidential)
(Savingram)

Washington,
August 24, 1955.

Your telegram No. 3767 (of August 22).

Saudi-Russian Relations

State Department say that in early July King Saud's private secretary, on the King's instructions, informed the United States Ambassador in confidence that the Russians had suggested the opening of diplomatic relations through the channel of the Saudi Embassy, Tehran.

2. The United States Ambassador spoke strongly against it and, on his advice, the King also discussed the subject with the United States Ambassador in Tehran. The United States Ambassador, Jedda, has also spoken twice to Yusuf Yassin on the subject.

3. The King told both Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Chapin that, as guardian of the holy cities with a responsibility to 400 million Moslems, he felt that he should not accede to the Russian request.

4. In view of this, the State Department suggest that it would be a mistake to make any fresh representations now. They agree that if it appears that the Saudis are seriously considering the question, then we should take action, employing the arguments in paragraph 4 of Jedda telegram No. 218 which are those already used by Mr. Wadsworth and Mr. Chapin. In addition, they pointed out to the King that there was no normal political or other intercourse between Russia and Saudi Arabia which justified the opening of diplomatic relations, and that the motive behind the Russian suggestion must therefore be a sinister one.

EA 1018/221

No. 22

**SIR READER BULLARD'S STATEMENT OF RESIGNATION
BEFORE THE TRIBUNAL**

Mr. Wardrop to Sir Anthony Eden. (Received September 16)

(No. 517)
(Telegraphic)

Geneva,
September 16, 1955.

Please see our immediately preceding telegram.

"I have been shown by the President a copy of the letter which the United Kingdom delegation sent to him to-day and I have in the meantime given very anxious consideration to my own personal position as a member of this Tribunal. I have always felt uneasy about the position of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin in connection with these proceedings but I had not realised until yesterday, when Sheikh Yusuf Yasin openly asserted the fact, that he himself was the Saudi Arabian official in charge of affairs at Buraimi, and that he accepted full responsibility for the conduct of Quraishi. Moreover, in the last few days it has become abundantly clear that Sheikh Yusuf Yasin is in fact in effective control of the conduct of the proceedings on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government, and is representing that Government on this Tribunal rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator.

It has been established that the first thing Quraishi did on reaching Geneva was to see Sheikh Yusuf Yasin, and the subsequent course of events leaves no doubt in my mind that the Sheikh saw fit to brief him as to his evidence and conduct before the Tribunal. This, I regard, as completely vitiating the whole proceedings.

I have always regarded my own position as one of complete independence of the British Government and this, I know, is the position which the British Government desired me to occupy. Indeed, I regard it as essential to any system of arbitration that each member of the Arbitration Tribunal should feel completely at liberty to give any decision he thinks right, including one against his own Government. I am afraid the position of the Tribunal has been hopelessly compromised by the conduct of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and by other distasteful matters which have come to notice. I do not think that the Tribunal is any longer in a position to reach a unanimous or judicial conclusion on the matters before it, and I feel the only step I can take which is consistent with my own independence and honour is to tender my resignation. I shall inform the United Kingdom representative of my resignation and my reasons for it.

I much regret to have to take this decision the more so because of the very high regard I have for our distinguished President personally, and for the manner in which he has conducted the proceedings in the most difficult circumstances. He will recollect, however, that on more than one occasion I spoke to him about the position of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin and expressed to him my deep personal disquiet."

SECRET

EA 1081/490

No. 23

**STATEMENT BY HER MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT ON THE
BURAIMI DISPUTE**

(Received October 4)

*Foreign Office,
October 4, 1955.*

By the Agreement of July 30, 1954, between the Government of the United Kingdom (acting on behalf of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat) and the Government of Saudi Arabia, an Arbitration Tribunal was set up to decide the location of the common frontier between Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi and sovereignty in the Buraimi Oasis. Almost from the outset the United Kingdom has had reason to complain of the breaches of the conditions of arbitration which were agreed upon by the parties in an Exchange of Notes. All diplomatic representations on these complaints to the Saudi Government having been without result, the United Kingdom was compelled to ask that the Tribunal should consider these complaints at the meeting in Geneva in September.

2. The main charges which the United Kingdom made against Saudi Arabia were that the latter had tried to overthrow the Ruler of Abu Dhabi by force, in favour of a Saudi nominee, and that they had been engaged in a deliberate, systematic and persistent policy of large-scale bribery calculated to subvert the people in the disputed areas from their allegiance to the Ruler of Abu Dhabi or the Sultan of Muscat.

3. Evidence of the Saudi attempt to promote a *coup d'état* in Abu Dhabi was given by Shaikh Hazza the present Ruler's brother. This evidence showed that some time last year the cadet branch of the Ruling Family which is not well disposed towards the present Ruler, went to Saudi Arabia, where they were given a very large sum of money and facilities for obtaining arms. On their return to Dubai, a shajkhdom bordering on Abu Dhabi, they attempted to secure support for an armed entry into Abu Dhabi with a view to overthrowing the present Ruler. Counsel for Saudi Arabia did not even attempt to refute this evidence.

4. Although evidence showed that as much as 5,000 rupees a month was being paid by the Saudis to certain individuals as the price of their adherence to the Saudi cause, the campaign of bribery was particularly directed against members of the Ruling Family of Abu Dhabi, notably Shaikh Zaid bin Sultan, also a brother of the present Ruler of Abu Dhabi and his representative in Buraimi. The Saudi agent was Abdullah al Quraishi, ostensibly a clerk in the Saudi police at Buraimi, but known to be a Political Officer high in the Saudi service. Quraishi told Shaikh Zaid on March 30 that he had heard from the Arbitral Tribunal that the territory would be returned to the Saudis, and promised that if he would throw in his lot with the Saudis, he would be assured of his position in Buraimi, and would receive funds from the Saudis and 50 per cent. of the profits from any oil that might be discovered there. Quraishi also said that should the Arbitration go against the Saudis they would take the area by force. Later an emissary from Quraishi offered him a new car and 40,000 rupees. The offer of 40,000 rupees was subsequently repeated by Quraishi himself, who said that it would be a present from King Saud. At a further meeting between Zaid and Quraishi on August 4, Quraishi said that King Saud would give Zaid 400 million rupees if he would prevent the Iraq Petroleum Company from operating in the disputed territories and leave the field open to ARAMCO (the oil company holding the concession for Saudi Arabia). King Saud would like to give a written guarantee to this effect but was afraid to do so lest it should fall into British hands. Shaikh Zaid loyally reported these approaches to his brother the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and to Captain Clayton, the Commander of the Abu Dhabi and Muscat police detachment in the Buraimi Zone. Captain Clayton was called as a witness before the Tribunal and corroborated the shaikh's evidence. Neither witness was shaken in cross-examination.

5. A similar attempt at bribery was made against two of the principal shaikhs of the Dhawahir tribe. They were approached by Shaikh Rashid bin Hamad, a Saudi partisan, who offered them a monthly payment of 100,000 rupees each if they would turn away from Abu Dhabi and declare for Saudi Arabia.

SECRET

6. Counsel for Saudi Arabia did not attempt to deny that substantial sums of money had been distributed in the Buraimi Oasis. Instead he described this as the bounty and generosity of the wealthy Arabs in this area. If there are Arabs in Buraimi able to distribute money on this scale they can only have got it from Saudi Arabia. This is a point with which Counsel for Saudi Arabia did not deal.

7. Saudi Arabia made no attempt to refute the evidence of Shaikh Hazza or of the two shaikhs of the Dhawahir tribe. They did, however, call as a witness Abdullah al Quraishi. He admitted that there had been meetings between himself and Shaikh Zaid but said that they were asked for by Shaikh Zaid because he wanted advice about how to make his peace with Saudi Arabia. Quraishi denied that there had ever been any offers of money to Shaikh Zaid. He claimed that, although he was meeting Shaikh Zaid, against whom the Saudi Government had been making all kinds of complaints and who is their chief opponent in the Oasis, he had never thought it necessary to report the meetings to the commander of the Saudi police detachment in Buraimi or to the Saudi Government.

8. Possessing as they did the strongest evidence (which has still not been refuted) that Saudi Arabia was engaged in a campaign of systematic corruption designed to pervert the Arbitration, Her Majesty's Government laid their case before the Tribunal at Geneva. Unfortunately it soon became apparent that Saudi methods, which are now well known in the Middle East, were to be extended to the Tribunal itself. Not only had Shaikh Yusuf Yasin to be called to order by the President for sending a note to the Saudi Agent during a sitting of the Tribunal but Quraishi admitted under cross-examination that his first act on arriving in Geneva was to get in touch with Shaikh Yusuf Yasin, the Saudi member of the Tribunal. There can be little doubt that the evidence he subsequently gave was carefully rehearsed with the Saudi arbitrator. As appears from the statement which Sir Reader Bullard made on his resignation from the Tribunal, Shaikh Yusuf Yasin made it abundantly clear that it was he who was conducting the proceedings on behalf of the Saudi Arabian Government and was representing that Government on the Tribunal rather than acting as an impartial arbitrator. He was in fact the judge of his own cause. Moreover, he asserted that Quraishi was his official, for whose acts in Buraimi he accepted responsibility. In spite of this he claimed that during the period of Quraishi-Zaid interviews mentioned above he had "forgotten" to take action on three British protests against the presence of Quraishi in the Buraimi Zone. Finally, confirmation was secured of Her Majesty's Government's suspicion that attempts had been made by the Saudis to tamper with the impartiality of the Tribunal behind the President's back.

9. In these circumstances, Sir Reader Bullard had no choice but to declare that he could not continue as a member of the Arbitration Tribunal. Her Majesty's Government are in full agreement with the motives that led to Sir Reader Bullard's action.

10. The President of the Tribunal, Dr. Charles de Visscher, has also felt it necessary to resign and Her Majesty's Government wish to record their appreciation of his services and their regret that this distinguished jurist should have been placed in so difficult a position. Her Majesty's Government are now considering, in consultation with the Arab Rulers whom they represent, the situation caused by the resignation in such circumstances of two members of the Arbitration Tribunal.

EA 1081/348

No. 24

RE-ESTABLISHMENT OF THE POSITION IN THE BURAIMI OASIS

To Sir Michael Wright (Baghdad)

(No. 1444)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office,

October 26, 1955.

The Prime Minister made the following statement about Buraimi in Parliament to-day.

Mr. Speaker, I will with permission make a statement on the situation in South-East Arabia.

The House may recall that on the 28th of July, 1954, I reported that agreement had been reached with the Saudi Arabian Government to submit the Buraimi frontier dispute to arbitration. I expressed the hope that this Agreement would enable us to resume the traditionally friendly relations between Her Majesty's Government and the Saudi Arabian Government.

I am sorry to have to tell the House that these hopes have been disappointed. The proceedings before the Arbitration Tribunal at Geneva have broken down. The British member of the Tribunal and its Belgian President have resigned. The reasons for these events were explained in detail in a statement issued by the Foreign Office on the 4th of October. I have just learned that Dr. Dihigo, one of the two remaining members of the Tribunal, appointed as a neutral has also resigned.

For many years Her Majesty's Government sought to reach an agreement in these matters by negotiation with the Saudi Arabian Government. These efforts led only to steadily increased Saudi claims against the territory of two Arab Rulers, the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat. Finally, in August 1952, in the region of Buraimi, the Saudi official, Turki bin Ataishan, after passing through the territory of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi invaded the territory of the Sultan of Muscat and established himself in a village belonging to the Sultan.

Despite this provocative act, Her Majesty's Government continued to seek a solution by peaceful means, and dissuaded those local leaders who wished to meet force by force. For two years Turki remained in Buraimi, seeking to extend Saudi influence in the area. In 1954, Her Majesty's Government advised the two Arab Rulers to submit their case to arbitration. An Arbitration Agreement was drawn up which it was hoped would lead to a settlement and to more friendly relations.

The Saudi Arabian authorities have systematically disregarded the conditions of arbitration which were then agreed upon. The "police" group which they were permitted to keep in the Buraimi Oasis for the sole purpose of maintaining law and order was, in fact, led by Political Officers who persistently exceeded their functions. Bribery and intimidation on a wide scale has taken place in the disputed areas, with the result that it is no longer possible—I regret to say, Sir—to estimate where the loyalties of the inhabitants lay before Turki's armed incursion. The Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat have scrupulously observed the conditions of arbitration which Her Majesty's Government in good faith recommend to them. They have had to stand by and watch their subjects being suborned, and the outcome of the arbitration itself being gravely prejudiced in advance. A fair and impartial arbitration is not possible in such circumstances.

These facts, combined with the conduct of the Saudi Government in relation to the Tribunal itself, have led Her Majesty's Government to conclude that the Saudi Arabian Government is no more willing now to reach an equitable solution by arbitration than they were previously by negotiation. Their actions and conduct amount to a repudiation of the Arbitration Agreement, and have made a continuation of the arbitration impossible.

Her Majesty's Government has, therefore, felt obliged in the exercise of its duty which is to protect the legitimate interests of the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat, to advise them that the attempt to reach a just compromise by means of arbitration has failed. The forces of these Rulers, supported by the Trucial Oman Levies, have accordingly this morning taken steps to resume their previous control of the Buraimi Oasis, and areas to the West of it. My latest information is that the Saudi force has been evacuated from the Buraimi Oasis, their only casualties being two men slightly wounded. They are being cared for by our forces.

Her Majesty's Government and the Rulers concerned have no doubt that, as a matter of law, they would be entitled to regard as a fair frontier between the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and Saudi Arabia the line many in this House know as the 1952 line, claimed in their recent Memorial before the Tribunal. However, while fully reserving their legal rights in that respect Her Majesty's Government have decided with the agreement of the Rulers in order to act in as reasonable and conciliatory a manner as possible, to declare and uphold a line which is more favourable to Saudi Arabia. In 1935, when the present dispute may be said to have crystallised, a line, which is known as the Riyadh Line, was put forward by Her Majesty's Government. It involved substantial concessions to the Saudi Arabians. This line was further modified in 1937 in favour of Saudi Arabia and it is this modified line that we are now declaring as the frontier. The Saudi Arabian Government are being informed of these decisions.

I regret that this step should have been necessary. But as negotiations and arbitration have both failed, we have no other means of honouring our obligations and standing by our friends. I hope that in time the Saudi Arabian Government will accept the solution that we have had to declare. Her Majesty's Government are ready at all times to discuss with the Saudi Arabian Government any minor rectifications of the line which may seem convenient in the light of local circumstances.

Ends.

The following supplementaries were asked:—

Mr. Attlee: It would appear that it was quite impossible to have a fair arbitration and I think that that is evidenced by the retirement of the neutral members. In those circumstances we have no option but to stand firm and to say that we cannot have these things broken by force.

Prime Minister: I am very grateful to the Right Honourable Gentleman.

Mr. Bellenger: Can the Right Honourable Gentleman say whether there are any British troops in the area and whether they are likely to be involved in this dispute?

Prime Minister: I would rather not say anything about our military dispositions at this moment for obvious reasons. Operations are being carried out at the moment by the Trucial Oman Levies which the Right Honourable Minister for Bassetlaw (Mr. Bellenger) probably knows are Arab troops with some British officers. I would rather not go beyond that. Up to the present I have had no information on any casualties among these Levies, but I have not heard any details.

EA 1081/456

No. 25

OCCUPATION OF BURAIMI

Sir Bernard Burrows to Mr. Samuel (Foreign Office). (Received November 9)

(Confidential)

Bahrain,

Dear Ian,

October 31(?), 1955.

I gave the essential facts of the Buraimi operation in my telegram No. 784 of October 30. I am now writing to fill in a few more details of the events which occurred and of the situation that now exists.

2. I had a successful visit to Buraimi on October 29, including lunch with Zaid and Hazza, who were naturally overjoyed at what had happened. The T.O.L. were in very firm possession of Hamasa, with their headquarters in the house of one of Turki's wives. The Muscat detachment is stationed in the Buraimi fort and is co-operating well with the T.O.L. The wali had not arrived but was due on the next day. The people of Buraimi were extremely pleased at the removal of Shaikh Saqr, who is perhaps the most unpopular man in the whole oasis. The future leadership of the Na'im is obscure since Saqr has no close relatives, and the tribe is very scattered. The Muscat authorities may decide not to appoint any new Shaikh for the time being. In Hamasa the people were subdued as a result of the departure of their leaders and the surrender of arms. Quite a number of them had disappeared into the hills shortly before and shortly after the surrender. They may cause a little trouble later. The followers of Obaid had caused by far the greatest amount of trouble in the attack on Hamasa, and the future of the Beni Ka'ab gives some anxiety since it is not yet certain that Obaid's followers will easily switch their loyalties to Abdullah Salim, who did not play a particularly distinguished part in the operation.

3. The Muscat authorities have, on the Sultan's instructions, been badgering us to send to Muscat Rashid, Obaid and Saqr. Zaid also, though he agreed at the time of the negotiations to the promise given to them that they could go to Saudi Arabia if they preferred it, now urges the same thing. I had originally given Henderson authority to offer the return to Saudi Arabia, partly because I thought it would make our case look better in the outside world if we had allowed this, partly in order to help him in securing surrender. He believes that as it turned out the offer was decisive in the latter respect and thus saved a very hazardous night attack which would undoubtedly have resulted in scores of casualties on both sides. I therefore feel no misgivings about the policy that was followed and it will be necessary to risk argument with Muscat in order to keep our side of the bargain, provided that when they realise its full consequences the three leaders still choose to go. Fortunately, Innes has entirely seen our point of view and for once has expressed himself quite firmly to the Muscat authorities on the subject. The three men are at present being guarded by the Levies at Sharjah. They will be sent by dhow to Saudi Arabia as soon as their families have been collected.

4. There will be various quite complicated property questions to settle arising from the departure of these men and of some other Saudis and pro-Saudis. I think we can safely leave these to the Muscat authorities. Our preoccupation up to now has been to ensure that the property of those who have left is not looted by the remaining inhabitants.

5. I have not yet had any news of the effect of the Buraimi operation on Dhank. The Yahyai Shaikh was in Hamasa but escaped during the attack. It is thought likely that there will be offers of surrender made either in Ibri or in Buraimi. Zaid thought that the operation would also cause a great diminution of the Imam's strength. I have as yet no information from that area.

6. I fear that questions of Saudi official or allegedly official property may give us headaches. We have here two large sacks full of documents which we are examining as fast as we can. The Agency at Dubai have about 150,000 rupees found in the tin box which Nami tried to smuggle out. The Levies hold in Hamasa quite large stocks of food (mostly rice and dates), some containing hidden ammunition. They also have the Saudi vehicles and are using them to make up for those which they lost as a result of rifle fire on entering Hamasa. The Saudi

EA 1081/426

No. 26

SITUATION IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Macmillan. (Received November 4)

(No. 85. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *October 30, 1955.*

With the resumption of control over the Buraimi oasis and the areas to the west of it by the Ruler of Abu Dhabi and the Sultan of Muscat and Oman, supported by Her Majesty's Government, Anglo-Saudi relations are in the melting-pot. Thus the end of King Saud's second year of reign sees almost entirely spent the fund of goodwill which his great father built up with the United Kingdom. It seems an appropriate moment to consider once again the character and policies of the régime which has brought this about.

2. In reviewing the first year of Saud's reign (my despatch No. 116 of 1954) I expressed the hope that the emergence of the King's brother Faisal—Crown Prince, Foreign Minister and (for what the title is worth) Prime Minister—as the real power behind the Throne, might set Saudi Arabia on its feet. That hope has been disappointed. Not one, so far as I can see, of this Saud family is prepared to derogate from the power they wield in the country, and such absolute power cannot be maintained in any other way than it is at present: by corruption, extravagance and nepotism. Thus the pattern of rule which emerged in the first year of the new reign exists to-day and is likely to remain while the present régime lasts.

3. It would be rash of me to forecast how long it will last: it is enough for the moment to look at the portents. The murmurs of disaffection first reported in my despatch No. 45 of the 12th of May have grown, if anything. Furtive anti-Saudi slogans have appeared of late on walls near and actually around the ostentatious and costly new royal palace in Jedda. And for the first time for many years (as I have already reported) there has been trouble among certain tribes. This last must be particularly troubling to the Saudi Government, for the continuing loyalty of all the tribes in the country is an important factor in the stability of the régime. Thus, even in suppressing the revolt in the south (and it must have come as a shock to him to realise how much force was needed to do this) the King was at pains to make known

his regret at having to take military action, his order that there should be no undue harshness, and his offer of amnesty afterwards.

4. Yet it is not so much the tribal element as the middle class, the townsman, that must be taken as the barometer of change in this country. And there are still no signs that this class is vocal or energetic enough to organise an effective subversive movement. The few people in the towns with any qualities of leadership have already a vested interest in the way things are at present, and though some of them may openly criticise the inadequacies and stupidities of the Saudi clique they will not themselves be prepared to risk open opposition. The young officers of the armed forces, many of them trained abroad, or here under Egyptian instructors of an anti-monarchist régime, and dissatisfied with their present lot, could be the nucleus of revolt; but not quite yet, I think. I suspect that they have still to acquire the necessary degree of shame and sense of injustice which fires the revolutionary. But it seems likely that should a potential leader present himself he would find plenty of support in the thin educated ranks of the Saudi army and air force.

5. Despite these uncertainties in the country's internal affairs it may well be that by general watchfulness, and suppression where necessary, the Saudi Government will successfully discourage restive elements for some time. But short of establishing a police State—for which in any case there is neither the personnel nor organising ability—the measures which the present ruling clique take to ensure their safety may ultimately prove inadequate. Thus with autocracy will be coupled a growing fear of revolution, and it is axiomatic that where the rule is both absolute and insecure it will do all it can to divert the attention of the people to a scapegoat. What better one than Britain—given in any case a ready-made pretext in the Buraimi dispute?

6. In the year which followed the signing of the Arbitration Agreement in July 1954 between the United Kingdom and Saudi Arabia we were prepared to believe (perhaps against our better judgment) that

SECRET

our differences with the Saudi rulers could eventually be solved fairly. In doing this we made a necessary bow to world opinion. It was a prudent, if expensive, gesture. But, having made it, and seen the consequences, and redressed these by vigorous action in the disputed areas, Her Majesty's Government can now build their policy towards this country on firmer ground. From my point of view at this post, such vigorous action—with the Saudi retaliation it may bring—can only make the maintenance of good Anglo-Saudi relations most difficult, to say the least. This, however, is a calculated risk which of course had to be taken; and (as will be clear from my telegram No. 249 of the 22nd of October) I fully recognise the overriding importance of preserving United Kingdom strategic, political and economic interests in and around the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea, at whatever cost to relations with Saudi Arabia. For, where before there might still have been some doubt, it is now clear beyond all doubt that the present Saudi régime will stop at nothing to gain control of the whole of the Arabian Peninsula.

7. It is unfortunately certain however that, by now adopting an even firmer policy towards Saudi Arabia than in the recent past, the United Kingdom will incur strong American criticism. In detail this should be easy to answer if only because it rests not so much on the usual American hostility to "colonialism" as on the United States Government's very real interest in the operations of the Arabian-American Oil Company. But it would be deplorable, in the uncertain future of this country's affairs, if general pique in Washington at British policy in this peninsula should endanger that close Anglo-American co-operation

which will be needed if Saudi Arabia is to be steered towards more satisfactory forms of government. At present, as I have suggested above, no alternative to the present system offers itself. But the second year of Saud's reign has shown the need for such an alternative if the country is not to be faced later with anarchy which can only turn to the advantage of communism. The American argument may be that if only the Saudi Government were helped by the West to arm themselves fully, secure frontiers chosen by themselves, and in general were treated by Her Majesty's Government in particular as an adult Power of some consequence, there would be no danger of anarchy or communism. This argument seems to me, however, to show ignorance of the true state of affairs inside the country: an ignorance easily accounted for by the paucity of American official contacts here with any but leading Saudis close to the King. To my mind the next few years of Saud's reign may see the emergence of a faction which might ultimately, when the day comes, be able to take over the reins of government. Whoever the new men will be they will almost certainly be inexperienced, open to every influence, good and bad. It is to be hoped that the new Arabia will not want then for the advice and guidance, discreetly given, of the two Western Powers who alone can co-operate to pull her out of the mess of bribery and corruption, ignorance and arrogance, self-indulgence and irresponsibility, in which she is now stuck.

8. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Political Resident at Bahrain and Her Majesty's Ambassador in Washington.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

SECRET

E 1021/2G

No. 27

RECORD OF CONVERSATION IN PARIS ON DECEMBER 15, 1955

Present:

Mr. Dulles	Secretary of State
Mr. Elbrick	Her Majesty's Ambassador, Paris
Mr. Dillon	Sir H. Caccia
Mr. F. Russell	Mr. Shuckburgh

Mr. Hancock

Middle East: General

In conversation after luncheon on December 15 Mr. Dulles said that, while in general Anglo-United States policy in the Middle East was in harmony, he was anxious about Saudi Arabia. The United States Government had specially close relations with the Saudi Government, arising from American air rights and oil concessions. First there had been Buraimi, now there was the question of the Imam of Oman.

2. The Secretary of State agreed that it was urgently necessary to reach an agreed policy. Our policy on Saudi Arabia must fit in with the general Anglo-American Middle East policy. The situation in the Middle East was comparable to the situation which faced us in Europe in 1948 after the Communisation of Czechoslovakia and before the consolidation of NATO. The retraction of British power in the Middle East had created a vacuum. In this situation an Anglo-American policy must make the most of British and American assets in the whole area. The British position in the Persian Gulf was a valuable asset in dealing with the Arab world. It depended, not so much on power as on confidence. If the confidence of the principalities under British protection in the Persian Gulf was shaken they could hardly be blamed for turning to the nearest protector, whether Communist or neutralist. That was why we had taken action in Buraimi. If we allowed Saudi Arabia to infiltrate the Trucial Sheikdoms and Muscat, our whole position in the Gulf would be undermined.

3. The situation in the Gulf was relevant to the Bagdad Pact. Unless we now strengthened the Pact it would disintegrate. Similarly, we should neglect no source of power or influence in the whole Middle Eastern area.

4. Mr. Dulles agreed generally with the Secretary of State's assessment of the situation, though he pointed out that the American position in Saudi Arabia was one of the assets of which the two Powers disposed. In order that Anglo-American policy might be further co-ordinated he proposed that a joint study should be undertaken in Washington fairly soon after Christmas and at any rate before the Prime Minister's visit at the end of January. One question which Mr. Dulles wished particularly to have examined was the spread of Communist influence in Kuwait.

5. It was agreed that Mr. Shuckburgh should proceed to Washington early in the New Year, accompanied by an expert on Arabian questions; and the British representatives would return to London before the time of the Prime Minister's visit.

December 15, 1955.

SECRET

ES 1534/17G

No. 28

DISCUSSIONS WITH MR. HOOVER JR. ON MIDDLE EAST POLICY

Sir Roger Makins to Mr. Selwyn Lloyd. (Received December 27)

(No. 540. Secret)
Sir,

Washington,

December 22, 1955

I have the honour to report that, in accordance with the instructions in your despatch No. 790 of December 9, I discussed with Mr. Herbert Hoover, Jr., Under-Secretary of State, on the 20th of December the measures which Her Majesty's Government propose to take to strengthen the Western position in the Middle East, with particular reference to the vital need to ensure the continued flow of Middle East oil to Europe, and the related question of Saudi Arabian bribery. I was accompanied by Her Majesty's Minister, and Mr. Hoover had with him Mr. Burke Elbrick, Deputy Assistant Secretary of European Affairs, and Mr. George Allen, Assistant Secretary for Near Eastern, South Asian and African Affairs.

2. I had first spoken to Mr. Hoover about various activities undertaken by Her Majesty's Government to help combat Communism in the Middle East. (I am reporting separately on this.) I then told Mr. Hoover that Her Majesty's Government had recently undertaken a study of further measures to secure the Western position. I handed him a memorandum⁽¹⁾ (of which I enclose a copy) setting out the main points in the first seven paragraphs of the Middle East Oil (Official) Committee's Report of October 1955, which was enclosed with Mr. Wright's letter of November 25 (UE 71171/55) to various Heads of Mission in the Middle East. This, I said, set out the basic problem confronting Her Majesty's Government. In the light of this analysis, Her Majesty's Government had already decided to make a substantial increase, of the order of £500,000 a year, in their basic expenditure in the Middle East. Most of this would probably be spent on information and British Council work, and there would also be an increase in technical assistance. The full details had not yet been worked out, but Her Majesty's Government proposed to discuss with the oil companies concerned the problems involved and the best means of dealing with them. They might also ask the oil companies to contribute towards some of the schemes they had in mind. In the meantime, Her Majesty's Government thought it would be helpful if the United States Government would be prepared to go over the same ground with United States oil companies interested in the Middle East.

3. Mr. Hoover said that there was a very good working relationship between the Central Intelligence Agency and the oil companies operating in the Middle East. Indeed, the relationship could hardly be closer, though, of course, it was not advertised. However, in the matter of practical activities such as I had mentioned, everything depended on the local management rather than on the stockholders. In the case of the Iraq Petroleum Company, for example, the guiding factor would be the British management, and neither of the United States share-holding companies could have much influence on what was done in the field. In effect, this meant that United States efforts were restricted to those of Aramco.

4. I said I fully understood this. Nevertheless, before speaking to the international companies, Her Majesty's Government wished to give the United States Government the opportunity to discuss the subject with the American companies interested in the area and to put forward any views they had on the subject as a result of this discussion. Mr. Hoover said he felt sure that the United States companies would be very favourably disposed to Her Majesty's Government's suggestions. I added that a suitable occasion to pursue this discussion and to compare notes might be the next periodical Anglo-American meeting on Middle East oil questions, which was due about February 1956.

5. I then turned to the question of Saudi Arabian bribery. I said that the subject had been discussed by you with Mr. Dulles and that it had been agreed that there should be an exchange of views. In the course of the next few days

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

I expected to be able to present to the State Department a memorandum setting out the information available to us on the subject, and we hoped that by putting this together with information available to the United States Government it might be possible to reach an agreed assessment of the situation. I added that it was not only ourselves who were alarmed at Saudi activities; in the very recent past, Her Majesty's Government had received complaints on the subject from the Shah of Iran, the Prime Minister of Iraq, the President of Lebanon, and the King and Prime Minister of Jordan. We also believed that there was a large element of Saudi responsibility for the recent disturbances in Jordan. Her Majesty's Government recognised that they themselves had no power to influence the Saudi Arabian Government; but they hoped that in view of the threat to Western interests constituted by these activities, the United States Government would consider what they could do to persuade the Saudi Arabian Government to spend their wealth on more proper objects, and to remedy the present situation in which the Saudi Arabian Government were allowed to overdraw their revenues by bank loans and by obtaining advance payments from Aramco.

6. Mr. Hoover replied that his reading of the Saudi Arabian mentality was that the Saudis were head-strong people; you had to work with them and could do no good by fighting them. The United States power to influence their actions had been going down for twelve months and at present was almost zero. It was likely to stay there unless something could be done to clear up the situation in South-Eastern Arabia. The Saudi Arabians refused to see any difference between United Kingdom and United States policy, and therefore assumed that the United States Government must approve of United Kingdom actions in the area. His personal view—he was not necessarily speaking for the Department in this—was that there was considerable danger that the Saudis would go over to the Soviet Russians because they would see that the United States Government could not help them in matters to which they attached greatest importance, namely, matters affecting their prestige. He therefore very much hoped that the United Kingdom and United States Governments would be able to work out a common policy which would avert this danger. I agreed that such discussions were most desirable.

7. I am sending copies of this despatch to Her Majesty's Representatives in Bagdad, Beirut, Bahrain, Damascus, Amman, Cairo, Jedda, and to the Political Officer, Middle East Office (Nicosia).

I have, &c.

ROGER MAKINS.

ES 1902/1

No. 29

SAUDI ARABIA: HEADS OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

Mr. Beeley to Mr. Macmillan. (Received July 13)

(No. 55. Confidential) *Jedda,*
Sir, *July 1, 1955.*

I have the honour to send you herewith the annual report on the heads of foreign missions in Jedda.

I have, &c.

H. BEELEY.

Enclosure

(Passages marked with an asterisk are reproduced from previous reports)

Afghanistan

Mohammed Nauroz Khan, Ambassador.

*Presented his credentials on the 24th of June, 1954: the first resident Afghan representative here—despite the existence of a Saudi Arabian Mission in Kabul for some years past. Formerly Ambassador in Tehran and later in Moscow. Has held a number of governmental posts in Afghanistan, the latest being that of Minister of the Interior, in which post he incurred some criticism for inefficiency.

*Pleasant if rather heavy socially; fairly friendly towards Britain. Speaks moderate English and French. (Written in 1954.)

Relinquished his mission on the 14th of June, 1955, on appointment as deputy in the Majlis in Kabul. Was latterly in Jedda blind to everything but Pakistan's (and the United Kingdom's) alleged injustice towards his country on the "Pakhtunistan" issue.

His first secretary, Mohammed Amin Massoud, a polite but ineffectual man equally obsessed by Pakhtunistan, is temporarily in charge of the embassy.

Belgium

Georges C. Puttevils, Chargé d'Affaires *en titre*.

Presented his letter of appointment on the 10th of April, 1955, as first head of the newly established Belgian Legation. Was formerly in the Foreign Ministry in Brussels; this is his first post abroad.

A friendly colleague who promises to be co-operative. Looks to us for a fair amount of advice on local affairs. Has had some difficulty over the practical details of setting up the legation, and seems to have had little time so far to get down to work. He will probably concentrate on promoting his country's commercial relations here.

Speaks fair English, but his wife—a shy woman preoccupied with looking after her children's health in the severe climate of Jedda—speaks only French.

Egypt

Abdul Wahab Azzam, Ambassador.

Presented his credentials on the 11th of March, 1955. Formerly Ambassador to Pakistan.

A quiet and distinguished man of letters who on his own admission is more at home among books than office files. Was educated partly in London and has what seems a genuine regard for British institutions. Is at the same time an orthodox Moslem probably highly respected among the Saudis. Speaks Persian, Urdu, Turkish and French besides English.

Finland

Said Binzagr (Saudi Arabian), Honorary Consul.
*Appointed on the 7th of September, 1950. A local merchant of very good repute. Pleasant and trustworthy. Speaks only Arabic. (Written in 1954.)

France

Jean Filliol, Ambassador.

Presented his credentials on the 11th of March, 1955. From the end of 1951 was counsellor at the French High Commission in the Saar, and before that was in charge of the French consulates-general in Shanghai and Alexandria. Has also been French Political Representative in Trieste. Was with the Free French during the war, after consular service in London and Copenhagen since 1934.

Intelligent, energetic, cheerful and friendly. His conversation is an oasis of left-bank sophistication in the desert of small talk. Our personal relations are excellent. There has been no occasion yet to test his co-operativeness in practice, but I have no reason at all to doubt it. I saw his inconspicuous Polish wife only twice before she left for the summer.

Indonesia

Radham Sulaiman, Minister.

*Presented his credentials on the 31st of March, 1952. A Javanese educated at Leyden, where he also taught from 1930 to 1945. Returned to Java after Independence and held posts in the Indonesian Ministry of Religion and Ministry for Foreign Affairs.

*Friendly socially; but rather quiet. An intelligent man; a student of Oriental languages and literature. Speaks Dutch and German and a little English. (Written in 1954.)

Is shortly being transferred to another post (not yet known).

Iraq

Amin al-Mumaiyiz, Minister.

*Presented his credentials on the 1st of June, 1954, the first Iraqi Minister to reside in Jedda. Educated at the American University of Beirut and is a career diplomatist of considerable experience. Has served in London and Washington and latterly as head of the Department of Arab Affairs at the Foreign Ministry in Bagdad. (Written in 1954.)

A genial and urbane man who despises the backwardness of Saudi Arabia. Most friendly towards Britain, and an enthusiastic reader of my air-mailed copies of the *The Times*. At home in European

society, and converses amusingly and intelligently in English. Is accompanied by a pleasant wife who talks fair English and is equally at home in European society.

Italy

Giuseppe Capece Galeota, Duca di Regina, Minister.

*Presented his credentials on the 2nd February, 1953. Is also accredited to the Yemen, which he has visited once so far. His previous diplomatic service includes pre-war experience in Bulgaria. During the last war he was from 1941 Italian consul-general in Munich—which would imply Axis sympathies. Although he himself seldom mentions this period, it is said that he was a Fascist supporter, and his subsequent career has apparently been blighted by this.

*Does not appear to have much to do, his main interest being protection of the large colony of Italian artisans in Saudi Arabia who have come mainly from Eritrea. A friendly, unassuming man with a sense of humour. With the Duchessa (although rather heavy and somewhat boring) he is a popular asset to the small European community. Both speak good English and better French. (Written in 1954.)

Has gone on leave and will not return. Expects to be appointed to the Foreign Ministry in Rome.

Jordan

Al-Sharif Hamid Sa'ad-ud-din, Chargé d'Affaires. *Appointed on the 1st of August, 1954. Was formerly in the Royal Diwan in Amman, and before that (until 1951) Chargé d'Affaires in Kabul for some years.

A fat man with less personality than his predecessor, and probably not so well liked by the Saudis. Is a member of the old Shereefian family of Mecca, and makes no secret to me of his contention that he and his people ought by rights still to be ruling in Jedda. (Written in 1954.) Is probably living very much in the past. Speaks fluent Turkish and moderate Persian, but no English.

Lebanon

Ghaleb Turc, Minister. *Chargé d'Affaires from the 28th of October, 1950, until the 27th of May, 1953, when he presented his credentials as Minister on promotion. Goes back to Beirut as often as possible to try (it is said) to have himself transferred from Jedda and appointed to a home post. Was said recently to have fished for the post of Director-General of the Ministry of Communications, but failed.

*It is doubtful if he has the ability to hold a Ministerial post. Is pleasant, hospitable, well educated, and very close to the European diplomatic community in Jedda, but finds it difficult to think things out for himself, and tends to pick the brains of his foreign colleagues. His relations with the Saudis are good and he is usually well informed about local goings-on; but, equally, he probably passes on to the Saudis any indiscreet remark let fall by a colleague. Is ably partnered by a charming and modernist Lebanese wife, probably more intelligent than himself. Both speak excellent French and good English, and are a popular couple in the community. (Written in 1954.)

Expects to be transferred shortly to the Foreign Ministry in Beirut. His departure, and his wife's, from Jedda will be a loss to the diplomatic community.

Netherlands

D. N. Hooykaas, Honorary Consul. Appointed on the 12th of October, 1954, on taking charge of the Netherlands Trading Society in Jedda. Since the opening of a Belgian Legation he no longer represents that country besides his own.

A big, solid Dutchman, quiet and friendly, with an intelligent appreciation of local affairs. Speaks good English and French.

Persia

Hossein Diba, Minister. *Presented his credentials on the 15th of August, 1954. Formerly Minister in Brussels, and not too happy about being posted to Jedda. A man of considerable experience in Europe.

*Is a most likeable and friendly man, courteous and civilised and fond of things European. It is too early yet to assess his professional ability, but the chances are that he is not very forceful when it comes to arguing with the Saudis. However, there is probably little to argue about, since Persian affairs here are limited more or less to those connected with the pilgrimage. He speaks fluent French and Turkish and a little English, and hopes to have his wife join him here soon. (Written in 1954.)

Siam

Ekachai Raktiprakon, acting consul-general. *Appointed on the 22nd of July, 1953. Formerly a consular officer in several places in the Far East. His only work here is connected with the several hundred Siamese pilgrims and resident students in Mecca.

*An inoffensive little man who makes painful efforts to please. Speaks English that might be understandable if it were not spoken with a staccato clipped accent. (Written in 1954.)

Syria

Omar Baha-ud-din al-Amiri, Ambassador. *Presented his credentials on the 15th of September, 1954, the first resident Syrian Ambassador, and the first Syrian head of mission here since 1952. Was a lawyer and school instructor in Syria until appointed Minister to Pakistan in 1950. Did not favour the Shishakli régime, and was recalled; but stayed in Jordan and Iraq for some time as a refugee. Was reinstated after the fall of Shishakli. Has for some years past been a prominent member of the Moslem Brotherhood and has held high office in the organisation in Syria since 1947.

*Is a pleasant and easy talker, well read and intelligent. Aspires to political office, and was a candidate in the recent Syrian elections. Speaks fluent French and Turkish and adequate English. (Written in 1954.)

Turkey

Kemal Aziz Payman, Minister. *Presented his credentials on the 10th of November, 1952.

*A pleasant but undistinguished little man. Always most anxious to identify himself with his Western colleagues—even to the point of being rather indiscreet in his outspokenly scathing remarks about Saudi Arabia and its rulers. Could be more useful to his Western colleagues if as a Moslem he were on better terms with the Saudis and his Moslem colleagues and, for example, visited Mecca and Medina now and again and came back with a first-hand view of conditions there—especially during the pilgrimage. But he makes no secret of his dislike of the country. Speaks fluent Turkish and French and German, but only a few words of English. (Written in 1954.)

United States

George Wadsworth, Ambassador. *Presented his credentials on the 9th of January, 1954. Is also accredited to the Yemen, where he has just presented his credentials. A career diplomatist who has seen wide service, latterly in the Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Turkey and Czechoslovakia. In his short time here he has established good relations with the Saudi rulers, with whom he can talk direct in passable Arabic on everyday affairs. (Written in 1954.)

Is a colourful personality and a delightful colleague. He reminds me of one of those egotistical,

kind-hearted and somewhat exhibitionist uncles who are the favourite members of so many families. His determination to squeeze every drop of significance from the fragmentary items of local news which reach the diplomatic corps in this country, sometimes leads him down false trails, but as a general rule his judgment is shrewd and reliable. He enjoys discussion for its own sake, and while a great talker himself nevertheless listens carefully to other people's views. On the whole a sound representative of his country and a sincere friend of Britain. Besides some Arabic speaks good French.

APPENDIX
BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

ES 1012/1

No. 30

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN SAUDI ARABIA

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Macmillan. (Received September 21)

(No. 71. Confidential) Jeddah,
September 14, 1955.
Sir,

I have the honour to send you herewith my revised report on leading personalities in Saudi Arabia.

2. In accordance with instructions I have prepared the revised version in the form of amendments to last year's report.

I have, &c.

H. PHILLIPS.

Enclosure

Leading Personalities in Saudi Arabia

Notes on titles, &c.

1. Sherif.—Applied to persons in the direct male descent from Hassan, the son of the Caliph Ali.
2. Seyyid.—Applied to persons in the male descent from Hussein, the other son of Ali.
3. Amir.—A title of all princes of the blood.
4. Sheikh.—A title used, not only for tribal personages, but often for higher officials and townsmen of consequence.
5. Bey.—Still used by persons who would have been so called by right or courtesy in the Turkish system and who may dislike the association of "Sheikh" with age or desert life.
6. Hajji.—Convenient in a country where every Hejazi adult has made the pilgrimage, for certain persons not otherwise easy to give a title to.
7. Effendi.—Applied chiefly to minor officials.
8. Ibn or Bin.—Means "son of" or "descendant of." Sometimes replaced by the definite article "al" (or in its other forms, "as," "an," &c.).
9. Al.—Means "family" or "of the house of" when written with a capital A: "al" (small a) is the definite article.
10. Abu.—Father.
11. Umm.—Mother.

The following index lists the name of every person who has more than an incidental mention in the report: each individual will be found under his first (i.e., personal) name. The index also includes the names of certain families.

- Abdul Aziz bin Ahmed as Sidayri—27.
- Abdul Aziz bin Musaid al Jiluwi—40.
- Abdul Aziz bin Abdullah ibn Hassan Al al Sheikh—63.
- Abdul Aziz ibn Mohammad ibn Ibrahim Al al Sheikh—64.
- Abdul Aziz ibn Muammar—43.
- Abdul Aziz ibn Zeyd—44.

- Abdul Aziz Ibrahim al Muammar—45.
- Abdul Aziz Kaaki—106.
- Abdul Hamid al Aun—137.
- Abdul Hamid al Khatib—46.
- Abdul Malik bin Ibrahim Al al Sheikh—61.
- Abdul Muhsin bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi—42.
- Abdullah al Khayal—47.
- Abdullah an Nafisi—48.
- Abdullah bal Khair—49.
- Abdullah bin Abdul Aziz bin Jiluwi—see 40.
- Abdullah bin Adwan—50.
- Abdullah bin Saad as Sidayri—34.
- Abdullah bin Saud bin Abdul Aziz—4.
- Abdullah Feisal—24.
- Abdullah ibn Abdur Rahman—20.
- Abdullah ibn Hassan—51.
- Abdullah ibn Ibrahim al Muammar—see 97.
- Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn Abdullah al Fazl—84.
- Abdullah ibn Mohammed al Fazl—81.
- Abdullah ibn Muhsin Al al Sheikh—62.
- Abdullah Kazim—52.
- Abdullah Musa Kaaki—108.
- Abdullah Suleiman—53.
- Abdur Rahman al Qusaibi—122.
- Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed as Sidayri—30, 38.
- Abdur Rahman Helaisi—54.
- Abdur Rahman Tarbishi—55.
- Ahmed Baeshen—56.
- Ahmed bin Abdul Mushin as Sidayri—36.
- Ahmed bin Turki as Sidayri—33.
- Ahmed ibn Abdur Rahman—21.
- Ahmed Jaffali—57.
- Ahmed Obeid—58.
- Ahmed Qandil—59.
- Ahmed Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza—69.
- Ahmed Zahid—146.
- Al al Sheikh—60-64.
- Ali Abdullah Ali Reza—71.
- Ali Reza family—65-73.
- Ali Taha—74.
- Asad al Faqih—75.
- Bakhashab Pasha—76.
- Bashir Bey as Sadawi—77.
- Bujad family—78.
- Dabbagh family—79.
- Dawish family—80.
- Fahd bin Abdul Aziz—9.
- Fahd bin Saad as Sidayri—35.
- Fahd bin Saud—2.
- Fakhri al Ardh—139.
- Fazl family—81-84.
- Fawzi Silo—85.
- Feisal bin Abdul Aziz—5.
- Fuad al Khatib—86.
- Hafiz Wahba—87.
- Hamid ibn Mazi—114.
- Hamza al Ghauth al Madani—88.
- Hamza Marzouki—89.
- Hassan Sherbatly—90.
- Hithlayn family—91.
- Husni Bey Khair Allah—92.
- Hussein Ali Reza—73.
- Hussein Aweini—93.
- Huscini family—94-96.

Ibrahim Al Muammar—97.
 Ibrahim ibn Abdur Rahman Al Fazl—82.
 Ibrahim ibn Suleiman al Aqil—98.
 Ibrahim Shaker—99.
 Ibrahim Tassan—100.
 Ibrahim Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza—68.
 Ibrahim Zahran—101.
 Idrisi family—102.
 Izzedin Shawa—103.
 Jamal Husseini—94.
 Jiluwi family—40-42.
 Kaaki family—104-108.
 Kamal Adham—109.
 Kanaan Khatib—110.
 Khairuddin az Zuraikli—111.
 Khalid al Qarqani—112.
 Khalid bin Abdul Aziz—7.
 Khalid bin Ahmed as Sidayri—28.
 Mazi family—113-114.
 Masaad bin Ahmed as Sidayri—31.
 Messud Qassim Zeinal Ali Reza—67.
 Midhat Sheikh al Ardh—138.
 Mishaal bin Abdul Aziz—11.
 Mishari bin Abdul Aziz—14.
 Mitaab bin Abdul Aziz—12.
 Mohammed Abdullah Ali Reza—72.
 Mohammed al Khurajji—115.
 Mohammed Ali Ali Reza—65.
 Mohammed bin Abdul Aziz—6.
 Mohammed bin Ahmed as Sidayri—29.
 Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al al Sheikh—60.
 Mohammed bin Ladin—116.
 Mohammed bin Saud bin Abdul Aziz—3.
 Mohammed Effendi—117.
 Mohammed Hussein Nazif—118.
 Mohammed ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Abdullah Al Fazl—83.
 Mohammed Ibrahim al Ghazzawi—119.
 Mohammed Mahmoud Zahid—145.
 Mohammed Surur—120.
 Mohammed Zeinal Ali Reza—70.
 Musaid ibn Abdur Rahman—22.
 Muwaffaq Bey al Alusi—121.
 Naif bin Abdul Aziz—15.
 Nasir bin Abdul Aziz—8.
 Nasir bin Abdullah as Sidayri—37.
 Nawwaf bin Abdul Aziz—16.
 Neshat al Ardh—140.
 Qusaibi family—122.
 Rajai Husseini—95.
 Rashad Faroun—123.
 Rashid Ali al Geilani—124.
 Rashid family—125.
 Razim Bey al Khalidi—126.
 Rifada family—127.
 Rushdi Malhas—128.
 Saad ibn Abdur Rahman—23.
 Sadaka Kaaki—104.
 Sadiq Husseini—96.
 Said al Atas—129.
 Said Binzagr—130.
 Said Jaudat—131.
 Salah Musa Kaaki—107.
 Salman bin Abdul Aziz—17.
 Samir Shamma—132.
 Saud al Arafa—25.
 Saud bin Abdul Aziz—1.
 Saud bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi—41.
 Saud bin Abdur Rahman as Sidayri—39.
 Saud family—1-25.
 Saud ibn Abdur Rahman—19.
 Sayid Sami Kutubi—133.
 Shaibi family—134.
 Sharaf Ridha—136.
 Sharif Muhsin—135.
 Sharifian family—136-137.
 Sheikh al Ardh family—138-140.

Sidayri family—26-39.
 Siraj Kaaki—105.
 Suleiman bin Ahmed as Sidayri—32.
 Suleiman Nunaih—141.
 Sultan bin Abdul Aziz—10.
 Taher Redhwan—142.
 Talal bin Abdul Aziz—13.
 Thamir bin Abdul Aziz—18.
 Turki bin Ahmed bin Mohammed as Sidayri—26.
 Turki ibn Ataishan—143.
 Turki ibn Mazi—113.
 Yusuf Yasin—144.
 Yusuf Zahid—147.
 Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza—66.
 Zahid family—145-147.

Royal Family: House of Saud

Traces its origin as the ruling dynasty to Mohammed ibn Saud (d. 1705), the founder of the Wahhabi Empire, based formerly on Dariya and now on Riyadh in the Central Nejd. On account of its long ancestry and prodigious procreation in recent generations, the family with its principal collateral branches now numbers several hundreds and is related in various degrees to a large proportion of the other personalities of the kingdom. The late King, Abdul Aziz bin Abdul Rahman al Feisal al Saud, the twelfth Wahhabi monarch and founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, fathered, according to Philby, forty-four sons (of whom thirty-five survive) and probably a comparable number of daughters his eldest surviving son, the present King, has twenty-two sons so far, some of whom already have issue. A genealogical table of the family is given in Philby's "Arabian Jubilee" which, together with Philby's "Arabia," are probably the best English authorities on the Saud family as a whole, although they cannot be regarded as completely accurate.

1. His Majesty King Saud bin Abdul Aziz.

King of the Saudi Arabian Kingdom, G.B.E.
 Born at Kuwait in 1902 on the eve of his father's (Ibn Saud's) dramatic capture of Riyadh. He was full brother to Turki, the eldest born son, who died in 1919 leaving one son, Feisal ibn Turki, who has never played any part in public affairs.
 Saud took part in the last campaigns against the Rashids. During the 1934 war with the Yemen he commanded the eastern wing of the Saudi forces which, as it turned out, saw no fighting. Apart from these he has no military exploits to his credit as had his father.

Designated heir to the throne and Crown Prince, May 11, 1933. Hardly left Nejd until 1935 when he visited several European capitals including London. Represented Saudi Arabia at the Silver Jubilee and the Coronation of His Majesty King George VI. In 1947 visited India. Attended the meeting of heads of Arab States in Egypt in May 1946 but as a figurehead only, King Farouk having been appointed as Ibn Saud's spokesman. In 1947 visited America as the guest of the United States Government and various American firms. Spent ten very cold days in London on his return journey. In 1947, 1950, 1952 and 1953 he led the pilgrimage in place of his father who remained in Riyadh or Taif for reasons of health. In May 1953, he represented Saudi Arabia at the Coronation of King Feisal II in Bagdad and then immediately visited King Hussein in Amman. A few weeks earlier he had visited Syria and Lebanon where his reception gratified him.

In October 1953 was appointed Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces without reference to the fact that in 1944 he had been appointed Commander-

in-Chief of the Saudi Army. During Ibn Saud's last illness the Amir Saud ruled the country and on October 11, 1953, the actual position was recognised when he was appointed President of the newly-constituted Council of Ministers with over-riding powers. He appointed the Amir Feisal (5) as his deputy. When Ibn Saud died suddenly at Taif on November 9, 1953, the Amir Saud who was in Jeddah flew immediately to Taif where he was received by the Amir Feisal who declared his allegiance to him. The new King with the assent of the royal family then appointed Feisal as his heir and Crown Prince. There were no disturbances at the time of the accession and everything was done to make the change as easy and natural as possible. The King declared to the many delegations which visited him that he would continue in his father's policy.

Saud has some of his father's regal dignity and most of his uxoriousness, but there the resemblance ends. In ability and intelligence the present King does not shine. Although the ultimate power nominally rests in his hands, he is very much dependent on his advisers (more particularly those in the Royal Family) and they it is who largely rule the country. This is not to suggest that Saud is in any way dispensable: as a figurehead he serves the purposes of the régime admirably. An indefatigable traveller who in the two years of his reign has paid State visits to Egypt, Kuwait, Bahrain, Pakistan, Jordan, Yemen, Qatar, Persia, with India next on the list; a virtuous Moslem who plays up his role of Guardian of the Holy Places to the utmost and might well be seeking to revive the Caliphate; and, within his country, a convenient focus for tribal loyalties which the régime keep constant by liberal subventions. There is little doubt that among the simpler of his subjects Saud is immensely popular, not so much for himself alone as for the panache which the King in this country has now assumed. Nevertheless, the fantastic extravagance of his way of life is rapidly bringing the régime into disrepute with larger sections of the people. Although Saud by now must realise this (for he could hardly fail to notice the elaborate security measures with which he is now surrounded) it is unlikely that he will initiate any significant degree of reform. Saud himself probably has a real concern for the welfare of his people, but he is so little aware of even the most elementary aspects of government that his good intentions can seldom be put into effect.

He is quite pleasantly mannered in the discharge of his social duties to the diplomatic corps, but, being as he is both purblind and vain, discussion of any political point with him is at once laborious and profitless.

The following is a list of the living sons of King Saud:—

Fahd, Musaid, Mohammed, Abdullah, Feisal, Khalid, Abdul Muhsin, Abdul Rahman, Mansur, Abdul Ilah, Saad, Badr, Bandar, Majid, Thamir, Sultan, Abdul Majid, Talal, Naif, Miqrin, Ahmed.

Of these, only the following deserve separate mention at this stage.

2. Fahd bin Saud

Born about 1925. Was taught by a Sudanese graduate of Gordon College and speaks fluent English. In 1943 he married a daughter of the Amir Feisal (5). It was thought that when his father became King, Fahd would assume a position of greater importance, but latterly, however, it seems that he is being overshadowed by his younger brother Mohammed (3). As eldest son, he has been granted the largely honorary post of Chief of the King's Personal Cabinet. His one official function

to date has been a minor part in the congratulatory mission which was sent to the Yemen this year (see under the Amir Fahd bin Abdul Aziz (9)). It is of course possible that he may himself come to the throne one day. So far there has been no public discussion of this, and it now looks as if his chances are slight. He is said to be incapable of making even the simplest decisions.

3. Mohammed bin Saud

Amir of the King's Bodyguard, the Khawiyah. The most impressive of the King's sons. He is gradually assuming a position of importance in the King's household and on occasion does the honours of host in his father's absence. He was appointed to represent King Saud at King Hussein's wedding celebrations in Amman, accompanied his father on the State visit to Persia, and led the Saudi mission sent to Syria to congratulate Quwatly on his election as President. Mohammed is also credited with having handled the arrangements for recent royal tours in the kingdom. He seems sensible.

4. Abdullah bin Saud

Amir of Gardens and Farms in Riyadh, an appointment of little importance. He has recently created a zoo for one of his father's many palaces.

Brothers: (All Amirs)

The following are in order of age, the living sons of Ibn Saud, brothers or half-brothers of the present King:—

Feisal (1904), Mohammed (1910), Khalid (1912), Nasir (1920), Saad (1920-21), Fahd (1921), Abdullah (1922-23), Bandar (1923-24), Musaid (1923-24), Sultan (1924), Abdul Muhsin (1925), Mishaal (1926-27), Abdur Rahman (?), Mitaabs (1928), Talal (1931), Mishari (1932), Badr (1933), Naif (1933), Nawwaf (1934), Turki (1934), Fawwaz (1934), Abdul Ilah (1935), Salman (1936), Ahmed (Majid) (1937), Thamir (1937), Ahmed (1940), Mamduh (1940), Abdul Salam (?1941), Hidhlul (1941), Mashuri (1942), Abdul Majid (1940), Sattam (1943), Miqrin (1943), Hamud (1947), of whom the following are worthy of special note:

5. Feisal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1904 of a lady of the family of Abdul Wahhab. Educated partly by Sheikh Hafiz Wahba (87). In 1920 he led the successful military expedition to the Asir and in 1934 he commanded the western wing of the Saudi Army which had such striking success in occupying the coast of the Yemen. First visited Europe in 1919. Since then he has paid many visits to Britain both as a private visitor and in an official capacity, the latter occasions being in 1919, 1926, 1936 when he received the G.B.E., 1939 when he represented Saudi Arabia at the London discussions on Palestine, 1943, after which he visited the North African battlefields, 1946 when he again represented Saudi Arabia at the London conference on Palestine and in 1948 and 1951 on both of which occasions he had discussions in the Foreign Office. He has also paid several visits to England for medical reasons and was notable for the sharp contrast between his dignified appearance at the Dorchester Hotel and the dissipated house parties in the country. He first went to the United States in 1943 and has since paid several visits. He headed the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco conference in 1943 and the Preparatory Commission of the First General Assembly of the United Nations. He attended several further meetings of the General Assembly, about which he has become increasingly bitter as a result of its attitude towards Palestine. He also

visited the U.S.S.R., Turkey and the Levant States. In 1946 at the invitation of King Abdullah he visited Transjordan but no politics were discussed.

Appointed Minister for Foreign Affairs in about 1930 and since then has impressed a succession of foreign diplomats by his suavity, intelligence and lack of application to business. In fairness it must be said that the latter characteristics may be due to severe gastric ulcers and other ailments. There is no doubt, however, that he holds fairly strong views on foreign policy. He is a notable advocate for Arab unity but has never specified what this would mean in practice. Amongst the royal family he has always been the most bitter opponent of Israel and this has caused him to become disgusted with the attitude of the western nations. He has always shown himself at least outwardly friendly to Britain but has probably been infected by the nationalistic strain which has always prevailed in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and would no doubt be glad to see our influence banished from the Arabian peninsula. Personally he has always been on good terms with British officials and though he rarely chooses to he can speak English fairly well. A great deal of the business of his Ministry is carried out by Sheikh Yusuf Yassin (144) but it is probable that if Feisal expresses a strong opinion he has the last word. Sheikh Yusuf is notably silent in his presence, but this is probably a silence of respect rather than of disagreement. There is no reason to suppose that there is any divergence in policy, either between Feisal and Sheikh Yusuf or between Feisal and King Saud.

In about 1930 he was appointed Viceroy of the Hejaz and permanent President of the Consultative Council. As a result he has resided a good deal in Jeddah and Mecca where he has become popular and has often been spoken of as a bulwark against Nejd penetration. There were some who hoped that he, rather than Saud, would succeed Ibn Saud. However, there has never been any open sign of disagreement between the two brothers and it is unlikely that Feisal has ever seriously wished to undertake a struggle to become King. He certainly came to an understanding with his brother long before the death of Ibn Saud. This was symbolised when Saud was appointed President of the newly-constituted Council of Ministers on October 11, 1953, and immediately appointed Feisal as the Deputy President. When Ibn Saud died in his arms on November 9, 1953, Feisal immediately went forth to greet Saud as King, who thereupon declared that Feisal was his heir and Crown Prince. Since then the two brothers have almost ostentatiously displayed their regard for each other and the partnership has been working well. In the early months of 1954 there were rumours that Feisal was feeling irked by his subordinate position to the King. There are no indications that he now feels this way. In August 1954 Feisal was appointed President of the Council of Ministers, a post which till then the King had held. It soon became clear that the effective power in the country had passed into the hands of Feisal, although then and now there has been little interference with the outward trappings of Saud's way of life. Feisal himself is probably above corruption. Nevertheless the continuing stupidities of the present régime, its irresponsibility, its wanton extravagance and its almost complete failure to come to terms with the problems which the new wealth have set the country, must to a great extent be laid at his door. Saud is not intelligent; Feisal is, and therefore must take the greater share of the blame for the present rottenness of the country. The truth perhaps is that Feisal is now a tired man and has ultimately refused to accept the higher responsibilities which should have been his.

Feisal's eldest son, Abdullah Feisal (24) is probably the most competent of the younger generation of

princes. There are five other sons, Mohammed, Khalid, Saud, Abdur Rahman and Saad.

6. Mohamed Ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1910 of Jauhara bint Musaid, a former favourite wife of King Ibn Saud, and a sister of Abdul Aziz bin Musaid bin Jiluwi (40).

Mohammed headed the Saudi forces which entered Medina in 1925 and has since enjoyed the title of Amir of Medina. He has never, however, been concerned with the administration of the city, nor held any other official post except acting Viceroy of the Hejaz during the Amir Feisal's absence in Europe in 1932, on which occasion he exceeded himself and was replaced by his brother Khalid (7).

He is generally regarded as the dark horse of the Saud family, but said to be popular with the tribes and to possess the fire and appearance of his father as a young man. Bears an unsavoury reputation abroad for wild orgies, notably in Kuwait in 1932 (with the Amir Feisal), in India in 1943 (with the late Amir Mansour and Abdullah Suleiman (53)), and in Paris and Cairo in 1950. Visited the United Kingdom with the then Amir Saud in 1937 and 1938; accompanied his father to Egypt for the meeting with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945, and the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in 1945. Appeared with the then Amir Saud at several interviews between His Majesty's Minister and the late King at Riyadh in March 1942, but has since then rarely been seen in public. Has as a result become something of a mystery figure. With no official position to occupy he has nothing to do and has for some years been heavily addicted to the bottle. Has money in various commercial enterprises in Jeddah. There is a story that the late King once announced that he respected his first three living sons: Saud because he was his heir; Feisal because he was intelligent and Mohammed because he feared him. Popular belief also has it that Mohammed refused to accept the designation of the Amir Saud as heir to the throne in 1933, but in this he is confused with the late King's brother Mohammed.

7. Khalid ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1912; full brother and constant companion to (6). Accompanied the Amir Feisal (5) to the United Kingdom in 1939, and to the United Kingdom and the United States in 1943, but has never held any official post except acting Viceroy of the Hejaz for a short time in 1932 (see 6).

8. Nasir ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1920. Governor of Riyadh, 1945-47 until dismissed by his father after the death during a carousal in Nasir's palace of Abdullah al Mitaib who was one of the vassal Rashidi princes, a former Amir of Haila, and to whose daughter Nasir was married. It is popularly believed that Nasir was only saved from execution by the intervention of the Ulama, and that this whole episode was one of the reasons for the subsequent liquor ban. Nasir reappeared, however, at Ibn Saud's reception for His Royal Highness the Duke of Edinburgh in January 1950, but has not since been reappointed to any official post.

9. Fahd bin Abdul Aziz

Appointed Minister of Education in December 1953. A member of the Council of Ministers and of its Financial and Regulations Committees. Amir of al Jauf and Amlaj. Represented his father at the Coronation of Her Majesty. Was delegated by King Saud to lead the congratulatory mission

to the Imam of Yemen after the failure of Prince Saif al Islam Abdullah's revolt in 1955.

Fahd is a likeable person, and speaks a little English. He is believed to have comparatively enlightened ideas about education and was very impressed with British methods (which he favours more than American ones) during his visit to England in 1954. However, his power is largely circumscribed by the unprogressive Wahhabi influences at court and by the general fear of the country's rulers that the spread of enlightenment will increase social unrest. It is not thought that Fahd himself was in any way responsible for the recent policy of forcing Saudis to take their education in Saudi Arabia, but the consequent increase in the number of Saudi schools (inadequate as they must necessarily be) has kept him and his Ministry fully occupied.

Fahd is one of the more sensible of the group of princes who rule the country, but regrettably his power and influence, though increasing, are still not much.

10. Sultan ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1924, the second of the many sons of Hassa bint Ahmed al Sidayri, the other living sons being Fahd (9), Abdur Rahman, Naif (11), Turki, Salman (12) and Ahmed. Sultan succeeded Nasir (8) as Amir of Riyadh in 1947, and was appointed Minister of Agriculture in December 1953. A pleasant, good-looking young man, but rather bumptious: is learning English, but speaks little as yet. Is a member of the Council of Ministers and of its Financial Committee. Has on occasion deputised for both the Ministers of Health and Education.

11. Mishaal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1926 or 1927, the second of four sons of Shahida umm Mansour (d. 1938), who was the former Caucasian concubine, and subsequently the favourite wife of the late King. Mishaal succeeded his elder brother Mansour as Minister of Defence in 1951 shortly after the latter's death in Paris of a diseased kidney. Persuaded King Ibn Saud to change the title to Minister of Defence and Aviation in April 1952 in recognition of his responsibility for Civil Aviation and in anticipation of the creation of a Saudi Arabian Air Force with American assistance under the 1951 Dhahran Air Base Agreement, and also to thwart those who had been working for a separation of defence and aviation, amongst them the Amir Talal (13). Mishaal is an unpredictable young man, handsome and quite intelligent, but childishly impatient, and he has shown during his tenure of office a complete lack of political responsibility and diplomatic courtesy. His conduct towards the British Military Mission in 1951, once he had effectively secured their dismissal against the hope of more generous and manageable American services, and his behaviour and attitude towards the British airline companies operating pilgrim flights during the 1951 and 1952 pilgrimage seasons have not endeared him to Her Majesty's Government. Likewise his personal conduct during his visit in 1951 to the United States at the invitation of the United States Government, when he openly displayed much more interest in the lower strata of American feminine society than in his officially conducted tour, did not leave a pleasant impression. Visited Damascus in July 1952 and claimed to have been much impressed by the parade of arms put on for him by the Syrian Government, and the attention paid to him by Colonel Shishakli in the interests of securing Ibn Saud's support. Recently he seems to have been putting more energy into his work. With a huge budget at his disposal the Saudi armed forces have latterly shown signs of improvement, while civil aviation affairs, the conduct of which he has left

almost entirely to Ibrahim Tassan (100), have run a smoother course.

12. Mitaab bin Abdul Aziz

Mishaal's younger full brother, was appointed Deputy Minister of Defence in January 1952 and appears to have taken over a fair amount of the more routine business, which he conducts with rather more sense of responsibility than his brother. In 1953 he obtained the concession for the Red Sea fisheries which he is now planning to work with the aid of a Swedish company. A pleasant and polite individual.

13. Talal ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1931 of the former concubine Munaiyir, who became the late King's favourite and first-ranking wife (generally known as umm Talal). Towards the end of his father's life Talal was perhaps the favourite son. Because of this is now one of the wealthiest of the princes. Appointed Comptroller of the Royal Household in 1950, but relinquished this post early in 1951. In 1953 was appointed Minister of Communications, a post in which he took a commendable amount of interest. His attempt to control the civil airlines brought friction with Mishaal (11).

He tended to fall for the flattery and wiles of hangers-on and, when able to get away from court duties in Riyadh spent much of his time in extravagant living in Cairo and Paris, where he was said to have celebrated his engagement with a wild party lasting several days. The wedding which followed in February 1955 was somewhat marred by a last-minute cable from his brother the King, expressing displeasure at music featuring in the ceremonies. Such puritanism was a foretaste for Talal's Lebanese wife of the rigours of Saudi Arab society. It was, therefore, probably at her instigation that Talal at the age of twenty-four sought and obtained the post of Ambassador at Paris.

Talal is a plump, animated, intelligent and friendly man who speaks good English with an American accent and has shown himself receptive to the material features of Western civilisation. Before his marriage he might well have proved to be in Paris a more frequent visitor to the Folies Bergère than to the Quai d'Orsay, but his wife is said to be bent on making a dignified ambassador out of him. Latest reports suggest that she is having small success.

14. Mishari ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1932, the son of a black slave or concubine. Imprisoned in Riyadh for the infamous murder of the British Vice-Consul in Jeddah, November 1951.

Her Majesty's Government acquiesced to King Saud's wish at his accession that Mishari be released, and soon after he took to appearing regularly in the royal cortège. In December 1954 he emerged as principal backer of the National Yarn and Textile Co., of Riyadh. Came to Jeddah in 1955 and is at present engaged in building a house for himself on the Medina road.

15. Naif bin Abdul Aziz

Full brother to Sultan (10), born 1933. Was appointed Deputy Governor of Riyadh in March 1952, and succeeded Sultan as Governor in December of that year. Made to resign in April 1955 and has been succeeded by Salman (17), another full brother. Naif is a pimply, uninteresting young man.

16. Nawwaf ibn Abdul Aziz

Born 1934, full brother to (13), and also favoured by Ibn Saud. Appointed, early in 1951 Comptroller of the Royal Household in succession to his brother, and also Commander of the Royal Guard (which apparently gives him a rank equivalent to that of the Minister of Defence). Visited the United States in

1947 and 1954, and Lebanon and Syria in December 1952 where he was much feted and given decorations probably not so much for his own sake as to encourage Saudi loans. In January 1953 he went to Egypt where he made a prolonged visit so much did he enjoy the attention paid to him.

A slim and handsome young man, seemingly intelligent and friendly but rather shy. Speaks excellent English, and has become an enthusiastic tennis "rabbit."

17. Salman ibn Abdul Aziz

Appointed Amir of Riyadh in April 1955. He had for some time been acting for his brother Naif (15), who has now retired into the background.

18. Thamir bin Abdul Aziz

Has recently shown himself much enamoured of going to Harrow (which for one of his age was out of the question) or Sandhurst. It now seems that he will seek entry in January 1957 after taking a suitable crammer's course in the United Kingdom. Is fairly intelligent, but shy.

Uncles, All Amirs

Of Ibn Saud's ten brothers, only five are still living:—

19. Saud

The sixth eldest, born about 1890. Has three sons. Takes no part in public affairs.

20. Abdullah ibn Abdur Rahman

Born 1900. Took an active part in the military operations (including the capture and destruction of the notorious Ikhwan centre of Ghatghat), which led to the crushing of the Duwish rebellion in 1929-30. For many years was prominent in the counsels of King Ibn Saud: and, since about 1939, has been one of the official advisers of the King, whom he accompanied to Egypt in 1945 for the meeting with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Has often attended meetings with Her Majesty's Representatives and the King in Riyadh, and is now officially Chief Adviser to the King. He is known to have a powerful influence in policy-making, and is understood to have been responsible for the edict in 1955 which prohibited the export of capital and ordered the return of money invested abroad.

A shrewd man, who has recently acquired an interest in trading on his own account. Severe disagreement with British contractors over the palace which was being built for him in Riyadh led indirectly to the withdrawal in 1955 of all Messrs. Mitchell Cotts' British staff in Saudi Arabia. The intense acrimony resulting from this dispute over the palace has adversely affected the chances of British contractors in Saudi Arabia.

Abdullah is remarkable in such profligate society for his thriftiness, and for the care he bestows upon his property, notably the Rolls Royce car presented to the King by Mr. Churchill after the 1945 meeting and passed on to the Amir Abdullah. He is the only member of the royal family to take a serious interest in agriculture and probably has the best and most modern farms in Arabia, in the smallest detail of which he is interested.

He has eleven sons and ten daughters, according to Philby.

21. Ahmed

Born about 1920. Two sons.

22. Musaid

Born about 1922. In October 1954 he was appointed Head of the Complaints Bureau of the Council of Ministers. The following year he was sent by King Saud to mediate in the dispute between

Pakistan and Afghanistan. He was not successful but through no shortcoming of his. It may be expected that he will have a position of increasing influence and importance in the new reign. In appearance he is small and wears a perpetual glower. Said by Philby to be an enlightened farmer. Two sons.

23. Saad

The youngest of the brothers. Neither he nor Ahmed (21) have played any part in public affairs.

The other five, now dead, were:—

Feisal and Fahd, neither of whom played any part in public affairs nor left any sons: Mohammed, the fourth son of Abdur Rahman, who questioned the designation of the Amir Saud as heir to the throne in 1933; he died in 1943 leaving four sons: Saad, killed in battle in 1916, leaving three sons: and finally Abdul Muhsin who died in childhood.

Nephews, All Amirs

The only nephew of King Saud who has so far achieved a position of note, and is, at the same time, the outstanding member of the younger generation of the Saud family, is:

24. Abdullah al Feisal ibn Saud

Minister of the Interior, Member of the Council of Ministers and of its Financial and Regulations Committees. Born 1921, eldest son of the Amir Feisal (5) by a lady of the Sidayri family. Became prominent in the Hejaz in 1950 as acting Viceroy in the absence of his father in Cairo and as a popular patron of sports and other liberal pursuits. Appointed Minister of the Interior (for the Hejaz) and Health in summer 1951, the post of Minister of Interior having been revived and that of the Minister of Health created for him. Resigned from the latter post in June 1954 in order to devote more time to his other Ministry. In this he has been zealous, even to the extent of himself (so the story goes) using the whip on one of those concerned in the recent manifestations of popular discontent in Medina.

A handsome and intelligent young man who has achieved popularity and prominence, especially in the Hejaz, through the exercise of a quiet charm and dignity, inherited from his father, and a genuine interest and sympathy in his work. He still lacks experience and authority and remains very much under the influence of his father, but he has a quick brain and is discriminatingly receptive of advice and knowledge. He is refreshingly free and accessible in his dealings with foreigners. He has learnt English "on two occasions and forgotten it" according to his own account, and invariably speaks Arabic with more than a trace of his father's clear and cultivated diction. In 1954 he published a slim volume of poetry of disarming naivety whose contents suggested that Abdullah Feisal is the first of the Saud family to suffer from that very Western complaint, ennui. Like his father he suffers from intestinal troubles but as with most of the younger princes he is no teetotaller. Apt to be weak and dilatory in making decisions and easily influenced by hangers-on, notably Egyptians. Likes fast sports cars. He is rare in having only one official wife. He has five sons.

Visited the United Kingdom for a week, at the invitation of Her Majesty's Government, in July 1952, before going on to the United States at the invitation of the United States Government. During his visit to the United Kingdom he behaved in a restrained and dignified manner remarkable for a Saudi prince abroad and created a very favourable impression.

Araif Branch. Also Amirs

Several of the King's many cousins are mentioned elsewhere, but general mention may be made here of the Araif as being members of a senior branch of the family by virtue of descent from Saud ibn Feisal, an elder brother of the King's grandfather and the eleventh monarch of Nejd (1869 to his death in 1875). Their generic name of Araif, usually applied to raided camels subsequently "recognised" and recovered by their owners, was given by Ibn Saud to three member of the family who left the Rashidis in Hail to join the victorious Ibn Saud during the course of battle in 1904. They subsequently attempted, in 1910, to assert their claim to the throne, as the senior branch of the Saud family, in association with the rebellious Hazzani chiefs and the Ajman tribe. When the rebellion was stamped out several of the family fled to the Hejaz to become fugitives at the court of King Hussein. Not, however, the chief rebel, Saud al Arafa (25).

25. Saud al Arafa

(Otherwise Ibn Abdul Aziz ibn Saud ibn Feisal otherwise Saud al Kabir.)

Does not appear to have much influence in the new reign, though his eldest son Mohammed was prominent in the King's cortège during the State visit to Persia in 1955. Had previously exercised his prescriptive right by custom of the Nejd to marry Ibn Saud's elder sister, Nura. Concerned in the rebellion (see above) but received a free pardon. He remained loyal to Ibn Saud in Riyadh, playing a certain role in the court where he took precedence after King Ibn Saud over all other members of the royal house.

26-39. Sidayri Family.

(Family tree on page 22.)

Important as being a large family of "King's men," closely related to the house of Saud and acting as Counts of the Marches from the Yemen with few exceptions up to the Iraqi border, where they meet the bin Jiluwis (40-42). They are the one large group of Provincial Governors appointed neither on a tribal nor a feudal basis. According to Philby some twenty-one of the sons and grandsons of the late King have Sidayri blood in their veins through their mothers, as also has the late King himself (his mother having been a Sidayri) and numerous royal princesses, nephews and nieces. The family traces its origin to a section of the Dawasir tribe, the Baddarin or Ahl Badr, first to settle in Wadi Dawasir, which drains the mountains of the Asir south-eastwards to Rub al Khali. The family later spread to the Wasim and the Sudair, from whence is derived the present family name and in which, at Ghat, the family home has been since about A.D. 1560. Most of the present senior members of the family derive from Ahmed ibn Mohammed as Sidayri (1869-70-1935-36) whose life, like those of several of his ancestors, was spent in the service of the Al Saud; a second cousin of the present King he was also the father and uncle respectively of two of the King's wives who have been with him for the best part of thirty years.

The following members of the family are worthy of particular notice: (26-32 inclusive are brothers).

26. Turki bin Ahmed bin Mohammed as Sidayri

Born 1901. The present head of the family. Was for many years Amir of Jauf. Has now been transferred to the Royal Advisory Council in Riyadh. The Amirate has been given to the Amir Fahd (5), the King's brother. A pleasant, intelligent man, well-spoken of by British visitors to his rather inaccessible seat. Short and thick-set, fond of his

comforts and not a strict Wahabi. His precedence at court is high. He has six living sons, of whom the eldest, Fahd—a cripple—acts as his deputy in his rare absence from the Asir.

27. Abdul Aziz bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born 1907. Has held various provincial Governorships but for several years has been Governor of Qariyat at Milh in Wadi Sirham area near the Jordan frontier. Small of stature and meek and mild in manner he nevertheless exercises effective authority in an appointment of importance involving the avoidance of border incidents with the Jordanians and frequent contacts with the Jordanian authorities. Said to be progressive with especial interest in agriculture and education. Has three sons.

28. Khalid bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Born 1914. Has held various provincial Governorships, including Jizan. Since 1943 has been Governor of the Northern territories, with his headquarters at Tebuk (on the old Medina railway). Wields decisive, popular and effective authority in the Northern Hejaz. Reported to be a pleasant and sociable man with a recently adopted Western table. Has eight sons.

29. Mohammed bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Formerly Amir of Sakaka, near the Iraqi border, and, from 1943 to 1950, Amir of Jizan on the Yemen coastal border, where he was apparently much in favour with the Imam of the Yemen. Appointed in 1950 to a new post "Protector of the Trans-Arabian Pipeline (Tapline)" in which post he has been assiduously cultivated by the Americans of the Aramco and Tapline Company. Spoken of quite highly, as an administrator, by senior members of the Aramco, after he had taken part in the 1951 negotiations between the Saudi Arabian Government and the Tapline Company and had, during this period, dealt effectively with the first major case of Iraqi tribal raiding in many years. He is popular with the bedouin, enjoys their kind of life and is effective in dealing with them. He has recently spent much time in building a modern town at Badanah where he lives. The result is said to be relatively impressive. Has three sons.

30. Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed bin Mohammed as Sidayri

Present Governor of Jauf Sakaka. Has three sons.

31. Masaad bin Ahmed as Sidayri

Replaced (29) as Amir of Sakaka in 1943, and as Amir of Jizan and the Tihamah in 1950. Has now been transferred with his brother Turki (26) to the Royal Advisory Council in Riyadh. His Amirate has been given to Mohammed ibn Jibrin. Progressive and pleasant and hard-working, he has big ideas for the future of the small port of Jizan and its environs and has already done much to foster agricultural development, public health and public works there. Has two sons.

32. Suleiman bin Ahmed bin Mohammed as Sidayri

Formerly Amir of Lith, a small port to the south of Jeddah. Said to be energetic and well-intentioned.

Others of the family worth mentioning are:—

33. Ahmed bin Turki bin Mohammed as Sidayri

Born about 1900. Amir of Qunfidah until finally removed to court at Riyadh in 1951. Reputed for his meanness, dishonesty and unpopularity. Not from the top drawer of the Sidayri family and generally treated accordingly by the blue-bloods of the family.

34. Abdullah bin Saad bin Abdul Muhsin as Sidayri

Born 1902. Second cousin to (26-32) Amir of Tebuk 1931-36. Deputy Governor of Medina since 1936 while the Amir Mohammed al Saud and, in his absence, his brother, the Amir Khalid, nominally holds the post.

35. Fahd bin Saad bin Abdul Muhsin as Sidayri

Brother to (34). At present Amir of Wadi Dawasir, the original homeland of the family.

36. Ahmed bin Abdul Muhsin bin Saad as Sidayri

Nephew to (33) and (34). Born about 1920. At present Amir of al Ula (on the old Medina railway). Smallish, round-faced man with a diseased right eye. Not pleasant socially nor popular in his Amirate.

37. Nasir bin Abdullah bin Nasir as Sidayri

At present Governor of the small port and environs of al Wejha on the northern Hejaz coast.

38. Abdur Rahman bin Ahmed bin Abdur Rahman as Sidayri

Born about 1910. Formerly Amir of Dhofar. Appointed Governor of Jeddah, April 1945. A handsome but cruel-looking man with little interest in his work. Relies heavily on his assistant, Ali Taha (74). Fond of motoring and hunting.

39. Saud bin Abdur Rahman as Sidayri

Born about 1924. Amir of Mahd Dhahab, the district in the interior of the Hejaz in which the Saudi Arabian Mining Syndicate used to operate. A weak young man, was a constant thorn in the side of the Mining Syndicate. Tends to behave in an arbitrary and unfair manner.

40-42. Jiluwi Family.

(Family tree on page 23.)

Like the Sidayris (26-39), a family of "King's men," related to the House of Saud and performing the same functions as the Sidayri family but in the north-east and Persian Gulf areas, and on a more feudal basis.

Abdulla bin Jiluwi bin Saud (d. 1935), father of the present Amir of al Hasa a distant cousin of the King, was a formidable right-hand man of King Ibn Saud in most of the latter's earlier battles, including the capture of Riyadh (1902). He was appointed the first Amir of the Qassim (1908) and later of al Hasa after its capture from the Turks (1903). In this latter post he "acquired an almost legendary reputation for stern justice, as also for his expert knowledge of horses, camels and women" (Philby: Arabian Jubilee).

The following living members of the family are worthy of particular notice:—

40. Abdul Aziz bin Musaid bin Jiluwi al Saud

Born about 1892. Has been Amir of Hail since 1925 or earlier. According to Philby, is one of the three remaining members of the force which captured Riyadh in 1902, though he was "then in his early teens." A distant relative of the King by descent but also related through his sister Jauhara, a former favourite wife of the late King (married about 1908, died 1919) and mother of the Amirs Mohammed and Khalid (6 and 7).

One of the King's right-hand men in suppressing the Ikhwan rebellion 1929. Dis-avowed by the King, temporarily, in 1930 for conducting a punitive expedition into Trans-Jordan. Was for a short while in supreme command of the Saudi forces in the Asir in 1932 at the time of the troubles with the Yemeni and Asir rebels. Appointed Inspector of the Saudi-Iraq frontier area in 1936, in addition to being Amir of the Hail Province (which includes the

former territories of the Rashidis and the Jebel Shammar). Said in 1939 to have aroused a suspicion, at Riyadh, of having designs on the throne.

Still well-preserved, of medium height, good figure, sensitive mouth and large hawk-like nose, a full black beard and refined features. Possesses an easy assured manner and is both courteous and pleasant to foreigners. Now spends most of his time in the desert, hunting. Is a very strict Wahhabi, feared but respected by the Bedouin. He and his cousin, the Amir of al Hasa, were the only Amirs who carried powers of life and death without prior reference to the late King. His only living son, Abdullah has been Amir of the relatively fertile Qassim province of Nejd since 1947.

41. Saud bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi

Born about 1900. Cousin to (40) and one of the most powerful men in the Kingdom. The second son of Abdullah bin Jiluwi, whom he succeeded to the Amirate of al Hasa in 1935 (his elder brother Fahd having been killed in action in the Feisal al Duwish revolt of 1929).

Visited India and Pakistan for medical reasons in the spring of 1948. Entertained King Abdullah of Transjordan at Dhahran in June 1948.

Like his father, he has built up a formidable reputation for stern, crude justice. A strange soft-voiced ruthless despot, who in 1953 moved his headquarters from Hofuf to Dammam. In appearance somewhat like Ibn Saud but is troubled by a spinal injury received when hunting in 1953. Was in Europe for treatment at the time of the general strike at Dhahran and of Ibn Saud's death. Held in fear by the Bedouin and by his Court staff, and greatly respected by Aramco, whose day-to-day operations and the behaviour of whose employees are under his surveillance.

His former suspicious attitude towards foreigners, especially noticed by Sir A. Ryan in December 1935 and also by Mr. Trott in 1950, was however much less noticeable when Mr. Pelham and Sir R. Makins were entertained by him at Dammam in early 1952: his application to the duty of host in his province led, in fact, to Sir R. Makins having to stay at his guest house rather than the Aramco's. This change (and his recent adoption of Western table customs) is attributed largely to the influence of two senior Aramco officials who have spent much time with him.

42. Abdul Muhsin bin Abdullah bin Jiluwi

Younger brother of (41). For several years was Amir of Dammam (which includes the main Aramco centre at Dhahran) until his brother transferred his headquarters there, which brought about the removal of Abdul Muhsin to Hofuf. A sadistic, sluggish and pock-marked young man, deriving his authority from his brother and capable of administering even cruder justice. Used to entertain frequently the many important Saudi and foreign visitors to the Dhahran area, but clearly drew no pleasure from this duty.

43. Abdul Aziz ibn Muammar

Born about 1904. Comes of a former ruling family of Nejd, apparently the same Beni Muammar of Ayaina, who were prominent in the early days of the Wahhabi movement and are mentioned several times in Philby's Arabia. Brought up principally at Riyadh. Was Governor of Yanbo for some time and earned a good reputation there. Was appointed Governor of Jeddah in August 1932 with the title of Amir on the death of Hajji Abdullah Ali Reza, who had been governor with the old title of Qaimmaqam since King Hussein's time. Appointed Governor of Taif in June 1935.

He is pleasant but pretentious, probably on the score of his blue blood. Is no relation to (45) and (97). He was a keen sportsman until affected by paralysis in 1939. Was treated in India in 1941 but is incurable and unable to walk. He is also deaf and has a speech affliction. Nevertheless he is apparently a competent administrator and is popular. The British Military Mission in Taif found him most helpful.

44. Abdul Aziz ibn Zeyd

Born about 1897 of a Hail family, and was educated in Constantinople. Sent to Amman in summer of 1926 to discuss claims in respect of raids, and attended with two other Saudi delegates an abortive conference at Maan in September. Was one of the two Saudi delegates on the tribunal which sat at Jericho from February to May 1927 in accordance with the Hadda agreement. Was later an Assistant Governor of Jeddah. Sent to Amman in August 1930 as Saudi agent at the MacDonnell investigation regarding raids. Appointed Inspector of Bedouin in the frontier region in January 1931, and held meetings at long intervals with Captain Glubb, his opposite number in Transjordan. Personally amiable, but would take no responsibility without reference to the King. From 1936 to 1938 was Inspector of the whole Transjordan-Saudi frontier, under a scheme for dividing the northern frontier area into three sectors under Inspectors with wide powers. In May 1943 was appointed Saudi Consul at Damascus. Promoted to Minister at Damascus in 1944 and to Ambassador in 1953. He was until recently also Minister in Beirut.

45. Abdul Aziz ibn Ibrahim al Muammar

Born about 1923. Son of Ibrahim al Muammar (97). Given a scientific education at the American University of Beirut where his student activities appear later to have given rise to suspicion of Communist sympathy. Speaks English perfectly and often acted as Ibn Saud's interpreter. Appointed Government Liaison Officer with the American Construction Company in Riyadh. In 1953 appointed Chef de Cabinet to the newly-created Minister of Communications, the Amir Talal (13) and became Assistant Deputy Minister in January 1954. Was transferred to the Ministry of Finance and was appointed to the important post of head of the Labour Office in Dammam. In the summer of 1955 was accused of promoting agitation against the régime and has now been removed to the prison at Riyadh. Rumour has it that he was there tortured and subsequently executed, but until he is certainly known to be dead there is always the chance that future popular revolt may restore him to a position of power.

One of the most outstanding Saudis of the younger generation and was well regarded by Ibn Saud. He is intelligent, westernised, and well aware of the real conditions in Saudi Arabia. Inclined to serious conversation and to be friendly with English-speaking foreigners.

46. Abdul Hamid al Khatib

Born about 1905. The family is of Malayan origin and settled in Mecca about the beginning of the nineteenth century. He has a reputation as an Alim and has written several theological works in Arabic. His elder brother, Abdul Malik Khatib Pasha, was Hashemite Agent in Cairo until 1925. He himself was mixed up in Hashemite intrigues, and in particular in the preparation of Ibn Rifada's raid in 1932. He returned to the Hejaz in 1936 under the amnesty of the previous year. Was made a member of the Mecca Majlis ash Shura until his appointment as Saudi Chargé d'Affaires in Pakistan in May 1948.

He knows no English, and according to some reports may still be in touch with the pro-Hashemite "Hejaz Constitutional Party" in Cairo. He is no relation to Fuad al Khatib (86).

47. Abdullah al Khayal

Saudi Arabian Ambassador in Washington in succession to Asad al Faqih (75). Used to be Saudi Minister in Bagdad where he made himself extremely unpopular with the Iraqi Government who convinced themselves that he was the centre for political and dynastic intrigue against the régime. He was declared *persona non grata* in December 1954, but the Saudis, who threatened to reciprocate by declaring the Iraqi Minister in Jeddah *persona non grata* did not recall him. When they eventually did so, they showed their approval of his conduct by appointing him to Washington.

Khayal is a friendly man, upstanding, intelligent and forthright. He speaks a little English.

48. Abdullah an Nafisi

Was for long Ibn Saud's agent in Kuwait mainly for trade purposes but is not empowered to issue entry permits to Saudi Arabia. He has a large business as a merchant in rice &c. Is a helpful friendly man but is getting old and with the expansion of Kuwait his position has declined. His son, Ahmed seems to be taking his place.

49. Abdullah bal Khair

Born about 1915. Spent seven years at the American University of Beirut and speaks English easily. Accompanied Ibn Saud to Egypt on the occasion of his meeting with Mr. Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill and did some of the translations. Appointed Assistant Secretary to King Saud when he was Crown Prince and is now Principal Secretary to the King. Is Chief of Protocol in the King's Cabinet. In June 1955, Abdullah was granted the title of Minister Plenipotentiary and was put in charge of the newly-created Directorate of Press and Radio. He has already shown himself energetic in providing publicity for the King's specious announcements on Arab affairs, and in fact is probably responsible for the drafting of some of them.

He is fond of the western style of life he knew at Beirut and is capable of making critical remarks about the condition of Saudi Arabia.

50. Abdullah bin Adwan

A Nejd approaching fifty. He has had a good legal education and is extremely well-versed in the Sharia Law. He speaks no English but is intelligent and well aware of the realities of a situation. He is very ambitious and is a friend of Turki bin Ataishan (143). Used to be Assistant Deputy Minister of Finance in the Eastern Province, and as such was largely concerned with Aramco affairs. Since the resignation of Abdullah Suleiman (53), he has been transferred to Jeddah with the rank of Minister Plenipotentiary, and is now Deputy Minister. Apt to be opinionated and narrow-minded: not respected much by Aramco.

51. Abdullah ibn Hassan

The most notable of the descendants of the founder of Wahhabism, or the Unitarian Movement. Is one of the leading Wahhabi Ulema in Mecca. Played a role in 1926, with Abdullah ibn Blayhid, in the Wahhabi purging of the Holy Cities, and was in 1929 thought, like him, to favour the Ikhwan extremists. Signed the pronouncement of the Ulema in favour of Jihad at the time of the Ibn Rifada rebellion in 1932. Proud and fanatical. Known as "Sheikh al Islam," he exercised considerable influence over Ibn Saud in religious and secular matters.

52. Abdullah Kazim

A Hejazi said to be of Cossack origin. Born about 1887. Was employed in the Mecca Post Office in King Hussein's time. Appointed Saudi Director-General of Posts in 1926. Went to Port Sudan in March 1926 as one of Ibn Saud's delegates to negotiate about the E.T.C. cable and showed himself an obstructive negotiator. Was again pretty sticky in taking delivery of Marconi wireless in 1931-33 but created a good impression at the time of the cable and wireless negotiations in the spring of 1935. Now leads an uneventful life in Mecca, pensioned by the Government and revered by all.

53. Abdullah Suleiman al Hamdan

For long King Ibn Saud's Minister of Finance and the second most powerful man in the country. He failed, however, to insure himself sufficiently with the new King and his brother Feisal, and in August 1954, the cabal who were bent on his overthrow finally succeeded. His place has been taken by Mohammed Surur (120), and his power largely taken over by the Amir Feisal himself. Abdullah Suleiman is now living in retirement in Jeddah with a new and pretty Syrian wife and is reputedly enjoying the sight of the continuing financial chaos in the country. Probably still one of the world's richest men. For details of his career and of other members of his family who have followed him into political oblivion see Personalities Report for 1954, Nos. 81-84.

54. Abdur Rahman Helaissi

Formerly Second Secretary and at times Chargé d'Affaires at the Saudi Embassy in London. In 1954 was appointed Deputy Minister of Agriculture. Helaissi, who comes of a Bureida family, is undoubtedly one of the few (very few) senior Saudi officials with whom it is pleasant to have dealings. He is intelligent and fully aware of the parlous state of the country, but regrettably has no influence outside his Ministry. Within those limits he has done much to bring order out of chaos.

55. Abdur Rahman Tarbishi

A Nejdî who was for long close to the late King. He is still Comptroller of the Royal Household and manages the King's personal affairs. A Minister of State. His sons have gone into business and recently acquired the Fiat agency.

56. Ahmed Baeshen

Born in Jeddah. Owns and runs under the name of his father, Mohammed Saleh Baeshen, a large commercial firm which specialises in the import of Indian produce. Devotes a good deal of time to his unpaid functions as President of the Jeddah Commercial Court. He is conscientious and fair-minded even to the extent of judgment in favour of a Christian firm.

57. Ahmed Jaffali

Born about 1918. Partner in a well-known firm of wealthy Mecca merchants, Messrs. E. and A. Jaffali with a large office in Jeddah. Since 1947 has made a speciality of promoting urban electrical schemes and with powerful official support and good agencies (principally of British firms) has been largely responsible for the electrification of Taif, Al Khobar, Mecca and Hofuf; also for telephone schemes in Riyadh, Taif, Mecca and Jeddah. Active, shrewd and capable with a very pleasant manner: can be unscrupulous when he chooses.

58. Ahmed Obeid

Born about 1920. By virtue of a friendship with Abdullah Suleiman (53) acquired the lucrative post of Director of Agriculture. Proved himself evasive and

awkward to deal with, was responsible for numerous money-wasting delays, and was a thorn in the side of the British Locust Mission, the Food and Agriculture Organisation, and the United States Point Four team for whom he was supposed to act as a liaison link with the Government. Gave up his post in the Ministry of Agriculture after setting up the Press and Publications Establishment, the chief product of which has been a picture magazine "Ar Riyadh" with Obeid as editor. The production and format were good but the contents have been disappointing, and the editorials fatuous. Though charming to talk to, Obeid is apt in his writing to get carried away by an exaggerated sense of his own importance.

59. Ahmed Qandil

Born about 1918. A pleasant and helpful personality who is in charge of the office for pilgrim affairs. Has a genuine interest in his job which he tackles to the best of his ability. Unfortunately without any clear idea of the practicable and often kept in ignorance of Ministry of Finance decisions affecting his department. Visited the United Kingdom in 1953. A poet of some repute.

Al Sheikh Family

An important Mecca family who have cornered a number of influential posts in the religious and scholastic spheres. The more notable members are:—

60. Mohammed bin Ibrahim Al al Sheikh

Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia.

61. Abdul Malik bin Ibrahim Al al Sheikh

Brother of the Grand Mufti and head of the Society of Virtue, a puritanical organisation which operates in the Hejaz and is responsible for forcing the rigours of Wahhabism on the otherwise lax Hejazi.

62. Abdullah ibn Muhsin Al al Sheikh

Chief Justice in the Meccan Sharia Courts and hence the senior judiciary authority in the country.

63. Abdul Aziz ibn Abdullah ibn Hassan Al al Sheikh

Deputy Minister of Education and First Assistant to the Chief Justice. Also a preacher in the Haram at Mecca.

64. Abdul Aziz ibn Mohammed ibn Ibrahim Al al Sheikh

Son of the Grand Mufti and director of the Saudi Library in Riyadh.

65-73. Ali Reza Family.

(Family tree on page 24.)

A family of Persian origin which came to the Hejaz in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Since then the family as a whole, which has a branch in Bombay, has built up one of the largest fortunes in the Hejaz and has come nearer than any other family in Arabia to being one of merchant princes in the European and mediaeval sense. Its individual members have played for half a century a prominent and distinguished part in the municipal and political life of the Hejaz. In the past five years, however, the family has found itself rivalled in pre-eminence and wealth by several other local families and is now doing its utmost to re-establish its superiority by currying favour with King Saud wherever possible. Two members in particular, Ali Abdullah and Mohammed Abdullah are apparently intended in the future to occupy controlling positions in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Finance respectively. The following members deserve individual notice.

65. Mohammed Ali Ali Reza

Son of Zeinal Ali Reza. An exceptionally wealthy man, known locally as the pearl king. Has done much for education in Jeddah and Mecca. Was Qaimaqam of Jeddah for a short time before his uncle Abdullah Ali Reza. Now spends the greater part of his time in France and India.

66. Haji Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Born about 1885. Senior member of the family resident in the Hejaz. Is much respected locally. A distinguished and scholarly man in Arabic and Persian who still affects the style of dress fashionable in King Hussein's time. Suffers from diabetes. Possesses a sparkling humour and has two strange passions in life: bridge and billiards.

67. Messud Qassim Zeinal Ali Reza

Resident in Istanbul. Is married to a Swiss cabaret artiste about whom he quarrelled violently with his cousin Mohammed Abdullah (72). Now never visits the Hejaz.

68. Ibrahim Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Eldest son of (66). Is the head of the Bombay branch of the family firm. Rarely visits the Hejaz. Was a member of the Indian Trade Delegation which toured the Middle East in the spring of 1947.

69. Ahmed Yusuf Zeinal Ali Reza

Born about 1920. Works in Jeddah and represents the Zeinal interest in the firm of Haji Abdullah Ali Reza & Co. Increasingly left in charge by his cousins during their travels abroad, he has gained a good deal of experience and confidence. Apart from a tendency to arrogance (shared by other junior members of the family) he is quick and clever and a pleasant and friendly person, if not particularly scrupulous. Enjoys the company of Westerners and is extremely proud of his collection of firearms and an open admirer of the Germans.

70. Mohammed Zeinal Ali Reza

A quieter and more modest version of his brother Ahmed (69). Being groomed to take over more responsibility in the family firm.

71. Ali Abdulla Ali Reza

Usually known abroad as Sheikh Ali Ali Reza. Born about 1910. Educated at Victoria College and the University of California. Is married to an American wife, whom he keeps in seclusion. While he is not uninterested in the family business he has mainly devoted himself to politics and diplomacy. He holds the rank of a Saudi Arabian Minister Plenipotentiary and usually accompanies His Royal Highness the Amir Feisal (5) to New York and London. Although apt to be pompous and to take himself too seriously, he is a good-hearted, quite mature personality with smooth and polished manners and a striking resemblance to Orson Welles. Believed to see himself as successor to Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (144) and if his influence with the Crown Prince subsists may well achieve this ambition. Was created Minister of State in 1955 and accompanied the Amir Feisal to the Bandoeng Conference.

72. Mohammed Abdullah Ali Reza

Minister of Commerce, Minister of State, Adviser to the Ministry of Finance and National Economy, member of the State Economic Council and of the Council of Ministers, President of the Jeddah Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Born about 1913. The effective head of the family firm of Haji Abdullah Ali Reza & Co., he has definite political ambitions which have led him away from day-to-day office management and kept him a great deal on the move outside Saudi Arabia. He was instrumental in

fixing up the Onassis agreement, feathering his own nest at the same time. Pilloried for this by the Cairo press. Has shown himself sufficiently astute to maintain the security of his position in the country, although being one of the most outspoken critics of the present régime. Although immature and rather childish in many ways and full of bright, though usually impractical ideas, he is unusually intelligent and can be quite ruthless and unscrupulous when he chooses. Is feared but not liked by the community because of his arrogance.

73. Hussein Ali Reza

Grandson of Haji Hussein Ali Reza and head of that firm which, though respectably constituted by Jeddah standards, is not on anything like the same scale as Messrs. Haji Abdullah Ali Reza. Educated in the United States. A very pleasant and modest young man.

74. Ali Taha

Assistant Governor of Jeddah since 1928. A Hejazi born about 1894. Rose from a small post as secretary to the Governor. Cadaverous and unhealthy. Speaks Turkish well. Well-meaning and not without intelligence. Acted as Deputy Governor of Jeddah from April 1944 and showed himself helpful and co-operative over routine matters with Her Majesty's Legation. Reverted to his former post of Assistant Governor on the appointment in April 1945 of a new Governor Abdur Rahman Sidayri (38) all of whose work, both in the latter's rare presences and lengthy absences, he continues to do.

75. Asad al Faqih

A Druze and a native of Aley in the Lebanon. Counsellor to the Saudi Legation in Bagdad in 1938. Afterwards Chargé d'Affaires and appointed in 1943 to be Minister there. Has some knowledge of English and speaks French well. Member of the Saudi delegation to the San Francisco Conference in April 1945. Became first Saudi Minister in Washington in December of that year, and later Ambassador when the post was raised to that level. Led the Saudi delegation to the United Nations in 1955, but has shown himself to have very little influence in the Arab bloc there. Has been replaced in Washington by Abdullah al Khayal (47).

76. Bakhshab Pasha alias Mohammed Abu Bakr

A prominent and influential Jeddah merchant, who in recent years has become one of the commercial barons of Saudi Arabia. Principally known for the control he now exercises over the Arab Car Company which in 1953 carried by far the largest proportion of pilgrims to and from Mecca during the annual pilgrimage. Owns a large fleet of buses and lorries, besides several other enterprises. Able but swollen-headed and disliked by the local merchants.

77. Bashir Bey as Sadawi

Born in 1889 in Homs. Educated in Libya. Opposed the Italian occupation in 1913 and fled from the country. Held various posts in Lebanon and Syria. In 1939 he became confidential adviser to Ibn Saud, particularly on Arab affairs. He was used as an emissary in Syria. Intelligence reports during the war indicated a pro-Axis attitude. During the war he accompanied Ibn Saud to Egypt in February 1945 for meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. In 1946 again accompanied the King to Egypt for a State visit and then went to Damascus to represent the King's views on various issues with the Syrian President. In 1947 he formed the Libyan Liberation Committee in Cairo and was elected its President. In the succeeding years he was most active in promoting Libyan independence. Came under Egyptian influence and became associated with

Azzim Pasha's intrigues in Libya. In March 1941 declared the National Congress party's opposition to the reforms which the British Administration had put into effect and claimed that they had violated the United Nations resolution. Instituted a violent propaganda campaign against Federation. With the financial support of Egypt he opened branches of the National Congress Party in all rural districts. He attempted to organise widespread disturbances after the elections in which the National Congress Party failed to acquire a majority. As a result of this he was deported to Egypt on February 22, 1952, on orders of the Prime Minister with the approval of King Idris. The National Congress Party was outlawed. He returned to Riyadh where he again became confidential adviser to Ibn Saud but continued attempts to return to Libya. However, King Idris had firmly set his face against him.

Bashir Sadawi holds a position of considerable responsibility in the Court at Riyadh, and is now one of the King's official advisers. He is a close friend of Rashid Ali. He speaks Turkish, Arabic and French, and is pleasant and plausible in conversation. His chief interests still lie in Libya.

78. Bujad (or Humayd) Family

A leading family in the notoriously fanatical Ghutghut section of the Ateyba tribe.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

79. Dabbagh Family

A Mecca family of "Moorish" (*i.e.*, some north-west Africa) origin. Appear to be Seyyids. Became prominent in 1932 in connexion with plot behind the revolt of Ibn Rifada and the preparations for the retarded revolt in Asir. The family is numerous.

For an account of individual members of the family see Personalities Report for 1946.

80. Dawish Family

The leading family of the Mutayr tribe centred near the Iraqi border. Feisal ad Dawish who died at Riyadh in 1931 was famous first as one of the leading Wahhabi leaders in the conquest of the Hejaz and then as a rebel against Ibn Saud.

For fuller account of the family, see Personalities Report for 1950.

81-84. Fazl (or Fadhl) Family

Nejdis of Aneyza origin long settled in the Hejaz. They have been concerned in firms doing important business in the Hejaz and India, where they had a high reputation (enhanced by their position as business agents of Ibn Saud) until 1930. The family still have influential connexions in the Hejaz. The following members deserve mention:—

81. Abdullah ibn Mohammed Al Fadhl

Vice-President of the Legislative Council and Assistant Viceroy. Probably born about 1883. Was formerly a merchant in Jeddah. Described in 1917 as "anti-Sherif and pro-English" and as going by the sobriquet of "Englisi" in Jeddah. Put in prison at that time in Mecca for some unknown offence, but later sent on a delegation to negotiate with Ibn Saud in Mecca. Went over definitely to Ibn Saud and acted as his representative at Rabigh for the 1925 pilgrimage, in which employment he is said to have feathered his nest. Figured as a Hejazi delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. Sent on an unsuccessful mission to Eritrea in 1927 in connexion with negotiations for the recognition of Ibn Saud by Italy and proposed treaty arrangements. Also had some part in the treaty negotiations with Great Britain. Became Assistant to the Viceroy at Mecca and so on to appointment to his present post in or before 1929.

Went in that year on a mission to Persia. Alleged in the same year to have done nicely in the company of Abdullah Suleiman (53) by cornering benzene just before new duties were imposed. May still have commercial interests, but has long been dissociated from the business of the other Fadhlis. Not impressive in appearance or conversation: somewhat of a sheep.

82. Ibrahim ibn Abdur Rahman Al Fadhl

Lives in Mecca and is engaged in trade in an unimportant way. Said to enjoy the confidence of the Amir Feisal (5).

83. Mohammed ibn Abdur Rahman ibn Abdullah Al Fadhl

Was a partner in the firm which collapsed in India, but resided in Jeddah, and tried to dissociate himself from the other partners, his brother and cousin. Has five sons, some of whom are in influential positions in the Ministry of Finance.

84. Abdullah ibn Ibrahim ibn Abdullah Al Fadhl

Private secretary to the Amir Feisal in 1926. Selected in 1931 for the post of Chargé d'Affaires in Holland, under a scheme which did not materialise for having a legation there with the Saudi Minister in London as Minister. Appointed Treasurer to the Government later in 1931 as a result of the cabal against Abdullah Suleiman (53). Later became Director of Finance in Jeddah, then Government Representative to Aramco at Dhahran and Saudi representative for supply matters in Bahrain. Appointed member of the Council of Ministers in February 1946, and Saudi Consul-General at Cairo later that year: subsequently Minister on the retirement of Fauzan as Sabiq.

85. Fawzi Silo

Born about 1895 in Hama. Joint Operational Commander of the 1st and 2nd Syrian Brigade on the Palestine front. Head of Syrian delegation during the Syro-Israeli Armistice negotiations in 1949. Appointed Director-General of Ministry of National Defence in April 1950. Minister of National Defence in several Cabinets. Made Head of the State when Shishakly arrested the politicians December 3, 1951. Soon became restive in his position as a figure-head and in July 1953 was replaced as President by General Shishakly who was elected unopposed. Silo performed the pilgrimage immediately afterwards and in October 1953 was appointed Military Adviser to the Crown Prince, the Amir Saud, a position he retains now that Saud is King. However, his influence is not much, and he seems for the most part to be leading an uneventful life in a bungalow in Jeddah.

86. Fuad al Khatib

Born in the Lebanon about 1875. Educated at the Syrian Protestant College. Became a teacher at Gordon College, Khartoum. Joined King Hussein about 1915 and later became his Foreign Secretary. Left the Hejaz with King Ali in 1925. Acted as an agent for some British intelligence agency in Cairo. Lived at the court of Amir Abdullah of Transjordan. Believed to have been in communication with the French in Syria in 1940 and 1941. Broke with the Amir Abdullah in 1943 and retired to the Lebanon. Returned to the Hejaz in 1947 to go on pilgrimage. Made his peace with Ibn Saud and was appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Afghanistan in June 1948. Now Ambassador.

Well-known as a poet. He is fond of evolving political schemes but is without influence. No relation to Abdul Hamid al Khatib (46), but brother to Bahij Bey al Khatib, a Syrian personality.

87. Hafiz Wahba

Born 1889 in Egypt. Educated at al Azhar and the Muslim Jurisprudence College in Cairo. In youth he supported pan-Islam, was a fervent Egyptian nationalist and a hater of Britain. He is believed to have been deported from India. He started a school in Kuwait but left it in 1916 to take service at Ibn Saud's court where he became tutor to the Amir Feisal. In 1919 he accompanied the Prince to London. Civil governor of Mecca, 1925-27 with a viceregal title. He performed his functions well and read the King's inaugural address at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in June 1926. After a brief lapse from favour he became Assistant Viceroy under the Amir Feisal, but his masterful attitude probably antagonised the Prince and in July 1928 he was relegated to the post of Director-General of Education. Besides his administrative duties he was also given much diplomatic work. He was a Saudi delegate at the abortive Kuwait conference in 1923-24, negotiated with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928 and represented Saudi Arabia at the International Postal Congress in London in 1929. In 1929 he was appointed Minister in London, but went on a mission to Kuwait before taking up his post in 1930. In 1931 he was designated Minister at The Hague but for reasons of economy never took up the post. Represented Saudi Arabia at the opening of the Tokyo mosque in 1938. In 1940 settled the temporary form of the Saudi-Kuwait Agreements with the Political Agent, Kuwait. Accompanied the Amirs Feisal and Khalid to America and England in the winter of 1943. In 1945 accompanied the King to Egypt to meet President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill. Was a member of the Saudi delegation at the San Francisco Conference in April 1945 and the Assistant Saudi delegate to the Preparatory Commission and First Assembly of the United Nations. Made a K.C.V.O. on May 10, 1946. February 1948 became first Saudi Ambassador in London.

Hafiz Wahba has long since lost his anti-British feelings and is now a confirmed anglophile. So much so indeed that the King calls him an Englishman and tends to regard his opinions as being unduly biased in favour of Britain. He has, however, been helpful in London and is a good propagandist for Ibn Saud. He has a pleasant manner with a nice touch of humour and speaks English well. He neither smokes nor drinks; his three daughters have been given a good western education and appear in London society. Throughout his career he has been in intense rivalry with Fuad Hamza (died 1951) and Yusuf Yasin (144). His long absences in London have cost him much political influence though the King still regards him warmly as a friend. His anxiety not to find himself in trouble with anyone decreases his usefulness.

88. Seyyid Hamza al Ghauth al Madani

A Hejazi of Medina, born perhaps 1895. Said to have been educated in Turkish schools and to have frequented Turkish society. Sided with Turks at time of Arab revolt, and edited an anti-Hussein paper at Medina in their interest. Continued to be anti-Hussein after the success of the revolt and fled. Said to have been sentenced to death by default during his absence. Seems, nevertheless, to have been given an important post at Damascus, which he continued to hold under King Feisal's régime there, even after King Hussein had launched against him an accusation, probably trumped up, of having stolen valuables from the Prophet's tomb. According to Philby (Arabian Days) was in the service of Ibn Rashid of Hail for a period. Was in Ibn Saud's service by end of 1923 and was one of his delegates at the abortive Kuwait conference of 1923-24, an appointment which led to a revival by the Iraqi delegates of the robbery charge. Became Assistant

Governor of Medina after its occupation by Saudi forces in 1925. Was later employed in the palace. Selected in 1931 for the proposed Consulate-General at Batavia—a post which was never opened. Was appointed member of the Legislative Council whence he was transferred to the Emir Saud's diwan in September 1932. Conspicuous as a palace man. Became first Saudi Minister to Bagdad in 1938. Fell into disfavour during his visit to Medina in 1941, but was later pardoned and reinstated in the King's entourage and was frequently present at meetings of the "Cabinet." Appointed Saudi Arabian Minister to Persia early in 1948 and presented his credentials in May, thus healing the diplomatic breach between the two countries caused by the reported desecration of the Kaaba by a Persian in 1940.

89. Hamza Marzouki

Used to be an officer in the Sharia Courts at Mecca. In April 1954, was appointed to the post of Secretary-General to the Council of Ministers. Is also Director-General of Waqfs.

90. Hassan Abbas Sherbatly

Born about 1895; origins obscure. Obtained the notice of King Ibn Saud about 1940, reputedly as a seller of fruit and vegetables. Rapidly became principal purveyor to the King and much of the royal family in all manner of goods. His position is still supreme in this field and apart perhaps from Abdullah Suleiman (53) he is probably now the richest private individual in the country. Purchases mainly through commission agents and operates all manner of deals, many of them unscrupulous or shady. Repulsively ugly, almost illiterate, and with a wicked commercial reputation, he yet possesses besides a most astute brain, considerable charm and philanthropy. His brother Abdullah, a paler and thinner version of himself with a slightly more savoury reputation now looks after the fruit and vegetable side of the business.

91. Hithlayn Family

People of importance in the Ajman tribe, much concerned in the Nejd revolt of 1929. Its principal member, Dhaydan ibn Hithlayn, was slain treacherously in April of that year.

For an account of individual members of the family, see Personalities Report for 1946.

92. Husni Bey Khair Allah

An Egyptian lawyer in his fifties. Came to Saudi Arabia in 1951. Speaks impeccable English. Holds the official appointment of legal adviser to the Ministry of Defence and Aviation. He is, however, employed by the Saudi Arabian Government generally as a legal adviser and negotiator in dealing with foreign companies. In particular he has been much concerned in negotiations with Aramco. Aramco negotiators like him personally and consider that though his arguments are sometimes not well founded either in logic or in law he is nevertheless not a twister as was his predecessor, Ahmed Taufiq.

93. Hussein Aweini

Born 1902 in Beirut. He is a Sunni Moslem and was educated at the Greek Catholic College in Beirut. Came to the Hejaz shortly after Ibn Saud's seizure of the country and quickly made a large fortune. Friendly with several influential members of the Court, including Yusuf Yasin (144) and Fuad Hamza. Returned to the Lebanon in 1932, but continued to make periodic visits to Saudi Arabia. In association with Ibrahim Shaker (99), Mohammed Surur (120), Abdullah Suleiman (53) and Najib Salha he did well in the war and formed in 1948 a firm called the Arabian Trading Company, which is now one of

rather a misfit in the Saudi administrative structure and he is unlikely to rise much above his present position. He is a pleasant personality, sympathetic to western minds though he is a sincere nationalist. His son was educated at Victoria College.

104-108. Kaaki Family

The war has brought into the limelight the previously unknown family of Kaaki. Reputedly of Syrian origin but long resident in the Hejaz, this family followed the traditional family calling of baking, as their name suggests. They dabbled in the money market and various members of the family were small independent money-changers. They are now the real financiers of Saudi Arabia, and no large money transaction ever takes place now without the Kaakis being directly concerned. They owe their present position first to Najib Salha, the venal right-hand man of Abdullah Suleiman and former Director of Public Works, and to Abdullah Suleiman himself. While His Majesty's Government were paying an annual subsidy to Ibn Saud the Kaakis made money at will. In April 1945 they started to interest themselves in real estate and began by purchasing from the Minister of Finance, Abdullah Suleiman, the Banque Misr Hotel and several other buildings in Mecca. They have since gone into the contracting business in a big way and now possess enormous wealth and powerful contacts in all parts of the country.

The most important members of this family are:—

104. Sadaka Kaaki and 105. Siraj Kaaki

Brothers, these two are partners in the most lucrative business in the country. They are the Government brokers and are represented in every town in the Hejaz and the Nejd with the exception of Medina. The firm of S. & S. Kaaki is by far the most important of the Kaaki firms.

In 1949, they opened a Coca Cola factory at Jedda, the first modern industrial plant in Saudi Arabia other than those connected with oil or gold. Recent activities include much contract work in Riyadh through the medium of a Lebanese-managed contracting company and a grandiose scheme to launch two Middle East companies to handle export-import business and utilities with the idea, amongst others, of doing development work in the Trucial Sheikhdoms.

106. Abdul Aziz Kaaki

Cousin to 104 and 105. Started his career as a money-changer and is now a very wealthy man, his properties including a bakery and a large garage.

107. Salah Musa Kaaki and

108. Abdullah Musa Kaaki

Before the war these two were the most affluent of the Kaaki family and flourished in Mecca with a capital of something like 15,000 Saudi sovereigns. In partnership with Salem bin Mahfouz Salah, established a highly-unorthodox local bank in 1952 now known as the National Commercial Bank with an office in Jedda and Riyadh and many local agents and which operates as a principal money-lender to the Government and indulges in profitable exchange business. Abdullah Musa's capital is also involved in this enterprise.

109. Kamal Adham

Half brother to Amir Feisal's wife (by an Albanian father). Smooth and well-educated, he has since 1953 enjoyed ample financial support from his royal brother-in-law in supplying his household and in running the Arabian Engineering Company which has made a reputation for itself in building

with the help of Egyptian architects the few villas of any taste to be seen so far in Jedda, and in quick jerry building for the King in Taif. Kamal Adham is very western in outlook and though still a young man has developed a considerable panache; he is believed to fancy himself as a future Prime Minister of Saudi Arabia. Despite mild arrogance and playboy instincts Adham has many solid virtues and may well go far.

110. Kanaan Khatib

A Syrian of western appearance with an almost perfect English accent. He is an adventurer and a playboy who is friendly with many Saudi notables, especially the Amirs Abdullah Feisal (24) and Mohammed (6). After several nominal positions since 1952 he has finally found employment in the Jedda office of the Pacific Western Oil Company who hold the concession for the Saudi share of the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone.

111. Khairuddin az Zuraikli

A Syrian born about 1880. Editor of *Al Qibla*, official journal of King Hussein. Later was Hashemite propagandist in Jedda. Go-between between King Ali and Ibn Saud. Joined the latter. Adviser to the Saudi Agency in Cairo in 1935. A crony of Sheikh Yusuf Yasin (144) and Najib Salha. Attended the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Arab Conference in Alexandria in October 1944 with Yusuf Yasin and also the discussions which led up to the signing of the Covenant of the Arab League in March 1945. In 1947 accompanied the Amir Nawwaf (16) on a trip to the United States. In 1950 appointed Saudi permanent representative in Cairo in the Arab League.

Khairuddin does not carry much political weight though probably rather more than Taher Redhwan (142), whom he replaces in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs when the latter is on leave. He has maintained good relations with the British Embassy and is anxious to take part in any discussions which might give him kudos or show him as possessing influence but in fact would probably shy off any serious decision. Speaks French.

112. Khalid al Qarqani (alias al Hud, alias Abu Walid)

Born about 1890 in Tripolitania, the son of a well-known Arab mathematician. Is said to have served under the Senussi and fought the Italians. He lived in Italy for two years probably as a political detainee. Introduced to Ibn Saud by Hafiz Wahba (87) in 1930 when he was made First Assistant to the Viceroy. He held the post only for a brief period and then became a member of the King's privy council. He went into business with the German merchant, afterwards honorary German Consul, de Haas. In 1930 the Government ordered a consignment of arms from Poland through him. Was appointed by the Government to accompany the American engineer Twitchell on his tours of survey for water and minerals. In 1932 was sent with Hamid Suleiman on an abortive expedition to investigate the dispute between the Idrisi and Ibn Saud's governor. In the following year was part of an equally unsuccessful delegation to Sana before the outbreak of the Saudi-Yemen war. Was a Saudi delegate to the Bahrain Transit Dues and Kuwait blockade Conference in 1935. Was also a Saudi representative at the negotiations over the Red Sea oil concession with Petroleum Concessions (Limited). Accompanied Dr. Mahmud Hammuda to London and Paris in 1939 in connexion with the proposed amendment of the Sanitary Convention. Also visited Germany before the outbreak of war. Had an interview with Hitler but was unsuccessful to

attempting to purchase arms for Saudi Arabia. Has travelled extensively including, it is said, to Russia. In 1945 when given only two years to live, this Embassy tried unsuccessfully to obtain permission for him to rejoin his family in Egypt. Since then he has remained in good health and plays an active part in the King's inner council where he is considered an expert on European affairs. He fulfils the duties of Head of Political Section during the absences of Yusuf Yasin (144). As well as being one of the King's official advisers, he is a member of the Council of Ministers and of its Financial and Regulations Committees.

Khalid has a pleasant manner and is a good conversationalist though there is sometimes a nationalistic sting in what he says. Forms a negotiating team with Yusuf Yasin, particularly in regard to the frontier dispute, and is the milder and more conciliatory partner but at bottom his opinion and attitude is little different from that of Yusuf. Speaks French, Turkish and Italian.

113-114. Mazi Family

An important Nejd family which has provided loyal and relatively efficient provincial Governors.

113. Turki ibn Mazi

Born about 1913. In 1932, Inspector-General of Asir and was associated with Zahid bin Zuayr in efforts to make Ibn Saud realise the gravity of the situation preceding the open revolt of the Idrisi at the end of October. Took part in negotiations with the Imam. Accompanied Khalid al Qarqany (112) and Hamid Suleiman on their fruitless mission to Sana in 1933 before the outbreak of the Saudi-Yemen war. Visited the Yemen again in 1943 and 1944 as Ibn Saud's special envoy to the Imam. He reported the people of the Yemen to be groaning under the yoke of the Imam and anxious to transfer their allegiance to Ibn Saud. He would appear to be an expert on the Asir and Yemen. In 1948 appointed Amir of Najran and in 1952 promoted to Amir of Abha and the Asir. He is extremely popular in his Amirate and is reputed to be one of the best Governors in the country.

114. Hamid ibn Mazi

Brother to Turki and succeeded him in 1952 as Amir of Najran. Is likely to continue his brother's ambitious projects for the development of this small port.

115. Mohammed al Khurajji

Father-in-law to Sheikh Abdullah Suleiman (53), to whose influence is attributed the fact that he has become the wealthiest man in Medina.

His two sons, Mohammed and Abdul Aziz, have also become influential men in the Hejaz, as Government agents in Medina and as wealthy merchants and builders.

116. Mohammed bin Ladin

Born about 1913. A Nejd. Believed to have worked as a mason for Aramco in Dhahran until about 1942 when he set up as a small building contractor on his own account. With the field then virtually to himself he attracted royal attention because of the speed with which he executed projects, his prodigious memory for detail and his comparative honesty, and by 1951 had attained the position of Government Director of Building entrusted with the task of repairing and rebuilding the Holy Places in Mecca and Medina and carrying out, mostly by subcontracting, many other public works and royal commissions, usually without proper financial allocation. His position was regulated to some extent in 1953 and his scope limited; in spite of his illiteracy and a chaotic office administration he remains principal

Government contractor. One of his more important tasks at present is the completion of the Jedda-Medina road. In July 1955 he was granted the title of Minister of State, largely in recognition of his work on the immense new palace complex in Jedda. Extremely elusive and constantly on the move; yet has never been known to break his word once he can be induced to give it. Now a very wealthy man.

117. Mohammed Effendi Ibrahim Masoud

Born about 1915. A Hejazi who was educated in the Lebanon but not at the American University as he likes to have it thought. When a United States Mission was established in Jedda he was appointed Arab consultant a post which he still holds. In the summer of 1952 accompanied Abdullah Feisal (24) on his visit to Britain and America. In November 1952 awarded a certificate by the State Department for meritorious service. Invariably accompanies the head of the American mission to discussions with Arabs and has even been entrusted himself with messages to King Ibn Saud.

Is very smooth and speaks English well, though his literary style is poor. Is probably more loyal to the Saudi than to the American Government. This has been suggested to the Americans who nevertheless place great confidence in him and usually accept his opinion without reserve. He has grown wealthy partly through renting a large house to the United States Embassy. Since he has now got all he can expect from the Americans it would not be surprising if he were to leave them for Saudi Government service. He may hanker after a position in the Saudi foreign service.

118. Mohammed Hussein Nazif

Born about 1882 of a prosperous and well-known Jedda merchant family of Egyptian origin. He is said to have lost favour with King Hussein and at that time to have been desirous of British naturalisation. Of sincerely religious views he was probably a Wahhabi before the Saudi conquest of the Hejaz, and was a delegate at the Moslem Congress in Mecca in 1926. He is a much respected older figure and is reputed to have the best private library in the country.

119. Mohammed Ibrahim al Ghazzawi

A Hejazi with a sonorous voice and an impressive bearing who is the official poet laureate. He reads his own poems, chiefly eulogistic of the royal family, on all State occasions. He resides in Mecca, and in 1952 was appointed Second Vice-President of the Consultative Assembly. In 1955 he was made an honorary Minister Plenipotentiary.

120. Mohammed Surur as Sabban

Minister of Finance and National Economy, President of the State Economic Council, Chairman of the Board of Directors of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, Supervisor-General of the Directorate of Pilgrimage Affairs, Minister of State, and a member of both the Council of Ministers and of the King's Cabinet. Born about 1902, son of a slave of the Sabban merchant family of Mecca (his mother is said to have been an Ethiopian). Began in business as the moving spirit in the family hide and skin trade. A clerk in the municipality of Jedda under King Hussein, he is said to have tried to assassinate King Ibn Saud during his conquest of the Hejaz in 1925 and to have been subsequently incarcerated in Riyadh. Returned to the Hejaz about 1929, and was taken up by Abdullah Suleiman (53), then Minister of Finance; rose rapidly with the latter's support and was effectively second in command in the Ministry for the greater part of the period

the sixteenth century. Three groups of his descendants are accounted specially important, viz.:-

The Dhawi Zeyd,
The Abadila, a particular branch of whom are the Dhawi Aun, and
The Dhawi Barakat.

All Grand Sherifs of Mecca in the seventeenth century were drawn from the rival Dhawi Zeyd and Dhawi Aun. The last Grand Sherif belonging to the former was Abdul Mutallib, who held the post three times at long intervals. The majority belonged to the Dhawi Aun, of whom came the late King Hussein and his sons. The most important members of the Sherifian family now live outside Saudi Arabia. Perhaps of the others the two following deserve mention.

136. Sharaf Ridha

One of the Dhawi Zeyd branch, usually called Sherif Sharaf tout court. Appointed Acting Minister of Finance under Ibn Saud in January 1926. Resides in Mecca and is now a member of the Legislative Council. In 1936 appointed to be a member of the King's suite. Appears to spend all his time at Mecca and Taif. A courteous, dignified man, rather silent and with something of a brooding air.

137. Abdul Hamid al Aun

One of the Dhawi Aun branch. Understood to be a grandson of Ali bin Abdullah, formerly Grand Sherif of Mecca until his dismissal by the Turks in 1907. Chiefly noteworthy as being the principal figure in the Sherifian plot against Ibn Saud in 1940. Arrested and sentenced to death, he was pardoned (King Abdullah of Transjordan interceded for him). After a period of detention at Riyadh he was allowed to leave the country with the two younger brothers and some other relatives who were also implicated. Now believed to be in Egypt.

138-140. Sheikh al Ardh Family.

138. Midhat Sheikh al Ardh

A Syrian and the eldest of three brothers. Studied medicine at Damascus and has probably also had some training in France. Has been doctor to the royal family for about twenty years during which time he has amassed a large fortune. He accompanied the Crown Prince to England for the Silver Jubilee in 1935 and the Amir Mansour to Egypt in 1942. Lost his post for a brief period in 1943. Has been useful to the royal family in a number of ways and has probably provided slaves from Syria.

He has a charming manner and speaks French easily. He had the courage to call in many foreign specialists to attend to Ibn Saud's health yet despite this competition he maintained himself as Ibn Saud's principal medical adviser. In the new reign he no longer appears to be in favour as a doctor, but has instead become one of the King's official advisers and his influence is likely to increase. He accompanied the Amir Feisal to the Bandoeng Conference this year.

139. Fakhri al Ardh

Has prospered in the wake of his brother Midhat. Has turned his hand to a number of lucrative enterprises to which he has been helped by the royal family. At one time served in the Saudi mission to Iraq.

140. Neshat al Ardh

Whether or not he is the most disreputable of the brothers he has acquired the greatest notoriety. It seems fairly certain that he was a principal channel through which Saudi bribes were disseminated in Syria. In 1953 accompanied Abdullah Suleiman (53) on his trip to Germany.

141. Suleiman Nunaih

A Nejd. Director of Coastguards. Dismissed in May 1944 for incompetence in dealing with the smuggling of gold from the Hejaz, but was reinstated shortly after. Friendly and helpful.

142. Taher Redhwan

Born about 1910. A Syrian and a relation of Yusuf Yasin (144). In 1950 appointed a Minister Plenipotentiary. He is normally the official in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Jeddah but is liable to alternate in this position with Khairuddin az Zuraikli (111).

In his official relations he was at first most unco-operative and surly mainly because he was afraid of giving anything away. He has become more friendly as he has become more sure of himself, but obstinacy is engrained in his nature. He is without serious political influence and his future probably depends largely upon that of Yusuf Yasin. He has a deformed foot and speaks no English, except "goodbye."

143. Turki ibn Ataishan

The second son of a prominent Nejd family, he is in his mid-forties. He was Amir of Ras Tanura from about 1945 until 1952, when he was succeeded in this post by his brother Salim. At the end of August 1952 he arrived in the Buraimi oasis accompanied by forty followers and established himself in the village of Hamasa, thus precipitating a crisis in the long-drawn-out dispute concerning the south-eastern frontier of Saudi Arabia. The village of Hamasa belongs to the Sultan of Muscat and most of the rest of the oasis is the Ruler of Abu Dhabi. Ibn Saud laid claim to the whole area of which Buraimi is the strategic centre and declared that Turki was his legally-appointed Amir to govern this part of his Kingdom. Despite a Standstill Agreement which provided for the cessation of provocative actions, Turki continued unashamedly his attempts to suborn the neighbouring tribes and to encourage revolts against the local rulers. His tendentious and unreliable reporting to Riyadh contributed to heightening the tension. However, agreement was finally reached in July 1954 to submit the disputed areas to arbitration on certain conditions, one of which was the withdrawal of Turki and his followers. After a short period of being feted as the hero of Buraimi, he has now been accorded the post of head of the Labour Office in Damman, in place of the unfortunate Abdul Aziz Muammar (45). It is most unlikely that this appointment can satisfy one of his ambition, and since too he is well thought of by the powerful Saud bin Jiluwi (41) greater things are perhaps in store for him.

Turki is well educated in the Arab style and is an assiduous reader. He keeps in close touch with current affairs. He is exceptionally agile mentally and fertile in devising workable schemes. He speaks no English though he understands some. Turki is one of the most impressive and capable of the top Saudi administrators and is particularly good in handling Bedouin, for his imposing figure, his accomplishments in the field and his knowledge of Arabic poetry show him to possess the traditional qualities of an Arab leader.

144. Yusuf Yasin

Born about 1890. A Syrian from Latakia. Was once a schoolmaster in Jerusalem. Joined King Feisal at Aqaba and went with him to Damascus. Left on the approach of the French and joined King Hussein in Mecca. Attached by him to the Amir Abdullah at Amman, with whom he remained for six months but of whom he formed such a low opinion that according to his own account he transferred his allegiance to Ibn Saud. Came to Mecca in 1925 and started *Um al Qura* the official Government gazette of which he remained editor for some

years. The Nejd delegate at the Moslem Congress of 1926. Director of Publicity. Took part in negotiations with Sir G. Clayton in 1925, 1927 and 1928. Acted as Minister for Foreign Affairs in the absence of the Minister for part of most years from 1926 onwards. Went to Bagdad at the end of 1935 to negotiate the Saudi-Iraq Treaty of Brotherhood and Alliance. Accompanied King Saud, then the Crown Prince, to London for George VI's coronation. Negotiated with His Majesty's Minister the Saudi-Kuwait Agreement which he signed in Jeddah in April 1942. In 1944 joined Abdullah Suleiman (53) in opposing the re-organisation of Saudi finances and economy suggested by His Majesty's Minister. Was the Saudi delegate at the Preparatory Committee meeting of the Arab Conference at Alexandria in October 1944 and signed the Covenant of the Arab League on behalf of Saudi Arabia in March 1945. Accompanied Ibn Saud on his visit to Egypt for the meetings with President Roosevelt and Mr. Churchill in February 1945. Again accompanied the King on his State visit to Egypt later in 1945, when he added to his fortune through his handling of the King's expenses. Accompanied the Amir Feisal to London for frontier discussions at the Foreign Office. Saudi delegate at the Damascus Conference on the Eastern Frontiers in February 1952. Principal Saudi negotiator in all frontier discussions since the departure and subsequent death of Fuad Hamza. Appointed a Minister of State in 1946. Deputy Foreign Minister, a member of the Council of Ministers and of its Regulations Committee. He had been at pains for some time to show his regard for King Saud before the latter's accession and had kept him well-informed on foreign affairs. His influence at court is now probably considerable. So far, his position in the inner circle of the King's advisers has not been seriously threatened though there is small doubt that there are some, notably the Ali Reza group, who are awaiting an opportunity to have him removed from power. This, however, will be difficult, because with his intimate knowledge of the details of the frontier disputes he has made himself virtually indispensable. It was only natural that he should have been chosen to be the Saudi member of the Buraimi Arbitration Tribunal.

Politics are the breath of life to Yusuf Yasin. Throughout his career he has been an Arab nationalist and as such is to a considerable extent anti-British

though he is equally opposed to any other foreign influence. He will certainly seize any opportunity to decrease British influence in the Arabian peninsula. Though he has a legalistic mind and is fond of scoring debating points he nevertheless has a keen sense of realities and is a great respecter of power. He proves amenable in relation to the power and influence which he thinks his opponent wields. Obstinance is part of his nature. In argument (which he enjoys) he is always persistent, dogmatic and sometimes excited. He is an indefatigable worker and tries to engross all subjects of importance into his own hands. He is also a devout and puritanical Moslem. These qualities have made him the ideal confidential servant of a despot.

He can be entertaining in conversation and is imperturbable in the face of the many shafts of wit directed against his reputed meanness, gluttony and monogamy by intimates of the court. He has remarked that he expects to be one of the richest men in Syria, but he fears that the Syrian Government will not permit him to hand this wealth on to his sons, the eldest of whom has studied the oil business in America. His children have all been to English schools in Egypt though he himself speaks little English. Though very vigorous he is probably not in good health.

145-147. Zahid Family.

(Family tree on page 24.)

145. Mohammed Mahmoud Zahid


The eldest of the five brothers who between them manage Zahid Bros., with its highly lucrative General Motors Agency supplying Cadillacs to all who can afford them (including many who fail to pay). Speaks no English and is now more concerned with managing the family's property than anything else.

146. Ahmed Zahid


Financial manager for Zahid Bros. Speaks little English and is not a particularly attractive character.

147. Yousuf Zahid

Born about 1920 and educated in the United States. A glad-hander ("call me Joe") who acts as principal travelling representative for the firm of Zahid Bros. Quite intelligent and possessing more polish than his brothers.



The above genealogical table is based on that in Philby's "Arabian Jubilee" (1950).



soldiers garrisoned a fort near Bab al Mandab. The Dammani dissidents were given refuge in the Yemen, whenever harassed, from where they made raids into the Protectorate. Even in the Lower Aulaqi Sultanate, which is far from the frontier, reports have been received of Yemeni gifts of arms &c., to anti-Government elements. Finally there have been raids by Dahm (Yemeni) tribesmen into the Eastern Aden Protectorate.

7. The raiding and interference in the Protectorate became so serious that a strong note of protest was delivered in July to the Yemeni Government, which was warned that Her Majesty's Government reserved the right to take direct action against the raiders (the Aden Government was authorised to engage in hot pursuit). The Yemeni Government denied all responsibility for the raids and made counter-accusations. Also in July a proposal for a meeting of the two frontier officers in order to find a means of restoring tranquillity on the frontier was accepted by both sides, but the meeting was postponed, because of the illness of the Yemeni frontier officer.

8. The increasing gravity of the situation had caused anxiety to certain responsible Yemenis, and the possibility of a meeting between the Imam and the Governor of Aden was mentioned on several separate occasions. Eventually, following a meeting between the Yemeni Foreign Minister and my predecessor, an invitation to the Governor to visit the Yemen was issued by the Imam.

9. The visit took place in Taiz from October 16 to 25. The Governor had one meeting with the Imam and several discussions with the Minister for Foreign Affairs. As a result, agreement was reached on the Dammani and Rabizi problems, the question of the ex-Mansuri Sheikh and of the Masabin refugees, the disposal of Husn Al Awsaj, the need to reduce armed forces in the frontier area and the necessity of preventing the giving of material aid to anti-Government elements. Certain matters raised by the Yemenis were referred to Her Majesty's Government and the Yemenis also expressed the desire to enter into more general discussions later with Her Majesty's Government. Agreement was not, however, reached on the wording of the draft record of the talks, and this was still the subject of discussion between the British and Yemeni Governments at the end of the year. The differences have been narrowed and there

is hope of early agreement on the wording of the document, its publication and the execution of its terms.

10. Following the Taiz discussions the Yemeni frontier officer met the Adeni frontier officer and they reached agreement on the Wadi Shaab dispute. In December agreement was also reached on the settlement of claims arising from raiding between certain Yemeni and Eastern Aden Protectorate tribes.

11. During the Taiz talks and the following month raiding continued. The situation improved in December, however, except for one serious incident in Shueibi country. Mureis (Yemeni) tribesmen crossed the frontier in order to assist a deserter from the Shueibi tribal guards who was resisting arrest. On representations being made to him, the Imam ordered the withdrawal of the Mureis. Some, nevertheless, failed to withdraw and action was taken to evict them. Aircraft were used and bombs were accidentally dropped on Yemeni territory causing damage and at least one known casualty. Her Majesty's Government expressed their regret for this accidental bombing and at a meeting of the frontier officers in December agreement was reached on the method of settling the dispute and examining claims for compensation.

12. Although by the end of the year there had been some improvement in the situation, the Taiz discussions cannot be said to have brought about any marked improvement in relations between the Yemen and Aden and, in consequence, Britain. There is little doubt that the Imam was dissatisfied with the results of the discussions. He had hoped to gain something from the meeting—e.g., the abandonment of the federation scheme—but the Governor had not come to bargain his freedom of action in internal affairs for Yemeni promises (of questionable worth) of non-interference in Protectorate affairs in the future. Although the Imam has stated several times that he has instructed his frontier officials to remain on the defensive and to refuse material aid to dissidents, there can be no doubt that the Imam has approved in general the policy of interference which his frontier officials have executed with considerable and perhaps excessive enthusiasm. It is understandable, therefore, that he sees little advantage to the Yemen from the Taiz discussions. He may, nevertheless, for his own reasons honour the Taiz agreement. His reasons

could be the realisation that he has gone too far and may provoke, if he continues his policy of interference, Her Majesty's Government into forcible retaliation which would threaten his own position; or he may wish to create a better atmosphere before entering into general discussions with Her Majesty's Government or before suggesting arbitration or a reference of the dispute to the United Nations; or he may have decided to organise opposition to the Aden Government by the more subtle method of propaganda and the covert encouragement of dissidents inside the Protectorate while refraining from hostile action in the frontier area.

Internal Situation

13. There was no sign of organised opposition to the Imam during the year, although this oppressive rule can only be welcome to a minority of Zaidis who stand to gain by the continuance of the present régime. Complaints were frequently voiced in private and occasionally in public, as happened on the occasion of the Accession Day celebration in December. In the absence of outside interference only the Imam's death from natural causes or by assassination is likely to bring his reign to an end. Although not enjoying good health, he has not apparently suffered from any serious illness during 1954. Against the danger of assassination he has invariably been heavily guarded by his special bodyguard. His release of a number of the more eminent political prisoners involved in the 1948 *coup d'état* may be taken as a sign of his increased confidence in his position.

14. The Imam's visit to Sana'a in July in order to welcome King Saud and his subsequent stay there for about ten weeks, during which he made generous payments to the northern tribes, may have strengthened his position. He has also felt strong enough to try to force his brothers and leading citizens to support the nomination of his son Saif Ul Islam Badr as Crown Prince. It appears that only the Prime Minister, Saif Ul Islam Hassan, has had the courage to withhold his support. He has based his opposition, which he has voiced publicly, on the fact that the Imamate is an elective and not a hereditary office, and also made known that he does not in any case consider Al-Badr a fit person to be Imam—a view with which I find it hard to quarrel.

15. The relations between the Imam and Al-Hassan have certainly not been improved by the dispute. Nevertheless in the present circumstances I cannot see Al-Hassan trying, or even wishing, to supplant the Imam in the latter's lifetime, and in any case I do not think that he has the power to do so. That he would like to succeed the Imam after his death is hardly open to doubt and his control of the late Imam's treasury may prove to be a vital factor in achieving his ambition.

16. The position of Saif Ul Islam Abdullah is more difficult to assess. He is the least disliked by the people, and has intelligence, charm, some ability and apparently more enlightened ideas than his brothers. In the second half of the year he has played a much more active part in his country's affairs and can no longer be dismissed as a titular Foreign Minister. He is the only brother who has remained in Taiz since the Imam's return and has been in regular communication with the Imam. It is doubtful, however, whether the Imam pays much attention to his advice or trusts him. He has not, I think, the strength of character of the Imam or Al-Hassan, and there may be some truth in the report that on the Imam's death he will support Al-Hassan's candidature for the Imamate on the understanding that he will become Prime Minister. Al Badr is a weak and colourless personality whose tactless behaviour in Sana'a, where he has been trying to act as if he were the Governor there, has succeeded in arousing Al-Hassan's anger. Neither he, nor the remaining brothers of the Imam, appear to possess the qualities required of an Imam of the Yemen. It seems probable that the death of the present Imam will be followed by a period of turmoil from which a new Imam or a new system of Government could equally well emerge. Much may depend on the Free Yemenis who have many supporters within the country and who might support Al-Badr for the Imamate, because he is much more amenable to influence and could probably be induced to introduce reform in the Yemen.

Foreign Relations

17. Yemeni contacts with the rest of the world increased during the year, a development which should in the long run be beneficial.

18. The Yemen sent a delegation to the ninth session of the General Assembly of

the United Nations and representatives to meetings of the Arab League, but her representatives can hardly be said to have distinguished themselves in either body. Yemeni diplomatic representatives were appointed for the first time to Ethiopia and Saudi Arabia, and the Yemen has now diplomatic representatives in seven and agents in two countries. American, French, Italian and Indian diplomatists have all visited the Yemen during the year. The French and Italian Governments are believed to be considering the establishment of missions in the Yemen, although the Imam is unlikely to welcome such a step. Relations with Saudi Arabia were strengthened by the visit of King Saud. Egypt continued to be represented by a chargé d'affaires in Sana'a. Major Saleh Salem, the Egyptian Minister for National Guidance, visited the Yemen in July and, as a result of his visit, an Egyptian military mission arrived in Taiz in October and is now engaged in the (doubtless) heartbreaking task of training the Yemeni army. A number of Egyptian teachers also came to the Yemen on loan from the Egyptian Government. Finally, the Arab League sent a mission, under the leadership of its secretary-general, to Yemen in February in order to ascertain the Yemeni point of view on the frontier dispute with Aden.

Economic Affairs

19. In the development of his country, Imam Ahmed has shown more interest than his father did. He promised reforms and improvements in a speech made in Sana'a in July, and he appears to be making some effort within the limitations of his vision and of a medieval administration. It has been suggested that he is making a show of development in order to silence criticism. I believe, however, that he is genuinely interested in development, albeit slow, unplanned and often ill-considered development, and is not particularly influenced by criticism from outside. His main fear is that that development will bring with it foreign control and this fear has affected the speed and method of development.

20. Among the projects in progress and under consideration during the year were the development of the harbour at Mocha, improvement of the Mocha-Taiz, Taiz-Sana'a and Hodeida-Sana'a roads, the establishment of textile, cement and tobacco factories, the increased cultivation of tobacco and cotton, the continued, and so far unsuccessful, search for oil (by a German company), the making of extensions to the new hospital at Taiz,

the building of three new 50-bed hospitals—probably at Ibb, Mocha and Beidha—the construction of a new town at Mocha, the supply of electricity to Beidha and the improvement of the electricity supply for Sana'a. The United Nations banking expert, Dr. Siemenski, returned to Taiz in November in order to supervise the introduction of a new silver currency, but the Imam has not finally approved the scheme. In furthering these projects the Imam has looked to France, Germany, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and the United Nations for expert advice and help.

21. Despite Britain's offer of technical help made in the 1950 Exchange of Notes, the Imam has not yet asked for British technical assistance. His reasons are presumably political, as the development of Mocha is undoubtedly aimed at lessening Yemeni dependence on the port of Aden. In December, however, I drew the Yemeni Government's attention to the services which the Development Division of the British Middle East Office provides and the Imam expressed interest and asked for details. These were furnished, and the head of the Development Division offered to visit the Yemen in February 1955. The Yemeni response to that offer will indicate whether the Imam genuinely wishes economic help from Britain. The lack of response so far to the suggestion of an Anglo-Yemeni Air Agreement (which would be of undoubted economic benefit to the Yemen) is an unfavourable pointer to his attitude generally towards economic co-operation with Britain. It seems unlikely that economic co-operation can precede a political settlement.

Press and Radio

22. *As Saba*, the only one of the three Yemeni newspapers with any degree of independence of the Government ceased in October its virulent attacks on the Aden Government's and British policy generally as a result of the suspension for six months of the deportation order made by the Aden Government against the editor. It remains to be seen whether the editor will be able to continue to resist Government pressure on him to publish anti-British articles.

23. The opening of a broadcasting station in Aden caused some concern to the Yemeni Government who have on several occasions complained about specific broadcasts which they regarded, without justification, as unfriendly. No progress has been made towards erecting the new broadcasting station at Sana'a, although the complete equipment has been there for more than three years.

Conclusion

24. 1954 was a disappointing year for Anglo-Yemeni relations. Although the situation on the frontier had improved by the end of the year it would be rash to suppose that a reversal of Yemeni policy and a trend towards co-operation and friendship with the British and Aden Governments was taking place. As long as the Imam chooses to regard any measures for the political, economic and social development of the Protectorate as a violation of the *status quo* and a threat to his claim to the Protectorate, the seeds of strife remain; for it is out of the question that the Aden Government should sacrifice its freedom of action in internal affairs in the hope of appeasing the Imam. There is, unfortunately, little prospect of the Imam's altering his view, as he only listens to the "advice" of the ignorant sycophants who alone have regular access to him. The main hope of better relations in 1955 would seem to lie in the possibility of negotiations between the British and Yemeni Governments for the final settlement of the southern frontier of the Yemen in accordance with the Treaty of 1934. The strength of the Imam's position in the country would seem to preclude any hope of internal change which might bring with it an improvement in external relations.

25. I enclose a chronological summary of the main events of the year.

26. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden and the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

R. MCGREGOR,

Chargé d'Affaires.

Enclosure

Main Events in the Yemen in 1954

January

- 7-9 Accession Day celebrations.
- 31 Occupation by Yemeni troops of three villages in Wadi Hamra (disputed area).

February

- 2 Awadh-Fagami settlement concluded.
- 18-25 Visit of Arab League Mission to Yemen.

March

- 11 Yemeni officials and troops crossed the frontier and re-erected post in Subeihi territory.

May

- 17 Note presented to Yemen Government in protest against raids by Dammani rebels into Protectorate from bases in Yemen.

June

- Occupation of fort in Wadi Shaab (Protectorate) by Yemeni tribesmen.
- Release of a number of important political prisoners.
- 18 Heavy attack by Yemeni troops and irregulars on Marta'a in Audhali Sultanate.

July

- 6-10 Visit to Yemen of Major Saleh Salem, Egyptian Minister for National Guidance.
- 12 Note of protest delivered to Yemeni Government about serious frontier situation.
- 15 Imam went to Sana'a.
- 17-21 Visit to Yemen of King Saud of Saudi Arabia.

August

- 3-6 Meeting in Sana'a between Yemeni Minister for Foreign Affairs and Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires to discuss frontier situation.
- 24 Imam invited Governor of Aden to visit him.

September

- 24 Imam returned to Taiz.

October

- 16-25 Visit to Yemen of Governor of Aden.
- 18 Arrival in Taiz of Egyptian Military Mission.
- Heavy raid by Awadh in Beihan territory.

November

- 18 Meeting at Al-Abr to discuss raids between Yemeni and Eastern Aden Protectorate tribes.
- 23 Mureis (Yemen) tribesmen enter Shueib (Protectorate) country in support of Tribal Guard deserter resisting arrest.

December

- 9 Accidental bombing of Yemeni watch-tower during action to arrest deserter and evict Mureis.
- 21 Meeting of frontier officers to discuss Shueib incident.
- 28-30 Accession Day celebrations.
- 30 Meeting of frontier officers to discuss Wadi Shaab incident.

EM 1015/6(c)

No. 32

SITUATION IN THE YEMEN

(1)

*Sir Thomas Hickinbotham to Secretary of State for the Colonies.**(Received April 5)*(No. 158. Secret)
(Telegraphic)*Aden,**April 5, 1955.*

My secret telegram No. 154.

2. The situation in the Yemen appears to be becoming more confused every day. Reports reaching here, all of which are unconfirmed, indicates that Said Al Islam Al Badam is moving southward to surround Taiz. There seems little doubt that the customs post at Radide on the Aden-Taiz road has been taken over by the local rebel leader and the soldiers have either run away or returned to Taiz, and intercepts of radio messages between Sanaa and Taiz and Hodeida indicate that the situation in Taiz is uncomfortable and one report goes as far as to say that the soldiers responsible for the *coup d'état* are drifting away as the tribesmen advance. On the other hand, telegrams are being received from Taiz from newspaper editors and these are to the effect that the situation is quiet and that country is tranquil.

3. Perfect, who arrived here on Sunday, is still here and is waiting for instructions from McGregor with regard to his return. McGregor sent one short message of no importance on the 4th, but it seems fairly clear that the (corrupt group ? situation) at Taiz is still under control of the military. I have telegraphed to him to-day mentioning the situation at Rahida and enquiring whether it is desirable for Perfect to return.

EM 1015/11

(2)

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 8)(No. 43. Secret)
(Telegraphic)*Taiz,**April 3, 1955.*

Reference my telegraphic report (sent through Aden) on the situation in Taiz and my telegram No. 40.

According to my information the army discontent was brought to a head by an incident on March 30. In the Hauban area outside Taiz a dispute arose between some soldiers and villagers about firewood and fighting ensued (resulting in fatalities on both sides and burning of the villagers' houses by the soldiers). Lieut-Colonel Atcaxthal, T.O.A., of the Taiz army, was blamed for the incident by the Imam who ordered his arrest. The army rallied to his support and decided the time had come to depose the Imam. Atcaxthal became leader of the revolt and is now styled "Head of the Army."

2. Taiz was calm last night and to-day, but the army is taking precautionary measures against the possibility of attack from outside.

3. As you will have realised from the report under reference, the position regarding the abdication and succession is not strictly in accordance with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs note or the message now being broadcast by the B.B.C., Cairo and Aden. The Imam Ahmed never had any intention of abdicating on the grounds of ill-health, and has done so only under compulsion. He is at present Atcaxthal's heavily guarded prisoner in the army barracks at Urdhi. There is also some reason to believe that Abdullah was reluctant to become Imam and, according to some reports, was forced at the point of gun to accept the nomination. The Ulama and officials of Taiz also had no option but to support the army demand for abdication of the Imam and accept the outcome. I am not able to say whether or not the statement in the note and the message sent and broadcast abroad that the Royal Princes, communities of learned people, the army and notables support

SECRET

the change is true in regard to the rest of the country. Of the Royal Family Qasim is now in Taiz, Abbas in Sana is said to have given his support to Abdullah, Badr is reported to have gone to Hajja with a view to raising the tribes against the army, the Prime Minister is in Cairo and Ali is in Sana and unlikely to take independent line. I would summarise the position by saying that the majority of the ordinary people will be glad to be rid of the King, that the majority of the leading officials will try to sit on the fence until it becomes clearer that general acceptance of the present changes, or at least a peaceful settlement, will depend completely on attitude of the other members of the Royal Family [group undec.] some of whom might raise the tribes against the army. It seems possible that they will not do so in view of the fact the Imamate is still held by one of the family and one more popular than Ahmed. The proposed visit of a [group undec.]—Saudi mission should help the achievement of a peaceful settlement.

4. Since the revolt I have not visited the Ministry of Foreign Affairs nor communicated formally with them. The note was handed to me at the Legation by an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who has been my link with the Government for essential purposes during the last few days. The note bore the usual stamp of the Ministry and was signed by the same official with the designation of Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs. I presume that for the present you will wish me to avoid as far as possible giving the impression that Her Majesty's Government accepts the new régime as anything other than the present effective authorities in Taiz.

EM 1015/9

(3)

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 7)(No. 44. Secret)
(Telegraphic)*Taiz,**April 6, 1955.*

My telegram No. 43: Situation in Yemen.

The army revolt has failed and the Imam Ahmed has regained the throne.

2. The Imam skilfully and secretly organised support from many supporters [group undec.] and on the afternoon of April 4 seized Maqam (the official residence) at Urdhi with the help of irregulars and loyal soldiers. Fighting between his and Abdullah's supporters lasted until 1730 hours April 5. Artillery fire from the loyal garrison in the citadel made important contribution to the victory. Abdullah and leading officials are under arrest in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, but Lieutenant-Colonel Atallthal Toa [sic] and about 150 soldiers have fled from Taiz; Albadr is said to be in Amran [groups undec.] ready to march on Sana if there is any trouble from the army there, but this is now unlikely. I have sent short personal message of congratulation to the Imam.

3. I shall report more fully as soon as possible. Telegraph office has just opened.

EM 1015/17

(4)

Mr. Phillips to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 13)(No. 4 Saving. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)*Jedda,**April 6, 1955.*

Your telegram No. 267 of April 4 to me and Cairo telegram No. 476 of April 4 to you.

Coup d'état in Yemen.

At the time Imam Ahmed was restored there was in Riyadh a delegation from his brother Abdullah whose mission was to explain to King Saud the circumstances in which Abdullah had usurped Ahmed's authority. I do not know whether at the time the King was prepared to be convinced by this delegation, or what has happened to it since Ahmed's return to Taiz. But it is clear from the following

SECRET

official Saudi communiqué to-day that the King breathed a sigh of relief when Ahmed was restored:—

Trouble and sedition broke out in Taiz the capital of the Yemen on Thursday morning, but thank God these have ended and things have reverted to normal. His Majesty the Imam Ahmed has resolutely nipped the sedition in the bud and re-enforced law and order. Radio Mecca is happy to announce this good news to all Arabs and all Moslems throughout the world. We congratulate our sister State on the victory achieved by her great Imam and on the stability of law and order there. May she continue to flourish and progress.

2. There were strong rumours here earlier in the week that the Saudi Government might, instead of trying to bring Abdullah round (last sentence of Cairo telegram under reference), try to support Badr against him and thus restore Ahmed. But I know of no actual intervention by the Saudis to this end. There were equally strong (probably Saudi-inspired) rumours that the British authorities in the Aden Protectorate intended to bolster Abdullah's authority during his brief reign.

3. However achieved, there is no doubt that the restoration of Ahmed is most satisfactory from the Saudi point of view. The rulers here are not unconscious of the effect that his overthrow permanently might have had on the people of this country. Now, on the contrary, his restoration with the help of the tribes can only be a shining example to tribal loyalty (already strong) in Saudi Arabia. The stability of the Saudi rulers rests on the support of the tribes (with gold) and of the mullahs (with religion).

4. I should not be surprised if these events in the Yemen led to closer co-operation between Saud and Ahmed in the future. One possible manifestation of this would be increased Saudi support for Yemeni complaints against Her Majesty's Government.

EM 1015/10

(5)

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 7)

(No. 47. Confidential) (Telegraphic)

Taiz, April 7, 1955.

My telegram No. 44: Situation in Yemen.

The two officers concerned in the revolt were executed on the night of April 5. Lieutenant-Colonel Atcaxthal, T.O.A. [sic], was captured 10 miles from Taiz and was executed at 1330 hours April 6. Most of the soldiers who fled have apparently now surrendered and the Imam is said to have pardoned the soldiers who took part in the fighting. Prince Abdullah is said to have been wounded and moved to hospital. No accurate figures of casualties are available yet. I have no further reliable news of the situation in the rest of the country but the situation in Taiz is back to normal.

2. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs is not functioning at present. Official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs before the revolt who was not involved in the revolt has suggested that I address any urgent communications to the Yemen Government and send them to the Imam who will probably depute somebody to deal with them.

EM 1015/12

(6)

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received April 10)

(No. 49. Confidential) (Telegraphic)

Taiz, April 9, 1955.

My telegram No. 47: Situation in the Yemen.

Situation now seems to be normal. Egyptian-Saudi Mission arrived at Taiz on the afternoon of April 7 and have seen the Imam. Four others involved in the revolt have been executed including Qadhi Yahya As-Sayaghi (Judge of Taiz).

Prince Abbas has arrived at Taiz to ask for the Imam's forgiveness. Prince Abdullah has not been moved to hospital as previously reported and reports that he was wounded may not be true. Provisional estimate of casualties since March 30 is [group undec. ? 20] killed and 30 wounded.

2. The Imam issued statement on April 6 denying that he abdicated and asserting that he merely authorised his brothers Abdullah and Abbas (in Sana) to act temporarily for him under his guidance. He also said at public executions on April 7 that he was pardoning the soldiers who had been misled and that the executions were a form of "redemption" for the army. On April 8 at a further execution he said that it was necessary to punish the army because they should be "the highest example." The Imam is summoning many persons for questioning and it is generally expected that there will be further executions. His intention is said to be to execute the army officers and officials responsible for the revolt which was allegedly planned about two months ago and set off by the incident at Hauban (reference paragraph 1 of my telegram No. 43).

3. The telegraph office has been disorganised, but the director assures me that all my previous telegrams have been sent. Grateful confirmation of their receipt.

EM 1015/25

No. 33

ABORTIVE COUP D'ETAT IN THE YEMEN

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received May 7)

(No. 22. Confidential) Taiz,
Sir, April 25, 1955.

I have the honour to give in this despatch an account of the recent abortive *coup d'état* in the Yemen, and to make some comments on the reasons for its failure and the effect which it has had and may have on the internal situation and on Anglo-Yemeni relations.

2. I reported in my despatch No. 19 of the 30th of March, that there was growing discontent in the Army. On the evening of March 30 a serious incident occurred in Hauban, which is the name given to a group of villages a few miles to the north of Taiz. A party of soldiers demanded wood from the villagers; the latter refused and fighting broke out resulting in fatalities on both sides. The soldiers returned in force and set fire to the villagers' houses. The action of the soldiers angered the Imam and he ordered the arrest of Lieutenant-Colonel Thalai, Chief Instructor of the Taiz Army, whom he considered to be responsible for the incident. Thalai decided that the time for action had come and was able to count on the support of the majority of the officers and soldiers, the notable exception being the Army Commander, who played no part in the subsequent events. Preparations were made during the night, and in the early morning key points, including the telegraph office, in the town and surrounding area were occupied. The Maqam, *i.e.*, the Imam's palace and court at Urdhi (a suburb of Taiz) was blockaded and after half an hour's not very serious firing between the Army and the Imam's bodyguard the latter ceased resisting. A Committee of Officers accompanied by many leading Court and Government Officials (some against their will) met the Imam in the presence of the Foreign Minister, Saif-ul-Islam Abdulla, and demanded his abdication in favour of Abdulla. (At this time it was generally believed that Abdulla was reluctant to accept the Imamate.) The Imam was reported to have agreed verbally to abdicate. Messengers were then sent by air to Hodeida and Sana'a to obtain the *bi'at* (acknowledgment as Imam) of the Ulama, leading personalities and tribal leaders for

Abdulla. The reaction of Al-Badr, the Imam's son, was to leave Hodeida at once for Hajja, a mountain stronghold, in order to organise the tribes in support of his father. Prince Abbas in Sana'a, however, announced his support for Abdulla. Meanwhile in Taiz on Friday, the 1st of April, Abdulla issued an official announcement that Ahmed had abdicated on account of ill-health and he had succeeded him (see enclosure 1).⁽¹⁾ The following day, a written announcement of his abdication and his wish that Abdulla should deal with public affairs was issued by Ahmed (see enclosure 2).⁽¹⁾ On the same evening, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' Note announcing the abdication and succession of Abdulla was delivered to me. Similar messages were being sent to other Arab countries.

3. During the first day of the *coup d'état* I was unable to leave the Legation or to send any telegrams or any communication of any kind. This was apparently by order of the Army. The following day I sent a letter to Abdulla requesting that I should be informed of the situation, allowed to communicate with my Government and permitted freedom of movement in accordance with diplomatic right. I received a verbal message that I could move in certain areas with a guard for personal protection. Later, Ali Raja, an official of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs who subsequently was styled Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs, called on me in the afternoon and thereafter was my link with the Government. At my insistence, he agreed to let me send a clear telegram the purpose of which was to inform you that all was well and that normal telegraphic communication would be restored in about two days. As I subsequently learned, the telegram was never sent.

4. During my tour of the town and area in the second day conditions were outwardly normal, but there was no sign of enthusiasm for the change; the people of Taiz are Shafai, and have no liking for the Zaidi Army and were moreover too wise to acclaim the new Imam when it was by no means certain that he could maintain his

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

position. As reports came in of the raising of the tribes, families were sent from Taiz into the mountains for safety and goods were moved from shops in anticipation of looting.

5. On the third and fourth days the situation in Taiz was unchanged, but public nervousness increased as broadcasts from Cairo, Aden and London reported that the tribes were on the move. Also, the irregular troops had fallen out with the Army and were leaving Taiz to join their tribes. Artillery was placed at various strategic points, including a hill dominating the Legation. (I should perhaps make clear that the Legation is situated about 800 yards from the Maqam where all the fighting took place.)

6. During the period of uneasy calm, Imam Ahmed pretended to be sick, refused to move from the Maqam and asked that only a few of his bodyguard be left with him to attend to his needs. Abdulla had a private meeting with him on April 2, at which Ahmed fooled him into thinking that he had given up interest in the Imamate by saying—"the power has been given from my right to my left hand." As a result the Imam was left practically unobserved, although the Maqam was surrounded by soldiers, to lay his plans. This he did with considerable skill. He changed the members of his personal bodyguard frequently and used them to take messages to the tribal leaders in the neighbourhood of Taiz and further afield, and to bring him news. He also managed to collect several drums of water and, on the pretext that the roof required repairing, sand which he used of course to fill sandbags. Finally, he arranged to send his family by car to Sala for safety on the afternoon of April 4. As soon as he received the news that they had arrived safely, he came out of the Maqam, was quickly joined by some of his bodyguard and irregulars, opened fire on the soldiers guarding the Maqam and forced his way back into the Maqam. The battle then commenced between the Army, who were concentrated in barracks about a hundred yards away and the telegraph office, and the Imam's supporters in the Maqam, the Imam himself firing a machine-gun. The garrison in the citadel which overlooks the town had been in communication with the Imam and as soon as the firing started they shelled and destroyed the Army bakery.

His supporters in the mountains behind Taiz at the same time cut the water supply. Thus the soldiers were deprived of water and food. Firing went on continuously from 2.45 p.m. until 5.30 p.m. the following day, April 5. During the fighting many soldiers deserted, singly and in groups, some fleeing from Taiz and others coming over to the Imam's side. Then, after a 15 minutes lull, the Imam left the Maqam and led the final attack on the Army barracks where Abdulla and the remaining soldiers surrendered. For some hours after there was intermittent firing as tribesmen from the mountains intercepted fleeing soldiers. Lieutenant-Colonel Thalai was captured some ten miles from Taiz, and Ali Raja at Rahida, the custom post on the road to Aden.

7. The Imam wasted no time in dealing with the leaders of the *coup d'état* and re-establishing his authority. Prince Abbas was arrested and brought to Taiz. Many leading officials, Army officers and others were arrested and numerous persons were summoned for questioning as to their conduct during the *coup d'état*. The Imam issued an official statement on April 6 (see enclosure 3),⁽¹⁾ in which he denied that he had abdicated from the Imamate and asserted that he had only entrusted temporarily the conduct of public affairs to Abdulla and Abbas in Sana'a, who were to act under his guidance. He announced a general pardon for the soldiers who he said had been misled, and promised compensation for the villagers whose houses had been destroyed.

8. Public executions in Taiz began on April 6 and continued daily until April 11, and there was one further execution on April 17. In all twelve persons were executed—five Army officers, including Lieutenant-Colonel Thalai, an Army clerk, the Judge of Taiz and his brother, a private secretary of Abdulla, the son of the Naib of Sana'a and two Sheikhs. In addition, on the evening of April 5, an Army officer was murdered by order of the Imam. In Sana'a the Chief "retainer" of Prince Abbas was executed and three others. Finally, it was announced in the Yemeni newspaper *As Saba* that Princes Abdulla and Abbas, who had been removed to Hajja, had been executed.

9. The Imam refused to allow the Prime Minister, Al Hassan, to visit Yemen on his

⁽¹⁾ Not printed.

SECRET

EM 1015/34

No. 34

FINAL DESPATCH OF HER MAJESTY'S CHARGÉ D'AFFAIRES AT
TAIZ ON LEAVING THE YEMEN

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received August 12)

(No. 34. Confidential) Taiz,
Sir, August 6, 1955.

At the end of my tour of duty in the Yemen, I have the honour to submit some observations on the state of relations between Great Britain and the Yemen, and on the internal situation in the Yemen.

2. Anglo-Yemeni relations are bad, and are unlikely to improve very much, if at all, as long as the frontier question remains unsettled. Furthermore, internal developments in the Protectorate affect those relations, as the Yemeni Government take the view that any change, political, economic or social, is a change in the *status quo* and inimical to their interests.

3. At present there seems to be no basis for a settlement satisfactory to both parties. The Yemeni Government, or more accurately the Imam, lays claim to the whole of the Aden Protectorate and, apparently, to the colony of Aden also. His claim is understood to be based on historical, geographical, economic, racial and religious grounds. Historically, the Imam's predecessors did rule over this part of Arabia from about 1640 to about 1730, by which time the then Sultan of Lahej had established his independence and the Yemen had lost control of the Aulqi and Yafa'i areas. The next relevant period is that of the second Turkish occupation, which lasted from 1872 to 1918. During this period the Yemen was part of the Ottoman Empire and the Turks reached an agreement with Britain regarding the position of the frontier. The Imam of Sana' was not, however, a party to the agreement and the Yemeni Government assert that they are not bound to honour the agreement as a successor State. Geographically, Aden Colony and the protectorate together with the Yemen of to-day formed that part of south-western Arabia which was known as "Al Yemen." Economically, the Western Aden Protectorate is to some extent dependent on the Yemen, and the port of Aden is the natural outlet for the trade of the southern Yemen. Racially, the argument is simply that the peoples of the protectorate and Aden Colony are Arabs. The religious argument is no more than that

the people are all Muslim, and ignores the existence of religious schisms and notably the fact that the majority of the Protectorate Arabs belong to the Shafa'i sect (Sunni) whereas the Yemen is a Zaidi (Shi'i) State—although about half the population are Shafa'i.

4. The Imam's claim can be refuted on grounds of law and common sense. When Britain established herself in Aden in 1839 and at the various times of concluding the existing treaties with the Arab rulers of the protectorate, no part of the protectorate was subject to the Imam of Sana'. Secondly, while the Yemen was part of the Ottoman Empire, the boundary between the Aden Protectorate and the present kingdom of the Yemen was determined by the Anglo-Turkish Convention of 1914. The present kingdom of the Yemen, as the successor State, is considered to be bound, according to international law, to recognise that boundary. Common sense would seem to be a sufficient reason for rejecting the racial, religious, geographical and economic arguments.

5. The present Imam's father signed a treaty with Great Britain in 1934 which, *inter alia*, obliged both Governments to "maintain the situation existing in regard to the frontier on the date of the signature of this treaty" and to prevent "any violation by their forces of the above-mentioned frontier and any interference by their subjects, or from their side of that frontier, with the affairs of the people inhabiting the other side of the said frontier," and an agreement was made in 1951 with the present Imam in accordance with which both sides undertook to refrain from actions which might alter the *status quo* in the disputed (frontier) areas pending the completion of the work of a joint frontier commission which was to be set up to settle certain disputes. Despite those agreements, the Yemen has so far avoided the setting up of the frontier commission and has continually interfered with the affairs of the protectorate. In the last four years this interference has intensified and created a situation which might now be accurately described as critical.

SECRET

6. It was hoped that with the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1951 an improvement in our relations with the Yemen would follow and that personal contact between a British Minister and the Imam would result in a better understanding by the Imam of the British point of view. This hope has not been realised. My predecessors were not received by the Imam, and I have only had one meeting with him, but I doubt whether in any case the personal approach would yield appreciable results, for the realisation of his claim to the protectorate is virtually an obsession with the Imam and I feel sure that he believes in its justness.

7. In the past Yemeni interference in the protectorate has usually taken the form of the encouragement of disturbances in the frontier area. In the last year or so, however, the emphasis has been more on the encouragement of dissidents well inside the protectorate by supplying them with arms, ammunition, money, grain and a refuge in the Yemen whenever hard pressed. Material aid, moreover, has apparently sometimes been made conditional on results and even specific results. By a combination of threats, material inducements and appeals to Arab and Muslim sentiment, attempts have been made to persuade rulers to dishonour their treaty obligations, sheikhs and officials to be disloyal to their rulers and soldiers to desert. Furthermore, through the diplomatic channel, the Arab League and the Bandoeng Conference, the Yemeni Government has sought apparently with some success to rouse sympathy and rally support for the Yemeni case, with a view, doubtless, to putting pressure on Britain in the United Nations should such a course prove to be necessary.

8. The reasons for the intensification of Yemeni interference in the protectorate are probably the following:—

- (i) The Imam's disappointment that the establishment of diplomatic relations has not brought him any benefits. He appears to have believed that Her Majesty's Government did not wholly approve the policy of the Aden Government and might be prepared to make some concessions to the Yemeni point of view;
- (ii) His fear that certain measures taken by the Aden Government to improve security and administration in the western Aden Protectorate would consolidate their hold over the

protectorate and thwart his ambitions in that direction. Publicly he argued that those measures were a violation of the *status quo* and he possibly genuinely believes that this is so;

- (iii) His fear in particular of the effect of the federation scheme for the protectorates. He is, I believe, afraid that a well-organised Arab (Shafa'i) State on his southern frontier would be a threat to him, as he has a large underprivileged and dissatisfied Shafa'i population in his country;
- (iv) His suspicion that there is oil in the protectorate and that Britain intends to strengthen her position in the protectorate in order to ensure that the oil is exploited for her benefit.
- (v) His resentment at the military measures taken by the Aden Government (a foreign christian body) and particularly the use of aircraft against Muslim Arabs whom he regards as his subjects.

9. The Yemeni campaign of interference has not been unsuccessful, but I do not think that responsibility for the present troubled situation in the protectorate can be wholly ascribed to the Yemen. It would, I think, be more accurate to say that the Yemen has shamelessly exploited a situation which has arisen at least in part from internal causes. It seems that the Government of Aden has not been able to win the confidence of a minority of the population, and their efforts to improve the security of the Aulqi area in particular have met with considerable opposition from certain tribes. In addition, their plans for economic development and better administration, and particularly the federation scheme, have not been enthusiastically received. The reasons are complex, but the moral would seem to be that changes should be introduced slowly and only after the ground has been carefully prepared and the co-operation and, if possible, enthusiasm of the rulers and people concerned has been won. Projects understood and welcomed are better than theoretically sounder schemes which have to be imposed to any extent.

10. The more confidence the rulers and peoples of the protectorate have in the Aden Government, the fewer will be the opportunities for the Yemeni Government to cause trouble in the protectorate. It would be naïve to suppose, however, that for some

SECRET

time the Yemeni Government will not find persons in the protectorate who are willing to further their disruptive aims. Therefore, in view of the regrettable unreliability of the Arab forces at present, it will certainly be necessary to keep British forces in the protectorate for some time. Their presence will serve the dual purpose of heartening the loyal population and deterring the Yemen and protectorate dissidents.

11. I have already opined that the underlying conditions for a settlement with the Yemen hardly seem to exist. At the present time the Imam is doubtless not dissatisfied with the measure of success with which his interference in the protectorate has met, and with the greater outside sympathy and support which he can now probably count on and with the unfortunate impression which publicity about collective punishment and the bombing of villages has recently created. It seems to me unlikely that many nations outside Western Europe would understand or try to understand the difficulties with which the Government of Aden are faced. Where colonial issues are concerned, emotion and prejudice rather than reason govern the attitude of most non-colonial Powers. In those circumstances, I think it can be assumed that the Imam considers that his bargaining position has been strengthened and that he will not accept indirect negotiations and settlement less favourable to him than that hinted at recently by his Minister in London and elsewhere, viz., recognition by Her Majesty's Government of his sovereignty over the protectorate in return for the continued enjoyment by Her Majesty's Government of the facilities which she already enjoys in Aden.

12. As such a settlement would not, I understand, be acceptable to Her Majesty's Government, the object of British policy must be to create, or at least to wait for, more favourable conditions for the conclusion of a settlement of the frontier dispute.

13. The first step is clearly to put our own house in order, *i.e.*, the protectorate. The protectorate rulers and people must be convinced that we are not trying under the pretext of economic and administrative improvements to turn the protectorate into a colony. Secondly, British troops will have to be kept in the protectorate for some time in the interests of security and in particular in order to discourage the Yemen from interfering. It would, I think, be desirable wherever possible to use Arab troops in preference to British troops for

internal policing and with an improvement of the situation it may prove possible to end the system of collective punishment, at least as manifested in the bombing of villages, which is not very efficacious and, rightly or wrongly, is a difficult system to defend in the court of world opinion. Full publicity should be given to Yemeni interference, as they themselves appear to have begun, with the assistance of the Egyptians, a propaganda campaign against Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Aden. Earlier in the year, while the late Prince Abdulla was Minister for Foreign Affairs, there was some hope of a friendly settlement, and it was right to curb publicity; since, however, the Imam's victory over the rebels and the loss of any influence by the Crown Prince over his father, hopes of a reasonable settlement in the present Imam's lifetime seems remote. There is no reason, therefore, why our case, which is a good one, should be left largely unstated. Furthermore, in view of the Imam's statement that he might ask the Security Council to send a commission to determine responsibility for the present situation in the protectorate and the possibility that he may generally seek to make propaganda in the United Nations, it might well be advisable to keep friendly and "neutralist" Governments informed through the diplomatic channel of the facts of the situation. The possibility that the Yemeni Government may in the near future explain what they mean by "wider talks" cannot be discounted. I consider it unlikely, however, that the Imam will be prepared to discuss any final settlement of the frontier problem except on the lines of the solution mentioned in paragraph 11 above. Finally, we can legitimately hope that time may not be against us, for the internal situation in the Yemen is not stable and there is a possibility that a change in régime will bring with it a change in the Yemeni attitude.

14. In assessing the internal situation in the Yemen, I am hampered in two ways. First, I have virtually no official or social contact with prominent Yemenis, because they are afraid to visit me or invite me to their homes. Secondly, since the abortive *coup d'État*, the Imam has on different pretexts prevented me from travelling in the Sana' and Ibb provinces. This latter restriction on my movement is particularly unfortunate, as during the four months since the failure of the attempted *coup d'État* there have been repeated reports of unrest in the country. However, from the reports

which I have received and the conversations which I have managed to hold with different classes of Yemenis, it is possible to give an (I believe) accurate account of the situation.

15. The abortive *coup d'État* was an attempt by the late Prince Abdulla supported by a discontented army in Taiz to force the Imam to abdicate. It failed because it was badly executed and, in particular, because Abdulla did not have the support of the tribes. For a little over a month after the failure, there was some hope that the Imam would mend his ways and improve the inefficient system of administration and introduce economic and social reforms. The Crown Prince, whose ideas, however vaguely conceived, incline towards reform, surrounded himself with advisers who were known to hold more liberal ideas than the (with one or two exceptions) worthless and ignorant crowd of Court and Government officials who had previously enjoyed a limited influence with the Imam. The Imam, in the first flush of victory, tolerated the presence of the newcomers and was indulgent towards his son. When, however, Al Badr started to talk about a constitution for the Yemen, the Imam became annoyed, spoke severely to him and withheld from him the appointment of Prime Minister which Al Badr had previously said would be assumed by him, restored many of the former Court and Government officials to their posts and threatened to execute anyone who talked of reform in his presence.

16. The army began to show signs of unrest once again, openly complaining about their food and their general conditions, and in both Sana' and Taiz detachments are reported to have refused on occasions to obey orders. The Imam's reply has been to disband some detachments, transfer others to different parts of the country and call up some of the Defence Force in Sana'. The news of the arrival of British troops in the protectorate caused him further alarm. The popular belief in Taiz is that the troops have been sent to deal with the Yemen and the attitude of the army is expressed in the current saying: "the Imam is brave, if he wants to fight the English, he can do so himself."

17. The unrest is not confined to the army, however. I have been struck, as other foreigners have, by the amount of criticism of the Imam which is now voiced

openly by different classes of Yemenis and the widespread speculation about another *coup d'État*. Moreover, there are reports that some tribes have been angered by the execution of Princes Abdulla and Abbas.

18. The Imam is, of course, aware of the situation and has held meetings in Taiz with the Viceroys of all the provinces and other senior officials. He is said to have expressed his concern that, as a result of his treatment during the recent revolt, his "holiness" is no longer respected. He is also said to have expressed the fear that British troops would take advantage of any fresh trouble in the Yemen to intervene.

19. I would hazard the opinion that the Imam is still strong enough to deal with any attempted revolt, because he could, I believe, still count on the support of at least the majority of the martial Zaidi tribes. If, however, he were assassinated, it is likely that there would be civil war, for it is probable that Saif ul-Islam Hassan would return to contest the accession of Al Badr as Imam, and it is also possible that the Shafa'i population would take the opportunity to try to remove the Zaidi yoke from their neck. On the other hand, Saudi Arabian and perhaps Egyptian intervention in the interests of preventing bloodshed and in support of Al Badr is a contingency which cannot perhaps be ignored.

20. The fact has to be faced, however, that the opposition to the Imam is at present leaderless. The former Prime Minister, Saif ul-Islam Hassan, could provide the necessary leadership, but his apparent acceptance of the rôle of an itinerant exile may be taken as a sign that he is not prepared to lead any revolt. It seems to me even possible that Al Hassan would agree to return to the Yemen and live quietly during the lifetime of the present Imam, if he felt that he could trust his brother. Finally, it is not unreasonable to suppose that the Yemeni people will continue to find solace in the mildly stimulating properties of qat, the influence of which on life in the Yemen should not be ignored, and forgo the more powerful stimulant of revolt.

21. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office.

I have, &c.

R. MCGREGOR,
Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

EM 1041/176

No. 35

FAREWELL INTERVIEW OF HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRES AT
TAIZ WITH HIS MAJESTY THE IMAM OF THE YEMEN

Mr. McGregor to Mr. Macmillan. (Received August 12)

(No. 35. Confidential)

Taiz,

Sir, July 31, 1955.

I have the honour to refer to my telegram No. 88 of the 31st of July, about my interview with the Imam.

2. In view of my imminent departure from the Yemen, I asked the Acting Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs—whether I might call on the Imam in order to take my leave of him. The Imam consented to see me on the 30th of July, and I had about forty minutes' conversation with him. Only the Acting Director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, a soldier and a servant of the Imam were present during our conversation.

3. After a brief exchange of courtesies, the Imam asked me to report to you exactly what he was going to say. He began by saying that for over a hundred years Great Britain had occupied Aden and there had been no trouble in the Protectorate until the present Governor of Aden had been appointed (I regret to say that His Majesty made clear by his tone of voice and facial expression his personal dislike of the Governor) and the federation scheme had been announced. The federation plan was the main cause of the present trouble: it was a "new thing." The people of the Protectorate were simple, almost like animals, if not worse; they did not understand or want federation and they and their sheikhs had appealed to him for help. His Majesty then said with great vigour and apparently without any qualms that there was absolutely no truth in the accusations that material assistance was being given from the authorities at Beidha to the rebels. He admitted, however, that he gave shelter to refugees from the Protectorate and contended that this was his religious duty, quoting a verse from the Koran in support of his contention. He then remarked that he was thinking of sending a Minister [*sic*] to the Security Council who would ask for a commission to be sent to the Protectorate in order to determine who was at fault, *i.e.*, to blame for the present disturbed situation.

He professed, nevertheless, to be sincere in wishing friendship with Britain.

4. I replied that there had been trouble in the Protectorate before the federation scheme had been mooted, reminding the Imam that the discussions had been held in London in 1950 in order to find a means of settling certain disputes. The Imam thereupon interjected the remark that he had been referring to internal revolt and not to frontier disputes. I explained that the main object of the federation scheme was the economic development of the Protectorate and that in any case there was no question of forcing it upon the Protectorate Rulers and peoples; law and order, however, had to be maintained in the Protectorate and, if the Yemen desisted from assisting the dissidents, peace would soon be restored.

5. The Imam then asked why, if Britain wanted to develop the Protectorate, she did not do so in partnership with the Yemen. Without waiting for an answer, he further asked what was the meaning of "protection." Did it mean jet aircraft, the destruction of houses, the killing of people, &c.? I replied that the Rulers were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in their States and the protection of innocent law-abiding people. Under the treaties they had the right to ask for the assistance of the Aden Government and it was the duty of the latter to help. As in all countries, including the Yemen, the Government had the right and duty to deal with rebels and to use all the forces which they had available for that purpose. I pointed out that the assistance which the rebels were apparently receiving from the Yemen made this task more difficult and that under the Treaty of 1934 the Yemen had undertaken not to interfere in the affairs of the Protectorate. At this point the Imam interrupted me and said that under that treaty the situation should "be as it was." I rejoined that the *status quo* which had to be maintained was the *status quo* on the frontier and the Aden Government had faithfully observed this point of the agreement. The Imam remarked with a smile

SECRET

that a strong Power like Great Britain could interpret a treaty in any way she liked, but he remained silent when I pointed out that the Arabic word for "frontier" was used in the Arabic text of the treaty.

6. The Imam asked me whether I thought that the British forces from Cyprus would be able to quiet the situation, and he answered his own question by saying that he did not think that they could do so. He added that I and the British authorities in Aden might not understand the Yemeni mentality and that he hoped that the Protectorate would not be "turned into another Tunis or Algeria." I replied that I hoped that the presence of British troops would calm the situation in order that economic and social development could be continued. It was necessary to restore order and prevent the loss of lives of innocent people. I referred to the murderous attack on the cotton-carrying truck near Urqub, and reminded His Majesty that according to reports from Aden the leader of the gang responsible for this attack had come from Beidha shortly before. The Imam asked whether there was any proof of this, remarking that reports should be investigated. I concluded by assuring His Majesty that Her Majesty's Government desired to have good relations with the Yemen and, as I had informed the Yemeni Government through the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, were prepared to consider any Yemeni proposals for "wider talks"; but the Yemeni Government had not yet said what subjects for discussion they had in mind. The Imam did not seem interested in this matter and merely said that Qadhi Al-Amri was not here.

7. His Majesty then referred to his position as a spiritual leader which, he said, was recognised by the peoples of the Western and Eastern Protectorate and he gave a definite promise that he would use his spiritual influence to calm the situation if the British Government would co-operate with him regarding their policy in the Protectorate.

8. I said that his spiritual position has been recognised by us and I personally was very pleased to hear that he would be willing to use his influence in such a good cause. I then assured him that I would explain his views to my Government exactly as he had expressed them and I hoped that with friendly co-operation between both Governments a happier atmosphere would prevail in the Protectorate and some

progress would be made in raising the standard of life of the very poor people of the Protectorate. I thanked him for granting me an interview. His Majesty said that he relied on my honour as a Briton to represent faithfully his views to my Government, and after a few words of farewell he left the room.

9. Our conversation was extremely frank but was conducted in a friendly manner. Although from the outset it was clear that the Imam was going to talk about the internal affairs of the Protectorate, I did not think that it was advisable for me to refuse to discuss this matter. This was the first time that the Imam had agreed to receive your representative, and I did not wish to show him any discourtesy nor at the same time to lose the opportunity to make clear to him Her Majesty's Government's views on a number of matters, especially as there is reason to suppose that his Ministers and officials do not always report accurately my conversations with them.

10. Although the outcome of our conversation was not particularly encouraging, I think that it has been of some value. The Imam has put some of his cards on the table. It is abundantly clear that the main cause of this present hostile attitude to the Governor of Aden is the federation scheme and that he would be willing to stop stirring up trouble inside the Protectorate if the federation scheme were shelved or, rather, abandoned. He adopted the attitude that, as a Muslim leader he could not be indifferent to the "sufferings" of his co-religionists in the Protectorate and as the ruler of a neighbouring State he could not disregard the "civil war" which was going on near his southern border. No doubt this attitude was not all pose, but there can equally be no doubt that the main reason for his opposition to federation was his fear that it would result in the creation of a strong Shafa'i (Sunni) State on his southern border, which would be a danger to him, especially in view of its power of attraction for his large and discontented Shafa'i population which is concentrated in the southern and south-western regions of the Yemen. It is also interesting to note that he showed no desire to discuss the question of a frontier settlement and made no direct mention of his claims to the Protectorate. His contemplated approach to the Security Council would appear to be in connexion with the present situation in the Protectorate and not an appeal for a settlement of the frontier dispute.

SECRET

11. As the Imam wishes me to report his views personally when I reach London on leave, he will not expect an answer before the middle or late August. I hope, therefore, to have an opportunity of discussing this matter with the Eastern Department shortly.

12. I am sending copies of this despatch to the Head of the British Middle East Office and the Acting Governor of Aden.

I have, &c.

R. MCGREGOR.

Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

EM 1051/7

No. 36

ANGLO-YEMENI RELATIONS

Mr. Macmillan to Mr. Monteith (Taiz)

(No. 92. Confidential)
(Telegraphic)

Foreign Office,
September 20, 1955.

McGregor's telegram No. 88.

You should speak to the Imam on the following lines in reply to the message he sent through McGregor at latter's farewell interview. Needless to say I do not expect you to speak in a manner which would impair at the outset your relations with the Yemeni Government. But you should be firm.

2. Her Majesty's Government are anxious for friendly relations with the Imam and his Government, and have no intention of interfering in any way with the internal affairs of the Yemen.

3. Equally Her Majesty's Government are themselves entitled to expect that there should be no interference by the Yemenis in the affairs of the Protectorate. They cannot consider changing the policies which they are following in the Protectorate at the behest of the Yemeni Government, but they wish to assure His Majesty that these policies can have no ill effect on the Yemen, and cannot in any way affect the validity of the Treaty of 1934 and of the Agreement of 1951.

4. In order to further friendly relations Her Majesty's Government hope that the Imam will agree:—

- (a) to receive a Minister Plenipotentiary to be resident in Taiz;
- (b) to arrange that the Yemeni Minister in London should reside here;
- (c) to finalise the result of the talks which he conducted with the Governor of Aden in October of last year.

EM 1051/11

No. 37

ANGLO-YEMENI RELATIONS

Mr. Monteith to Mr. Macmillan. (Received November 30)

(No. 47. Confidential)

Taiz, November 16, 1955.

Sir, I have the honour to refer to your telegram No. 92 to Taiz of September 20, 1955, containing a message to His Majesty the Imam, and to my telegram No. 108 of October 29.

2. The Imam received me for an hour on October 27. Seiyid Hassan Ibrahim, the Yemeni Minister in London now on leave, was also present. The Imam was most friendly at the beginning of our interview, but became less so towards the end.

3. After some casual conversation, the Imam asked about your reply to the message he had sent to you by Mr. McGregor. I explained that your reply had come by telegram and that I was instructed to give it verbally; he agreed but asked me to confirm it in writing later.

4. When I said that Her Majesty's Government were anxious for friendly relations and had no intention of interfering in any way with internal affairs of the Yemen, the Imam immediately asked what was meant by "internal affairs." I said that this meant the affairs of the Yemen within its present boundaries. The Imam seemed to have been expecting that answer, but it did not greatly please him.

5. I then said that Her Majesty's Government were entitled to expect that there should be no interference by Yemenis in the affairs of the Protectorate. The Imam said he was not interfering. I said there was good reason to believe that arms, ammunition and money were reaching dissidents in the Protectorate from Beidha. The Imam said that was an accusation against himself as none of his officials would act against his orders; he added that the Yemen anyway had no arms to spare for anyone else for they had long been trying to get enough for themselves. He asked whether Her Majesty's Government really believed that the policy in the Protectorate was not affecting the status quo agreed to in 1934. I said that nothing had been done to alter "the situation existing in regard to the frontier" as we interpreted that phrase. The Imam made a gesture of hopelessness.

6. I then put the points to which you hoped the Imam might agree in order to further friendly relations. The Imam said that it might be possible to receive a Minister Plenipotentiary in Taiz later, but that there were other things to be done first. He said the Yemeni Minister in London did reside in London and had only been to Germany and other places on exceptional business. He said vaguely that he would think about finalising the result of his talks with the Governor of Aden in October last year.

7. By this time the Imam seemed thoroughly disillusioned. He said he had extended the hand of friendship and that none had taken it. He reverted to points mentioned in paragraph 5 above and said that he had offered to co-operate in stopping the disturbances in the Protectorate and had just been told to mind his own business. He asked whether anyone would deny the duty of a Moslem ruler to give hospitality to those who needed it; I said not, but that hospitality should not extend to giving arms to rebels. He repeated that he was not giving arms.

8. He then said he had just had a telegram reporting more bombing of villages in the Protectorate, confused the issue by dragging in recent events in Cyprus, and said that a policy of severity was useless. I said that if there had been any more bombing in the Protectorate (of which I have no information) it was because it was the duty of the Government to maintain law and order, and that bombing was no more brutal than any other form of action. The Imam seemed unconvinced.

9. He spoke of his wish for better relations which would have to be based on mutual confidence. I asked what we could do to create this confidence. He said Seiyid Hassan and I could discuss that, and that all our troubles sprang from Aden. He spoke of the good old days of Major Seager with whom he had discussed problems man to man and thought that any future discussions with the Yemeni

Government should be conducted by me rather than the Aden authorities. I said I agreed that it might be better for negotiations to be conducted by the Foreign Office, but that they would be better conducted by a senior official, which was one of the reasons why we wished him to receive a Minister, and that the Foreign Office would of course have to consult the Colonial Office in so far as it was concerned. I tried to explain that the policy of the Aden Government on all major points is subject to the approval of Her Majesty's Government, but the Imam is so convinced that all his troubles come from the present Aden authorities, that I do not think this made much impression.

10. The Imam, who had been growing progressively restive for some time (he has been suffering considerably from rheumatism in the last few days) then broke off the interview.

11. Altogether it was not a satisfactory interview, though it was something that it took place at all. The Imam was not angry at the end, but obviously extremely disappointed that what he regarded as a generous gesture had not met a better response. On your instructions, I tried to temper firmness with courtesy, but I cannot pretend that the interview will do anything to improve my relations with the Yemeni Government.

12. I am sending a copy of this despatch to the Governor of Aden and to the Political Office with the Middle East Forces.

I have, &c.

W. N. MONTEITH. Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires.

APPENDIX

BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES

EM 1012/1

No. 38

LEADING PERSONALITIES IN THE YEMEN

(Enclosure in letter from Taiz Chancery to Eastern Department No. 1011/4/55 of July 14, 1955). (Received August 2, 1955)

Leading Personalities in the Yemen

1. Ahmad al Nasir li Din Allah bin Yahya Hamid al Din.
2. al Hassan (Saif al Islam).
3. al Ali (Saif al Islam).
4. al Qasim (Saif al Islam).
5. al Ismail (Saif al Islam).
6. Mohamad al Badr (Saif al Islam).
7. Abdul Karim al Amir (Saiyid).
8. Abdullah Abdul Karim (Saiyid).
9. Abdul Malik Ahmad al Amri (Qadhi).
10. Abdul Malik al Shahari (Saiyid).
11. Abdul Rahman Ahmad al Sayaghi (Qadhi).
12. Ahmad Abbas (Saiyid).
13. Ahmad Abdul Rahman al Shami (Saiyid).
14. Ahmad Ahmad al Sayaghi (Qadhi).
15. Ahmad al Hadharani (Qadhi).
16. Ahmad al Jarafi (Qadhi).
17. Ahmad Zabara (Saiyid).
18. Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid).
19. Ali Mohamad al Jabaly (Shaikh).
20. Ali Mohamad al Rubaidi (Shaikh).
21. Ghalib Ahmad al Jarmouzy.
22. Hamood Al-Washali (Saiyid).
23. Mohamad Abdullah al Amri (Qadhi).
24. Mohamad Abdullah al Shami (Qadhi).
25. Mohamad Abdul Rahman al Shami (Saiyid).
26. Mohamad Ahmad Pasha (Saiyid).
27. Mohamad Hussain al Amri (Qadhi).
28. Mohamad Ragheb Bey (Qadhi).
29. Saleh Musin.
30. Salim Hussain al Rummah (Shaikh).
31. Yahya bin Mohamad Abbas (Saiyid).
32. Yahya Mohammad Al-Kibsi (Saiyid).
33. Mohammed Hussein Musa (Saiyid).
34. Mohammed Abdu Saleh As-Sharjabi.

1. Ahmad al Nasir li Din Allah bin Yahya Hamid al Din

Imam and King of the Yemen. Born in 1895, eldest surviving son of the Imam Yahya who was assassinated in San'a in 1948. Before the death of his father held the title of Crown Prince and was Viceroy of the Taiz (where he lived) and Hajja provinces and played a considerable part in the subjection of various tribes throughout the Yemen who contested his father's sovereignty. Succeeded his father as Imam on 3rd Jamad al Awal 1367 A.H. (March 1948) after organising the defeat of the revolutionaries, whose leaders he beheaded.

Since then he has lived in Taiz and has made that city the seat of his Government. In every sense an absolute monarch, retaining in his hands responsibility for every decision, large or small. He delegates practically no authority to his officials, whose views seldom really influence him. Is surrounded most of the time by a crowd of ignorant sycophants.

Has a robust constitution but suffers from various diseases at times. Has to some extent a fear of death but by means of a wide-spread intelligence system is soon aware of any sort of opposition,

which he punishes extremely ruthlessly. Is respected rather than loved by his people, who at all times can write to him. Does not emphasise the differences between the two religious sects, Zaidi and Shafai, in the Yemen.

Has only once been out of the Yemen, to visit Aden in 1946. Is woefully ignorant of the state of the rest of the world and does not wish to conform with internationally recognised practices. Has a deep suspicion of foreign Governments and all foreigners. Has, nevertheless, effected more advances than his father, perhaps due in small part to his sensitivity to foreign, particularly Arab, criticism.

Is no lover of the British and is obsessed with the desire to gain control of the Aden Protectorate.

Has three sons, Saif al Islam Mohamad al Badr, al Abdullah and al Abbas, of whom the two last-named are still infants.

2. al Hassan (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1897, son of the late Imam Yahya. Viceroy of the province of San'a, where he lives, and to a great extent administrator of the whole of the northern part of the Yemen. Before his father's death was Viceroy of the province of Ibb. Has the title Prime Minister.

A fanatical Zaidi, living a simple life in San'a, strongly opposed to any changes. Has an obvious dislike of foreigners, who find life in San'a, where his authority is considerable, very difficult. Does not wish the Yemen to have more contact with the outside world.

Is not liked by the people, perhaps mainly because of his miserliness, but is respected for his energy and for his efforts to improve agriculture, which is his great love.

Has little respect for his brothers except the Imam. Strongly opposed nomination of al Badr as Crown Prince, because he himself wishes to succeed the Imam.

Does not always enjoy good health and went to Rome, via Aden and Egypt, in December 1952 to undergo an operation. This was his first journey abroad, apart from one pilgrimage to Mecca, and before it he was abysmally ignorant of conditions outside the Yemen.

Is not more anti-British than anti-foreign in general. Shows little interest in the question of Yemeni claims to the Aden Protectorate.

Was in Cairo after attending conference of Arab Prime Ministers when there was attempted *coup d'Etat* in Taiz in April 1955. Since then has not, or has not been allowed, to return to the Yemen and has visited Indonesia, Japan, India and the United States. No longer Prime Minister and Viceroy of the province of San'a.

3. al Ali (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1904, son of the late Imam Yahya. Lives in San'a nearly all the time. Holds the title Minister of Education, but takes no active part in governmental affairs. Is a fair poet and a very heavy drinker, being not seldom seen inebriated. Has no political influence or ambitions.

4. al Qasim (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1906, son of the late Imam Yahya. Lives in San'a. Holds the title Minister of Communications, but takes practically no part in governmental affairs. Maintains good relations with his brothers, and was especially friendly with the late Saif al Islam Abdullah.

Suffers from diabetes, for treatment of which he flew via Cairo and London to the United States of America in October 1952, and via Cairo to Rome in April 1955.

5. al Ismail (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1910, son of the late Imam Yahya and full brother of Saif al Islam al Abdullah, of whom he is very fond. Used to hold the title Minister of Health, but this was taken from him fairly recently because of his very heavy drinking, for which he has been imprisoned at least once. He is on bad terms with his brothers the Imam Ahmad and Saif al Islam al Hassan.

Leads a carefree life in San'a and is unconcerned at the state of affairs in the Yemen. Has no apparent political ambitions and has not been outside the Yemen.

6. Mohamad al Badr (Saif al Islam)

Born in 1926, the eldest son of the present Imam. Was proclaimed Crown Prince in April 1955, and is Minister for Foreign Affairs (since May 1955), and Minister of Defence. Was Viceroy of the Hodeida Province where he was fairly popular. Has visited Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the Levant and Italy. Is impressionable and easily influenced, is not very intelligent and lacks experience in foreign affairs. Favours a policy of progress. Dislikes al Hassan mainly because latter is opposed to his succession to Imamate.

7. Abdul Karim al Amir (Saiyid)

Born in 1912. Lives in San'a. A fair writer who is editor of *Al Iman* newspaper, which is published in San'a. Has progressive ideas and is fairly intelligent, but has not been out of the Yemen. Was a close friend and ardent supporter of the late Saif al Islam al Abdullah.

8. Abdullah Abdul Karim (Saiyid)

Born in 1910. Lives in Taiz. Is a son-in-law of the present Imam Ahmad. Took part in the *coup d'Etat* in 1948 and was consequently imprisoned in Hajja immediately the Imam Ahmad assumed power. Was released in 1950 and at the end of that year was given the title Acting Chief of the Royal Cabinet, which title he no longer holds. Is usually much in the Imam Ahmad's favour and is fairly influential. Has not travelled abroad and has no apparent desire to see the present conditions in the Yemen altered in any way.

9. Abdul Malik Ahmad al Amri (Qadhi)

Born about 1918. Lives in Taiz. A cousin of Qadhi Mohamad Abdullah al Amri. Private secretary (and sole cypher clerk) to the Imam Ahmad, who trusts him with most of his secrets. Is also in charge of the pharmacy in the new hospital in Taiz. Enjoys the confidence and respect of the Imam Ahmad. Discreet and quiet: keeps very much to himself and does not appear to be very much liked. Though fairly intelligent he has no idea of what happens in the rest of the world and cannot be called progressive-minded.

10. Abdul Malik al Shahari (Saiyid)

Born about 1875. Lives in Hajja, where he is Viceroy of the province of Hajja. Comes from the Mansur family who provided, in the past, some of the Imams of the Yemen. A fanatical Zaidi who holds no brief for progressive ideas. A strict ruler. By virtue of his post is in charge of the political prisoners in Hajja. Has been outside the Yemen only on pilgrimage to Mecca, whence he used to go as the Yemeni Government official in charge of arrangements for Yemeni pilgrims.

11. Abdul Rahman Ahmad al Sayaghi (Qadhi)

Born in 1902. Lives in Sa'ada, in the very north of the Yemen, where he is Viceroy of the province of Sa'ada. Was in the past headmaster of the religious High School in San'a. An energetic and fairly honest official. A friend of the late Saif al Islam al Abdullah, for whom he used to work when Saif al Islam al Abdullah was Viceroy of the Hodaidah province. Has not been out of the Yemen and has comparatively little influence with the Imam Ahmad.

12. Ahmad Abbas (Saiyid)

Born about 1913. Lives in Taiz. Has the title Director of Workshops in Taiz and is more or less in charge of the Yemeni Government's stores and engineering undertakings there. A staunch supporter of the Imam Ahmad since the *coup d'Etat* in 1948. Is in his favour and has his confidence and is one of the few Yemenis who has access to him at almost any time. Has some influence with him. Drinks and is an unpleasant person to meet. Is not in favour of the employment of foreigners.

13. Ahmad Abdul Rahman al Shami (Saiyid)

Born about 1903. Lives in San'a. Elder brother of Saiyid Mohamad Abdul Rahman al Shami, and like him a nephew of the Imam Ahmad, whom he strongly supported during the *coup d'Etat* in 1948, though one of his sons, Mohamad, played a considerable part in the *coup* and was later imprisoned in Hajja for three years.

Has appointment of Director of Civil Aviation in San'a and is the representative of Saif al Islam al Hassan when visitors go to San'a. Is in the confidence of Saif al Islam al Hassan and is one of his most senior officials. A pleasant enough person to meet. Does not seem to have many ideas of his own.

14. Ahmad Ahmad al Sayaghi (Qadhi)

Born about 1905. Lives in Ibb, where he is Viceroy of the province of Ibb. Was previously a clerk working for Saif al Islam al Hassan, who has much confidence in him and with whom his relations are good. An egoist whose greed has brought him much wealth and land since his appointment to Ibb. Is a strong ruler and is not popular. Has not been outside the Yemen and has no knowledge of things modern and no wish to see any change in the present state of affairs in the Yemen.

15. Ahmad al Hadharani (Qadhi)

Born about 1888. Lives in Taiz. Is generally regarded as the jester at the court of the Imam Ahmad. A fair poet and a good narrator he can at all times collect a crowd of listeners. Spends much time near the Imam Ahmad whom he likes mostly because he is the source of his income but with whom he has very little influence. Is neither anti-Western nor pro-Western, but is a time-server. His son played a small part in the *coup d'Etat* in 1948,

and was imprisoned until 1951, but is now one of the clerks of the Crown Prince. Spent some years in Aden Colony and Protectorate. Has travelled widely: to the Hejaz, both in the days of King Hussain and recently, to Ethiopia, Eritrea, Egypt, India and Indonesia. Draws a small pension from the Government of the State of Hyderabad. An entirely untrustworthy and unlikeable person.

16. Ahmad al Jarafi (Qadhi)

Born in 1882. Lives in San'a. Chief Judge of the Court of Appeal in San'a. A strong supporter of the present régime in the Yemen. Puritanical and conservative in outlook. Has a son, Qadhi Ismail Ahmad al Jarafi, who is a secretary in the Yemeni Legation in Cairo.

17. Ahmad Zabara (Saiyid)

Born about 1910. Lives in Taiz. Is a son-in-law of the present Imam Ahmad. At present Chief of the group of religious Judges at the Court of the Imam Ahmad. Though from one of the leading families of the Yemen he has little personality and is rather unpopular. Has not travelled abroad and is very reactionary in his approach to all questions. Given title of Chief of the Royal Cabinet in 1955.

18. Ali Ibrahim (Saiyid)

Born in 1878. Lives in San'a. Officer commanding the troops in the province of San'a, but has no military background or knowledge. Prior to the first world war was a member of the Turkish Parliament, but has not been out of the Yemen since the Turks left the country. Is the father of the present Yemeni Minister in London. Is not politically ambitious or active.

19. Ali Mohamad al Jabaly (Shaikh)

Born in Hodaidah in 1902. Worked in his youth as a servant and office-boy for a Greek coffee merchant there. Is recognised as the Yemeni Government's trade agent in Aden, where he is usually resident. Was in effect the sole purchasing agent for the Yemeni Government, handling all their foreign exchange matters, recruiting foreign employees for them, until 1954 when he lost some Government agencies to Ahmed Hussein Ghalib al Wajib, another Yemeni merchant in Aden.

Is a wealthy and active merchant, and directs the affairs of the Yemen Navigation Company, the Salif Salt Works and a cotton-growing enterprise in the Yemen. Has offices in Hodaidah, Asmara and Addis Ababa as well as Aden, and has agents in the Levant, Egypt, Italy and the United States of America. Has very close contacts with Italy. Has travelled widely and is well versed in the ways of the world. Is quite the most active person connected with the Yemeni Government and has considerable influence with the present Imam (but does not get on well with Qadhi Mohamad Abdullah al Amri). Has a predominant interest in Hodaidah, where his two brothers Saleh and Salim run his affairs for him.

Is an untrustworthy person, with progressive ideas, but always intent on making money. Is sometimes inclined to harm Aden-Yemeni relations when faced with commercial difficulties, but remains on the whole outside politics.

20. Ali Mohamad al Rubaidi (Shaikh)

Born about 1905. Lives in Rahida, the customs post on the Aden-Taiz road, where he is the officer in charge of the customs. Since the end of 1952 has been the Imam Ahmad's second recognised trade agent in Aden. Corrupt but likeable. Has gained the Imam Ahmad's favour but at the same time incurred the dislike of Shaikh Ali Mohamad al Jabaly, the Imam Ahmad's first trade agent in Aden.

Not really a very important person, but one who comes in contact, as a Yemeni Government official, with the outside world. Not entirely anti-British.

21. Ghalib Ahmad al Jarmouzy

Born about 1906. Lives in Taiz. A descendant of Turkish parents. Was previously an officer in the Yemeni army in San'a. Now Director of Civil Aviation in Taiz and also officer in charge of the Government guest-houses there.

Has practically no contact with the Imam Ahmad, but arranges everything in connection with civil aviation, when he is ordered to do so. A heavy drinker of cheerful but not altogether pleasant character. Spends much time gathering, and passing on to the Imam Ahmad, information about the activities of the foreigners in Taiz.

22. Hamood Al-Washali (Saiyid)

Born about 1910. Cousin of Imam. Viceroy of Province of Taiz. A typical conservative Yemeni official with little knowledge of the outside world. Arrested after the abortive *coup d'Etat* in 1955 because he advised the Imam to abdicate, but subsequently released.

Favours establishment of a properly organised administration and a progressive policy. By no means unfriendly towards Her Majesty's Government but prefers close contact with other Arab States rather than with European States.

23. Mohamad Abdullah al Amri (Qadhi)

Born in 1912, eldest son of the late Qadhi Abdullah al Amri who was the Minister of the late Imam Yahya and with whom he was assassinated. After the accession of the Imam Ahmad in 1948 was made Deputy Foreign Minister and, in the absence of Qadhi Hussain al Halali, has been the only Minister in Taiz. He is in charge of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and is the only channel in Taiz for official business. At the same time he is the Imam's "general factotum" and concerns himself with all sorts of affairs of State, particularly those involving the foreign employees of the Yemeni Government. In spite of these official duties he has very little authority and must refer most matters to the Imam Ahmad for a decision.

Went to the United States of America in 1947 as a member of the first Yemeni delegation to the United Nations Organisation and in the same year toured the United States and Europe with Saif al Islam al Abdullah. Has been to the United Kingdom more than once, the last time being in 1950 at the head of the Yemeni delegation for the Anglo-Yemeni conference that year. Has also visited Egypt, the Levant, India and Pakistan.

His fairly numerous voyages abroad and his contacts with foreign statesmen at the United Nations Organisation's meetings and at the Arab League's meetings have broadened his mind considerably.

Is intelligent, able and experienced, but has little influence with Imam Ahmed. Is unco-operative but hints that it is not his fault. Doubtless his position is difficult but he is regarded by both foreigners and Yemenis as insincere and is unpopular. Probably not anti-Western or anti-British, nor against progress, but works for his own interests at all times. In short, a time-server.

24. Mohamad Abdullah al Shami (Qadhi)

Born in 1877. Lives in Beidha, which is his seat as Viceroy of the province of Beidha. Very well-known to the officials of the Aden Government because he is the appointed Yemeni Frontier Officer with whom frontier matters are discussed.

Usually well in the Imam Ahmad's favour and very active in putting the Imam's point of view to the

people of the Aden Protectorate. Like many Yemeni officials, however, he prefers to remain away from Taiz, where, on his occasional visits, he is never at ease. Went to London in 1939 as a member of the Yemeni delegation to the Palestine Round-Table Conference and again in 1950 as a member of the Yemeni delegation for the Anglo-Yemeni conference that year. Has also visited France, Italy and Egypt.

A Zaidi of strong religious convictions and usually conservative ideas, he appears to be convinced of the justice of the Yemen's claim to the Aden Protectorate.

25. Mohamad Abdul Rahman al Shami (Saiyid)

Born in 1922. Is a nephew of the Imam Ahmad. Works in the Yemeni Ministry of Foreign Affairs and has the title Secretary-General. Went to Egypt in 1949 as member of the Yemeni delegation to the Arab League and again in 1950 and 1951. Has visited the Levant as well. Went to New York as member of the Yemeni delegation to the United Nations Organisation at the end of 1952.

Of modest character, popular and respected. Has progressive ideas and has learned much from his travels. Is, however, relatively insignificant and unimportant, in spite of the fact that he has occasionally deputised for Qadhi Mohamad Abdullah al Amri.

26. Mohamad Ahmad Pasha (Saiyid)

Born about 1888. Lives in Taiz. Governor of the town and district of Taiz. Is a descendant of the Mutawakkil family who provided, in the past, seven Imams of the Yemen. On account of differences with the present Imamic family, the Hamid al Din family, his own family moved some time ago from San'a to Taiz and joined the Shafai sect of Islam. During the Turkish occupation members of the family were given good posts and the father of Saiyid Mohamad was awarded the title of Pasha which the family then adopted as their family name.

Has never liked the Hamid al Din family and took part in the *coup d'Etat* in 1948, and his eldest son, Saiyid Ahmad, became Minister of Agriculture in the Government of the revolutionaries. But he bribed the court which tried him, after the accession of the Imam Ahmad, for treason, and he was acquitted, and later given the post of Governor of Taiz.

Of very cheerful and engaging character, but corrupt, cunning and very selfish. Despite his dislike of the Imam Ahmad he cannot be relied upon to help to strengthen Anglo-Yemeni relations because he fears for his own life. Is for most of the time a rather sycophantic adviser to the Imam Ahmad.

Has visited Egypt and the Levant, but is by no means intelligent or very broad-minded. In 1955 appointed Governor of Hodeida and since May 1955, acting Viceroy of Hodeida Province. His son, Yahya, is acting for him as Governor of Taiz.

27. Mohamad Hussain al Amri (Qadhi)

Born about 1907. Director of Agriculture, San'a, and formerly Viceroy of the province of Hodaidah. An uncle of Qadhi Mohamad Abdullah al Amri.

Under his direction, Hodaidah obtained a piped water supply. Is not at all adverse to progress, but is very much under the control of the Imam Ahmad. This leads him to be at times more despotic than he might really wish to be.

Was not much disliked in his province, and is rather dull and unintelligent. Is also corrupt, and probably anti-British. Has only once been outside the Yemen, on a visit to Eritrea.

28. Mohamad Ragheb Bey (Qadhi)

Born in 1872. Lives in San'a. A Turk who held various posts in the Yemen during the Turkish occupation, and also served in diplomatic posts in Europe. After the Turkish evacuation returned to Turkey for a short time, came to Aden and then returned to the Yemen at the request of the late Imam Yahya, who made him his Foreign Minister. He retained this office until soon after the accession of the present Imam, but has since been given no place in governmental affairs.

Is a civilised and intelligent old man, able to speak French. Is respected, but is prevented from leaving the country as he wishes. One of his daughters is married to Saif al Islam al Qasim and another was married to the present Imam but after divorce married a Syrian dentist who used to work in San'a.

29. Saleh Muhsin

Born about 1920. Lives in Taiz. Was one of the servants of the present Imam Ahmad before his accession to the Imamate. Took part in the *coup d'Etat* in 1948 but was pardoned by the Imam Ahmad, who retained him at his court in the elevated (and meaningless) position of Chief of Protocol at the Royal Palace.

In 1950 was sent to Asmara as the Imam's representative or trade agent, but returned to Taiz before the handing over of Eritrea to the Ethiopian Government in 1952. Then reverted to his life at court where he has considerable influence on the Imam Ahmad, whom he can see whenever he wishes.

Has visited Egypt and the Levant and would like to see advances made in the Yemen. Is a good friend of Shaikh Ali Mohamad al Jabaly, but without the energy of that person and a good deal less intelligent than he.

30. Salim Hussain al Rummah (Shaikh)

Born about 1918. Lives in Beidha, where he is Shaikh of the town and its surrounding district, having just recently succeeded his late father. Is also the officer in charge of the customs in Beidha and the right-hand man of Qadhi Mohamad Abdullah al Shami, the Viceroy of the province of Beidha. Respected by the local people and also by the officials of the Aden Government with whom he has much contact over frontier matters. Not an opponent of progress nor very anti-British.

31. Yahya bin Mohamad Abbas (Saiyid)

Born in 1877. Lives in San'a. Is Chief Judge of the Supreme Court of the province of San'a. Very backward in his ideas and puritanical in his approach to most questions. Has not been out of the Yemen.

32. Yahya Mohammed Al-Kibsi (Saiyid)

Born about 1905. Member of a well-known San'ani family. At present deputy Viceroy of the province of Taiz. Formerly judge of Al Jauf and member of Appellate Court in Taiz. Has not been out of Yemen and is not very intelligent. Appears to be loyal supporter of Imam Ahmed, but was imprisoned for twelve months at Hajja after 1948 revolution and his cousin with whom he lived at that time was executed.

33. Mohammed Hussein Musa (Saiyid)

Born about 1915. Editor of Yemeni newspaper *An-Nasr*, published in Taiz. Formerly treasurer in Amran. Has visited Egypt and is intelligent and well educated for a Yemeni. Loyal supporter of Imam.

34. Mohammed Abdu Saleh As-Sharjabi

Born about 1910. Editor of Yemeni newspaper *Saba*. Lived many years in Aden where his newspaper was published until banned in 1950. Now published in Taiz. Has photographic studio in Aden. Was deported from Aden in 1954 but deportation order rescinded in 1955.

Is intelligent, but not well educated. Untrustworthy and unlikeable character but has courage. Published violently anti-British articles in newspaper until late 1954 when deportation order was suspended. Not anti-British but puts own interests first on every occasion.

OBITUARY

Al Abdullah (Saif al Islam)

No. 5 in 1954 report. Executed at Hajja on April 13 (?), 1955, for participating in abortive *coup d'Etat* during which he proclaimed himself Imam.

Al Abbas (Saif al Islam)

No. 7 in 1954 report. Supported the late Al Abdullah in attempted *coup d'Etat* in March/April 1955, and was executed at Hajja on April 13 (?), 1955.